Check the thread 'What is presence patrolling?'
In the last few days some posts have appeared on What is presence patrolling? about the Rhodesian Fire Force concept and body counts. Specifically posts: 158, 161-165. Note the last refers to a Fire Force concept evaluation exercise in North America currently.
I decided to create a new thread: Moving the Rhod. Fire Force concept to Afghanistan and please check there: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10742.
Interesting post, lot of valid points
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Originally Posted by
Rhodesian
Sirs
But I'm not and was not a sir -- I did get promoted -- but only 'cause I managed to stay alive all over the world before and after there was a Fire Force. Still never got to the 'sir' level... :D
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the surprising response was, “Don't tell us what to do, we have flown all over the world.” This incident became rather infamous inside Rhodesian circles as an “obvious” sign that the “Brits don't really know what they're doing.”
Surprising and disappointing display of arrogance and willful ignorance (as opposed to real ignorance). Brits are bad about that, so are we Americans all too often. No excuse for that, shame on 'em.
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...Fire Force and why it isnt happening in Afghanistan has equally gone the way of the Herc - We got the cross in the wrong place, we wont admit it, we wont move it, and when questioned we'll use words like, “It wont work, it cant be done, it costs too much, what cross are you talking about, what's a helicopter, and who the £*$! cares about little Johnny Bravo anyway?”
Could be. I don't see it that way but discussion boards are an imperfect communications medium. I missed anyone saying any of those things, particularly that last and there are enough people here who have worried about a bunch of Johnny Bravos and are worrying about them as we comfortably write back and forth on a board to make that a comment in rather poor taste .
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This aside, if we are discussing the relevance of the application of over-whelming vertical force within the Afghan theatre etc, then Fire Force was a good example of how to up a kill rate.
Totally agree but I don't think we were. Rightly or wrongly, that hearts and minds BS permeates UK and US society and political thought -- and therefor, military action. Now. Hasn't always been that way and likely will not be at some time in the future, everything goes in cycles...
Our emphasis, no matter how misplaced, is not on the kill rate for most of the force. For that small part where that is emphasized most of your concerns are met but no more details make it into print than did some Fire Force or other Rhodesian actions at the time of the ops, that all tumbles out later.
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Rhodesian culture is what made Fire Force work.
Excellent point and I totally agree. No question about it. Be nice if modern western types had some of those attributes. Unfortunately, times and mores change and we mostly -- not all -- don't nowadays. Kids from Liverpool and Los Angeles are not going to react the same way nor are senior Army types from Surrey or Kansas. That doesn't even address the fact that you guys did a great job of cutting the BS and bureaucracy to fight an existential war while we are flooded with an almost Byzantine bureaucracy, BS in ten pound bags and fighting, lackadaisically, a minor war of choice. We don't have to be there and most everyone knows it. That makes a difference. A huge difference.:(
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A lot of the discussion held here is coming from people who “have flown all over the world,” telling everyone, some in a sarcastic manner, why FF wont work, cant be done, it's too scary, it might kill people, its really gonna annoy the ROE inspectors, and we might even get rockets fired at us etc.
I didn't see all that much sarcasm but agree with rest -- only pointing out that the guys who would have to do it (except for the helicopter jockeys who really do tend to worry with good cause about RPGs up tail pipes) are not the ones who have those concerns; it's their nominal civilian bosses back in the States and Whitehall. I didn't see any suggestions re: what to do about that...
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LIST {omitted}... I am sorry sirs, but it's embarrassing to see all the hand wringing from those who have “flown all over the world.” China, YOU PUT YOUR £$%^&* CROSS IN THE WRONG PLACE. FIX IT!
I won't respond to your list by item. I will merely point out that what you folks did in one war against one enemy in one place at one time in one set of circumstances was great, it really was. However IMO trying to apply it almost verbatim to another war fought by other people with differing political rules and parameters in another time and place is just as surprising and disappointing a display of arrogance and willful ignorance (as opposed to real ignorance) as were the RAF with their crosses.
I never made it past Private, but...
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Originally Posted by
Rhodesian
We were very impressed with the Hercules transports you all showed up in, but couldn't work out the logic of placing a giant white cross on the nose of the aircraft so that everyone, including a peasant with a rifle, had something nice and visible to aim at.
Perhaps that might have been because a white cross was the agreed recognition symbol for Operation Agila, the Commonwealth ceasefire and elections Monitoring Force in Rhodesia?
http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/Agila/Subs8.jpg
http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/Agila/Subs17.jpg
http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/Agila/Subs12.jpg
Since the reason for having the symbol was so that locals wouldn't fire on aircraft and vehicles, there's every reason to have it on the nose--where it hopefully gets seen before they fire--as well as on the tail, where it gets seen after they've shot. :wry:
two caveats, and a suggestions
While I don't want to divert this thread into a political discussion, it is worth pointing out that, in at least two ways, the high Rhodesian kills rates achieved against ZANLA and ZIPRA were politically problematic.
First of all, the military success achieved against black nationalist guerillas appears to have blinded many in the the Rhodesian government to what had been perfectly obvious since 1965: that, in the end, the Rhodesian experiment with white minority rule was doomed to eventual failure. By delaying the point of implementing one person, one vote it ended up weakening Rhodesian negotiating power (which would have been far stronger in, say, 1967 than it was at Lancaster House, by which time Rhodesia had become almost universally reviled). At the same time the war actually strengthened ZAPU and ZANU relative to other potential political forces in the country (much as the wars in Vietnam, Algeria, Mozambique, or Yemen strengthened the Viet-Minh, FLN, Frelimo, and NLF/YSP).
Second, Rhodesia's external operations—while hugely successful in a narrow military sense, with kill rates of up to 3000:2 in Op Dingo—also served to weaken rather than strengthen the country's international position, and thereby increased external pressure. Certainly those in the international anti-Apartheid movement at the time saw them as a political godsend, facilitating efforts to paint Rhodesia as a rogue, racist state.
While there's no doubt that ISAF ROE could be tweaked in a variety of useful ways, the political reality is that if ISAF started racking up similar kills rates, greater civilian casualties, and conducting major raids into Pakistan it would have the effect of undermining US domestic and international support for the counterinsurgency, weaken Karzai, alienate Pakistan, and probably increase Taliban recruitment rates. As Wilf and Ken are inclined to remind us, the military is an instrument of policy, and wars are fought in a context. There's no point undertaking operations that win battles at the cost of losing the broader political-military struggle.
On a side issue, might I also suggest that we start referring to the black Zimbabweans killed in the war as ZANLA, ZIPRA, "black nationalist guerillas," or something else a little more appropriate than terrs and gooks? SWJ has always frowned on the use of "gooks" for the Viet-Cong, "ragheads" or "hajis" for Iraqis or Afghans, "wogs" in the former British Empire, "kaffirs" for blacks, "stücke" or "figuren" for Jews and gypsies, etc,—regardless of whether such derogatory terms were in common use in theatre by the troops of the day.
Heh. Yep, I remember that flap...
OTOH, the Brigade I was with in '66 had two brags. They had not been in their Base Camp in over 300 days and they had a higher weapon count than body count. Different strokes...
Unfortunately, body counts can get get corrupted in the name of propaganda. Oops. I mean PsyOps, Information Warfare, Influence Operations or something... :wry:
When I went back in '68, I was visiting a nearby unit's TOC and noticed a Body Count of 800 some of and a Weapon Count in the low hundreds. I asked some skeptical questions and got what amounted to a shoulder shrug. The idea really got corrupted by us in Viet Nam and thus it is a no-no for us today. However, Ewell was right -- so was JMA -- in that the ratio is the important thing. Today, the troops keep score, even if units do not. :cool: