Do Special Operations live up to their role in Air Power support? Thoughts?
Do Special Operations live up to their role in Air Power support? Thoughts?
I think you need to rephrase the question:Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis Levin
Are you asking:
Does the Air Force live up to their role in providing in supporting Special Operations?
Is there sufficient Air Power support to Special Operations?
Does Special Operations properly employ its organic Air Power?
I read him more like "Are LRS teams worth it in an air war?"
Does AFSOC live up to their role in Air Power Support?
AFSOC having two hats to wear (1) being the Air leg to SOCOM and (2) being an AF MAJCOM, with that does it affect their ability to live up to their role in Air Power support? They have to fullfill the vision and mission of both owning parties. The problem I see is that the views and requirements are different from the Air Force and from SOCOM. The Air Force stil depends on AFSOC for traditional airlift while at the same time having to use the same resources for SOCOM.
I guess I don't understand the question. Is there a problem with AFSOC and if so, what is it?Quote:
Originally Posted by Louis Levin
Also, how is it the Air Force depends on AFSOC for traditional airlift?
I'm doing research and trying gain insight to see if anyone else sees a problem with the dual role that AFSOC has as the air leg of SOCCOM and as an AF MAJCOM. In this they are responsible for the mission and vision of both the AF and SOCOM. Does AFSOC require greater power in its role to be able to deliver more Air Power? I was wrong on the traditional airlift, my apologies.
One area you might want to look at is the CSAR assets (PJ, HH-60G, HC-130). They've been bounced around quite a bit over the past couple of decades. Recently, they were briefly part of AFSOC but were place back under ACC after less than two years IIRC. The reason, so I was told, was two-fold:
First there was controversy over adding additional roles to CSAR assets. In essence, AFSOC wanted them to do more than just CSAR. ACC did not want the CSAR mission diluted. That is putting it very simplistically.
Secondly, the program to replace the HH-60's which was deemed too big for AFSOC to handle given its other responsibilities at the time. I heard that the intention was to put CSAR back under AFSOC once the helo fleet was recapitalized, but of course that program isn't going so well (to put it mildly), so who knows at this point.
Anyway, take all that with a grain of salt as it's what I heard from others a couple of years ago, but it's an angle that might we worth exploring in your research.
AFSOC has several mission sets, so it's extremely difficult to put your question in context.
Is AFSOC that different from ARSOC?
I rec you take a step back, build a context and reframe your question. There are numerous SMEs on this forum if you only give us a fighting chance.
AFSOC, USASOC, and NAVSPECWARCOM all deal with the duality of being part of their respective services, answering to those Service Chiefs, and having the majority of their budgets and all their personnel come from those services; along with answering to USSOCOM for their SOF-Unique funding, and oversight of force provider issues in general.
Each has their own unique challenges. Big Navy is used to having SEALS on board ship to do boarding missions and other dangerous operations; and also used to SOCOM paying the service-common bills for them with dollars that Congress identified for SOF-unique bills. So the Navy is struggling with coming to realize that "dangerous" is not equal to "SOF"; and that they too have to foot the service-common bills to keep the SEALs afloat.
The Air Force Chief and the AFSOC CG have a great relationship; but the AF is cash-strapped, and while developing Irregular Warfare capabilities are comparatively inexpensive, it is one more bill they'd rather punt. AFSOC has to be careful to avoid becoming the Air Force's contribution to IW; because similar to the Navy issue, IW is not equal to SOF.
The Army/USASOC relationship is the one people are most familiar with. Historic issues are still there; it is always a fight in a tight budget over capabilities. If USASOC needs new helicopters for TF-160, it is big Army that buys the helicopters, pilots and crews, and USSOCOM that provides the extra gear and training to make them "special." In shrinking budgets, divergent opinions of priorities become more problematic.
All in all, it's messy and boisterous, but it works. USSOCOM plays a critical role in keeping the service chiefs honest and ensuring that the US has a SOF capability that is actually trained, organized, equipped and postured to perform SOF missions. Similarly, the service chiefs keep SOF from getting too far off the reservation as well.
Louis,
This sounds suspiciously like a CGSC/ACSC or SAMS/SAAS thesis. And this is great, but discussion would be easier if you be a little more up front about it.
Similar questions would include "how is this different from service transportation assets being service run versus USTRANSCOM run?", or "how is this different from the problems the intel community runs into with the 'service missions' versus 'joint missions'?" You might also look at communications, with the conflicts between service doctrines, joint requirements, and systems capabilities.
Are there valid analogies, and are there misleading analogies?
Also, could you more clearly define 'Air Power' for the sake of this discussion?
After glancing at the AFDD 1, I noted that special operations is its own role in "Air Power" operational functions. So when you askI think you may still need to clarify your question.Quote:
Does AFSOC require greater power in its role to be able to deliver more Air Power?
And (last point for this post, I promise) how often does AFSOC operate without a clear role in a larger USSOCOM operation? I do not have numbers, but I suspect the percentage is very small. If this is the case, it would be hard to justify greater autonomy (where I think you're going with this) for AFSOC, when the relationship with USSOCOM is wired as tightly as it seems to be. In this, your point (as I understand it) is part of a much larger issue of balancing degrees of service autonomy, degrees of fragmentation of DoD, against greater jointness and centralization.
We could go into the culture of the Air Force, and Billy Mitchell's role in shaping the personality of the Air Force today, but that could turn into a serious thread-jacking.
What about AFSOC's advisory role? In the past, they had maintained a small, very specialized advisory squadron. That has reportedly been expanded now. The Air Force clearly needs a capability to advise in a diverse environment on a number of airframes, sustainment tasks, tactics and doctrine. Without the ability to help host nation air forces, USAF risks being mired in conflicts even more than ground forces. IT's not all about flying ISO U.S. forces.
The issue with the USAF is more fundamental than that. The bottom line is that the USAF as an institution does not want to change or add anything in its basic mission set. In fact, the USAF as an institution wants to further reduce its mission set to its self perceived traditional “core” missions.
This is, of course, completely delusional behavior. The reason the USAF is in a budget crunch in the first place is the, very accurate, perception that the service has not done much in the war on terror realm. Additionally, as a service it has made the fewest changes to accommodate post cold War reality.
A consistent issue brought up to the USAF, and one their leadership actively chooses to completely ignore, is that a military is valued off of what it does today. Most of the core missions of the USAF fall into the category of contingency capabilities, that have little utility outside of a very narrow band of activity.
The central problem facing the USAF, and this goes back to the heart of your AFSOC question, is that the USAF as an institution does not want to expand its capabilities list beyond what it is currently performing. In fact, it wants to reduce this, but it does not want to cease performing any of its traditional roles as well. In essence, the USAF is engaging in self induced irrelevancy.
Actually, the problem is the Air Force is constantly trying to reinvent itself. In my view, it's trying to change too much and too often.Quote:
Originally Posted by Peacedog
On your first point, the war on terror is not an air war. What more would you have the AF do? On your second point, I think you need to look at some history. SAC, for example, was the Air Force's most important organization through most of the service's history. SAC isn't around anymore - it was disestablished 19 years ago as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. I'm not sure how getting rid of your premiere Cold War organization is failing to change to post-Cold War reality.Quote:
This is, of course, completely delusional behavior. The reason the USAF is in a budget crunch in the first place is the, very accurate, perception that the service has not done much in the war on terror realm. Additionally, as a service it has made the fewest changes to accommodate post cold War reality.
Policymakers like contingency operations and like those capabilities. I spent almost all of the 1990's doing contingency operations when I was in the Navy, for example. We're still doing them today. I think policymakers would disagree with your assertion that "a military is valued off of what it does today."Quote:
A consistent issue brought up to the USAF, and one their leadership actively chooses to completely ignore, is that a military is valued off of what it does today. Most of the core missions of the USAF fall into the category of contingency capabilities, that have little utility outside of a very narrow band of activity.
What specifically should the AF be doing that it is not doing? What about UAV's and so-called Cyber-warfare - those are two areas where the AF has not only tried to expand, but tried to control almost the whole ball of wax.Quote:
The central problem facing the USAF, and this goes back to the heart of your AFSOC question, is that the USAF as an institution does not want to expand its capabilities list beyond what it is currently performing. In fact, it wants to reduce this, but it does not want to cease performing any of its traditional roles as well. In essence, the USAF is engaging in self induced irrelevancy.