Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level
A couple of recent threads detailing the Stryker Bde in the Arghandab area (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8082) and how Taliban take over a village (http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9205) have caused me to rethink my attitude towards denial of insurgent freedom of maneuver.
Villages and other populated areas can be considered sanctuaries for insurgents until counter-insurgent forces wrest control away. As such, I'm curious what you all think are relevant factors when trying to deny access to an area, in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms. I think these sort of ops can be both enemy- and population-centric in a seamless way, and they need not be a black or white proposition that has been sensationalized in recent media offerings.
ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have been slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night, to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.
Used it for a business plan...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
jcustis
ETA: I guess it would be better to frame my question through the use of a hypothetical scenario (I'll call it a tactical decision game). Let's say we are dealing with Pashtun Taliban who have slipping into a series of villages along the Helmand River at night to conduct an intimidation effort against local civilians in order to secure poppy cultivation and onward shipment. They receive passive and active support in the process, ranging from areas to rest, cache supplies and arms/ammunition. When the feel secure enough, they remain in these areas and move amongst the people as they go about their daily routine, holding Sharia Law courts to keep the locals in line. Their endstate is to control a network of villages through subversion first, but intimidation if required. This network of villages, while producing funds via opium cultivation and other taxes, is also intended to serve as a footprint from which attacks against coalition forces can be conducted.
Hi Jon,
Know that your CAG-guy would be working his assessments of Security, Economics ($/hectare), and Governance of their side and ours for you. Here is something from the civilian side of things that might be of use to you as well.
From Marketing Strategy 3rd Edition by O.C. Ferrell and Michael D. Hartline (man they are proud of that book...my wallet cried for days):
Internal Environment
- Availability and Deployment of Human Resources
- Age & Capacity of Equipment or Technology
- Availability of financial resources
- Power & Political Struggles within the Firm
- Current Marketing Objectives & Performance
Customer Environment
- Who are our current & potential customers?
- What do customers do with our products?
- Where do customers purchase our products?
- When do customers purchase our products?
- How & why do customers select our products?
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External Environment
- Economic growth & stability?
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- Technological Advancements?
Merry Christmas
Steve
Denial Operations / Interdiction
I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.
Sovereign borders are a key form of what I call legal status sanctuary
Quote:
Originally Posted by
BorderEnforcementAdvisor
I am currently stationed in Iraq where I am advising the Iraq Department of Border Enforcement. Among my peers we have had numerous discussions in regards to denial/interdiction operations. Obviously we want to stop the flow of foreign fighters and outside influences into the country. One of the questions we posed was what; is our current doctrine in regards denial/interdiction operations. After much time researching this topic very little doctrine exists; David Galula states in his book, Counterinsurgency and Doctrine,
“Every country is divided for administrative and military purposes into provinces, counties, districts, zones, etc. The border areas are a permanent source of weakness for the counterinsurgent whatever his administrative structures, and his advantage is usually exploited by the insurgent, especially in the initial violent stages of the insurgency. By moving from one side of the border to the other, the insurgent is often able to escape pressure or, at least, to complicate operations for his opponent.”
The only doctrine I have been able to find is FM 31-55 Border Security and Anti-Infiltration Operations written in 1968. It is currently out of print and I ordered it through Amazon.com. Since then new doctrine has been written. But very little has been written on border and anti-infiltration operations. In the early 1980 the Low Intensity Conflict FM came out, I am not sure of its number. In 1986 Counter-Guerrilla Operations FM 90-8 dedicated about four paragraphs to the topic of securing the borders. FM s 3-24 and 3-24.2 discuss very little about border operations. They state the obvious that securing the borders is important. FM 3-07 Stability Operations makes reference to securing borers, but does not provide a guide to developing a plan to secure the borders. So the point of my post is where is the doctrine and why have we allowed ourselves to become so far behind in this topic.
Any law that constrains that actions of those enforcing the law, but enables the actions of those violating the law is clearly a problem. This is exactly what borders are.
In Vietnam we hand built an insurgent sanctuary by creating the state of North Vietnam; let alone allowing the use of Cambodia and Laos relatively free from attack.
Similarly the Durand line is a matter that must be effectively dealt with between the governments of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West if there is to be any hope in working toward an enduring solution. It means nothing to the Pashtun people; it is a constant source of irritation to Afghanistan; and a critical national interest to sustain for Pakistan; and the primary sources of legal status sancuary for Taliban insurgents and AQ UW operators. This can only be settled at a conference table by senior diplomats and leaders, and due to the many divergent interests will require some very creative statecraft. Someone order up some creative senior people for State.
This is good if your focus is counterinsurgent
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Originally Posted by
MikeF
I tend to agree with much of what the author wrote. I posted these two paragraphs b/c I think they help highlight how to consider sanctuaries.
But if your goal is counterinsurgency (defeating the reasons the government is being challenged and not just those individuals or organizations who currently dare to operationalize that challenge); then this is a pretty limited view IMO.
There is far more dangerous sanctuary to Great Britain among the disaffected Pakistanis heritage British Citizens living in Great Britain than than there is in either the countries of Afghanistan or Pakistan. Thus the importance of understanding and addressing the sanctuary within poorly governed populaces over that of undergoverned spaces. As this author states, dirt can be surrounded, searched, and cleared of insurgents. But while that may be a critical supporting effort to a larger COIN operation, I would caution strongly against considering it decisive, or a COG to ones larger campaign.
The irony is, the harder one works to defeat the physical sancutaries in the lands of others; may very well be intensifying the sanctuaries among your disaffected popualces at home with ties to the issues and people of those regions. Win the battle, lose the war. When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.
There are second and third order effects
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
When people talk about COIN being PhD warfare, this the type of second/third order effect consideration and understanding that they are referring to. Not that it is somehow vastly more difficult to take down an insurgent safehouse than it is a squad position.
in everything we do. Taking out an enemy Squad may be simple but what that Squad was doing at that location may have several orders of effect and it may have been better to have bypassed them.
Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants...
Ken, strong points, but not much related to mine.
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Highly disputable. Machiavelli and John of Islay among others plus the survival of Byzantium for Centuries would seem to be but three examples refuting your first assertion. Your case for it assumes a degree of selfishness that is not universal and is peculiarly western in large quantities. You also excluded third party interventions which are, as 'humanely' practiced in a 'limited' war, a western proclivity and which muddle your position...
As for your summation, I suspect the survivors of the conventional battles at Peleliu and the Hurtgen Forest might strongly disagree. In fact, given the overall history of US Arms for the past 264 years, it seems our net effectiveness at it is at best questionable. As Jon Custis once noted, we have been fortunate that our opponents have been more screwed up than we have...:wry:
My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.
Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own.
At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.
When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :
"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."
De Nile is a river in Africa...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.
Doh. Of course they are. I think Surferbeetle says that quite well...
My points were and are that the difference is a policy, not a military issue and that COIN no more goes against human nature than is effective conventional warfare "at the essence..." of it. If that statement were remotely true, we would have more conventional wars, not fewer as is the historic trend. You then say:
Quote:
When tasked to help suppress an insurgency...say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :
"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."
You obviously live in a dream world. First, the mantra that poor governance is the cause of all insurgency has been refuted by many here over the past few months -- that is a dangerous misperception. While that is frequently touted by the insurgents as 'their' reason it often is far from the truth and that FACT is amply demonstrated by the number of successful insurgencies where the new government is worse than the one it replaced...
Secondly, you try to tell the average Politician who thinks he's in charge that you'll get back to him in two weeks and see how far that flies. Telling him or her that to acknowledge their failures flies in the face of your own logic:
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"Also that politicians are better at seeing the faults in the actions of other nations governments than they are in their own."
Threats by military people to resign are welcomed by politicians; that way they can reach down and get compliant folks to the top...
My points not only are directly related to yours, you implicitly acknowledge with this:
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At no point did I address the differences of the military aspect of either of those two types of political conflict; merely that the military should be aware of differences of the political nature between the two, and not apply a one size fits all solution.
that my initial statement was and is correct:
"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."
Thank you for your support. ;)
Applied results of non-kinetic TTP's...
I would like to emphasize some of the deep and subtle insights made so far on and compare them with a 'real-time' report regarding the interdependencies of the trinity of governance, economics, and security...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
"Warfare is not at all complex -- policy pertaining to warfare is quite complicated. That is true of MCO and COIN -- and all other variants..."
Thank you for your support. ;)
...and from Dr. Marc Tyrrell
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The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.
From today's Washington Post by Blaine Harden: In N. Korea, a strong movement recoils at Kim Jong Il's attempt to limit wealth (H/T to Daniel Drezner)
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It was an unexplained decision -- the kind of command that for more than six decades has been obeyed without question in North Korea. But this time, in a highly unusual challenge to Kim's near-absolute authority, the markets and the people who depend on them pushed back.
Grass-roots anger and a reported riot in an eastern coastal city pressured the government to amend its confiscatory policy. Exchange limits have been eased, allowing individuals to possess more cash.
The currency episode reveals new constraints on Kim's power and may signal a fundamental change in the operation of what is often called the world's most repressive state. The change is driven by private markets that now feed and employ half the country's 23.5 million people, and appear to have grown too big and too important to be crushed, even by a leader who loathes them.