Treat with extreme caution
Zack,
The only advice I would offer about attempting to analysis the 2006 War is be very careful of most Western English language analysis. It almost all contains substantial errors and fallacies.
EG: This from Exum
Quote:
Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted Israeli communications during the 2006 war, it is worth noting that in cases when encrypted communication failed, IDF soldiers simply used their personal cellular phones to communicate.
Actually in 2006 all the IDFs formation tactical radios were VHF/FM, with no encryption. Any actual knowledge of the IDF would have told him that.
Hezbollah only ever attempted to break one form of IDF encryption and in doing so compromised the attempt, thus it was countered.
This is one minor example.
Some of what has come out of CAC and other similar sources is also of doubtful veracity and usefulness.
Stephen Biddle's analysis (also not great but the best yet) is actually the only one I know that has any credibility because it used first hand sources.
To be constructive, I know a few of the men actually involved in the operational planning of the war in 2006, so if you PM me, I'll happily pass on questions. - so if you really want to know about the IDF using EBO, they can tell you first hand.
The single biggest issue (and the one not written about in English) with the 2006 Lebanon War was a failure to stick to the plan, because the plan kept being micro-managed at the Political level, and that casts doubts on the actually political objectives. IMO, it is an absolute case study of ignoring Clausewitz's observations.
Yes, lots of tactical problems, but again, everyone misses the political and economic dimensions that created the conditions where those became a problem - no time or money to train for proper combat operations - and huge faith in Air Power/EBO.
The above post jogged my memory
The Combat Studies Institute also has an interview with Naveh which was posted at the small wars journal website here
smallwarsjournal.com/documents/mattmatthews.pdf
Regarding SOD and the 2006 war his take on events was that no-one in the IDF was cleverer (!) enough to understand his conceptual schema. His invective against IDF Gen. Dan Halutz (formerly of the IAF) is revealing in this regard. Understandibly when one frames one's ideas in an esoteric vocabulary properly belonging to those who were berets and frequent Parisian Cafes what do you expect?