Less Than Total War and Total Victories
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What I'm trying to suggest is that outcomes that are something less that a full victory for either side are actually the norm. I believe we ought to change our strategy and doctrine to identify finding a resolution that both sides can live with rather than total victory by the government as the objective.
Steve,
Returning to this comment for a moment, let's go back in time a bit and broaden it because I think you made a key point that I have dealt with for decades. First of all I would say this applies in general wars not just insurgencies. It is quite common to see the Cold War bipolar structure as a limiting structure for general conflicts--the view that war between two countries or camps was too dangerous unless controlled and manipulated for gain by either or both of the major players. While I believe this was true in that Cold War parameters did tend to put brackets around conflicts, certain conflicts used those brackets to set goals that were less than "victory," ones that could be achieved before Cold War patrons forced some sort of settlement. Because it was my back yard, I look at the Arab-Israeli Wars as fitting this model. Indeed the very essence of IDF force structure, mobilization, and strategy is built around the idea that wars must be short and exported, adding terrain and creating facts as rapidly as possible. Where Anwar Sadat distinguished himself as a strategist was his adoption and adaptation of this model in the "73 War.
As for small wars, LIC, COIN, or whatever we call them, this less than total victory also played out in the Cold War framework. Conflicts in Africa were not necessarily about total victory. Regional secession was often de facto and not de jure. Katanga began as a Western interests-sponsored secession that was fought actively by governments of the same Western interests, the Soviets (at least rhetorically), and the United Nations. But over time and subsequent Shaba wars, the region became a de facto separate political entity. In late 1993, the governor of Shaba renamed Shaba, Katanga. Standing besiade him at the time was Nguz Karl I Bond who Mobutu had convicted of treason after the Shaba II War. The governor and Bond drove to the ceremony in Moise Tshombe's old car. That victory required 33 years to achieve and it was for regional goals, not total independence.
What changed somewhat as the Cold War ended was the likelihood of Cold War pressures moving to shut down or control the outcomes of such conflicts. Even without that control valve, very few have escalated to full blown conflicts resulting in clear cut victory for one side. The major exception was the RPF victory in 94 but that victory set the stage for an even greater conflict in the Congo and that one is not over.
Finally in closing this long-winded comment, I believe what you are saying we should do--change our strategy and doctrine to identify finding a resolution that both sides can live with rather than total victory by the government-- is already happening in the case of Iraq through sectarian pressures.
Best
Tom
Reading the thread, four thoughts occur
And that's one over my limit for one day... :)
1. The misuse of words by us and our political masters lead to false expectations. I for one used to get somewhat irate when anyone called me a Warrior -- I contend that a warrior is an undisciplined fighter who may be quite competent personally but in unable to impose his will on anyone other than by presence and direct action. Simplistic, yes but essentially correct. I was a soldier, not a warrior. Dumb term IMO. Same thing goes with the word 'victory.' Note that even you couch victory in Desert Storm as a "reasonable case." That implies that you have questions. Joe and Mary Ann Sixpack may not question that connection. I'd submit it was not a victory but we gave away the farm (that's another topic). Point is that in any COIN op, an acceptable outcome is all that is likely to be achieved. The political trend since WW II is to accept partial 'victories' and draws. The word may need to be buried (along with 'shock and awe' a real loser...). Mellifluous verbosity is unmilitary, he bloviated...:o
2. The Army has adopted the spin techniques of politicians. They don't work. We need to be more blunt, honest and cautious in pronouncements and should not let the politicians bulldoze us into spinning -- and we certainly shouldn't let ourselves fall into the coverup trap.
Both those above fit into the expectations and public confidence arenas, both absolutely as important in a democratic society to the pursuit of any military goal as the basic strategy and operational plan. To paraphrase Clemenceau with respect to the rationale and expectations issues; War is much too serious a matter to be left to the politicians. :wry:
3. The US Army needs to adapt its thought processes to the fact that warfighting is more than firepower, mass and force protection. Seems to be all that's considered. Planning, equipping and training emphasizing those factors has led us down a bad road. Demonstrations and deterrence can sometimes work; stealth, surprise, sensible audacity, agility and innovation most always will...
5. Re: FM 3-24. Interesting read. Way, way too long and way too much philosophizing. Soldier scholars will love it, soldiers who are not scholars will not. Most soldiers are not soldier scholars. Leaves out some things but it'll broadly work. As to its pro- or pre - scriptiveness, I am reminded of the immortals words of Bull Halsey; "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." :D
I have no complaints at all about the philosophy,
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Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
Well, having provided a bit of the philosophy in 3-24 myself, *I* like it. But, have you seen the exchange between Petraeus and Peters on "soldier scholars" in the July/August issue of The American Interest? My copy just came yesterday so I haven't read the articles yet.
I agree with almost all of it; what I'm questioning is where it is being stated. Questioning is not correct; what I'm suggesting is a look at what's where.
Let me caveat what follows with the fact that I know 3-24 was produced to fulfill a need that the senior leadership of the Army had wrongfully neglected. As such it is good and it needed to incorporate all that it does. I also understand it is to be an overarching document to quickly address a need. It does that well.
What I think is now required is to selectively incorporate the 'what' and 'how' with a minimum of why into a CI chapter in the next editions of FMs 3-21.10/11. More detail and more why should be in the new 3-21.20 and even more why in the next 3-90.6 (and 3-0). IMO a Field Manual should be designed for the ease and utility of the designed end user. Who is the end user for 3-24? A Company Commander or Platoon Leader. He needs the 'how' and 'what' the 'why' should be available to him elsewhere. Folks at Battalion have more need for the why and so on up the chain.
I have now read the articles SWJEd linked. I agree with both of them! :D
Seriously. I strongly agree with both and I'll explain that by pointing out that while we can certainly insist on or desire advanced degrees for all Officers or all Field Grades, everyone does not truly need -- and some would gleefully not obtain one if they had the option and could remain competitive -- an advanced degree. Do we really need all officers to possess one?
I see a need for a healthy percentage of Officers with varied degrees but I do not see that it is necessary for all. I think that a part of why we do what we do today is for ease of the personnel managers, it is easier to manage a single class of people than it is to manage two classes.
I'll also note that the younger generation of Officers may be more inclined to want advanced degrees and that can be a great incentive and I certainly don't object to that -- but I still think some without advanced degrees (or even a bachelors degree...) are or should be perfectly acceptable.
Both authors have good points; I think graduate education for officers should be encouraged but not mandated (other than for specific positions where a need is identified) and I do not doubt that we need many with advanced degrees. I do not think it necessary or even desirable that all officers obtain at least one. Having said that, if I just had to choose one or the other, I'd reluctantly go with Petraeus.