Iraq Isn't the Philippines
30 August Los Angeles Times commentary - Iraq Isn't the Philippines by Jon Wiener.
Quote:
Does History provide any models suggesting that the unhappy war in Iraq might have a happy ending? Journalists and military experts are pointing hopefully to the U.S. war in the Philippines at the turn of the 20th century as an example of how Americans can fight a tough guerrilla insurgency and eventually win.
Max Boot, an Op-Ed columnist for the Los Angeles Times, has written that the U.S. victory in the Philippines provides a "useful reminder" that Americans can prevail in Iraq. Similar arguments have been made by Robert Kaplan in the Atlantic Monthly and by the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute.
But the same suggestion is also made by writers who are not pro-war Republican pundits. The most prominent exponent of the Philippines model for Iraq is Thomas E. Ricks, the Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter for the Washington Post, whose new book, "Fiasco: The American Military Misadventure in Iraq," has been at or near the top of the bestseller lists this month. "Fiasco" shows that the war has been a disaster, but Ricks is nevertheless against pulling out American troops — because, he says, the Philippines example proves that a long occupation beginning in military disaster can end with the creation of a democratic and stable state...
The Philippine war was part of the Spanish-American War of 1898, in which the U.S. promised to bring democracy to the Filipinos by freeing them from the Spaniards. But, as Ricks says, things there "began badly" when a powerful Philippine resistance movement challenged U.S. troops — "like Iraq in 2003." In 1902, after three years of guerrilla fighting, the United States declared victory, although American forces remained in the country for decades, administering it first as a colony and then as a commonwealth. The Philippines was granted independence in 1946 — after almost five decades of U.S. military occupation (interrupted by World War II). Today it's a functioning democracy.
The problem with this version of history is that it doesn't look closely enough at what happened in the Philippines.
First, it neglects the massive differences between the Philippines in 1900 and Iraq in 2006. The guerrillas in the Philippines fought the Army with old Spanish muskets and bolo knives; today's insurgents in Iraq employ sophisticated improvised explosive devices, rocket-propelled grenades and heat-seeking shoulder-fired missiles that can shoot down helicopters. And combat in Iraq takes place in a fully urbanized society where "pacification" is much more difficult than in the mostly rural islands of the Philippines.
Also, the Filipinos who fought the U.S. Army at the turn of the 20th century had no outside allies or sources of support. Today's Iraqi insurgents are at the center of a burgeoning anti-Americanism that has spread throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, with supporters in Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.
And of course today there's also the media. Images of resistance fighters in Iraq, and of the victims of American attacks, are broadcast hourly throughout Iraq, Arab and Muslim countries and the rest of the world. Compared with the Philippines guerrillas of 1900, the Iraqi insurgents are much stronger and more capable and have a much broader base of support that extends beyond national boundaries...
Iraq Isn't the Philippines
Hi:
Greetings from the Philippines.
And my apologies to the Mod for trying to send a reply through the report command.
Yes, the Philippines is not Iraq.
But some lessons can be learned from the US victory in the Philippine-American War. I am a Filipino and hence, I will never call this an insurrection.
One factor causing the US victory was because Americans successfully won over much of the middle class at that time, who were then called the Ilustrados or "Enlightened Ones", because they were privileged enough to have been educated all the way to college--many even in Europe.
There were many other factors, of course. But space constraints confine me to this comment for now.
Incidentally, the Philippine revolutionary army was not that all poorly armed. It had a sizeable stock of Mausers--state of the art then and much better than the Krag. This German model served as the model for the Springfield '03.
As they say in my country, Mabuhay, which in Spanish means "Viva"
The Philippines: The First Iraq
Post at the Belmont Club blog - The First Iraq:
Quote:
Although history never quite repeats itself, current events often resemble earlier occasions so closely there is a temptation to draw lessons from them. Imagine a time when America found itself in a war against a foreign foe whose strategy was to inflict a constant rate of loss on the army; invited US and British reporters to feed antiwar elements with atrocity stories; when US commanders who expected a quick war against a corrupt and oligarchic native elite found they had roused the countryside against them. Imagine a time when the issue of this war was central to an American Presidential election, caused a split in one of the major parties and planted the seeds for a world war. Not Iraq. The war was
Philippine-American War and the election of 1912.
According to the McKinley administration the enemy was not the Filipino population. It was the Spanish oppressor and later, the perfidious and parasitical indigenous landed elite. At the opposite end, "the goal, or end-state, sought by the Filipino Republic was a sovereign, independent, socially stable Philippines led by the illustrado oligarchy. ... The peasants, who provided the bulk of guerilla manpower, had interests different from their illustrado leaders." What flung the oligarchy and the peasants together momentarily was common opposition to the invading US Army. Far from being unsophisticated yokels, the strategic goal of Philippine Republic generals was to send home enough body bags to persuade the mainstream media of the day to electorally repudiate the Republican administration in Washington...
Much more at the link...
Why is the NPA getting stronger
Pinoyme,
First I like to join the others in thanking you for sharing your perspectives with the council. Second, I would like you to share your opinion on why (according to a couple of articles I have read in the past few months) the New People's Army (communist insurgent group) appears to be gaining strength? What is their appeal to the Philippine people? Has the NPA's objectives changed over the years? Do their leaders still believe in communist economic models?
Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-P and the Indirect Approach
From the November - December issue of Military Review - Anatomy of a Successful COIN Operation: OEF-P and the Indirect Approach by Colonel Gregory Wilson, U.S. Army.
Quote:
The history of insurgent conflict during the Philippines Insurrection (1899-1902), Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), and Hukbalahap Rebellion (1946-1954) shows that successful COIN operations are protracted efforts that rely heavily on indigenous security forces. Therefore, the U.S. WOT strategy should emphasize working indirectly “through, by, and with” indigenous forces and building their capacity to conduct effective operations against common enemies.
the people, not the leaders
hackerfin,
Thanks for your initial response, but I have read what the leaders of the NPA have stated, now I would like an insiders view (a Filippino's) opinion on why the communist doctrine is attractive? The Filippinos as a whole are well educated and worldly people, so I would assume the short falls of communism are well known, and thus relatively easy to counter with good PSYOP, yet the reports I read in one of the Asian journals stated the NPA was growing in strength.
Admittedly the government there has done little (for numerous reasons, but primarily corruption) for their people, poverty is wide spread, and change is needed, but a communist insurgency?
iraq isn't the philippines
Hi:
The Philippines being an archipelago of 7000 islands (exact number depends on whether it's low or high tide), there has always been regionalism here.
But there has never been ethnic hatred.
Frankly speaking, I doubt if most of the US Army's (and that of some USMCs) tactics during the Philippine-American War could be used in Iraq.
One factor that most likely caused the middle class to go over en masse to the American side was that many of them did not think the Philippine revolutionary army had a chance.
The First Philippine Republic received no international support. And this was the Age of Imperialism, not the age of former colonies establishing themselves as independent republics.
Moreover, the middle class always had modest demands. It was only when the Spanish government started frustrating them and imprisoning, exiling, and even executing them for these that they went over to revolutionary mode.
The decision to shift to guerrilla warfare was made after initial battles showed the Philippine revolutionary army was outclassed in terms of military skills, logistics, and heavy equipment. The Battle of La Loma, then a suburb north of Manila--which was so one-sided in casualties illustrated this.
And this fact Amercians must finally face: Tortures and hamlettings were widely employed. General Arthur MacArthur efficiently, ruthelessly, and effectively suppressed news reporting on these matters.
Cheers.
Iraq Isn't the Phillippines
Agreed, Iraq is not the Phillippines and it is not America, but we can learn a lesson from both in order to secure victory. It is clear that we must stop the hemorrhaging in Iraq. To do this we must borrow a chapter from our own US history and the Phillippines experience. The “Elusive Iraq Strategy” is not as elusive as one might think. I draw a corollary to Alvin Hanson, the architect of the "New Deal" during the great depression. General Chiarelli (past commander of troops in Iraq) said it himself that there is a total economic collapse in Iraq. "One of the reasons the insurgents are fighting is because they don't have economic opportunities. We need to create those opportunities, to stop the bloodshed." In a May article of Military Officer, a military engineer wrote, “the most striking thing in Iraq is the extreme poverty. I’ve been to the Philippines and saw poverty. But at least they could eat. Here there is sewage and trash on the ground. Shepherds take their sheep to eat from the trash.”
Imagine what chaos we would have if 70% of males 18 to 40 years old were unemployment in the big cities--New Orleans, and New York City and Chicago and Detroit.... Imagine if it occurred for more than three years and with each day, people had little hope for a brighter tomorrow. The real answer to the insurgency problem in Iraq is in the creation of "A Cause to Live For" that is greater than their perceived "Cause to die for...." The solution must stand on three pillars--economic first, military second (for security and stability), and political legitimacy. We must (in conjunction with the Iraqi Government,) “Stand-up Iraq” by converting military camps to secured employment camps on a gradual basis using an “Ink Blot” methodology to rally the Iraqi people to a common cause (rebuilding "their" country brick by brick and in restoring HOPE). This is the “Real Deal.” That said, it can’t be over emphasized that this plan must be an Iraqi government plan of the people, by the people, for the people, so that they shall not perish.
In my travels around the world, regardless of culture, regardless of race, regardless of religion, people have more in common than differences. People want an opportunity for a job that provides a living wage, they want their health and they want to spend time with their family--in the end, it is simply surprising how little it takes to satisfy the human who has nothing. And, finally they want shelter, security and safety. Note however, that security is a double edge sword. You must have security but too much takes money away from the recovery effort and little progress is made to demonstrate real improvements.
There is a huge misunderstanding .... There's a belief that we have a defined enemy out there, and once you either put those folks in jail or you kill them, the fighting will just stop. That's just not the case. There is a root cause of the insurgency in Iraq and it is not religion, not terrorism, not race, not sectarian rifts, it is poverty. I was there, I spent this last year of my life there. They are fighting for "primal needs"--money, food, power, control, survival etc. Their fight is not an ideological manifesto like the media leads us to believe. The IEDs are set by Iraqi males and not from an outside Jihad.
The plan must provide public works “pick and shovel” reconstruction jobs to the Iraqi people with compensation, but in exchange they must live on their secured local employment camp. It is government reconstruction at its most basic level.
Now the lesson from the Phillippines--The requirement for the men to live on the camp is a key strategy for success in that it takes workers off of the streets and out of lawless activities while providing income producing jobs. Isolate the insurgent from the general population. We have met the enemy and they are locals--males 18-40 years old.
Economic Solution In Iraq
Regarding the economic solution proposed above. A key strategic point must be made. In COIN operations, it is essential to isolate the insurgents on the battle space. In the Philippines, we did this using a scorch and burn policy. Once isolated, the insurgents can be neutralized. However, in Iraq it is much different. The only way to isolate the insurgents is to create a “Cause to Live For, that is greater than their Cause to Die For.” Offer anyone that wants honest work the opportunity to help rebuild Iraq brick by brick. The Iraqi government’s role is to establish the local reconstruction work camps (Civilian Conservation Corps equivalent) and then enlist men 18-40 years old to live on the camps in exchange for pay and security. The insurgents are locals and most would choose an honest living if the conditions and opportunity for work were provided by their government. It is the “broken window theory” in its most basic form. Chaos breeds chaos. We must stop the chaos by taking care of the small things—refuge cleanup, remove broken down cars, burned out structures, fix the “broken windows.” Government legitimacy would come with the first payday for the men on the camp.
It is given that the work camps will have past insurgents on them--that is OK. The camps must be secured and be highly localized with no more than 1000 men and with no more then 100 men per work team. Many will do their work on the camp— plan work projects, keep the camp running, teach, train and educate. Others will go out into the community to do labor intensive reconstruction projects.
The military’s and ISF’s role is critical too. They must provide area security for these work teams and bases, and they must search down insurgents that are unwilling to commit to rebuilding Iraq. Security is still critical but security is a double edge sword—you must have just enough, but too much creates conditions for failure—a police state…the community becomes the inmates and the security becomes the guards.
Additionally, it must be understood that recovery cannot take root unless basic human needs are met. Aristotle said, “Poverty is the father of Crime, Revolution and Corruption.” The needs in Iraq are clearly based on Maslow’s hierarchy and apply to the community, and not just to individuals. In other words, the rebels fighting on the streets are doing so because it provides them the basic utility to meet their primal needs for food, water, shelter, income, power, belonging, esteem, and self-actualization. A corollary to Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs is that in as much as Maslow studied the response to human needs, he did not suggest that the converse of his theory is true—that is, when a society fails to provide for essential needs of its people, then its people will self-organize along lines using the lowest common denominator that has the ability to meet those primal needs from lowest to highest. In all cases, humans will organize along alliances that provide the greatest utility for meeting the hierarchical needs. This alliance may be along sectarian lines, tribal ties, gangs or even a nameless insurgency.
I am presenting my paper, “the Elusive Iraq Strategy--Creating a Cause to Live For” at the University of Mass, Boston. I hope to create a “Tipping Point” but I sincerely appreciate the frank dialogue and thoughtful discourse.
Terrorists tend to be upper-middle class folks, and their
This is a correct statement but dont confuse terrorists with insurgents. Terrorists are selfactualizing, whereas the insurgents are primal in their motives. This is a significant difference and misunderstanding among many. The major difference is that the insurgency targets are much more tactical, whereas the terrorist are more strategic in nature. It is important that the two be kept separate because the methods of engagement are significantly different and the momentum that is gained when one is attached to the other is synergistic. While I was there all of last year, the insurgents were local. Outsiders were well less than 1% of those in the fight.
The terrorist is politically motivated desiring to empose his ideological views. The insurgent is apolitical and much more primal in their motives as compared to terrorism. Insurgency warfare is not politically or religiously motivated. Notice how this flies in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.” Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the struggle is protracted and continues to gain momentum—that breeds chaos. Finally, insurgency battles are small scale quick engagements that are executed locally within kilometers of their homes.
This is not to say that insurgents do not get outside support, momentum and efficacy from the outside, and from each other. They certainly gain influence and power from the outside and even funding or support may be from external sources but in the aggregate, there is not enough self-interest for large numbers of outsiders to physically risk fighting at the grass root level. And, those that do fight are doing so for reasons much different then the primal needs of the insurgents. The primary rebel movement however, is local insurgency.
Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?
Sir,
Thank you for your patients with my rambling on this topic. I believe based on what I have learned from the war and in my studies that there are fundamental and significant differences between insurgents and terrorists.
Not only in their motives and their Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) but in our military response to each--how we fight. However, some experts will quickly say that insurgency and terrorism are inextricably linked. In doing so however, they would fail to recognize the consequence of this association. In my studies, the two are only loosely connected but often each gains tremendous momentum when the two are used interchangeably. I also believe that when we misrepresent one as the other, we do damage to our effort. It is, in our terms "a combat multiplyier" for the enemy in its most synergistic form. For example, when I associate what is happening in Iraq to a religious Jihad or a struggle against demoracracy, it gives the appearance of unification of one large group against another, and of a large scale almost global struggle. The risk is that we incite globally--“Beware the zealous leader who bangs the drums of war in order to whip the citizenry into a fervor, for this is indeed a double-edged sword. It both emboldens the blood, just as it narrows the mind. And when the drums of war have reached a fever pitch and the blood boils with hate and the mind has closed, the leader will have no need in seizing the rights of the citizenry. Rather, the citizenry, infused with fear and blinded by hatred, will offer up all of their rights unto the leader, and gladly so. How do I know? For this is what I have done. And I am, Caesar.” Quote from Julius Caesar.
I think a new thread would be helpful to me too. We should define the two.
Here are some of the things that I believe are the salient differences between the two:
Insurgencies are conditions in which the insurgents spawn within a population because the government will not, or simply cannot provide the appropriate governance for life (law, order, security, water, electricity, sanitation, etc. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then freedom fighters or terrorists. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, (it is more primal and basic) and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. In other words, their cause can change based on the situation. Today insurgents might attack American fighters in response to the surge, tomorrow they might strike a Mosque in a form of sectarian retaliation, the next day it is the Iraq security forces. Their targets are most often tactical. Their goal has nothing to do with winning although they don't mind the enemies (plural) failing--they will fight anyone who tries to bring order. They win if the struggle is protracted because it is from the pure chaos that they get their Utility. Insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. However, because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. This can be used as a COIN tool, and their members can be reformed.
The insurgents in Iraq are decentralized in their operations, are local within a small territorial range (kilometers from their home) and recruit their fighters from local talent. Here is an equation that predicts the probable distance from an IED strike to the insurgents' home base. P(b) = A * e**-Bx Where A and B are empirical constants determined from the enemy data sets. It is an exponential decay function. As the distance X from the insurgent’s base increases, the less probable that a single group committed it. It is believed that 90% of all insurgent attacks will occur within 15 km of their base.
The Terrorists on the other hand, have very much centralized command and control (decentralized in their execution) and will operate hundred up to thousands of kilometers from their command and control base of operations.
Their struggle is based on the terrorist’s commitment to violence as a small group (usually ranging in group size from few to less than one-hundred- fifty "card carrying" members) in order to intimidate a population or government to cause their perceived fundamental change. The group size is limited by command, control and confidentiality capabilities. Their cause is always ideological and political, based on group-actualization rather than self-serving. In other words, their belief is that what they do is for the "Public good"--acting on behalf of "all." It is aimed at the establishment, not decapitated states. Terrorism however enjoys the freedom to organize and operate unabated in failed states. Finally, rarely will anyone ever develop a counter-terrorist strategy to change this group’s apostasy--it is analogous to trying to change Rush Limbaugh from the right to the left--it simply cannot be done. Their beliefs are so deeply held that they appear to the world as radical and extreme. Terrorists may or may not be highly trained and their operations are top driven and centralized from the command and control elements. Their targets are always strategic. Because the terrorists act on behalf of all, they will never engage in grass roots fighting unless cornered into it. As a result, in my "Opinion," we have very few terrorist cells living in Iraq. Although the insurgents hope that we think differently.
I think a new string would be very helpful.
on lessons from huk campaign
Hi:
I finally got to read online the US Defense Department phamphlet on Lessons from the Huk Campaign.
This being the case, it might be interesting to read the NPA's analysis of the "Lava revisionist's clique's debacle due to their leftwing adventurism."
It's in the first chapter of Amado Guerrero's "Philippine Society and Revolution"
The author is none other than Jose Ma. Sison, the Maoist intellectual who led the so-called re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines.
The book can be accessed online.
I do not know the exact URL address. Nevertheless, one can Google--or better still chacha (http:www.chacha.com) his name.
People subscribed to this newsgroup might get better insights on COIN strategies by reading him. A word of caution though, readers will have to be tolerant of the shrillness of the book's tenor.
And to think that Jose Ma. Sison was not only an English major while in college, but a writer of poetry as well.
Whether his poetry is good or wheter it sucks is nonetheless an issue better left to literary critics. :=)
Internet connectivity is now somewhat better in the Philippines. Hopefully, it shall finally be restored fully.
Cheers.
