Getting the Basics Right in Afghanistan
Getting the Basics Right
A Discussion on Tactical Actions for Strategic Impact in Afghanistan
by Lieutenant Colonel Trent Scott and Colonel John Agoglia, Small Wars Journal
Getting the Basics Right (Full PDF Article)
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This paper has been prepared by the Counterinsurgency Training Center – Afghanistan. The purpose of the paper is generate discussion and analysis on whether we are not only doing things right here in Afghanistan, but indeed whether we are doing the right things. This analysis and requisite change is essential if we are to employ additional incoming ISAF units in the most effective manner. Comments/objections/counter-arguments can be sent to trent.scott@us.army.mil or john.agoglia@us.army.mil.
Events in Afghanistan are not going according to plan. There is a growing perception among local Afghans and within the international community that the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing stronger and more influential by the day. A spate of recent Western media reporting decrying the killing of innocent Afghans and Pakistanis as a result of the alleged over-judicious use of ISAF/OEF-controlled air power, the very public death of nine US soldiers in eastern Afghanistan followed almost immediately by the killing of just under a dozen French soldiers in central Afghanistan, and the widespread public belief that the central Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) under Hamid Karzai is institutionally corrupt, have contributed to the groundswell of local and international voices calling for a radical change to the way things are currently done in Afghanistan. Change is required, it must begin at the tactical level, and it needs to be led by ISAF. This is our war just as much as it is the Afghan’s war.
Although there is much to do at the strategic level in Afghanistan, such as developing a comprehensive border strategy, eliminating corruption, developing an effective and functioning government, defining the role of the Afghan National Police (ANP) – the list goes on – it is at the tactical level, at Regional Commands (RC), Task Forces (TF), Battlegroups, Companies and Coalition mentoring teams that the most immediate and tangible change for good can be made. Tactical actions resonate throughout the local communities ISAF troops are supposed to protect and influence audiences across the world. And, because insurgency is a violent political competition, tactical actions can have significant political impact. Conducting comprehensive, best practice operations designed to defeat the insurgency from the grass roots up is imperative if ISAF is to halt the consolidation of the insurgent’s influence in rural Afghanistan, establish the legitimate rule of law, and contribute to the development of a stable Afghanistan. Cumulative success at the tactical level will provide time and space – literally and figuratively – for the key stakeholders at the strategic level to make the necessary institutional changes required to ensure long term stability...
I hate to be the resident skeptic but --
Well, along with Wilf... :D
I'm not at all sure the article adds much to the discussion of the problem. I see the same thing lacking in it I do in most discussions of Afghanistan -- what is the goal, the desired end result? Seems to me that lacking a stated goal and more importantly one that is realistically achievable, it is rather difficult to prescribe cures.
Schmedlap quoted Bing West "...To prevent more recruits for the Islamic extremists, we'd like to have a tolerant democracy and a thriving economy in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But if we make that a precondition for crushing al-Qaeda, we will be in Afghanistan for decades." I believe that is quite accurate -- and I'm not sure I see a desire on the part of any other nation (other than perhaps Pakistan, mayhap Russia and India to an extent) to stay in Afghanistan for that extended period.
Wilf's question
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"The bit of COIN thinking that seems to be missing, is what activity US/NATO Forces security effort protecting and why? I've often asked this an no one (even an Afghan diplomat I met in London) seems to have a useful answer."
is pertinent and valid -- I also have seen no answer to that question.
Rex Brynen made the comment that:
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There was no lack of governance in Afghanistan when al-Qa'ida was at its zenith there—the Taliban was in control of most of the country, and exerting far more effective government control than anyone else had managed since 1992 (or earlier).
That's not totally correct -- there were significant exceptions to the rule of the Talib from Ismail Khan to Massood; several areas whre their footprint was quite light -- but it's close enough to actuality to qualify and is a very pertinent comment. It raises the specter that a 'western' approach to governance there may be a lot of wishful thinking.
Entropy adds as always some sensible commentary and very importantly points out:
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I might suggest, therefore, that the solutions in those localities may be equally diverse and should not be limited to one set of COIN "best practices" or principles nor even COIN itself. For example, sometimes the best tactic may include doing nothing at all and at other times it may include conventional means. My point here is that Afghanistan is too diverse to place too many doctrinal limits on options at the local level. (emphasis added / kw)
I'd simply add that Afghanistan is too diverse also to accept the probable desired end state the western nations involved would most like to see and that some realistic expectations and goals would seem to be a priority requirement...
Awright, stop speaking policy wonk to me... ;)
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
...But I don't think that is what was being argued in the paper.
""“A suitable political environment must be created to allow the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other. ISAF needs to understand this, and facilitate this outcome.”"
That sounds pretty flexible, and while it does not nail down an endstate, I do think it creates the framework for a dialogue on one.
My question is who is involved in this dialog? To me, the 'dialog' should be >67% Afghani and <33% All Others. Somehow, my perception is that you and the writers are not looking at it that way. If I'm wrong, my apologies.
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Ultimately I think the responsibility for a USG policy endstate is something that has to be created outside of Title 10, but must also be informed by it.
This is the reason for my policy wonk comment. I'm not at all sure what you mean here. Do you mean that the USG desired end state "must be a non-military solution even though the situation has military involvement?" If that's what was meant, I agree -- and I'll point out that said military involvement is --wrongly in my view -- driving the train. I understand that's by default but I also understand that we've been there for approaching seven years...
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I think the issues they bring up extend beyond OEF.
Agreed -- and beyond ISAF and beyond the USG, beyond NATO.
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Somebody remarked the other day that JTF's get stood up and never go away as we were looking to frame an endstate for a problem the notional JTF was given. The tendency was to reach higher and craft an endstate that had the ring of indefinite infeasibility about it - one of those at perfect peace with its neighbors, integrated into the region, monopoly on violence, economically viable sort of endstates. It was also one that nested perfectly with the USG policy objective given to us.
impossibility, infeasability, improbability -- the USG -- and DoD have a strong tendency to go for such solutions. I've been participating or watching for almost 60 years and it keeps getting worse instead of better. We need to get real, that's all. Park the superegos and just use some common sense. That seems to be too much to ask. :wry:
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....The question became what is the JTF endstate which gets the conditions to a point where the programs under the country team, perhaps beefed up with some additional Title 10 resources could be resumed under Title 22 authority. Or put another way, when do we hand it back and break down the guidon?
May I suggest without being pejorative that the put the other way version is closer to understandable English but it still is jargon. The point to me is that the JTF should NEVER have primacy unless all out major combat operations are the norm. That's the answer to your conundrum; DoD takes over by default and will not let go. It will not stop unless we break that model. DoD has been reluctant to let go as they -- correctly in my view -- perceive a huge vacuum at State. State in turn is reluctant to get assertive about what should be their turf because they're (1) short of personnel (2) short of money (3) have many people who do not want to go to less than desirable stations worldwide and deal with significant problems created by the fools we elect to office. It isn't easy. I know that. It still needs to happen. :(
Our Essay writers have a job that is in the default position and they're unsure how to let go. I totally understand that and I sympathize with them, I really do -- the ONLY answer to their problem is not to get to that point in the first place. Unfortunately, we are there, so a solution is required. I'm merely sating that any solution that is not principally an Afghan solution is highly unlikely to succeed. No more than that, really.
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I think they scope it down further by saying that ISAF must facilitate the creation of "a suitable political environment" that allows "the formal and informal/traditional governing structures to coexist and complement each other."
I understand that -- my point is that is not -- or should not be -- ISAF's job; IOW it ain't 10USAC, it IS 22USC (jargon is contagious :D) -- except it isn't really that either. Rightly or wrongly, we got NATO in there so it really and Afghan job with NATO support -- and they in turn are supported as necessary by ISAF; ISAF is the Caboose, not the Engine or even the Coal Car.
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The issue I hear them raising is that its just as much about "why" ISAF should do more, as it is "what" facilitation means. It sounds like that as long as ISAF sees its responsibilities in isolation of other USG and Coalition partner efforts then their efforts are as likely to be incongruous as supportive.
That facet I agree with, though I'd suggest it was far from adequately clear in the essay.
Thanks for a great reponse, Rob.
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
"...I am of the opinion though that if you can't get the Afghani to pick up the bulk of the conversation, then we're not facilitating, we're leading - and that is not where we want to be. I've been in conversations where the facilitator does most of the talking, it only works if the other participants have nothing to say, or are unwilling to say it - otherwise it just creates a backlash against the facilitator..."
Well said!
Add to that the inherent politeness of folks from the ME and Afghanistan will literally PRECLUDE their joining in and saying forthrightly what they may want. They might address it obliquely and in a mode a lot of westerners would not grasp but they are unlikely to address it directly. This is a very critical point tha many in the west tend to forget or over ride.
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...I think the authors were too, but were spending the bulk of their argument trying to raise the issue of the form that military involvment should take - with the understanding that it would have to fill some of the gaps not being provided from civilians due to capability and capacity gaps within those organizations.
I agree and that was my perception; I'd only make the point that they're looking at a military solution or, possibly more accurately, a great deal of military impact on the final solution. My belief is that is the wrong way to go as it will only continue the military centric approach -- which obviously is not working too well regardless of the great efforts and sacrifices and I also am quite convinced that adding more Troops will not help; on the contrary, I think it will hurt..
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Michael O'Hanlon wrote a pretty good piece the other day that Dave captured on the OP-ED roundup that addresses this issue pretty well. As DoD folks begin to look at the transition point to State, what might appear as a more natural one is more difficult to put your finger on because State lacks the means, as such it degrades into a circular argument.
Saw that and disagree; here's why:
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If we expect them to pick up the responsibilities, we have to provide them the means to match their authorities. That is a big shift for the reasons you point out, but the sooner we start doing it, the sooner they will be able to do it (kinda sounds like energy policy too). Right now the question of "when does the JTF transition authority to the State" seems muddied by the lack of resources State can bring to bear in a flexible manner. DoD can move to an "in support" relationship, but that is not entirely clear either if they are in reality doing the heavy lifting because State is not strong enough.
That presumes it is the intent of and in the long term interests of the US to do that and do FID and such.
I strongly dispute that.
We are as a people --and we are emphatically a distinct breed of people -- not mentally equipped to do that. We have tried it numerous places since 1900 with varying success -- mostly without success -- and I'm a firm believer in the "One-Third" and "Two Year" rules. Many disagree with those but I suggest they're living in a dream world and history does not support their objections.
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If our strategic outlook is that we will see more reasons to be involved on the ground and not less, and that while not the perfect tool, DoD does have the capacity, then doesn't it make sense for the USG to go ahead and invest in the more appropriate tools?
Yep -- but the far more important question and one that is not being debated with any seriousness is:
Should our strategic outlook be that we will see more reasons to be involved on the ground and not less.
I submit the answer is a resounding 'NO." We are not tempermentally equipped to do it well; we are too impatient and into short term solutions; more importantly -- and this is important -- our governmental system and its rapid in world terms turnover is totally inimical to such operations.
Furthermore and frankly, nowadays the rest of the world isn't inclined that way either:
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September 2008: Strategic Counsel poll: The majority 61% of Canadians oppose sending troops to Afghanistan, while only a minority 35% support it.
LINK
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More than two-thirds of Britons believe British troops should be pulled out of Afghanistan next year, according to an opinion poll released on Wednesday.
LINK
Can you say 'holding the bag" -- more importantly, how will most voters and Congress react to that. I submit it does not look good. We need to conduct a realistic, pragmatic look at our national goals and strategies and not just keep putting bandaids on the processes -- which is what we have been doing for all of my adult life. As the man said:
Doing the same thing over and over while achieving the same result is insanity.
This was probably implied during this thread but I wanted to make it more obvious
IMO we will never be able to articulate our final product because we are the facilitator. Before we can decide on why or what a "surge" (for lack of a better term) does/is. Shouldn't we pressure the GIRoA to tell us what their end state is? I mean Karzi is calling for the protection of Mullah Omar in an effort to co-opt him into the political process. (I am a fan of amnesty for insurgents, however that particular SOB owes me some blood!) But moves like this change the dynamics of what the Afghan government is trying to do. Until they make up their minds on where the ship is going, any attempts we make to steer the boat will likely do more harm than good. Before we can define our strategic aims as the third party counter-insurgent the host government needs to make some big decisions first.
I think you may be asking them for something they cannot answer
I'm not sure Karzai has a firm enough hold to do that (FWIW, I doubt anyone will in the near future in Afghanistan). We probably wouldn't like the answer if anyone could do that...
I do note that Karzai has said he believes strongly enough in talking to Omar that he said if the US and other Western countries disagreed, they could either leave the country or remove him. LINK.
The Talib are mostly Pushtun, so is Karzai but a lot of other shakers and movers are from other ethnicities. A balancing act in a regrettable necessity and it's bound to be inherently unstable. Karzai leans to far one way and he'll have another Iraq like mess on his hands with a civil war ongoing.
No easy solutions. Not that there were ever going to be -- problem is, no one with any knowledge of the area and people was consulted (or really listened to) and no real thought was put into it other than "Do something. NOW" That's the American way...
No slack!