Insurgency and Civil COIN indicators

Hello All,

I am presently completing a masters thesis where I attempt to measure the impact of Civil COIN on the insurgency in Baghdad. Civil COIN refers to the use of public goods and services and government improvements to weaken the appeal of an insurgency to the civilian population. In order to complete my paper, I have attempted to construct a list of indicators that may be effective in identifying 1) an insurgency is growing and 2) that Civil COIN is hindering an insurgency and its support. While my request is selfish to the extent that it helps me write my paper, I do believe constructing a list of COIN indicators may be valuable to COIN practitioners.

My list is not original and comes from various sources, at times with empirical support, but I would be interested in your input on these indicators. Any suggestions or additions would be attributed to this website and the user name (or the user if he/she is willing to provide his name). Thanks in advance for any suggestions, and I am willing to answer any questions you have about the indicators listed below.

Note: Many of the indicators will mirror each other, though there are some subtleties. Just as the solution to a problem is not necessarily the opposite of its cause, effective Civil COIN can not be indicated entirely through the opposite of insurgency indicators.

Thanks again,

Stu

Indicators suggesting increased support for Insurgency:
1. Legitimacy of host government
2. Establishment of counter government and services
3. Level of anti-Western sentiment
4. Identification with a global Muslim nation
5. Unrest and violence
6. Strength and support of local insurgency
7. Degree of political control by sectarian actors

Indicators measuring Civil COIN success against an insurgency:
1. Popularity of insurgency
2. Competent/Accountable host government involved in reconstruction
3. Popular Government
4. Economic Development
5. Democratic Government
6. Level of Social-political groups' involvement in reconstruction
7. Security improvements

Stu,

You probably couldn't have picked a more challenging or controversial topic:D

Hopefully John Fishel will contact you, he has completed some great work in this area.

It seems you're posing your questions to measure support for either the insurgency or the State, but in most, if not all, cases this is misleading. We always dumb things down, but as Einstein once wrote, back things as simple as you can, but no simpler. In most cases there will be more than one insurgent group (though they may assist one another, just go back to WWII where the non-communist and communist partisans would cooperate at times, put knife in each others backs at other times, and the same was true of the Afghan resistance against the Soviets). Took at a stab at your current metrics, my comments in red. I'll try to add some suggestions later.

Indicators suggesting increased support for Insurgency:
1. Legitimacy of host government
Does this always matter? If it is a war of identity based on race or religion between two our more groups can a government be legitimate?
2. Establishment of counter government and services Good, what are your indicators?
3. Level of anti-Western sentiment Ugh? This may or may not play a role, it doesn't play much of a role in many Sub-Saharan African conflicts
4. Identification with a global Muslim nation Maybe you need to re-title your thesis as Islamic based insurgencies?
5. Unrest and violence This only indicates the phase of the insurgency, not the level of support
6. Strength and support of local insurgencyThis is what you're trying to measure?
7. Degree of political control by sectarian actors By insurgent or state actors?

Indicators measuring Civil COIN success against an insurgency:
1. Popularity of insurgency Not all will agree with me, but the insurgents don't have to be popular to be successful, just the best bad option, much like the Taliban when they took over Afghanistan initially.
2. Competent/Accountable host government involved in reconstruction Reconstruction may or may not be required, if you nip the insurgency in the bud before there is major damage this is a mute issue
3. Popular Government Good luck, popularity only lasts through the honey moon period, plus the government is always supported by those who benefit from it, and opposed by those who feel the government is negatively impacting their life
4. Economic Development Maybe, I still haven't a seen study that proves this theory
5. Democratic Government Absolutely not, and in some cases this will trigger an insurgency
6. Level of Social-political groups' involvement in reconstruction
7. Security improvements

Quote:

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Originally Posted by stu

Civil COIN refers to the use of public goods and services and government improvements to weaken the appeal of an insurgency to the civilian population. In order to complete my paper, I have attempted to construct a list of indicators that may be effective in identifying 1) an insurgency is growing and 2) that Civil COIN is hindering an insurgency and its support. While my request is selfish to the extent that it helps me write my paper, I do believe constructing a list of COIN indicators may be valuable to COIN practitioners.

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So Civil COIN is the provision of social services? The implication being that good social services help defeat an insurgency? Where's the evidence?

Is your thesis that "use of public goods and services and government improvements to weaken the appeal of an insurgency to the civilian population." or actually, that successful insurgencies are reliant of the denial of the same? If so, is that no an entirely different problem?

PM me and I'll send you the list of variables that we used but it will have to be by snail mail.
(Thanks Bill for the vote of confidence).
Stu, basically your list is one of categories each of which is made up of a number of variables. In some cases your lists overlap as when legitimacy variables are shown as categories eg legitimacy and govt ability to deliver services. Note that we used the variable govt ability to mobilize the population and its key indicator was delivery of govt services.

Cheers

Johnt

It doesn't seem to be public yet, but about a year ago RAND completed a study on the effects of the surge on the operations in Iraq. The Author, Nora Bensahel also wrote about the initial failure of coordination with civil authorities (among other things) shortly after the invasion. You may either wish to check out her paper, or contact her for feed back. There is probably a lot of cross talk with what you are writing on, and even if she doesn't address the issue personally, one of the authors she cites likely does.

Much, though not all of the empirical evidence used comes from RAND's study Operations other than War. At the end of the book, they provide analysis of 89 insurgencies over time. I've included some notes I've written down from my read of the paper below - I'd highly recommend the huge book. Well written, organized, and valuable information.

I will respond to other issues in a bit, but very much appreciate the feedback. The indicators are not designed to always work. The question is if one wanted to know that an insurgency was growing, or if Civil COIN was working, what would you look at to get the answer? My list, with some serious organizational problems that you have pointed out, is a flawed attempt. The organization suggested with categories and variables is probably best. The challenge I kept running into was overlap from different categories, and that probably helps. I'll keep working and report back.

stu

Quote:

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RAND examined 89 insurgencies and their outcomes – government wins, government loses, or mixed outcome. They have found that on average, engaging in a successful COIN campaign takes over 10 years. In RAND’s study, half of the 89 insurgencies finished in 12 years, while the remaining half took another 6 years. Income and government success were highly correlated suggesting insurgents lose in richer areas. When an insurgency was rated as popular, it lost only one-third of the time. In comparison, when an insurgency was unpopular, it only won one-third of the time. Insurgencies with state support won over half the time, suggesting globalization may help insurgencies overcome the loss of support resulting from Civil COIN operations. Anocracies, described as imperfect democracies, only won one time against an insurgency, with many mixed results. Governments rated with high COIN competence won two-thirds of finished insurgencies. Governments with high or medium popularity won nearly half of insurgencies fought, while unpopular governments lost more than half. RAND’s study provides evidence that factors such as timeliness, economic development, insurgent and government popularity, legitimacy, and COIN competence all are important factors in successfully conducting Civil COIN.

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