I'll put my thoughts forward and see what everyone thinks of it.
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Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...but the vast majority of small wars have been won this way. That is inflicting so much pain on the enemy that he has given up military means. That is the limit of military power.
Those who say "Ahh... but the bad guys won by negotiation." Wallah! As long as the military has forced him to seek a resolution by peaceful means, then that is good enough. Military did it's job.
My perspective is (and I'll issue my standard disclaimer here - my experience is all in the trees so a view of the forest may be eluding me - hence my interest in SWJ and these forums) that the military serves a mission of greater scope than just the levying of military power. Like it or dislike it, mission creep is firmly entrenched in the NATO/ ABCA armies and we don't have to like it but we do have to work with it.
Military power is not just about 'inflicting so much pain on the enemy that he has given up military means', it is about either inflicting or threatening to inflict pain so that we convince, force or guide him into a course of action that is in-keeping with what we want.
In the current COIN environment the military is responsible for the sharp-end of persuasion, both in convincing the Afghan population that military opposition to us is too costly for them and futile, while simultaneously convincing them that 'our way' of security and governance brings greater benefit and prosperity than any alternative. Thus the 'limit' of military power cannot be neatly defined - we have to project power against the TB/ TB factions as you are saying, forcing him to either surrender or negotiative but simultaneously we have to present a viable alternative with the ANSF and development.
As to saying the military mission's success/ failure ends when the enemy accepts negotiation? Again, I'll put forward an alternative view. Having followed a number of your posts I'm well aware your a passionate Clausewitzian (and yes, I did just invent that term :) ) so I'll offer the view that with military endeavours being an extension of politics, political undertakings also require ongoing military activities. The military 'job' may be the continuation or threat of future violence to keep the enemy at the negotiating table or to increase the position of strength from which a settlement may be reached. It may also be maintaining sufficient forces and capabilities as deterrance to ensure the gains won.
Apologies if I am rambling - basically, I see the military mission as extending beyond merely forcing the enemy off the battlefield.
To put forward my own views, hopefully extending the topic in question and not taking away from it:
Yes, we do need 'killing' and violence in Afghanistan. Whether more or less I don't know.
What I do believe is that the military role should be related to security, incorporating both violence and the threat of violence to shape the population and eny in the AO in accordance with the friendly force mission. The military should be able to draw upon sufficient redevelopment resources to facilitate this mission through both the 'clear' and 'hold' phases of COIN to create security, providing the ability to bribe, persuade or convince the holders of power and the general population that our way indeed is a better way than the TB offer. Come the 'build' phase, however, civilian agencies must take the helm and become the driving force. Without doubt a military presence must remain in some sense but the main effort should change.
Simply put I think the military mission should be gaining consent amongst the population by the 'stick and carrot' application of military power, incorporating the ever-loved 'non-kinetic' effects to provide most of the 'carrot' that we can offer - reconstruction, prosperity, employment, etc. Nation building, reconstruction, capacity building - in my mind that is a civil/ state role that should be undertaken by civil players with the military in support.
And so ends my rant. The military job isn't in merely getting the enemy to the negotiating table, it's about getting him there while having shaped the environment so any negotiated success can be sustained. If that means the military has to engage in non-military tasks such as reconstruction then so be it - I just believe (and this was my contribution to the discussion) that the military should engage in the clear/ hold, and other actors should drive the build phase.
I trust I have grasped the essence and meaning of what you were saying William, and haven't debated away from the topic. I'm interested in this topic and accept my perspectives have been shaped more by personal preconceptions than by experience or wisdom, so I'm interested in your response.
Cheers! :)
Defeat, secure, then use civil affairs for "hearts & minds"
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The British in Malaya broke the back of the communist insurgency there not between 1952-1954 under the hearts and minds campaign of Templer, but with the use of brute military force combined with Briggs's resettlement program between 1949-1951. Once the insurgency's back was broken, Templer in charge was able to use persuasion of hearts and minds to further things along. This explanation is real and is truthful and has been put forward by a number of leading British scholars over the past few years, most recently in a special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies that challenges the Malaya Coin Paradigm.
I agree with logic you first beat and kill the enemy, then you deal in hearts and minds in a major way for the civil affairs follow up. But I do not agree you can expect to do both simultaneously, that just creates "scrambled eggs" which is what we have been doing and results in blowing up new schools, housing, roads, bridges, etc. when we have not first and foremost defeated the terrorists and established long term security control...which security needs to be provided more by national forces and less and less by NATO/allied forces.
My two cents and I think all histories of warfare at all levels support my "view."
That's okay, George, you don't have to bribe me...
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Originally Posted by
George L. Singleton
My two cents and I think all histories of warfare at all levels support my "view."
Even without your two cents, my history of warfare totally corroborates your views. :wry:
Good Post.
The pat American solution of throwing money at a problem has led us astray in Foreign Policy and in the COIN arena. I have watched a tremendous amount of waste as our gifts and aid are misused for things not intended, unused due to being totally inappropriate, trashed as not understood or just destroyed because the bad guys could do so. Total security is not required before embarking on projects -- but you better be above 50% surety before you pass out more than food, health and comfort aid.
We also need to be really careful to whom we give even that... :eek:
Clear and cool couple of hundred miles south of you... :cool:
How bad processes replicate...
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Originally Posted by
pjmunson
You have to do both at the same time... they aren't going to support you and they are going to be much more likely to buy into the insurgents' arguments.
But -- as you say below, you have to do both in at least a semi-intelligent manner. Also, the populace isn't buying anything. They are being pulled in two directions and fear always trumps goodies.
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And one of the biggest issues in winning their "hearts and minds", is to show them that once you come through and rid their town of the insurgent, you're not going to go off chasing him miles away, only to have the insurgents quietly return to slash the throats of those who come out in support of the government/COIN force.
Partly correct. You'll win his grudging tolerance and polite responses. You aren't getting his heart or his mind and will get very little respect. And you're still a foreigner... :(
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Raw sewage in the streets or no power = insurgent support. No jobs or no income = guys planting IEDs to feed their families. No mechanism for justice = lawlessness = criminal income and assistance for the insurgency. All of these things if left untreated make your kinetic job more difficult.
True but the three things you named are all civil functions. Military knowledge and capability in all three efforts is in extremely short supply. I do not see that changing. Ergo you're looking at Contractors or civil service folks -- who need a modicum of security before they appear. If you start too soon (see Iraq) you'll have three to five times as much effort and expense due to destruction of your premature efforts (see Iraq).
All that can be fixed at a cost in time and effort if there is adequate security; if not, you're just sticking fingers in dikes.
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So don't build the school if you have not done the kinetic things to drive the insurgents off in the first place, and still don't build it if you are not going to put forces in place to keep the populace safe. This comes into the resourcing problem mentioned earlier. You are chasing mercury if you do not have the forces to create persistent security.
That repeats what you said above, I still agree.
The issue is how do you do that if you do not have enough troops?
The obvious if unlikely to happen answer is get more troops. An alternative is to pre-empt these things before they get to the cluster stuck damage control level. We may or may not do that. Bad processes replicate because we lazily let them. We didn't learn a thing in Viet Nam because everybody cued on the wrong lessons; what really needed to be done was known but was put in the 'too hard' box by some seriously flawed Flag Officers who allowed that to happen. We appear likely to repeat that error if in a different direction if some have their way.
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Finally, while it would be nice if the military could focus on "purely military" things while others took care of the CA stuff, a reminder that the U.S. military has more bandsmen than the State Department has diplomats should tell us how the budget pie is, and will continue to be cut up. Until we are willing to give up some bandsmen (metaphorically speaking, and the we here is really Congress and the Executive branch budgeteers) then the military is going to have to be willing to do more than purely military tasks.
Again true. Add to that the fact that such a realignment entails the breaking of Rice Bowls, will be resisted by Congress and many in DoD and it is possible that little change will occur. Yetl, there are some good moves afoot and some of them will appear in Afghanistan over the next few months, others will take longer. After all, we used to ride to work on Elephants, it took a while but we finally parked 'em... ;)
A past problem was that most reacted with "We can do this, we'll make it work somehow. We'll just do it right next time." I've heard that bit too many times. As one of my pet Generals said "We 'can-do' ourselves to death." His Aide, a bright young Major, was fond of occasionally asking "What flavor of kool-Aid is popular in DC today?"
Fortunately, this time more people are more connected and more questions are being asked, many are beginning to say the conventional wisdom didn't work; we gotta change things. That is a good thing. :cool:
While you're dozing, contemplate the fact that you're correct
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Originally Posted by
kingo1rtr
One of the early contentions in this thread was the premise that war is war. I wonder if we ought to be making security in Afghanistan, not war. Why?
. . .
My point being if we kick every door down to get at the Taliban (and most of those doors belong to locals), and do get our man, what use is it if we turn round and there is nothing to hand him to, if we have failed to create the security, in doing so failing to win the 'minds' of the local, are we not ultimately failing, simply creating a tactical gain but underpinning operational failure and ultimately strategic stalemate?
You have just cited a superb and I think accurate rationale for why these types of operations are best avoided. That means identifying future problems early on, increasing the Corps Diplomatique locally, sending in a few SAS / SF and some Police Assisters on a low key basis and putting USAid or DFID to work BEFORE one needs to send the Army in. Thus hopefully to preclude having to do so.
Once you send in the Armies, the potential for escalation is significant, that for war almost assured. Armies break things. If they do that well (and they are worthless if they do not), they'll almost certainly do the foreign internal development thing poorly for a number of practical reasons.
Armies need to be trained to and able to do that mission, no question -- and the US was quite remiss in not being so prepared eight years ago and that has cost us -- but to expect more than a marginal performance and problem free execution from any decent Armies in such missions is deluded.
So you're spot on.
Now to get the Politicians aligned... :eek: :wry: