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I'm using it as one case study for my "high value targeting" paper I'm doing for the RAND Insurgency Board (and will later have the Strategic Studies Institute publish). Time is short and I was wondering what would be the best one or two sources on SL, preferably article or chapters rather than books.
Article on there comeback May31,08
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j...ozabQD910NOUO0
Steve--
See Chapter 7 of my and Max's Uncomfortable Wars Revisited. Compares SL and FMLN insurgencies.
Gustavo Gorriti's book is the classic on early SL. Scot Palmer has a book (edited) devoted to SL as well as a number of articles. Same for Cynthia McClintock.
Cheers
JohnT
What do you think of Steve Stern? Just got it from Amazon
it is a mixed bag of authors. A number of them are academics of both the left and the right. Among the better ones are Enrique Obando (former civilian #3 man in the Peruvian Defense Ministry) and Carlos Ivan DeGregori. The latter is also in Scott Palmer's Shining Path of Peru. Renique's writing on SL is incompetent and an ideological apology. Palmer's book is, i think, the definitive work - Scott was a Peace Corps Volunteer in the Unversity of Huamanga when Guzman was founding SL and teaching there. Guzman mounted a campaign to force Scott to be transferred.
I think that Max and my analysis is probably the best (and really the only) one to focus on the Peruvian COIN ops with good coverage of both SL and GOP strategy.
I'll pull it up. The Maxster is off on some boondoggle in Kingston, ON right now.Quote:
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
Steve, are you going to let us read your paper here?
This story may be of some use, its about the team that captured Abimael Guzman:
'Superman' Meets Shining Path: Story of a CIA Success, By Charles Lane. The Washington Post, December 7, 2000 ; Page A01.
reflects the bias of the sources (as does most good journalism).:rolleyes:
CIA did play an important role in the fight against SL - even as far back as 1986. In the first Alan Garcia administration Peru was getting very little US assistance because of anger with Garcia's economic policies (debt service in particular). We, in Southcom, could do a few things - Subject Matter Expert Exchanges, occasional combined military exercises, and IMET training and education for individuals when Peru was in an open window from Brooke sanctions. CIA was not so limited and was able to build a relationship with the SIN and DIRCOTE (DINCOTE's predecessor) which the article makes clear was maintained after Fujimori became President.
Generally, the article underplays the role of Vidal and overplays that of CIA making no mention of other USG efforts. In short, it was a much more complex situation that the brief article suggests. For example, one of the keys to success was the Peruvian Army decision to support the development of the Rondas Campesinas (peasant militias) in the mountains. Another was the Army effort to go after SL and not the drug traffickers in the coca growing areas of the high jungle - the Upper Huallaga Valley - to the consternation of the US DEA which sabotaged the most effective COIN commander in the region with a major campaign of slander against him. (So the elements of the USG were working at cross purposes - what else is new? :eek:)
Cheers
JohnT
John, Steve or anybody else with a background on SL
I'm working on a short paper discussing the decline of SL. Basically I'm arguing that
1. The removal of Guzman was critical in the defeat of SL
2. This was only possible because SL was a highly organized "spider organization"
3. This is not common among most insurgencies because they operate under a "starfish" structure in which is not easily decapitated. Therefore a comprehensive strategy to secure the population is preferred to enemy focused targeting.
My question is...do you think removing Guzman was the silver bullet that caused the decline of Sendero or do you think the Rondas Campesinas and other initiatives by GOP were the real reason for their success.
Compare and contrast the internal structural, ideological and cultural aspects of SL that resulted in its decline following Guzman's capture with the same aspects of the PKK and its decline following the capture of Ocalan. Do the same with the external pressures upon both organizations existing at the time of the decapitations and subsequent decline. Useful study.Quote:
Originally Posted by Mike Burgoyne
Thanks, I think I'll check that out.
That's very interesting. Former DEA guys I knew back in the late 1990's basically held the view that the DEA Ops in the Upper Huallaga valley were in fact a cover activity for "other" Intel operations to target SL, and that not everyone got onside. - That reflects your view.Quote:
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
Having examined the DEA and other "Tros Lettros" activity in Bolivia, inter agency friction seems to disproportionate to efforts actually involved.
Mike--
The fall of SL is complex. The capture of Guzman was not just his capture but that of the entire Politburo in one fell swoop due to good police work and SL carelessness. It was also due to SL expanding too rapidly and taking in new members who had not been recruited and indoctrinated as children - their previous pattern. While important, cutting off the head was hardly the sole reason for defeating SL. SL was a master of centralized direction and decentralized execution. In fact. the Politburo only put out the party line and all the regional commands were given free reign to conduct operations in their own area so long as they conformed to the party line. Hardly a pure spider org.
The other critical factor in the defeat of SL was its brutality which cost it nearly all its legitimacy in the Sierra and in Lima. That brutality turned the local people - districts and their dependencies - to arming themselves and forming the rondas. That the army, after some resistance, accepted the rondas and helped arm them and provided some communication capability was decisive in the Sierra. Cooperation with the police and govt worked in Lima for the people.
In the UHV, GEN Arciniega's efforts blunted SL until he was releived due to DEA's slander campaign.
Wilf--
I never heard the charge that DEA was a cover for other intel activity in the UHV and I'm inclined to discount that charge. CIA ran a very small operation in Peru, focused largely on Lima - at least when I was in Southcom (86 - 91) - while DEA had been operating in the UHV since, at least, 1979. Interestingly, the one SL regional command that was not shut down or significantly degraded by the capture of Guzman and the Politburo was the Huallaga Regional Command.
Cheers
JohnT
I'm inclined to discount it as well. Sounded like rubbish when I heard it, but from what you said previously, I can see how the myth got developed to reframe the events on the ground.Quote:
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
The other critical factor in the defeat of SL was its brutality which cost it nearly all its legitimacy in the Sierra and in Lima. That brutality turned the local people - districts and their dependencies - to arming themselves and forming the rondas. That the army, after some resistance, accepted the rondas and helped arm them and provided some communication capability was decisive in the Sierra. Cooperation with the police and govt worked in Lima for the people.
While working on my Masters In International Relations, I wrote a paper on SL, and what jumped out at me was that they essentially turned what appeared to be victory into defeat by relying almost solely on violence. There were several reports that predicted the success of SL, yet in the end, they lost the war. While they proclaimed to be a "Maoist" type insurgency, they never really adopted that philosophy, and instead of forming a relationship with the local people, their extreme brutality forced the locals into cooperation with the army, no small matter since the army was also implicated in many human rights abuses at the time. They also showed very little acumen when dealing with Perus indigenous people, and ignored their customs and culture in favor of communist doctrine. At one point, an SL leader said that he expected a million deaths during the "struggle." They killed community service workers to make the plight of poor Peruvians even worse, and widening the gap between rich and poor, ostensibly to cause the poor to rise against the rich. This however, backfired on them in a big way.
George
I saw those reports at the time and thought they were pure BS!
Cheers
JohnT
John,Quote:
Originally Posted by John T. Fishel
Thanks, that is a great perspective. I’m working my way through David Palmer’s compilation on Shining Path now and you are right like most conflicts it is complex and multi-layered. I’m going to make a more nuanced argument and see where that takes me.
Mike
goes by Scot :) He was the first, and perhaps the only, American victim of SL (Guzman's) machinations when Prof Guzman had his tenure at the U of Huamanga (as a PCV) cancelled.
Got your PM and am back to you.
Cheers
JohnT
Recent years saw an increase in reports on Sendero Luminoso activities, now tied to drug trafficking. Last year was quite violent, especially with the military operations in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac y Ene (VRAE). (See here some glamorizing of the Operaciones VRAE).
The situation may well deteriorate, but apart from mentions of incidents in the news, there is not a lot of coverage.
This piece criticizes the strategy chosen in the VRAE, as opposed to Alto Huallaga (i.e. military operations instead of police work).
I'm curious about people's thoughts on the issue, especially:
1. How big is the risk of this becoming a larger conflict?
2. ... and related: could/would this hurt Peru's economy, break the growth trend?
3. Why isn't there more attention to this in the international press?
Simple IMHO like many parts of the world there is little constant coverage of such places as Peru, look at the campaigning over Darfur, or the lack of attention to the famine in Ethiopia or Somalia until newsreel film shocked a few, Western audiences.Quote:
Why isn't there more attention to this in the international press?
Many press agencies have reduced their overseas presence and others rely on locally taken footage (not voices) before committing their own resources.
I understand that other parts of the international press watch the world differently, such as Spain in Latin America and France with some it's former colonies. How does Japan now report on Peru?
Reporting aside it is too easy to label countries such as Peru as disasters and what will change? Look at the thread on Zimbabwe as an example.
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/t...rists?page=0,0
Peru's "narco-terrorists" bring economic boom
The Shining Path appear to be practicing a new form of communism that has a capitalist flare, yet it the party maintains control. Much like their Maoists in China, but Shining Path being a non-state actor must rely on the illicit economy.Quote:
HUANTA, Peru — The Communist hammer-and-cycle adorns the black-and-green uniforms of the Shining Path guerrillas here, as well as the flags flying over their jungle encampments. But the main activity of the group is not ambushing military patrols and outposts, it is managing the area’s booming cocaine trade. Their real symbol ought to be the dollar sign.
I saw an interesting debate on Intelligence Squared two nights ago about the drug war in Mexico and whether or not the U.S. government was to blame for the war.Quote:
The government knows what’s going on, but is limited in what it can or is willing to do. Until a few months ago, the National Police were in charge of fighting the drug traffic. But after attacks by Senderistas grew more bold and destructive, they were replaced by the army. In the boldest attack yet, in April a Sendero band attacked a military garrison and killed 15 soldiers near here. Sendero uses homemade land mines, grenades, and modern automatic weapons bought with the revenue from their drug sales.
Carlos Bassombio, an analyst in Lima, said the biggest problem facing Peru is not the armed insurrection represented by the remnants of Sendero Luminoso, but the increasingly ubiquitous narcotics trafficking in the country and the endemic corruption it engenders. Low-paid policemen are easily corrupted, and farmer and their families are easily attracted to the kind of wages paid by traffickers.
http://intelligencesquaredus.org/ind...icos-drug-war/
Both side had some very credible debaters (former Mexican politicians, academic experts, former director of the DEA, etc.), and the audience who determined the winner was largely undecided at the beginning of the debate, and at the end they largely sided with team that argued that the U.S. was to blame based on our war on drugs, which in short was based on the fact that we created an illicit market by making it a war versus a health problem. Several parallels to prohibition were drawn, when it was outlawed, it supported the raise of organized crime in the U.S.. This is always an emotional topic on SWJ, but the historical record speaks for itself. Our war on drugs is a major failure, and IMO has only increased the scale of the global black economy, which in turns fuels insurgencies and terrorist movements. We need the political courage to seriously challenge this so called war on drugs, and consider some radical paradigm shifts in our approach. Unfortunately we have a McCarthy like atmosphere in our government when it comes to the war on drugs, and it is political suicide to challenge the failed status quo. I personally wish we could kill everyone associated with pushing this poison to our kids, but we can't, and our approach is only further undermining our national security without putting a dent in the drug trade.
What's the danger to U.S. interests in Peru? The same as it is everywhere else, the large black economy enables the non-state actor to effectively challenge the State's control and further destabilize not only the region but the global order.
Quote:
John Youle, an American who has lived in Peru for many years and publishes a popular newsletter on politics and the economy, believes Peru is not far from becoming another Mexico in terms of the violence emanating from the drug traffic. “You’re getting increasing violence," Youle said. "This could get quite a bit worse.”
There are a couple major changes for the new SL which makes it dangerous. It has fully embraced narco-trafficking and has shifted to a FARC model which allows it to purchase better equipment. This same strategy increased the size and capability of the FARC.
The second change is SL’s move toward a kinder gentler insurgency. SL has been launching some pretty serious attacks on police and military units but unlike its campaign in the 90s it is not inflicting massive violence on the general population. In fact it is using increased drug money profits to do civic projects and buy supplies from locals. This is dangerous because in the 90s SL’s violence against the people helped spawn the rondas campesinas which were essential in the defeat of SL. Now the RC guys (many of them are cocaleros) are less inclined to put their neck out to fight a more benevolent SL.
As far as this becoming a larger conflict, I think that depends on if the Peruvian government can fix some of their intel problems and hunt down SL’s units. However, more importantly it depends on if they can bring a whole of government approach to the VRAE and Huallaga which still live in disconnected poverty.
Yep, I have heard it called "Corporate Communism" and it can be deadly against Banker Based Capitalism. It is closer to what the original US Founding Fathers had in mind as opposed to Banking Kleptocracy we have now. So it will tend to have broad popular support:eek:Quote:
Originally Posted by Bill Moore
These developments of SL were eminently predictable - indeed they were predicted by me and others in stuff published during the 90s and early 2000s. What is interesting to me is that during the last round of SL many analysts both govt and non, were trying to argue that SL was selling drugs for guns when it wasn't happening. the demise of Guzman left the SL Huallaga Regional Command free to follow its own lead and emulate the FARC which it did - bringing to fruition the self-fulfilling prophecy of guns fro drugs. Mike B has a real good handle on what is happening now.
John Youle is an old friend. He was DCM at the US embassy in Lima in 1986; went from there to be POLAD in SOUTHCOM and retired to Peru. John is one of the best observers of the country. On the academic side, see work by Henry Dietz (U of Texas at Austin), Cynthia Mc Clintock (george Washington U) and David Scott Palmer (Boston U).
Cheers
JohnT
John Youle's company website is: http://www.consultandes.com/ and I failed to readily locate his newsletter.
Military Review just published an article I put together on Sendero Luminoso's resurgence in Peru.
Summary:
The decapitation of Sendero Luminoso (SL) in conjunction with the use of local security forces and a whole-of-government approach allowed Peru to defeat SL in the 1990s. A failure to follow through with the benefits of government services and a lack of pressure by security forces has allowed SL to regroup. In order to achieve a lasting victory the Peruvian government must address the foundations of insurgency: the intransigent insurgent leadership and the welfare of the population. Peru’s current challenges provide an admonition to the US in its current efforts to consolidate gains in Iraq and in support of other allies facing insurgency.
The full article is available here
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Military...031_art011.pdf
Since the time when I originally wrote the piece I think there has been considerable progress in the renewal of Peruvian intelligence and targeting capabilities. The Huallaga column has taken considerable losses through effective operations. There has also been some discussion on bringing back local defense forces.
I also think Peru's current problems are important for us to look at as we move forward in (or pull back from) Iraq and Colombia.
Mike Burgoyne
Mike,
I haven't read your article yet (I will), but I was under the impression that SL remerged largely as a criminal insurgency this time, with little of the original ideology they had originally. My question is even though they have the same name, or they really fighting for the same issues?
Actually, I argue that SL remains a communist organization that now funds its operations with drug money. I believe this because unlike traditional drug trafficking organizations (DTO) they are not trying to lay low and maintain their business. Instead they launch large scale attacks on police and military patrols and installations.
Mike
http://www.insightcrime.org/news-bri...h-still-strong
Recent Attack on Peru Police Shows Shining Path Still Strong
Quote:
Guerrillas of Peru's Shining Path rebels recently killed three policemen in the country's main coca-producing region, a sign that the group intends to defend its hold on Peru's criminally lucrative territories amid expanding coca production in the South American country.
Shining Path snipers attacked a police convoy on March 18, leaving three officers dead, reported El Pas. The convoy was carrying agents of the Special Anti-Drug Operations Division (Divisin de Operaciones Especiales Antidrogas) from their headquarters in the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro River Valleys (VRAEM), a region known to be the country's biggest coca-producing area.
The Shining Path of Peru: An Analysis of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Tactics
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.