What I learned on this staff ride.
Then as now, the simplistic views and categorizations we (humans) tend to apply to most all things, to more rapidly wade through the vast amount of information associated with everything around us, significantly limits our ability to see the world the way it actually exists.
The truly superb Army War College(AWC) historians, who conducted this staff ride, allowed me to see far more of the richness and complexity of this battle.
Today, we want to develop our leaders with the skills, similar to those of the AWC historians, for seeing the world in its totality; for only in this way will we be able to rapidly transition along the full spectrum of operations to apply the requisite tactical solutions that support our operational and strategic goals. The danger of simplifying reality to ease our ability to manage war risks executing a tactically prudent course of action at the expense of strategic success.
For example, on 01 July, 1863, “Confederate General James Longstreet argues that Lee should move east between the Union Army and Washington and build a defensive position. Lee overrules him. "No," he said. "The enemy is there, and I'm going to attack him there.... They are there in position, and I am going to whip them or they are going to whip me. " Longstreet had a tactically prudent course of action; but, Lee understood that this otherwise useful tactic would lead to almost certain strategic failure. Because the North had a larger population and economy, the South needed to obtain a negotiated settlement to survive. Thus, Lee knew his strategic goal was to reduce the Northern popular will for support of the war to gain a negotiated peace. Additionally, the only way to achieve this was to utterly destroy the Army of the Potomac; and, Longstreet’s tactic would not accomplish this strategic imperative.
Haven't had an opportunity to go on a "Staff Ride"
Have however stayed in a few Holiday Inn's:D and whenever I do in a place where there are historic sites I always make the trip.
Like much of what you mention I also felt doing so helped me to "step" outside of the current wars thinking long enough to gain some perspective.
Went to FT Fisher NC a while back and it was really an eye opener when you considered that 4000 + died in the effort to close and or hold that place. In Strategic context for the north it was a must in order to close off a major port of the south . And it took a whole lot to do so. Naval bombardments, Troop ground movements under heavy fire, siege tactics and ambushes, pasage of lines, you name it. It really helped me to accept how very complex war is(in any given time).
Wilf, do they really say that war is more complex now or is the message and point rather that those complexities must be understood and dealt by lower ranks then ever and under much faster shifting of circumstances?
Maybe that's part of the problem
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Originally Posted by
marct
Hi Ron,
I've been hearing that line a lot, but I really think it's a proxy for "there's just too much stuff we don't understand" rather than any actual change in the objective "complexity".
Would it be a beneficial exercise if we were to use an example something like the thread Mike F had but with perhaps a non military problem and help differentiate between complexity both objective and subjectiveLink
then try to tease out why and how it differs
from actor to actor.
Nature, Adaptation, and Competition
John Maynard Smith produced some interesting game theory models (ESS and Hawk-Dove game) to describe how animals compete for limited resources in a restricted environment.
Simply put,
-Doves never fight.
-Hawks will always fight.
-Retaliators fight against hawks and share with doves.
This game could be applied to competing agencies with the military/government to show how some adapt, some survive, and some fail.
v/r
Mike
From Strategos to the Pikeman...
John T. Fishel. Without getting into the strategic discussion, I'd like to point out that Meade had the great fortune of having John Buford out front, arguably a far better Cavalry commander than many of the big names. That possibly had greater effect than did the loss of Jackson on the goals or the outcome...
marct:
Quote:
I've been hearing that line a lot, but I really think it's a proxy for "there's just too much stuff we don't understand" rather than any actual change in the objective "complexity".
Absolutely. I'd point out that prior to and early on in Viet Nam, those 'lower ranks' were all over all the same sorts of complexities with absolutely no problems. NCO casualties during that war coupled with McNamara's Project 100,000 gutted the NCO ranks for 20 years and the Army is just starting to grow out of that. Destroyed trust takes time to rebuild. Said trust destruction was the fault of the Strategos as well as the Pikeman in about equal measures...
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This means that implicitly CPTs are supposed to fix their perceptual and interpretive lens on a limited number of "in the present" and "in the short term" stories of what they should be doing. If they don't, then they will get hammered by the organization (that's a general observation of probabilities).
That happens when an organization loses sight of it purpose and become excessively concerned about the well being, appearance and reputation of the institution as opposed to concentrating as it should sensible and proper job performance... :mad:
Superfluous but I'll point out that if the organization truly does its job well, it will have no problems with its appearance and reputation. As for well being, Rommel said it well "The best form of welfare for the Troops is first class training, for this save unnecessary casualties."
Wilf sums it up well:
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When was understanding by the lower ranks not required? War is an expression of society. War cannot be more complex than the world we live in.
Just so...
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IMO, how an Army describes its problems, or fails to, is strongly indicative of how it does or does not understand it's profession.
Or that it is in denial as to what that profession is...
Could also be that it believes -- underline that, believes -- that it must cater to various constituencies to the extent that it bcomes convinced that it is required to purposely engage in self destructive behavior... :rolleyes:
Marct again:
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Heritability, in socio-cultural terms, actually requires reinforcement, so the perceptions and 'solutions" (and "problem definitions") will tend to come from the most heavily reinforces part of that training...In socio-cultural terms, the more you know and the faster you can flip through your options, the greater amount of adaptability you have.
Both very true, both well known -- and both disregarded for expediency's sake, generally on false grounds of cost (and some deluded tactical thinking by theorists as opposed to doers). :mad:
Thus my much overstated contention that:
We do not do our initial entry training, officer or enlisted, for an adequate length of time or at all well.