Challenge to MW Essential Premise #2--Part 1
To recap:
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MW Essential Premise #2: In such struggles, both sides are adapting to the situation in an attempt to undermine the enemy--the side that executes the faster and "good enough" transients will eventually beat the side that is slower, even if those transients are "near-perfect."
What does this mean? Again, the situation is uncertain. Neither side knows as much as is desired and the grappling is part of the learning experience. To borrow Clausewitz's wrestling metaphor (the two-struggle or Zweikampf), it isn't the hold alone that wins the match, it's the moves leading up to the decisive and match-winning hold. And it's the moves in relation to each other. Which one is better? Which one is faster? There is some sort of accommodation between speed and quality--faster alone is not enough (and can actually be dangerous if the action is flat wrong). Perfect quality is not enough if executed too late and pre-empted or dislocated by the moves of the opponent (to use Leonhard's characterizations).
Challenge: If the OODA Loop concept was originally designed to explain how the F-86 could generate a higher and better tempo in “fast transients” against a MiG-15 in a Korean War era dogfight, is it still relevant/valid in understanding missile versus aircraft engagements?
Response: I would argue it certainly is. This is very clear if we look back to Vietnam War surface-to-air missile engagements—Randy “Duke” Cunningham knew exactly when to put his F4 into a steep dive when one of those “flying telephone poles” would come up to greet him. Timing was everything; the advantage the pilot had was he knew how the missile would react—after all, missiles had no brain. So if the pilot understood the guidance system, the pilot knew the missile G-loading characteristics (which were usually more than what humans could tolerate), the pilot knew the characteristics of his own aircraft, he could devise a response based on what he knew the missile was capable of.
Certainly as guidance systems and missile performance has improved, this has gotten harder and harder to do. Certainly the OODA Loop as ONE of a number of analytical lenses would help to paint the problem. Still, aircraft countermeasures against missiles (whether inherent to the aircraft or from other aircraft executing SAM suppression missions) are aimed at lengthening the missile engagement OODA Loop to the point where the pilot can effectively react and negate the threat. If we need to get into specifics here, we can, certainly…even if we are talking about theoretical scenarios.
But just an example, Missile Warning gear is intended to alert the pilot that a missile is in the air, giving him the option to divert or abort (or press on). In other words, it provides an “earlier” observation than he might otherwise get, leaving him more time for “orientation” and “decision” and “action.” “Wild Weasel” missions flying support for strike packages have a number of options that can be described in OODA terms. Is this the ONLY way to express what is going on? Certainly not. There are a number of other tools that are necessary to understand what is happening, what can be done, etc. Especially for the air defender, there’s a lot of game theory/queuing theory going on before the engagement so that decisions can be made in split seconds. Is that an application of the OODA Loop concept? One can argue it either way. On the one hand, some will say that “orientation” and “decision” times must be cut to an absolute minimum, so automated/algorithmic solutions are sought. On the other hand, some might argue that the OODA loop as the maneuver warfare advocates portray it is pretty much useless in such scenarios. Okay. This is a technical argument—I think the OODA concept applies, but I’d readily concede you won’t find any discussion of “reconnaissance pull,” “commander’s intent,” and “mission tactics” in this. Roger. But given what we have talked about regarding maneuver warfare, this would be seen as a relatively arcane discussion compared to the “larger” issues regarding command and control of larger units on the ground. That’s where most the arguments come in.
Challenge to MW Essential Premise #2--Part 2
Challenge: What makes us think the OODA Loop concept—if we believe it works to explain single entity versus single entity conflict—can apply to understanding aggregates of entities fighting aggregate of entities?
Response: This is perhaps the most important question regarding the applicability of the OODA Loop. Certainly a number of thread posters have expressed doubt about this. So this deserves a lengthier response.
We’ve already talked about the wrestler analogy—this is perhaps most akin to air combat maneuvering. A single decisionmaker pitted against another single decisionmaker. I need to elaborate a bit here, because Wilf and others have brought up chess players as an analogy—where does application of the OODA Loop work for chess?
I’d ague it doesn’t. For the simple reason that chess play is regulated by turns. Each side will ALWAYS get to react to the move of the opponent’s last move. There are no possibilities to get in two moves instead of just one. I get a move, you get a move. So the pace/tempo of the game is regulated by the rules.
Now, it’s been brought up that, given timed moves, a player that exhibits superior OODA capabilities should be able to apply this to win. True, but irrelevant to OODA loop implications that I’ll get into in a bit. Sure, expert players can “orient” and “decide” better and faster. But the issue is ultimately about quality of the moves. The players (or the tournament) decide ahead of time how long the chess clock limits are. Those limits never change. And the question comes down to quality of decisions made in that never-changing time limit. I just don’t think this equates to war very well.
Now, for those familiar with Ed Glabus and Aegis Corporation’s old InfoChess game, elements of the OODA are introduced. It’s a double-blind game with the ability to buy Information Operations capabilities. It’s very possible in that game that the opponent won’t get to execute his move when it’s his turn, particularly if he’s the victim of a successful Electronic Attack (EA) mounted by his opponent. But this is relatively rare—most of the issues in InfoChess involve quality of the moves. Players are bent on deception and operations security versus intelligence and counterintelligence most commonly. Even in InfoChess, there is still that pacing function. Sure, you have a better shot at getting into two moves to the opponent’s one given a successful EA operation, but this is an example of lengthening the enemy’s OODA Loop and not tightening your own and dealing with the consequences of that.
Maneuverists do talk a good bit about chess masters. But mostly it’s about expertise—and how that expertise means that true experts take much less time to orient and decide. That’s why MW is so difficult. You need experts—and you need to develop them. The maneuverists argue that the results are worth the cost. If you disagree with that—that the U.S. military cannot grow that many experts—then the argument is pretty much over. You and the “German School” maneuverists have different assumptions and value systems; you aren’t going to be able to agree on anything. However, you may have something in common with the Soviet school, more on that later.
Anyway, back to the issue at hand--
An understanding of OODA Loop theory, developed from F-86 versus MiG-15 dogfights, explains much regarding why some ACM matchups in Vietnam worked the way they did. And Boyd certainly applied this understanding to E-M theory, which revolutionized how we design and evaluate fighter aircraft. Okay. If somebody wants to attack that idea, I’d welcome it. But let’s assume for a minute that this is true. What makes Boyd make the leap into other realms of war, particularly those involving larger formations?
Most of the maneuverists will point to how basketball players play basketball. Or soccer players play soccer. Or hockey players play hockey. Or so on. Sure, offensive/scoring ability counts, defensive skills count, but being able to manipulate the tempo of the game is something each team strives to achieve. In “blowout” games, usually it’s pretty clear the winning team completely dominated the opposition, being able to pre-empt, dislocate, and disorient the other team. Those maneuverists, such as John Schmitt, will explain this effect in OODA Loop terms. IN such instances, Schmitt points to the lateral communication between the team members—the coach is unable to influence much of the play from the sidelines compared to other games such as American football or baseball. The game is in the hands of the players. These kinds of games show recon-pull in action. When gaps or holes in the defense are found, players naturally gravitate to it/exploit it without waiting for someone (like the coach or the team captain) to tell them.
The question is whether you can believe that this analogy will hold for larger aggregates of units in violent competitions where there are higher levels of uncertainty.
Both the German and Soviet school advocates will concede that this holds—the OODA Loop is applicable in such instances. The difference between them is with regard to where the experts are. For example, to use the basketball analogy—do I have a team that’s played several seasons together? If I do, the players are able to decentralize command and control and implement “recon pull” to immediately exploit discovered gaps. The commander doesn’t have to explicitly direct such exploitation. Soviet school pretty much assumes you have a “pick up”/”back lot” basketball team—team members don’t know each other, implicit communication is at a minimum, and so on. So there’s much more emphasis put on preparation—speed and focus is achieved through better planning BEFORE the operation, as opposed to German school which depends on speed and focus occurring DURING the operation.
So the basic question that differentiates the two schools boils down to this: do you have people that can make independent decisions? If you believe that can’t happen at lower levels—such independence is reserved for senior levels—then you are a Soviet school advocate. If you think you can grow that kind of effective independence at low levels, then you’ll lean to the German school.
Commercial wargaming provide some potential insights. My favorite system to explore this is the MMP/The Gamers Tactical Combat System. In this game, players have to write operations orders with sketches in order for units to conduct operations. You must designate objectives, provide control measures (where to move, what unit boundaries are, etc), and so on. The interesting thing about the game system is that units don’t obey orders as soon as they get them. A number of variables come into play. The first (and some say the most important) variable is how quickly the inherent command and control system accepts new instructions. There are other variables, such as whether the formation is currently in contact or is out of contact (better). And so on. Every turn that an new order is levied against a formation, a die is rolled. The player cannot possibly be sure WHEN a formation will accept and then execute a given order. Playing the numerous games in this series leads players to prefer the sides that have the lowest implementation values. In other words, players want to play the side that accepts and executes orders faster. While they can’t predict when orders will be accepted and executed, there is the possibility that one side will accept and execute orders faster than the other side. While there are exceptions on a case by case basis (i.e., occasionally luck will cause the slower unit to execute orders faster than the faster unit), overall the faster implementing side will get the majority of “jumps” on the opponent in conducting operations. This is a huge insight and leads to a depth of understanding regarding how the OODA Loop works in practice.
But this won’t be convincing to a number of people who will want to judge how well this works given historical examples. Maneuverists will point to a number of well-worn examples where shorter OODA cycles (for the German School, this typically involves recon-pull examples) contribute to situations where the enemy’s actions are rendered “too little, too late.”
Challenge to MW Essential Premise #2--Part 3
Challenge: If one admits that the OODA Loop concept does apply to aggregates of entities fighting aggregates of entities (i.e., it is indeed valid), how can one know that one is being effectively faster in such a context? By the time you detect/see the results of your speed, isn’t it too late to effectively exploit it?
Response: This is another extremely serious question. The kind of answer you get depends on which MW school you belong to—German school or Soviet school.
First of all, Boyd wasn’t the only one who believed the OODA Loop concept applied to aggregates. The Soviets believed much the same thing as articulated in their “Troop Control” algorithms. Their basic equation for Troop Control ran like this: Tcon (Time needed for effective Troop Control) was equal to T1 (time for effective reports to HQ) + T2 (Headquarters functioning, to include direction from higher headquarters) +T3 (time for orders and signals for the headquarters to reach the unit of action. According to the Soviets, C2 was operative if “Tcon (T1 + T2+ T3) + Top (the time it took for the receiving unit to execute) < Tcrit…with Tcrit being the “critical time” or the time within which the operation must be executed to have the intended effect. A great deal of foundation work in this regard was laid out by Altukhov in “Fundamentals of the Theory of Troop Control” in 1984. It’s difficult to say whether Altukhov was influenced by Boyd or not. We just don’t know.
So, given the Soviet algorithm. T1 = Observation. T2 had elements of Orientation and decision contained within. T3 and Top were the “action” elements of the OODA. It is very clear they understood that you had to tighten the Tcon loop to beat the Tcrit parameter.
Here is where the German school diverges from the Soviet school. To the Soviet school, the problem of detecting change in time to effectively take advantage of it is huge. Basically, they admit that it can’t be reliably done—and “reliably” is the operative term. So the focus is on preparation before the operation. Likely outcomes are calculated ahead of time and when conditions roughly approximate the preconditions for one of the options, then that option is chosen and pushed through. Here the idea is that the high command will be ready for certain sets of conditions with a “branch plan” or “sequel” ready for execution. If something unexpected comes up, it isn’t seized upon, even if it appears to be advantageous. That’s just how it is. So if you believe that a command and control system cannot possibly take advantage of the unforeseen in a reliable way, you tend to subscribe to Soviet school MW. The way to deal with uncertainty is to prepare like nobody’s business and execute violently but according to the plan (with all its branches and sequels).
On the other hand, German school embraces uncertainty and expects to “recon-pull” its way through the problem. So the German school adherents also admit that higher headquarters can’t judge the outcomes of actions in enough time to take advantage of them. So what the German school adherents advocate is decentralization—units see local conditions and act immediately, consistent with the higher commander’s intent. Decentralization buys the required speed—the cost is possibly the unity of effort. Commander’s intent is supposed to provide that unity of effort. Sometimes that occurs, sometimes it doesn’t. The criticism against German school MW is basically that you may not be able to rely on commander’s intent to govern initiative. If you don’t have cohesion, if you don’t have practiced experts, then I’d agree that they are right.
Of course, the requirements for expertise and cohesion throughout the system to accomplish this are much higher than it is for the Soviet school. It’s a lot less efficient but judged to be more effective. Like the basketball team, the players move the ball down the court and make the shots—there’s not much the coach can do on game day. His role was getting the team ready to play.
The German school advocates have a number of illustrations to show what they mean—and let’s admit it, these examples are pretty much a “best case” solution set. My favorite is SSgt Ruhbarth on the Meuse in 1940, pretty much pulling Guderian’s river crossing behind him (you can read all about that in Robert Doughty’s excellent book, The Breaking Point). And there are other equally compelling examples. But what is lacking are case studies that show breakdowns in this kind of command and control system. We have no shortage of cases showing the failures of Soviet School Maneuver Warfare (and I can provide those if anyone is interested). But we lack a comprehensive body of cases that show the risks in German school MW. Robert Leonhard tried to suggest one—Guderian’s conduct of the Battle of Yelnia in 1941—but I’d argue it’s not a good case (and I can provide my rationale why to anyone who asks—just send me a Private Message and I’ll send you a paper on it). Yet, I bet there are others. That said, I sense that these cases are illustrating poor applications of the theory rather than flaws in the theory itself. Of course, one might say the same thing about the Soviet school failures.
There are a number of cases that suggest the disadvantages of the German school approach that I will get into later. As far as the Soviet school failures, I would hope these are relatively self evident, but they may not be to some reading this thread. All I will say is that--despite these failures--they were good enough against the Germans and Japanese at the operational level of war to achieve success. This why Soviet School MW (and their understanding of the OODA Loop) is alive and well, even to this day.
There was no way the Soviets could attempt a German school solution. They had too many languages, conscription (even for NCOs) meant only a two to three year obligation, professionals were only to be found in the officer class—and of these, only at the field grade level (if at that) and above. The operative Soviet school problem was the risk that the situation would outrun the plan. They solved that through the echelon concept—basically, units would only be asked to do one thing and one thing only. Once they were done with that one thing, other units would follow them and carry on the fight. Therefore there was a huge emphasis on reconnaissance so units could prepare and plan to do that “one thing” and nothing more. Once units completed their mission, they were “expended.” Nothing further was asked of them. Other units continued the operation.
I’d hope this illuminates the effective challenges to this very key “MW Essential Premise.” Much depends on your particular experiences, studies, biases, and preferences as to whether you buy into Soviet or German school interpretations of the OODA Loop and how to implement it, or reject it altogether.
That's because all Boyd did with OODA...
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Originally Posted by
Teufel
I can agree with that. I think this really applies well to the current enemy as I have found that they really don't recover well if they are surprised. I don't know if you can train someone to incorporate the OODA to make quick decisions or if that just comes naturally with experience. I certainly wasn't thinking about Boyd when we were slugging it out, nor have I actively sought to train my mind to adopt his methods.
...was describe in a snappy way something that all humans are naturally coded to do from untold generations of evolution and survival. He didn't offer something new, he just offered a new description of something very old.
Kind of like discovering gravity. Important, but it was there all along.