Quality vs. Quantity, the Dangers of Imbalance
We had DR. Milan Vego from the Naval War College guest lecture this morning on Naval Theory and theorists. As the morning progressed it struck me how relevant the discussions (particularly the sidebars that were generated) were to this thread. One thing that really struck me was the question of: Does our pursuit of means (in our culture this might mean a quantum technological leap forward) determine the limits of our strategy, or should our strategy determine the means we pursue?
One of the things discussed was the Navy’s pursuit of the Littoral Combat Ship and nuclear submarines. Both are very expensive, and both have been debated in regards to futures type strategy – Seapower 21, Airpower 21, Force 21, NCW, etc. The idea that a vastly capable platform has “savings” over multiple technologically inferior platforms – read the LCS, a FCS BCT, JSF/F-22 because they are networked and can leverage technology.
Since we have hit the budget and that the amount of the Nation’s budget spent on Defense is hard to change (you’d probably need an existential threat to convince the public), then you have a choice to make in regards of quality (perceived or real) over quantity (generally proven and more affordable tech – but requiring more people). I think this is an important because while we are very engaged in a single theater, there are other strategic challenges that are evolving – you can call them peer or near peer, but what I think is important is that there are states and non-states who are looking to take advantage and have decided that this is a good opportunity because the one cop that is always on the beat is pretty busy.
We live in a world of finite resources. People covet those resources and as much as we’d prefer to come to an amicable co-usage of those resources, it seems biological to anticipate your greater needs and to try and secure an advantage, if for nothing else, out of fear. While we hope diplomacy and economic benefits will point out the advantages (first among them avoidance of the costs of war), it is a longer road, and there will probably be those who feel disenfranchised, or just don’t want to wait. Some will feel as though they should not have to wait for something they believe is inherently theirs. Some will mistake the reaction of others and see a bloodless gain bought by inability and apathy from others.
So no matter if we are discussing small wars or big wars, the imbalance brought about by pursuing an acquisition strategy which might allow us to gain superiority in a specific location while limiting our ability to respond to multiple challenges forces us into the uncomfortable game of guessing which place is more important to be. Given the multitude of competing state interests in pursuit of resources and given the viral spread of destabilizing non-state entities, are we building a force which we will be too scared to use/commit as an instrument of policy, and which once used will be too expensive (or too difficult) to reconstitute either through loss, or over-usage? I think a force that is too expensive in those terms may not be a very good policy tool, and may put us at a disadvantage as we try and respond to too much with too little.
Dr. Vego had a great observation about WWII. By the destruction of our battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese forced us out of a Mahanian pursuit of a major capitol ship engagement, and into exploiting the advantages of the Aircraft Carrier. This is not to advocate the use of Airpower in the Pacific Theater, but that of breaking away from accepted notions that no longer conform to environmental realities. There is a danger in building your strategy to justify acquisition – it’s a leap of faith of an unknown height. Where national security is concerned, it may be a technological “bridge too far”. I thought about his observation and I wondered if OIF and OEF might be a sort of Pearl Harbor catalyst to consider how we wage war, and how to regain balance between investing in the people who fight war and the technology which provides us advantages.
What is the nature of the threat & so what?
Granite Slate's, Ski's and LV's discussion on "what is a peer" got me thinking along a different track. How do we see the threat, and why? Service cultures play a part in shaping our perspectives, but that does not mean they are irrelevant. In gunnery the crew is taught to engage the most dangerous threat first - there are characteristics given to help qualify that, but it’s still a matter of arbitration. However, let’s say you have a more lethal threat that can engage you, but also have a less lethal threat closer in. Both are lethal. You have some latitude, you can perform a simultaneous engagement, but still, its a divided effort.
The ground war in OIF and OEF has perhaps affected the thinking of the Army and Marines in regards to the nature of the threat more so then the Navy and the Air Force. Why - seems easy enough, but why is it important to acknowledge. In terms of relevancy and treasure, casualty rates and force stress on the Army and Marines are immediate and lasting. They have brought hard lessons to be re-learned about the nature of War, and that it is fought by people. The Army and Marines stand a little closer to the consequences of Ground Combat - so not just our tactical thinking has been challenged, but our operational and strategic thinking has been challenged. OR rates for combat vehicles, CL IX, 4th and 5th tours, armored protection etc. have taken precedence over pursuit of perfect technology to solve problems - give me good enough - COTs over R&D - buy more of these now, I can't wait - We need a larger service to meet our commitments, etc. Its a kind of Maslow's Law for ground components - "we enjoyed our romp with contemplating self synchronization, but right now we have to shoot this guy and convince this other guy to quit blowing things up."
The Air Force and Navy are also affected, but less – it’s the nature of their role in this war, perhaps in warfare. I say the last because wars are about people and of course as stated people live on the ground, not in the air and not on the sea. They may venture into the air or sea for different reasons, and of course from a military stand point they offer advantages, and for our policy they dictate requirements, but people live - on the ground. So the Air Force and the Navy have more limitations in regard to affecting the ground then the Army and Marines. Both the Air Force and Navy offer unique and complimenting advantages in regards to war (and I hope we retain all of them), but I'd say they are more limited (we are all limited in some ways).
So it should be no surprise that the view of the most pressing and dangerous threat should be different. The perception of those threats leads to arguments on how best to spend limited resources.
The challenge for us is to consider our threats and the different ways in which we can counter and overcome them while not short changing the others. Historically this is a very challenging time for us, as we deal with combating Non-State & State enemies, convincing the public of a threat which we ourselves have a hard time agreeing on, waging a war in a near instantaneous information environment, trying to keep the WMD genies in their bottles, practicing and funding Joint, Inter-Agency and Combined warfare, and many other challenges.
As an Army guy I struggle to look outside of my perceptions and biases about the war and what it means to security, but I am an Army guy, so I first have to think about the Army's core competencies and what that means for the soldier trading shots the enemy at hand. I expect the same from LawVol as the USAF guy and the sailors of the USN. However, from a strategic point of view, its prudent to reconsider where we are going in light of what we've learned so far, and what events we see unfolding in the world. Is the technologically brilliant but hyper costly force the way to go? We must find some type of strategic balance between man and machine to be an effective instrument of policy for the long haul in order to preserve the freedoms we've been charged to defend.