Fight-Win or Full Spectrum?
War at the Pentagon - Jim Hoagland, Washington Post
Quote:
The most intense arguments over U.S. involvement in Iraq do not flare at this point on Capitol Hill or on the campaign trail. Those rhetorical battles pale in comparison to the high-stakes struggle being waged behind closed doors at the Pentagon.
On one side are the "fight-win guys," as some describe themselves. They are led by Gen. David Petraeus and other commanders who argue that the counterinsurgency struggle in Iraq must be pursued as the military's top priority and ultimately resolved on U.S. terms...
Arrayed against them are the uniformed chiefs of the military services who foresee a "broken army" emerging from an all-out commitment to Iraq that neglects other needs and potential conflicts. It is time to rebuild Army tank battalions, Marine amphibious forces and other traditional instruments of big-nation warfare -- while muddling through in Iraq.
I unavoidably compress what is a serious and respectful struggle about resources, military strategy and political ideology. The weapons in this discreet conflict include budget requests, deployment schedules and, increasingly, speeches and public presentations that veil the true nature of the internal struggle but reveal how the military's top commanders line up...
PSYOPS & Public Relations = Voice of America, not "spin"
Psyops and PR - as distinct from spin - are a little understood part of the campaign against our enemies. A friend on this site just mentioned this topic to me as little understood by many who write here.
Being budget conscious as the JCS has to be, vs. General Petraeus in the field, PSYOPS and related public relations (again, not spin) are the tactical and stratetic, long term most cost effective way to deal with Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The total war on terrorism, is an ideological/religious conflict, as Tom has written in related recent postings here. I have been hammering that point of view myself since day one of 9/11, it is a war being waged due to terrorist kidnapping of Islam as if it were soley theirs to interpret and run!
Guerilla warfare has never been easy to defend against, the ratio you know better than I do (I am Air Force, not Marine or Army) of troops to resist and fight back against guerillas is pretty substantial.
If any older West Pointers are out there you used to study in a textbook sense at West Point lessons about the Civil War's best known guerilla warfare personage, Colonel John Singleton Mosby. Mosby and my late first cousin, Alex Singleton, an Army paratrooper in WW II and Korea, in side by side photos looked like twins, in fact!
The debate should be about the mix; not either/or.
I suspect that the proponents of "fight to win", as Mr. Hoagland describes them, are more committed to the goal of keeping "boots on the ground" in Iraq than they are to any particular type of force structure or tactical doctrine. Those who want to put this war behind them must argue their case by focusing on the strategic challenges ahead, rather than be tarred with the brush of "defeatism". Nonetheless, restructuring our military to fight more "Iraqs" and "Afghanistans", at the expense of not preparing to fight another "Korea", "Vietnam" or some other type of "big war", will have tragic consequences somewhere down the road.
During my active duty service (1969-1975) I served with the U.S. Army Special forces for almost 4 years, mostly in Vietnam and other parts of Southeast Asia. I served a little more than a year with conventional forces in the Republic of Korea. As good and brave as the Green Berets were, they could not have lasted very long in combat against North Korean armor and artillery in the rugged but open terrain of South Korea. Conversely, M60 tanks and M113 APCs could be easily destroyed from covered and concealed positions along the myriad of choke points on the twisting trails and roads throughout South Vietnam, especially during the quagmire-causing monsoon season. Moreover, one can terrify a population using tanks and IFVs; but that is very diferent from pacifying them.
Based upon the experience I had, I believe that it is not possible for the same tactical doctrine and force structure to work well in both insurgency and mechanized warfare. Our military must have both an unconventional warfare force and a mechanized warfare force. The debate should be over what is the proper mix of these two force structures, and -just as important- what the distinction between the roles of the Army and the Marines should be.
I have my own ideas about what the mix of force structures, and what the distinctions between marines and soldiers, should be. I am sure that every one in this community has their own as well. That's where the focus of the struggle in the Pentagon should be. The "fight to win" crowd are just playing politics by another name.
I've been saying since mid 2002
(Note the year, 2002 is correct), after W. told that CNN Reporter in Jan 02 that "Regime change in Iraq is a goal of my administration," that we'd go to Iraq (did, in 2003), it'd take five years (2008) to achieve marginal stability (takes that long to rebuild --or build, either way -- an Army), ten (2013) to reasonable stability (that long for that Army to get fully functional on ID) and about fifteen (2018) to the nominal rule of law (that long before they have an external defense capability) -- and that within 30 years (or by 2033), Iraq would be a fully functional nation governed in accordance with world -- not western but world -- norms.
I further have long said we'd start reducing troops in late '08 and get down to around 40K by 2012 to 2013 and that number would be there for years. For Balad, think Stuttgart; for Al Faw, think Camp Casey; for Kuwait, think Japan.
Thus far, I've seen nothing that indicates I need to revise my guesses so I have not. Prepared to admit I erred if it appears that I did -- but thus far, I'm pretty sure we'll be there in 2033 (with acknowledgment that it is the ME and unpredictable things can happen).
Things are indeed not out of the woods -- and will not be for many years; the end result will be judged worth it but there'll be a lot of screaming by the impatient and unconfident in the meantime... :D
I couldn't do anything to improve on that
other than nit pick.
I would suggest one more topic; from COL Roper's trip report slides; "Delegate beyond point of comfort." I believe that is totally applicable to all spectrums of combat and to most non-combat activities.
I understand 'Outcome based training' is a new term in the works.
I might also add Bruce Palmer to those Cav / Armor leaders who adapted to both types of war. ;)
Good job.
Flattened, decentralized organizations and operations
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
2) It is much less about the equipment or MTOE than the training/education/mindset of the leaders - the units in Iraq that have been radically successful have understood their environment's demands and developed approaches suited for it.
4) The key is creating adaptive leaders, schooled in the principles of all forms of warfare (HIC, COIN, etc), and able to develop solutions unique to the environment the soldier finds himself in. Given the force structure, we can't afford to "specialize" in anything, we have to (and can) prepare through education and training for the "full spectrum" of conflict. Contrary to posters above, I believe we can have an "all purpose" force, which morphs to the environment's demands.
5) Company grade officers have excelled in the current fight, adapting and executing at levels unheard of five years ago. We can't go back to the pre-2003 version of the micro-managed, overcontrolled, O-6 signature army. Once this begins to wind down, we can't let garrison intertia strip the initative and authority from these superb officers who wielded great responsibility downrange. We need to nurture and develop it systemically.
6) We learned all this previously, as did other armies. We can't afford to forget it again.
Comments appreciated.
Cavguy,
Just in case, it does come across that you are a fan of armor. :D
I would agree that the US needs to increase its efforts on the human resources side of things. We need to attract, develop, and retain innovative multi-lingual, and multicultural soldiers and civilians who can successfully work DIME and interagency operations. The world is too complex a place not to employ specialists to solve problems. Pick-up games are not the solution. We can improve our abilities to fight and win full-spectrum operations by training together and synchronizing our actions across all elements of our power. To do all of this however means that the current method of recruitment, retention, rewards, and employment will need to be revised. I see many smart capable folks in the private sector who have no desire to work in government service and IMHO this is a reflection of a fault line in American society. As to the number of greybreads, I see the natural tension between wisdom and youth as beneficial and it would seem that the current war will help to shake things out to an acceptable equilibrium. I am not convinced about the balancing point you ascribe to armor in this fight however. Just as I get a little bit too focused upon the CA end of the stick from time to time, perhaps a broader view on the role of armor and something more about flattened, decentralized organizations and operations will help you to find success in your article. Either way, post a link if you can when you are done...
Ken,
I have been reflecting upon your thesis expressed in this and other threads which I paraphrase here as 'an example had to be made'. I would agree that displaying weakness in the ME leads to greater issues, and because we have shown weakness in the past the seeds of this can be found in 9/11. I feel that energy policy played a significant role in the calculus, but like you I recognize at this point that the reasons are moot, we must win this one and everybody is expendable. What bothers me is the politicization of many positions within government when instead we need the apolitical experts who are mature enough to look beyond short-term gain. A coherent energy policy which allows us to prevent the funding of our enemies is long overdue. We also really need to tighten up our shot-group when it comes to using all elements of national power in order to obtain our objectives.
Norfolk,
We have taken some heavy blows but we are not out by a long shot. Iraq & Afghanistan have exposed our limits and flaws but we have enough bright and dedicated folks who are digesting the lessons and applying the solutions. Fortunately our election cycle allows for regular change and hopefully the next round will result in better outcomes for the nation. Congress in particular needs some fresh faces at the feed trough and one can only hope that a majority of the next members will be able to focus upon putting the country and constitution first. Time will tell. :rolleyes: