Not a fan of the title...
Seems like this is the overriding strategic question of the "GWOT"/Long War: massive conventional warfare or special forces, intelligence, and a law enforcement approach to terrorism? Obviously it's not entirely either/or, but I think we do have to make a decision about what our military is going to be used for. Personally, I'm far more persuaded by Mike Vickers and the "indirect approach" than I am by Scheurer and the folks calling for World War III (or IV, per lunatic Podhoretz).
Massive U.S./coalition ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tremendously expensive, politically contentious, and are still years if not decades from achieving success. Given how much it costs us, economically and, maybe more importantly, in the state of our military, I don't see how this kind of model is sustainable.
I suppose Scheurer would argue that we need to take the gloves off and employ Roman methods of pacification, but in a post-Enlightenment, modern media age, I don't think people would go for that, absent maybe a nuked New York. And, at the risk of dragging this thread in another direction, I can't be the only Christian in America who finds "make a desert and call it peace" morally questionable.
Interestingly, the two have similar backgrounds
and I'm not totally sure that they're in much disagreement. Scheuer, in particular, has seen the specific threat up close and realizes that the probability of dissipating that threat to an acceptable degree is going to take more than law enforcement, more than covert action and that there will be some military involvement. I don't see him as rejecting an indirect appraoch, merely as -- hyperbolically, to be sure -- saying that it isn't going to be cheap or easy.
Granite State says:
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Massive U.S./coalition ground campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan have been tremendously expensive, politically contentious, and are still years if not decades from achieving success. Given how much it costs us, economically and, maybe more importantly, in the state of our military, I don't see how this kind of model is sustainable.
There's some truth in that on several levels but I think the reasons we are where we are should be considered. Mostly with an goal of avoiding the three major mistakes we made.
Essentially there are two major factors. The first is that a lack of knowledge of the Middle East and the ME way of war deluded four successive Presidents into attempting to be nice guys when confronted with challenges from the area. Carter, Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton all erred in that way and the Fly-in at the WTC and the Pentagon resulted. So, one factor and reason for our present situation is that we've hopefully learned that appeasement or whatever one wishes to call it -- in any event a sensible western reaction to a non-western insensible series of actions in western terms -- wil not work with some of those folks. Scheuer has pointed out elsewhere that sweetness and light allied with a hopo of moderate Islam reining in the bad guys is doomed to fail. I strongly agree with that.
The second factor is that in an ideal world or nation, the civilian leadership would select the best people to run their Armed Forces and would then provide control for their employment. The Armed forces (and, here, I'll also include the Non-defense Intelligence Community) are or should be proficient in the precise as possible management of violence to achieve national aims. As Wilf says:
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"...but I think military force has to be applied in an unambiguous way that most effectively achieves the desired aim."
Thus, the civilian leadership, if it determines violence is required should tell those Forces and the IC what the desired end state is and let them do the job in their own way. Regrettably, the tendency is for the civilian master to tell the Forces and the IC what to do instead of what is desired as an end state. Obviously in the current situation, we can look at Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Feith as examples of just that failure. Congress also has a very bad problem with telling people how to suck eggs without knowing much about the things whereof they speak.
Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either.
Thus the system has built in inefficiencies. Add to that the third failure, the Army's intransigence in ignoring COIN work against all indications of the probability and we had a problem waiting to happen. It happened. I think Scheuer is -- again hyperbolically -- trying to get people to wake up, no more. I do not see him advocating the Roman method; merely pointing out that it's going to take a national commitment to turn around what we invited by being unprepared and not responding properly to a number of indications...
And by trying to play nice. In a world that just is not nice, no matter how much we want it to be...
Just a couple things on this,
I think the public awareness and acceptance of the facts about what it takes to really win wars is valid. One need only look as far as any example of someone being shot and killed by police for walking around pointing a real looking gun at night in a dangerous part of town.
We are not wrong for wanting to do anything we can to keep this to a minimum but it is important that the public responsibilities and thus expectations be relatively closer to reality than they are right now.
One would think if those small lessons were learned the larger ones pretty much follow accordingly.
Heh. True and desirable. However...
1. In whose definition or opinion? Our system, probably mostly correctly, allows one person to make that determination. It does require a simple majority of 535 not terribly learned folks to agree or not to one extent or another but by and large your opinion and mine count for little.
2. Generally undefinable -- or indefinite. No enunciated strategy will ever be credible in any sense, the statement of it removes the uncertainty and thus starts the ebb of credibility The Powell / Weinberger doctrines (and the Monroe doctrine, among others, for that matter...) weren't credible either. An endstate in any war will always be unknown to at least some extent. See Korea or Kosovo...
3. May I say again: ""Lest I be accused of picking on the current crew; I've been around through 12 Presidents and the concomitant number of Congresses -- all have erred in the same way (all also "lied to the American people," generally about national security matters as well; but that's another thread) to one degree or another. Not likely to change, either."" (Emphasis added / kw)
No intent to be snarky, Ski, just an old cynics take on your reasonable and intelligent questions / statements -- and that last item, BTW, is also applicable to the other two items. :wry:
Oh, and R.A.:
Next to none if any -- wars are messy like that. That's why they're all dumb and immoral. Even if some are necessary.
Which ones are necessary? See Ski's problems and my responses... :wry:
Ron: I agree but reality is offensive to some. ;)
Ain't life grand, Guys? People have more fun than monkeys... :D
I agree with both of you, Ken and Rex
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Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
..I'm at a loss to know who such overwhelming conventional force would be applied, to deliver this hypothetical victory.
...There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.
Ken, I interpreted your posting this as an indicator that you see war as less elegant tham some would wish it to be. I completely agree with that assessment. For that I would offer the Doug Feith school of thought as an example.
My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight.
Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience. What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me.
Best
Tom
I agree with both of you, Rex (sorta...) and Tom.
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Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
Ken, I interpreted your posting this as an indicator that you see war as less elegant tham some would wish it to be. I completely agree with that assessment. For that I would offer the Doug Feith school of thought as an example.
True. The fact that it is less elegant (Great phrase!) means that one should be judicious in applying it as a solution -- a factor Scheuer seems to miss as you note:
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My problem with Scheuer's essay is that he offers no clear line of thought on the piece. Yes war is not a neat chess game. Yes we need capacity to wage war in a way that makes our enemies hesitant. No he does not identify or even hint against whom such a force could be applied to fight.
Part of the issue is that Scheuer was a manager not an operator and he certainly has little if any meaningful military experience...
Which I suspect is part of his problem.
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What is therefore clear to him (at least I hope it was clear to him when he wrote this) is not clear to me.
Nor to me, I just put it down to a Ralph Peters-like hyperbolic wake up call.
Rex said:
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There really aren't a lot of useful "get tougher/kill more people" counter-terrorism strategies. There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results.
Quite true and I totally agree. Regrettably, the US psyche is strongly attuned to immediate results; thus I think that the judicious application of force when required should always be an option but have to acknowledge that we won't always do it wisely. Rex also said:
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"Occupy Iran? Or perhaps Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco too, since much (or more) of the threat emanates from non-state groups there?...
I disagree with that aspect. Notably with "occupy" -- we shouldn't do that, we're not attuned to the requirements. The British do that sort of stuff fairly well but even they are not great at the job because it is quite difficult. Not to mention that occupying other nations is really dumb and to be avoided if at all possible. That is not a wise application of force.
I'm in agreement with Steve Metz -- it's not our thing; we need to apply force massively, we're good at that; do a lot of damage and not plan on a long term presence. That would annoy our 'friends' (but then we don't really have any of those in any event :cool:) but it would certainly serve as a cautionary to others who might want to trifle with us. That's the epitome of the old 'walk softly and carry a big stick' and the new 'you're either with us or against us.' ;)
I also disagree with this:
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And then there is Iraq, where large-scale application of military force (albeit, now with COIN discrimination) has succeeded in creating a radical Islamist threat where one did not previously exist.
The threat, as you sort of note, was endemic to the area and that was true before we invaded. Thus, we did not create one; it existed and we simply bought some of it to a head or out in the open. Deliberately.
Iraq was just militarily and politically the best target in an attempt to short circuit that ideal you cited: "There are rather more "get smarter" ones (which involve as much issues of politics, diplomacy, and development), although they're complex, difficult, and don't always produce immediate results." and change the dwell time for change from three to five generations doing it your ideal way to just one or two of them doing it our abrupt way. We'll see how it works out. :wry:
We can disagree on a few counts...
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Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
I don't think this was a primary intent of intervention in Iraq (unless one argues that Iraqi democratization was supposed to have a domino effect of regional regime changes that would result in a raft of new, secular-ish pro-Western governments.. which was never likely).
Notably this. I believe it was the principal of well over a dozen (or slightly more) lesser but synergistic reasons. The 'domino effect' being a far lesser one of those.
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Moreover, I think it is demonstrable that the war in Iraq has radicalized a great many Middle Eastern youths who otherwise would not have been mobilized into militant groups, and helped train them for a fight they now pursue in other places (as evidenced, for example, by the arrival of so many Iraq veterans, and Iraqi-insurgent-wannabes, in Nahr al-Barid refugee camp in Lebanon, resulting in the confrontation there last year).
I agree. We probably differ in that I see that as a non-problematical, natural and to be expected result of the intervention that will ultimately be to their disadvantage even though in the near term it does not appear to be so. Such confrontations in the near term as opposed to festering for a few years only to later erupt are advantageous to the west even if they are unpleasant.
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Be that as it may, you're there now, and the better it ends for Iraq the better it ends for all of us.
True.