A war in the Gulf / Straits of Hormuz: the past and the future

Moderator's Note

This is a new merged thread, reflecting the return of this issue and previously there were several threads on related issues:

From 2006-2010: CSIS Reports on The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War
From 2008: Straits of Hormuz Incident - The Iranian Small Boat Threat
In 2010: AQ-Linked Group Claims Gulf Tanker Attack

Obviously any conflict in this 'choke point' is related to the wider policy debate around relations with Iran over nuclear weapons, the international community (principally the west, Gulf states and buyers of oil) and the Israeli factor. Currently there is a principal thread 'Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options:catch all thread 2011':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14500

There are several threads on a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (currently locked) and a historical thread 'Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7588

Moderator's Note ends


By Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan of the Center for Strategic and International Studies - The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War.

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The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Bahrain
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Iran
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Iraq
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Kuwait
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Oman
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Qatar
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Saudi Arabia
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: United Arab Emirates
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War: Yemen
By Anthony H. Cordesman and Khalid R. Al-Rodhan
July 28, 2006

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28 July Washington Post - U.S. Plans New Arms Sales to Gulf Allies by Robin Wright.

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The Bush administration will announce next week a series of arms deals worth at least $20 billion to Saudi Arabia and five other oil-rich Persian Gulf states as well as new 10-year military aid packages to Israel and Egypt, a move to shore up allies in the Middle East and counter Iran's rising influence, U.S. officials said yesterday.

The arms deals, which include the sales of a variety of sophisticated weaponry, would be the largest negotiated by this administration. The military assistance agreements would provide $30 billion in new U.S. aid to Israel and $13 billion to Egypt over 10 years, the officials said. Both figures represent significant increases in military support.

U.S. officials said the arms sales to Saudi Arabia are expected to include air-to-air missiles as well as Joint Direct Attack Munitions, which turn standard bombs into "smart" precision-guided bombs. Most, but not all, of the arms sales to the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries -- Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman -- will be defensive, the officials said...

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28 July NY Times - U.S. Set to Offer Huge Arms Deal to Saudi Arabia by David Cloud.

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The Bush administration is preparing to ask Congress to approve an arms sale package for Saudi Arabia and its neighbors that is expected to eventually total $20 billion at a time when some United States officials contend that the Saudis are playing a counterproductive role in Iraq.

The proposed package of advanced weaponry for Saudi Arabia, which includes advanced satellite-guided bombs, upgrades to its fighters and new naval vessels, has made Israel and some of its supporters in Congress nervous. Senior officials who described the package on Friday said they believed that the administration had resolved those concerns, in part by promising Israel $30.4 billion in military aid over the next decade, a significant increase over what Israel has received in the past 10 years.

But administration officials remained concerned that the size of the package and the advanced weaponry it contains, as well as broader concerns about Saudi Arabia’s role in Iraq, could prompt Saudi critics in Congress to oppose the package when Congress is formally notified about the deal this fall...

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ISN Security Watch, 31 Jul 07: US Escalates ME Arms Race

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....The Bush administration's cash injection into allied Gulf state militaries, which is likely accompanied by strong behind-the-scenes diplomatic pressure, can also be seen as an effort to curb growing Russian and Chinese influence in the regional conventional arms trade, civilian infrastructure development and nuclear plans.

The US package has been accepted as a fait accompli by the Israeli government in a fundamental reversal of past Israeli foreign policy.

Israeli acquiescence was bought with a 25 percent boost in the annual US military aid grant to US$3 billion, and constitutes an Israeli recognition of a shift in US regional priorities away from the Israel-Palestinian crisis to protecting its strategic interests in the Gulf following the eventual withdrawal of troops from Iraq.

While this is not stated publicly, Israel and US-allied Arab states have been drawn together by the perceived mutual threat of the growth of Iranian influence and by the efflorescence of Sunni militant groups, and related strengthening of political Islam in Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan.....

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efflorescence?

CSRC, 21 Sep 07: Asymetric Strategies in the Middle East

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Key Points

* Iran, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan see the Greater Middle East as one theatre of geopolitical competition. They are not pursuing a theatre-by theatre strategy. At the same time, they see US regional strategy as being driven by developments in individual theatres of operation.

* Iran has taken advantage of the political situations of Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine to pursue a policy of compelling Washington make concessions to it in return for improvement of relations.

* Saudi Arabia has been increasingly concerned about US support for the Iraqi government. For Saudi Arabia the key issue is containment of Iranian political power and reduction of Iranian influence across the region.

* Arab states of the Middle East have become dependent on non-Arab powers Turkey, Iran, Israel and Pakistan for their own survival in the regional geopolitical competition.

* Pakistan is emerging as a pivotal state in the region and its domestic stability and future geopolitical orientation are closely intertwined with the stability of the region.

* Increasingly, Russia and China are exploiting this dynamic to further their own interests at the expense of the US. Neither power is willing to compartmentalize regional issues.

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Full 35 page paper at the link.

CNN and others are reporting the Iranian Navy, currently overseen (or commanded, I'm not 100% sure) by the Revolutionary Guard, "harassed" the Arleigh Burke destroyer USS Hopper, the Ticonderoga cruiser USS Port Royal, and the frigate USS Ingraham in the Strait of Hormuz on Sunday, sailing within 200 yard of one ship, dropping "white boxes" in the water, and sending threatening radio messages.

The Navy reports officers on one ship were "in the process of giving the order to fire" when an Iranian vessel was within 200 yards, but the Iranian vessel turned back before the US fired a shot.

This seems to be a major provocation - and we were, by the Navy's own account, moments away from opening fire, with inevitable major consequences.

Of course, CNN refers to the would-be attackers as "boats" and "ships" both in the report - so we have no idea what they were; they could be anything from a zodiac to frigates, though I'd bet on something approaching the former. . .

http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/...avy/index.html

What level of provocation do you think would have to occur for the US to take a Praying Mantis-level response?

Matt

here is the NYTs

Says it was the IRGC again using five fast boats,

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U.S. Describes Confrontation With Iranian Boats
THOM SHANKER and BRIAN KNOWLTON

Published: January 8, 2008
WASHINGTON — In a brief confrontation in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz on Sunday, five armed Iranian fastboats took aggressive actions around three United States Navy warships in international waters, according to a Pentagon spokesman, who called the moves “reckless and dangerous.”

The incident, which ended uneventfully after about 20 minutes took place as the three American vessels were sailing into the Persian Gulf, according to Bryan Whitman, a Pentagon spokesman. The American vessels were a destroyer, a frigate and a cruiser.

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Originally Posted by MattC86

What level of provocation do you think would have to occur for the US to take a Praying Mantis-level response?

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They would have to move beyond provocation to presenting an actual physical threat to our Naval Forces in the Gulf.

The navies of the US and the USSR used to play provocative games with each other for decades - ranging from the occasional belligerent nonsense as described above to continual attempts (successful and not) at strategic probing of defenses.

If you recall, Operation Praying Mantis was launced in retaliation for the Iranians mining the Gulf - which we discovered when the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine and blew a gaping hole in her hull. Three days later, payback. I don't believe they've forgotton that lesson.

The current belligerance is, as you stated, mere provocation. And the intent is to elicit a disproportionate response. I don't think its necessary to lay out the potential negative effects of that type of incident.

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Originally Posted by Jedburgh

If you recall, Operation Praying Mantis was launced in retaliation for the Iranians mining the Gulf - which we discovered when the USS Samuel B. Roberts struck a mine and blew a gaping hole in her hull. Three days later, payback. I don't believe they've forgotton that lesson.

The current belligerance is, as you stated, mere provocation. And the intent is to elicit a disproportionate response. I don't think its necessary to lay out the potential negative effects of that type of incident.

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That's true, my example was disproportionate to the provocation here; nothing comparable to the Roberts incident. However, the Navy's own account claims that they were in the process of "giving the order to fire" when the IRGC fast-attack boats turned away at 200 yards - danger close. Even the firing of a couple .50MGs would have been a major escalation, and could have caused exactly the negative effects you're referring to. We sink a "fastboat" with .50cal fire, and what happens next?

Granted, that's pure speculation, but the accounts indicate it was closer than would be comfortable.

And I think the combination of geographical constraints in the Strait and Gulf, combined with the partial asymmetry of the threat - a Soviet blue-water fleet vs. IRGC fastboats, light warships, shore-based missiles, etc., makes this a more dangerous flashpoint.

The old rule about ROE not relieving the commander of responsibility for his ship could lead to itchy trigger fingers, IMO. Especially with provocations and threats like this one.

Maybe I'm overreacting. . .

Matt

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Originally Posted by MattC86

Maybe I'm overreacting. . .

Matt

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They obviously had underlying purpose behind their actions and it is almost doubtless they will continue doing so in some manner until it achieves whatever end they are seeking.

Testing the lines.

They've already shown what they will do with their actions concerning the Brit's

Don't expect this to be the last thing we see.:(

via the BBC (video/audio link in the article).

US doubts over Iran boat 'threat'
BBC News, Thursday, 10 January 2008, 20:49 GMT

Iran has described the incident as an "ordinary occurrence"

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An alleged threat to blow up US warships "may not have come" from Iranian speedboats involved in a recent stand-off, the BBC has learned.
The voice on a Pentagon tape could instead have come from another ship in the area or a transmitter on land, senior US Navy sources told the BBC.

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On a side note, a Brit working with the Omani navy/coastguard once told me that smugglers use swarming tactics too, overwhelming local patrols by making simultaneous runs with dozens of high speed boats (I'm not suggesting any connection whatsoever--just an interesting Straits of Hormuz tidbit!)

Bowling for Boghammars … 2008 Edition by Malcolm Nance at SWJ Blog.

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The tense encounter between a squadron of US Navy Warships and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) and Islamic Republic of Iran Navy (IIRN) boats is not a new adventure by any stretch of the imagination. However, the most recent incident is neither an attempt to create a modern-day Gulf of Tonkin incident nor a move by the IRGC to a new tactic with which to harass passing ships. There is a long history of American and Iranian naval confrontation that spans over 20 years here. An accurate reading of what has happened and what could happen, should inform the reader of what most likely did happen...

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Absolutely superb article by Malcolm Nance, supplying the context and details of this naval encounter.

If such IRGC activity is a regular event I have two questions, do other navies have the problem (excluding Royal Navy) and is the activity ordered from the highest level of the Iranain government?

I now suspect the encounter only became public knowledge as the now identifed external speaker intervened, but this only was known after the "spin" doctors and politicians got involved raising the temperature.

davidbfpo

CSIS, 24 Jun 08: Conventional Armed Forces in the Gulf

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Conventional military strength is only one aspect of the trends in Gulf security, but it is important to understand how Gulf forces now compare and the mix of quantitative and qualitative strength that shapes national forces. This report summarizes the development of Gulf states’ conventional military strengths and weaknesses in force strength, force quality, capabilities and leadership.....

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International Security, Summer 08:

Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz

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....could Iran close the Strait of Hormuz? What might provoke Iran to take an action so contrary to its own economic interests? Does Iran possess the military assets needed to engage in a campaign in the strait, and what might such a campaign look like? Perhaps more important, what would the U.S. military have to do to defend the strait in the event of Iranian interference there? What would be the likely cost, length, and outcome of such efforts?

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While it would "suck" in the short term, one would hope the US would drag their feet just a little in responding in order to get some "quid pro quo" from those nations which benefit from the US as "globo-cop" when it comes to a free supply of middle east oil.

CSIS, 8 Sep 08: Security Challenges and Threats in the Gulf: A Net Assessment

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The next President and Congress will have to deal with all of the security issues that affect the Gulf, not just the Iraq War and Iranian proliferation. The attached briefing provides a summary overview of the issues that the US and its allies need to address, with supporting graphics and maps. Both Gulf and US policymakers need to reassess their priorities in dealing with the threats to the Gulf.

Regardless of the outcome of the war in Iraq, the US, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and other US allies with interests in the Gulf will need to adapt their forces to deal with the real-world threats in the region, and to make more effective efforts at cooperation, creating forces that are focused on real-world needs for deterrence and defense, and that deal with the full range of threats and not the most obvious military and security issues.

The Evolving Range of Threats

The Gulf does not face abstract threats or abstract potential enemies. At this point in time, it faces seven very real security challenges:

■ Conventional Military Threats and the Lack of Unity and Mission Focus in the GCC

■ Asymmetric warfare and ―Wars of Intimidation

■ Iranian Missiles and Proliferation

■ Iraqi Instability

■ Energy and Critical Infrastructure

■ Terrorism

o Region-wide impact of Neo-Salafi Islamist extremism. Franchising of Al Qa’ida, Sunni vs. Shi’ite tension, and its impact inside and outside the region
o War in Afghanistan, potential destabilization of a nuclear Pakistan, and impact on proliferation and Islamist extremism in the Middle East

■ Demographics, Foreign Labor, and Social Change

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Complete 232-page pdf file at the link.

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Originally Posted by Jedburgh

CSIS, 8 Sep 08: Security Challenges and Threats in the Gulf: A Net Assessment

Complete 232-page pdf file at the link.

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I need to order more hours in the day to keep up w/ all the relevant writings this site keeps making available.
Reed

WINEP, 24 Sep 08: Iran's Asymmetric Naval Warfare

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This study sheds light on Iran’s naval intentions and capabilities by exploring the military geography of the Persian Gulf and Caspian regions, reviewing the historical evolution of Iran’s approach to asymmetric warfare, assessing its naval forces, and evaluating its plans for a possible war with the United States. The study ends with a quick overview of several possible scenarios.

Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has invested substantially in developing its navy (particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy) along unconventional lines. The most important developments in this regard include the deployment of mobile coastal missile batteries, modern anti-ship missiles mounted on fast-attack craft, semi-submersibles, midget submarines, modern naval mines, unmanned aerial vehicles (possibly including “kamikaze” attack versions), and improved command, control, communications, and intelligence.

This study concludes that despite Iran’s overall defensive posture in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, it could take preemptive action in response to a perceived threat of imminent attack. And in the event of a U.S. attack, the scale of Iran’s response would likely be proportional to the scale of the damage inflicted on Iranian assets.

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Complete 40-page report at the link.

CSIS, 21 May 09: Threats, Risks and Vulnerabilities: Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

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While much of the world’s attention has focused on Iran’s missile developments and possible nuclear capabilities. Yet this is only one of the risks that threaten the flow of petroleum products from the Gulf – a region with some 60% of the world’s proven conventional oil reserves and 40% of its natural gas. Far more immediate threats have emerged in terms of asymmetric warfare, terrorism, piracy, non-state actors, and other threats.

This brief looks beyond Gulf waters and examines the problems created by Iran’s ties to other states and non-state actors throughout the region. It highlights Iran’s capabilities for asymmetric warfare, but it also examines the threat from terrorism and the role it can play in nations like Yemen. It looks at the trends in piracy and in the threat in the Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and Indian Ocean.

The key issues addressed are:

• Terrorism

• Asymmetric Warfare

• Maritime and Border Security

• Combating Piracy

• Critical facilities and Infrastructure

• Role of Chokepoints

• Role of State and Non-State Actors

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An old thread, still a good place for this puzzling Israeli think-tank report on Persian Gulf relationships: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/mal.../iran_e009.pdf

davidbfpo

Time to update an old thread and hopefully the best place for this comment article by Professor Paul Rogers; opening paragraph:

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The ability of Iran’s military to learn from experience and become adept in irregular warfare echoes that of insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. It also presents the United States with hard choices.

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Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...and-new-normal

I missed this and hat tip to FP Blog citing a WSJ article:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000...googlenews_wsj

Which opens with:

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An Islamic militant group affiliated with al Qaeda said it attacked a Japanese-owned oil tanker while it traveled through the Strait of Hormuz last week, adding another twist in the mysterious incident and raising fresh worry about the vulnerability of the important oil-supply route.

(Later)Privately, U.S. officials have expressed skepticism about the al Qaeda-affiliated group's claim of responsibility. They say that while the investigation isn't finished, the visible damage to the tanker hull is more consistent with a collision than a terrorist attack.

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There is a 2008 thread on the Straits of Hormuz and the Iranian small boats threat. This is possibly different and IIRC the last seaborne attack on a tanker was the French-owned Limburg in the Gulf of Aden, in 2002. Background:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_of_the_Limburg

For a long time the Straits of Hormuz have been a recognised choke point, with jurisdiction shared between Iran and Oman; with many navies having a presence.

This whole incident has been quite sketchy. Not only the lack of information (if it was an attack or crash), but several other points. Here's my (very crazy and hypothetical) take.

I don't think terrorist organizations acted alone on this. First, look at the victim: a Japanese vessel. I understand that the Japanese are often considered to be a "Western" power, but how many times have we seen Islamic terrorism call for violence against Japan? Not much (there have been a few times). I would imagine that an AQ offshoot would rather target a European or American vessel instead of a Japanese. Second, I think that if terrorists are attacking the Strait, then they are being supported by Iran's Qud's Force (The Revolutionary Guard's foreign unit) with weapons, training, and intelligence. Third, I think that the attack's purpose was to send a message. Iran seems to be flexing its muscles by demonstrating how rapidly oil tankers can come under attack. This "attack" was light enough to attract attention, but not heavy enough to cause a massive reaction by the West with force. Simply, with the recent "rush" by Iran to begin the fuel swap, the attempt on Ahmadinejad's life, and the procurement of advanced AA missiles, tensions in the area are tightening. Iran wants to remind everyone how fragile those can be.

So, that's my take from my crystal ball. I doubt that it is completely correct...hopefully the "attack" was an accident.

Which is more general on the Straits of Hormuz:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...ing-about.aspx

Ends with this pointer to insurance premiums:

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As an aside, there are a number of think tanks looking at the implications to world economies of conflict in the Straits, and while most agree that Iran's ability to close the Straits is limited to a few days, if at all, there has been some interesting work done on the increased insurance premiums (which would be passed on to the consumer) in the event of conflict in the Gulf (based largely on the medium intensity tanker wars mentioned previously). It makes the likely petrol price hike appear very manageable.

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See:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...of-Hormuz.html

Moderator at work

Until some merging today there were several threads on related issues:

From 2006-2010: CSIS Reports on The Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric War
From 2008: Straits of Hormuz Incident - The Iranian Small Boat Threat
In 2010: AQ-Linked Group Claims Gulf Tanker Attack

Obviously any conflict in this 'choke point' is related to the wider policy debate around relations with Iran over nuclear weapons, the international community (principally the west, Gulf states and buyers of oil) and the Israeli factor. Currently there is a principal thread 'Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options:catch all thread 2011':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14500

There are several threads on a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities (currently locked) and a historical thread 'Observing Iran (catch all historical thread)':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7588

A BBC News report based on an Iranian political and then naval statements:

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Iran says it may close a vital oil-trade route if the West imposes more sanctions over its controversial nuclear programme.

Vice-President Mohammad Reza Rahimi warned that "not a drop of oil will pass through the Strait of Hormuz" if sanctions are widened.

Iran's navy chief Admiral Habibollah Sayari later said closing the strait would be "easy".

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Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16344102

This story prompted this thread's creation. It is a repeating issue and worthy of a watching brief.

International politics can be unpredictable, even more so when small things happen and this story illustrates this rather well, headline and then sub-title:

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'US Navy rescues Iranian fishermen from Somali pirates'
A US aircraft carrier whose presence in the Persian Gulf last week triggered threats of retribution from Iran was involved in the rescue of 13 Iranian fishermen being held captive by Somali pirates in the nearby Arabian Sea.

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Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...i-pirates.html

IIRC Iran has deployed warships to combat piracy, under national control. Now for the diplomats to arrange the exchange, although I expect it will be Oman who resolves this.

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Be careful what you wish for regarding how other powers react to the latest effort to ratchet up pressure on Iran. Especially when the other power is as potent a competitor as China. China depends on Iran for eleven percent of its imported oil. The idea of joining in a de facto embargo of Iranian oil through ostracism of the Iranian central bank thus naturally discomfits the Chinese. It is still unclear exactly how Beijing will play this one, as it considers how the issue affects both its relations with the United States and the state of its energy-thirsty economy. An obvious response is to work ever harder to shore up China's relations with the other Persian Gulf oil producers. That is largely what Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's current trip to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates is about.

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http://nationalinterest.org/blog/pau...sian-gulf-6374

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U.S. intelligence agencies are closely watching Saudi Arabia for signs that the oil-rich kingdom will seek to develop nuclear weapons, amid tensions in the region centered on Iran’s nuclear program.

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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...627123/?page=2

A fascinating update and commentary on the naval situation in the Persian Gulf / Straits of Hormuz:http://www.naval-technology.com/feat...ind-hyperbole/

Curiously Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy (IRGCN) has once again taken a leap forward by buying hi-tech equipment, this time from the UK (a story I'd missed) and in the past we had the Swedish Boghammer sale.

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Their goal is to replace their underperforming Chinese and North Korean vessels with indigenously produced FACs to participate in 'swarm attacks,' a tactic in which waves of small vessels attack a larger slow capital target overwhelming it with small arms / RPG / missile fire, or even ramming it in suicide kamikaze-style attacks.

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Oddly the article skims over the positioning of a large number of SSM, one having such a large warhead it would destroy a supertanker's superstructure.