Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites

Where Are Our Priorities Focused…Lack of Knowledge of Basic Enemy Capabilites

About three days ago, I had a student that was completely lost during the FTX of the All-Source Intelligence Analyst Course (35F). I was bringing up points on knowing your enemy, their capabilities, what they are equipped with, how this effects you as an intelligence analyst, and how you need to take your knowledge of the enemy to better brief the Commander.

We started to discuss the aspects of the scenario, who the players were, what they were doing, what the pattern of life was, and eventually…we got on the topic of…What are they using to attack us.

I asked a few questions regarding weapons that were within the scenario that would pose a threat to friendly forces operating in that area. I was asked by the student who is about to graduate…

“You mean we need to know enemy weapons too???”

The student was being honest and sincere in their question, which made it hit me that much harder.

What I have been finding out is that there is the focus of targeting, data mining, COIN, etc., however intelligence analysts and combat arms troops alike can not differentiate between an AK-47, AKM, AKMS, or AK-74. I sat through a brief today, and was told that a PKM fires 5.45x45mm, and that an AK-74 is the same as a PKM, that is the same as an AK-47. The other day, the student was doing a scenario brief and tried to explain how the indicator to Indirect Fire (IDF) on a FOB was directly related to SA-7’s and DSHK Machine Guns found in a cache located near where IDF was reported to have been fired from. When I asked, acting as the commander, what the primary target of an SA-7 was, I came to find out that they did not know that it was a Surface-To-Air MANPAD weapon, and is not a weapon utilized in IDF attacks.

Additionally, I asked the students today what the difference between a 7.62x39mm and 7.62x54r was, and how that effected what may be found in a cache and how it might be related to a threat to troops in that area. Not one out of (24) students knew the difference, or could explain that the scenario that was presented to them included the application of that basic knowledge.

What I am finding is that we used to have playing cards that had Warsaw Pact aircraft and tanks on them that were commonly found in units. Only to now find that the students cannot differentiate between the application of an AK-47, and a Dragunov. After (4) months of courseware, these same students had no idea that a DSHK 12.7mm machine gun could take out a helicopter. Well…the problem arose that they didn’t even know what I was taking about at first until I showed them a picture.

What is going on with our training? What is it that the higher commands are expecting from our intelligence professionals, when all they know how to do is to identify data trends in a database? The current focus on upper echelon commanders has trickled down into our analysts not knowing basic information about how to research enemy capabilities, or knowledge of what they use.

I can understand if they have trouble differentiating between a VOIED, RCIED, etc., but to not know anything about weapons that are out there??? The Taliban utilizes weapons that are not lasers, or plasma guns, but basic weapons that have been around since their initial design in the 1940’s with only improvements in design, but still remain similar to the old.

I am finding that the analyst of today is useless without their computer, and unable to perform basic link analysis, enemy capabilities knowledge, or knowledge of common threats to our troops…which includes the everyday weapons that wound or kill our soldiers that leave the wire.

you wouldn't have that -- really unforgivable -- problem. The Task, Condition, Standard based model of training was never appropriate for a military force and was foisted on the Army by a series of civilian Education 'professionals.' It needs to go...

We need to apply Outcome Based Training and Education totally and rapidly instead of in spots and sporadically.

That some individuals or units are able to transcend the existing system is a compliment to them and the few people who got the extra mile to try to properly train them.

Like you. Thanks for doing that -- you might have helped someone keep some folks alive down the road...

The converse argument is that the OPFOR manual, Jane's etc can identify the equipment. Perhaps a foreign force weaponry recognition module is needed as part of the course. I wrote a user's guide to the RPG7 and a book on the weapons and tactics of the PLA at the operator's level. The latter is in the TRADOC system. Send me your details and I can send you names to confirm my work. Happy to do it as a favour.

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Originally Posted by GI Zhou

The converse argument is that the OPFOR manual, Jane's etc can identify the equipment. Perhaps a foreign force weaponry recognition module is needed as part of the course. I wrote a user's guide to the RPG7 and a book on the weapons and tactics of the PLA at the operator's level. The latter is in the TRADOC system. Send me your details and I can send you names to confirm my work. Happy to do it as a favour.

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I appreciate the offer. I have literally tons of information on foreign weapons. The problem I have is that I can not go off of the course cirriculum. So, I try and inject what I can, when I can to the students. As far as reference material, I have shown the students resources that come from DIA, NGIC, CIA, etc., on the classified side.

Where the problem is, that if I didn't bring it to their attention, none of them would know how to even look it up. I am an instructor at the last portion of the All-Source Intelligence Analyst Course (35F) where most 35F intelligence analyst go through here at Fort Huachuca. So, I get to see all of the students in the FTX portion just before they graduate. I can tell you that their almost 6-month course does not cover anything related to this topic at all.

So, even though it is not in the POI, I still force the issue and bring these things to their attention.

Yes, it is extremely frustrating, as I had a student today think that a couple Taliban fighters could take a ZPU-2 to the top of a mountain...well, until I told them that it is a towed anti-aircraft weapon. After they looked it up and saw the picture, their analysis of the stituation in the scenario totally changed.

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Originally Posted by Tracker275

IYes, it is extremely frustrating, as I had a student today think that a couple Taliban fighters could take a ZPU-2 to the top of a mountain...well, until I told them that it is a towed anti-aircraft weapon. After they looked it up and saw the picture, their analysis of the stituation in the scenario totally changed.

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Well, you can lug a ZPU-1 half way up a mountain (7:56 onwards). Does that get you half marks? :D

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

Well, you can lug a ZPU-1 half way up a mountain (7:56 onwards). Does that get you half marks? :D

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Hahaha....Ok, Ok...sure, they get half marks in my book...:D

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Originally Posted by Rex Brynen

Well, you can lug a ZPU-1 half way up a mountain (7:56 onwards). Does that get you half marks? :D

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The Chinese QJC02 15.5 x 114mm single barrel anti-aircraft machine gun is designed be easily broken up for mountain and plateau (Tibetan and Xinjiang) operations. It could certainly cause issues if it turned up in Afghanistan it would mean recent Chinese assistance and possible long range harrassing fire.

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Originally Posted by GI Zhou

The Chinese QJC02 15.5 x 114mm single barrel anti-aircraft machine gun is designed be easily broken up for mountain and plateau (Tibetan and Xinjiang) operations. It could certainly cause issues if it turned up in Afghanistan it would mean recent Chinese assistance and possible long range harrassing fire.

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That is the kind of stuff I'm talking about. You described a weapon system, which is most definitely a threat to CF aircraft. You also explained in a bottom line up front ("BLUF") way how it could create problems if supported by certain individuals.

Unfortunately, tid-bits of information like this that offer a commander with extensive knowledge in how to employ his troops in a manuever aspect without creating casualties that are unnessesary...are not currently conveyed by intelligence professionals when the weapon system is literaly thrown in front of their face.

Frankly, that weapon system you described is a most definitely a perfect fit for Taliban fighters for sure. I can only hope they do not employ it.

This is awesome! It just makes the point that higher is to focused internally (matrices, numbers, programs, etc.) and not focused outboard (results) on the enemy. You can see this across the USMC that we have lost the ability to care more about the fact that a commander has achieved a decision and reached the commanders intent, however it happens, vice caring that he did all of his PTP training to even get to where he is today.

As commanders we lose the So what part of the problem when all that is provided is numbers and graphs. We see the same thing as students do METT-TC of the enemy. They can list the heck out of everything that the enemy has, BUT as far as being able to explain its capabilities and what it is able to do they have no clue. As for that I blame myself as an instructor. But overall we can do a better job.

I know nothing about the school that you work for so I apologize upfront for speaking outside of my box but there has to be some creative way that you can engage the students and at the minimum introduce the topic to them and discuss it.

Ken,
I just escaped from the same schoolhouse that Tracker is trapped in now and you are absolutely right. Instead of teaching the students how to find information, assess it, draw conclusions, and present it, we focus on tools. I suppose the analogy would be fixating on how to use a hammer, saw, and level, but not teaching how to build a house. So what we end up with are kids who can fill out a chart but have no concept of what that information means. As an instructor, I lost count of the times a student when through the process and failed to see the answer that was staring them in the face. Very frustrating. The POI needs more time to cover all the skills, but TRADOC won't allow it, and then there is the "quantity over quality" mentality that permeates all of USAIC.

BTW, Tracker, I'm responsible for the ZPU-2 on the mountain. If it's the one in Kamdesh district, then it did what I wanted it to do...and nice job nailing that. Some of your colleagues might have missed that.

The flip side of this problem is that there a lot of tools in the box, and it takes a great deal of technical know how to use them. (Let's leave aside for a moment that the tools are constantly in flux, and the contracted nature of our current conflicts replaces the tools every few months for the newest tool, or that we have multiple tools that do the exact same job, and are completely committed to redundant reporting.)

The unfortunate part of our profession is that it does require using these tools, preparing the data to be disseminated to the lowest level (and that doesn't always mean Private Snuffy) and managing information with multiple machines and trackers. For us dumb maneuver guys this is often extremely difficult.

The real challenge we face, especially at the CO/BN level where the rubber meets the road is synching these two things. I don't think anyone really honestly expects a PVT to do real analysis of any kind, nor should we expect our SSGs and CPTs to be plugging away at the TIGR/ASAS-L/GE/MCS machines late into the night. I think we are also pushing the responsibility to the wrong people as well; yes it's the 35 series job to do some of these tasks, but utlimately they are not the decision makers. The accountability falls on commanders and operations guys to take those products and use critical thinking and apply their own analysis to the situations, not pass the blame for their own failures to some enlisted kid who will never see the enemy or the terrain anyway.

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Originally Posted by qp4

I don't think anyone really honestly expects a PVT to do real analysis of any kind

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I disagree...I do expect a private to do real analysis; that is their job and I expect them to do their job. Will I put them on a task of high complexity? Maybe...depends on the talent level of the Soldier. There is simply too much data coming in for just the NCOs to analyze...junior enlisted Soldiers have to be involved. (Besides, many of our SGTs and SSGs are re-classed and may have less analytical experience than the SPC they are supervising.) But in order for them to have any credibility, they must have the basic skills (research, critical thinking/analysis, written and oral communication).

Not least because I've seen too many demonstrate they can do analysis -- and embarrass a senior soul or two in the process. You didn't even mention that if you don't start 'em out properly, they will not perform well later when they will be expected by everyone to think and do a decent job.

If we do not break this "Joe isn't paid to think..." mentality then Joe will continue to try to avoid thinking to the maximum possible extent; most currently see it as part of their job description.

OTOH, if you demand that Joe think, he will -- and we'll ALL be better off and perhaps Officers and NCOs can start spending less than 90% of their time on 10% of their people -- while ignoring the others to raise themselves. That 'lowly enlisted swine' attitude possessed by a few has done the US Army no favors...:mad:

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Not least because I've seen too many demonstrate they can do analysis -- and embarrass a senior soul or two in the process. You didn't even mention that if you don't start 'em out properly, they will not perform well later when they will be expected by everyone to think and do a decent job.

If we do not break this "Joe isn't paid to think..." mentality then Joe will continue to try to avoid thinking to the maximum possible extent; most currently see it as part of their job description.

OTOH, if you demand that Joe think, he will -- and we'll ALL be better off and perhaps Officers and NCOs can start spending less than 90% of their time on 10% of their people -- while ignoring the others to raise themselves. That 'lowly enlisted swine' attitude possessed by a few has done the US Army no favors...:mad:

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Concur 120%.

Gaps in training are usually gaps between ears. Not that training is perfect by any means but if one fails to think the best training in the world serves little purpose.

The sooner entry analysts learn that process is merely a framework to assist in developing analytical skills rather than a road map to analytical nirvana, the better off they and we will be.

the same thing applies to checklists: they are guides to prompt memory recall. If you don't know it, a checklist won't do anything but add structure to ignorance.

Best
Tom

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Originally Posted by Ken White

Not least because I've seen too many demonstrate they can do analysis -- and embarrass a senior soul or two in the process. You didn't even mention that if you don't start 'em out properly, they will not perform well later when they will be expected by everyone to think and do a decent job.

If we do not break this "Joe isn't paid to think..." mentality then Joe will continue to try to avoid thinking to the maximum possible extent; most currently see it as part of their job description.

OTOH, if you demand that Joe think, he will -- and we'll ALL be better off and perhaps Officers and NCOs can start spending less than 90% of their time on 10% of their people -- while ignoring the others to raise themselves. That 'lowly enlisted swine' attitude possessed by a few has done the US Army no favors...:mad:

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Never in the history of warfare have there been more intel analysts and other assorted odd bodies yet the ability to join the dots in a place such as Afghanistan appears to be unimproved from the distant past.

Ken, you seem to believe that if you set these guys free they will do the job that's expected of them? So where exactly is the blocking point in the system? Can you point your finger on it?

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Originally Posted by JMA

Never in the history of warfare have there been more intel analysts and other assorted odd bodies yet the ability to join the dots in a place such as Afghanistan appears to be unimproved from the distant past.

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That is true and the Staffs are far too large. However, I will defend the folks that are there by saying the Strategic and policy failures that put and keeps them there and which rules their day to day conduct intrudes significantly on their ability to accomplish as much as they should be able to.

Having said that, I believe the blocking points -- there are several -- lie here and in this order:

LINK.

LINK.

LINK.

In short, the blocking points are overall US bureaucracy, organizational self serving systems and processes and marginal training inculcating a lack of trust and a reliance on processes rather than people.

It's that simple -- but that is extremely difficult to remediate.

Good news is the Kids mostly make it work in spite of the system...

Helluva way to fight a war. :mad:

When I clicked on Ken's link to U.S. Army Human Resources Command the message below came up. I guess this is further proof that they are the nefarious guys Ken says they are.

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There is a problem with this website's security certificate.

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I don't know much about computers, I started out as a 13B.

Ain't no use in lookin' down
Ain't no Discharge on the ground

Of course, I moved up from that humble beginning, and when I was the Fire Support Officer for 1/32 Inf I learned what an Infantry unit is like in the field, a travelling psycho ward. :eek:

I realize my off-kilter messages can sometimes be distractions from the subject under discussion. I was both enlisted and commissioned, so when I see overly intellectualized discussions about the service I'm occasionally tempted to respond with words from a Jody Cadence, the "Garry Owen," or the kinds of remarks EMs might have said back in my day.

One of the things I took pride in when I served was that I was the same guy to my NCOs and enlisted men as I was to my superior officers -- I wouldn't switch back and forth depending on who I was talking to. My habit of saying that there were things the organizations I was in charge of could be doing better was seen by raters and senior raters as admissions of derelection of duty, that I fell short of the "excellence" my peers were claiming to have achieved.

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Originally Posted by Pete

My habit of saying that there were things the organizations I was in charge of could be doing better was seen by raters and senior raters as admissions of derelection of duty, that I fell short of the "excellence" my peers were claiming to have achieved.

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Well that depends on whether the performance at the time was good (with some room for improvement), average (with a lot of room for improvement), trying (but with room for massive improvement), barely functioning (just going through the motions).

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Originally Posted by JMA

Well that depends on whether the performance at the time was good (with some room for improvement), average (with a lot of room for improvement), trying (but with room for massive improvement), barely functioning (just going through the motions).

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I was speaking of the 1982-84 period, when the U.S. Army changed from a "don't piss off the troops" attitude to one of establishing standards to recover from the post-Vietnam slump of the 1970s. Those who did not adapt quickly to the shift in emphasis were swept away, as I was.

In 1979 in Germany my battalion commander asked me what award a sergeant/E5 of mine had been nominated for upon the occasion of his upcoming permanent change of station. I said none because the Criminal Investigation Division at the Grafenwoehr training area was investigating him for pulling a knife on another NCO he thought had stolen his wallet. (Both were African-American gentlemen.) The battalion commander said, "Well, we don't expect the same standards from our NCOs as we do from our officers." As it turned out the CID report arrived at battalion HQ just before the sergeant left, and he received no Army Commendation Medal.

Things changed abruptly a few years later, and around 1987 Army Times reported that there had been an unofficial reduction in force among company-grade officers in 1984, with more questionable officer separations than since the post-Vietnam RIF.