Too many truths in all that...
Selil:
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Four hours training in how to use a blade screw driver is better than an hour on a phillips, an hour on a torx an hour on a blade, and finally an hour on an allen key screwdriver. They all work pretty much the same.
Not to pick on you and I know that's a hypothetical but I couldn't help thinking -- that's military instruction, cramming a 20 minute class into four hours... :rolleyes:
While there's too much truth in that as there is in what you say about being pretty much the same, another part of the problem is that in teaching the flat tip screwdriver, we don't teach the kid the mechanics of screws (because that's not a task...) so he understands the principle and we often fail to point out clockwise in unless it's a pre-war British item -- and we do not take the ten minutes involved to have him take out a few screws while blindfolded to embed the process in muscle memory (because he has to go to Rape Prevention class next...).
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Doctrine should be generational rather than turmoil. That way as members of the military are educated the systemic forces will create cohesion that strengthens capabilities rather than eroding under parasitic tensions of counter doctrinal actions.
Heresy! If we do that, then each new Commandant of a TRADOC School cannot invent something on his watch in order to get an enhanced OER. :D
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. The key goal was process improvement of an already defined skill, or the capture of that skill so the company could not be held "knowledge hostage".
That's called stovepiping in the services and we're terrible about it. Hostages everywhere. There's also another factor that impacts training. Aside from thinking the troops aren't smart enough to get 'advanced' concepts, the services have to face the double whammy of 'we can't spend too much money to teach the kid who may not stick around too long' and 'we can't train super soldiers rapidly not because we aren't able but because '...it takes time to make sure they won't misuse it.' Those can be managed but it's easier just to do it that way.
The counterpart double whammy is that kids are bored out of their skull by poor and excessively lengthy but too elementary training (kids of all ranks...) and good Captains leave because they do not wish to face a staff or instructor job and contribute to the first part or doing a lot of make-work.
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or bent processes like back ups in such a way that the company could not function without that specific entity.
The military counterpart is to keep knowledge to yourself and thereby becoming indispensable. I've met people who wouldn't and couldn't take a leave for fear their secret treasure trove of knowledge might be needed -- or found out.
Schmedlap:
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a focus on breaking down professional knowledge into just a list of skills is a bad idea.
Actually, breaking them down has merit -- but if the industry (or Army) involved doesn't take the next step of putting them back together to accomplish complex missions consisting of many individual and unit sub-tasks, then people will be stuck at the basic or task level. There is a difference between a METL and a Mission Training Program
Consider a simple thing like map use -- every school teaches virtually the same tasks to persons of all grades and skill levels. Rarely do they break those tasks down into basic, intermediate and advanced groups. Today, everyone can can get terrain mask data from the GIS software -- but Company, Battery and Troop Commanders should have been taught to do that for years with a plain old marginally accurate topo map. Actually, squad and section leaders should have been taught that. Still should. Today. So they can do it when the GIS is not available...
That's what happens when you teach tasks instead of how to achieve outcomes; people have to learn how to produce outcomes on their own. some can, some can't or won'. Your tale of precommission training showed you did -- but I bet you know several contemporaries who didn't... :eek:
Doctrine cannot drive Strategy.
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
That sentiment is useful and correct, but I would emphasise that there is no relationship between Doctrine and Strategy, except that Doctrine must provide a useable description of Strategy.
Saw this yesterday and mulled it a bit. If you mean that Doctrine must provide usable description of how to enable a Strategy to succeed, then I agree with what you say. However, I'd also posit that frequently, there is a reversal and Doctrine begins to drive Strategy -- a very bad outcome IMO. Selil in effect said that:
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Your doctrine is how you want to see stuff come out in the end, the strategy is a series of goals to meet that overall vision, and your tactics are the discrete elements, tools, methods, or things you do to implement the goals (would be strategy). Not completely aligned but the security paradigm I work within is completely flipped anyways.
Taking his statements in reverse order, I believe all security paradigms are eminently flippable. That is, in the realm of 'security' to have a fixed view is likely to lead to a more flexible opportunists breaching your security simply because you elected a dogmatic, complacent or egoistic approach -- or a 'Doctrinal' approach...
I think that goals are discrete aiming points. Those goals are determined by national policies. Those goals are achieved by developing a strategy or strategies to attain them. Doctrine is the hopefully coherent methodology and BROAD guidance you use to develop the operational and tactical methods to implement various strategies. Doctrine must not only allow but must encourage maximum flexibility in the selection of appropriate operational methods and TTP to implement strategies.
The alternative is to allow your doctrine to become dogma and drive your methodology and thus constrain your strategy. That requires less hard thinking and is the easier route. It also allows others to predict your probable responses with ease...
Should one decide to use one's doctrine to develop strategy, it seems one would be constrained to doing only what one firmly decided in advance to do -- a very problematic approach -- instead of determining what was needed and how best to achieve that.
I submit that problematic approach has been the US operating methodology for a number of years -- and that hasn't worked too well...
You are messing with a geriatric mind here...
Let me play with what you said:
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Doctrine should say "Strategy is X,Y and Z," ...
Does that mean that Doctrine says "this aspect of doctrine supports a Strategy of X. If you wish to do Y, then that aspect of doctrine supports that. OTOH if you want to do Z, this other aspect of doctrine shows how that can be accomplished." If so, I agree.
I'm concerned with ability to do X, Y and Z but not being able to rapidly cope with AA or AC (much less some antiquarian who drags out D, G or M... :D). I'm also concerned that Doctrine can be constraining in the sense that if it is allowed to drive strategy, means inappropriate to the task at hand may be selected simple because those means are the doctrine.
I do agree with this:
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so that the doctrine has some defined purpose. "We do this because....".
and would only suggest that doctrine should be minimal and not overly prescriptive. If it become to finite, it becomes the de facto 'book' and deviation is punished. That is not good. As you said initially, Strategy and Doctrine are different things:
Doctrine drives what we do and how we do it.
Strategy drives what must be done.
The two are melded into operational parameters or guidance and execution of operations to achieve the goals of the strategy. Our doctrine must support the elected strategy and if it does not, then new or altered doctrine should be developed to do that. Conversely, our strategy must not be constrained by current doctrine.
Thank you so much for that
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
I was at Bragg going over draft strategy with the Doctrine guys at SWCS this week and several times sparked the comment "that's not doctrine." To which my reply was essentially, "noted."
We cannot write a strategy for the future constrained by a doctirne based on an understanding of the past. Once we craft a new strategy, it will inform a review of existing doctrine and lead to a writing and publishing of the next generation of doctrine.
Once one becomes locked in place by their doctrine, they are doomed to an ultimate irrelevance.
I've always been confused by the fact that from a low guy on the totem pole perspective I kinda understood Doctrine to be like directions on how to
get somewhere
Strategy seemed like a where you want to go thing.
In that context it becomes an exercise in organized confusion when your looking for directions yet your not sure exactly where your going:confused:
Looks like you all are doing a good job of clearing that up for us. :)
Strategy for the future is a plan to achive goals, no more.
It is very broad, is devised and promulgated, hopefully with full knowledge that events and actions of others WILL cause changes. Thus strategy constantly evolves. Well, smart strategy does... :rolleyes:
Doctrine should also be broad. It could / would say you can, in the execution of a strategy, be required to do cordon and search operations.
Training involve using TTP which are fairly specific. They should still allow for individual approaches and differences standardizing only things so required to preclude self damage. TTP and Training tell you HOW to do a cordon and search; both must be frequently adjusted based on equipment and other parameters -- notably quality of personnel* -- as necessary.
Three different things with doctrine being the most static -- and therefor the one that need the closest scrutiny lest it constrain either your strategy or your TTP.
The problem in the US is that we have attempted to make 'doctrine' all inclusive to cover all eventualities (an obvious impossibility) and almost regulatory in its impact. IOW, in typical US fashion we have overdone it and thus confused doctrine with training and TTP (even with strategery... :D).
* Which the US Army has not bothered to do.