The Result of Losing Korea?

Gentlemen,

I submit our Nation has not prevailed in a war since WWII. This has given our current enemies hope that they can exhaust and defeat us. I am intrigued by the idea that had we decisively defeated North Korea, would Vietnam have occurred? I believe that because we accepted something less than victory in Korea that our leaders have made our nation more vulnerable and emboldened our enemies in the present age.

Had we done as McArthur advised and razed parts of China...done whatever was necessary to win in Korea on the order of what we did, with the U.K. and Soviets in WWII...that the modern world might look much different than it does today. Certainly we would not be facing the threat of nuclear missiles launched from North Korea on American soil or used to attack U.S. forces in the Pacific...or given to a government or terrorist organization that would use them against us? Was our weakness in fighting communism in Korea something which emboldened and inspired our communist enemies in Vietnam? Would they have done so if the U.S had won decisively in Korea and if we had used all elements of national power to make the communists in Vietnam understand what would happen to them if they decided to fight: Annihilation?

I believe this is an important question as it relates to our present struggle and how our enemy views us. There are important consequences to losing a war, some of which are not realized for a generation or two. Certainly we know our enemy cites our failure to win in Vietnam as an inspiration to outlast and exhaust us. Great powers can never lose a war; they must always be viewed as having won decisively.

Further, our weakness since WWII, I believe, has and will have significant consequences for the current world order. Should we lose in Iraq and elsewhere, who will view us as: 1. a reliable ally; 2. an enforcer of peace among the great powers. If I were Taiwan or Japan, I would not trust U.S. resolve. This is disastrous.

Does anyone have any books or research to recommend that could shed light on this? What are your thoughts?

Very respectfully,

CR

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I submit our Nation has not prevailed in a war since WWII. This has given our current enemies hope that they can exhaust and defeat us. I am intrigued by the idea that had we decisively defeated North Korea, would Vietnam have occurred? I believe that because we accepted something less than victory in Korea that our leaders have made our nation more vulnerable and emboldened our enemies in the present age.

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Not sure about this thesis. The Cold War turned out pretty well for the U.S. Also proxy fights in Central and South America, as well as in Afghanistan, went pretty decisively in our favor even if the results weren't necessarily pretty for the inhabitants at the time. Also Desert Storm.

As for whether Vietnam would have occurred if Korea had been "won" --- not sure what you mean here. If by "win" you mean that the U.N. forces end up guarding the Yalu instead of the 38th Parallel? What about this scenario makes the Viet Minh give up against French colonialism or stops the U.S. from intervening in 1956?

Please provide evidence that destruction of large parts of China would have resulted in China giving up its backing of North Korea and assenting to a permanent U.S. presence on its border. The more likely scenario sees Mao and Stalin becoming closer and a much closer Soviet-Chinese bond.

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Great powers can never lose a war; they must always be viewed as having won decisively.

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Nonsense, unless your definition of "Great Power" starts and ends with Alexander the Great. The Romans suffered repeated defeats. So has every other Great Power in recorded history. Did the British Empire end with its defeat in the North American colonies?

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Further, our weakness since WWII, I believe, has and will have significant consequences for the current world order. Should we lose in Iraq and elsewhere, who will view us as: 1. a reliable ally; 2. an enforcer of peace among the great powers. If I were Taiwan or Japan, I would not trust U.S. resolve. This is disastrous.

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I remember similar doomsayings about Vietnam. Somehow Japan and Taiwan still remain independent and allied to the U.S., despite at the time facing a far greater and more ideologically implacable foe than al-Qaeda.

I have seen nothing that would indicate that following MacArthur's wishes would have resulted in anything other than a wider, longer, bloodier war. I would also say that the opening thesis relies on a very selective definition of "war."

We won the war in Korea. One need only look at the bustling Korean economy and the fact that they were able to support the U.S. with combat forces outside their borders.

We are well on our way to winning in Vietnam. General Electric, General Motors and General Dynamics are accomplishing what General Westmoreland and General Abrams could not.:wry:

I agree that the U.S. and its allies won in South Korea. We successfully defended South Korea from a small insurgency, then a major conventional invasion, and preserved its sovereignty. We then helped develop its economy into one of the most successful in the world. South Korea's transition to democracy in 1987, though largely accomplished without U.S. support, completed a near-total victory for South Korea and the U.S. in both moral and military terms.

tequila, thanks for responding. Firstly, you are correct in pointing out that the U.S. achieved successes in Central American proxy wars, but these were just that: proxy wars and not true tests of national resolve on the order of larger conflicts. Enemies of the U.S. recognize this. Secondly, the U.S. also achieved some success in Desert Storm, but the enemy in that conflict was not decisively defeated and remained a problem for years afterward. One can argue that Desert Storm achieved its stated objectives, but perhaps the objectives were too limited for what really needed to done: permanently end the threat to U.S. interests in the region from that regime (oil, security). The Desert Storm campaign failed to do this or perhaps was not designed to do this. One can argue that it should have been in light of what the U.S. is experiencing now.

In many ways, the Cold War did turn out pretty well for the U.S., but that again was a different sort of conflict. There still remains unresolved business from the Cold War, so perhaps it will not turn out as well as we believe. How the U.S. handled certain conflicts during the Cold War certainly exposed its weaknesses to others--weaknesses U.S. enemies are now exploiting.

You are also correct in pointing out that every great power has suffered defeat since Alexander. I did not say that great powers have never lost a war or suffered defeats; what I mean is that it is never good for great powers to lose. You seem to indicate that losing is no big deal because when great powers in the past suffered defeat, it did not spell the end of them (at least immediately). Funny about Great Britain, especially in light of their recent humiliations at the hands of Iran.

I think it is a big deal whenever a great power loses (or is widely perceived to have lost), especially today because defeats are so amplified by modern media. If a great or greater power does not win convincingly, it has lost (Israel v. Hezbollah). After enough defeats, great powers cease to have the ability to successfully defend their interests and protect their people. I meant to point out that defeats can have tremendous detrimental consequences in the future--consequences that might not be readily apparent now. Because the U.S. did not decisively defeat the communists in North Korea, it has been plagued by a hostile regime for another generation. Now this regime has or potentially has the capability to do great harm to us or our allies either directly or by sharing powerful military technology with others hostile to our interests and way of life.

My definition of "winning" in Korea: total and lasting defeat of communist forces up to the Yalu River. Doing this very likely would have required some action against neighboring states supporting our enemies there (China). If we had to fortify that area, so be it. Better to fortify there than at the 38th Parallel like we are doing now. You may be right that such action might have brought Stalin and Mao closer; or the U.S. might have been able to sign a peace agreement of some sort from a position of victory and strength.

I wonder about the implications of not achieving victory in Korea were for Vietnam and future conflicts, if any. When great powers are seen as vulnerable, others are inspired to attack them and their interests. Had the U.S. won decisively in Korea and thereby made clear that it would not tolerate the spread of communism in SE Asia (and what would happen to those who tried), it might have given others (the Viet Minh) pause. We might have been able to achieve some sort of different relationship with the Viet Minh or whoever came to power in Vietnam.

I can't prove this as it is only a theory and something I put up for discussion. I could be wrong, but I would like to know what others think the implications were and are. I also wanted to see if anyone knew of any writing or research I could reference to learn more about the consequences of Korea in relation to Vietnam and future conflicts.

Lastly regarding Taiwan, I do not think the U.S. track record bodes well should Taiwan really need to be protected. I do not believe the U.S. would go to war with China to preserve Taiwan, especially if it turns out that it does not have the resolve to defeat the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, just like it did not have the resolve to win in Vietnam and Korea. If the world perceives the U.S. lacks resolve, it cannot enforce peace like it has in many parts of the world for the last 60 years, because of how decisively it and the Allies won WWII.

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I can't prove this as it is only a theory and something I put up for discussion. I could be wrong, but I would like to know what others think the implications were and are. I also wanted to see if anyone knew of any writing or research I could reference to learn more about the consequences of Korea in relation to Vietnam and future conflicts.

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In terms of historical analysis, you are leading with your conclusion rather than surveying the literature or sources to determine what your conclusions should be. This technique was also used in recent "Feith-based intelligence analysis."

Like the others I see your definition of victory as essentially one dimensional, centered on destruction of the enemy rather than defeat of the enemy. It is also quite limited in duration, especially since you are essentially taking Korea out of the Cold War continuim and tacking in some sort of causal relationship with Vietnam. Meanwhile there were conflicts elsewhere that shaped the thinking concerning the Vietnam conflict, Cuba being one and the Congo being another.

As for Gulf War 1, that conflict was limited and was done so deliberately--at least until the end when the White House issued calls for rebellion and did not back them up. There were significant reasons for not crossing into Iraq; if you have any doubt as to their validity, look at events today.

Tom

Let us not confuse winning the war with winning the peace. The Allies' WWII experience is an example of winning the war and then winning the peace as well, largely because of the Marshall Plan. Compare this with WWI where the Entente won the war but lost the peace miserably. The American Civil War is another example of won war and lost peace. I submit that Desert Storm is another war that was won while the peace was not.

When wars are fought, they should be done so with the objective of establishing a better state of peace. In too many the wars, the victors have not followed this precept with the result being a resumption of fighting after a short breathing spell to recover enough to begin again.

Thanks Tom. In response I would like to clarify by saying my definition of victory is not based solely on destruction. I think, tough, that to defeat one's enemy in war, force and destruction are critical components. How does one defeat an enemy in armed conflict without in some way actually destroying or threatening to destroy his ability to wage war and/or what is dear to him? Of course there are other elements of national power that come into play and other strategies, but the capability to destroy (sometimes used, sometimes only threatened) is of supreme importance. It forces peace. I very much agree with wm's point about winning the peace to ensure victory endures. A nation must use every means at its disposal to achieve victory based on correctly defined objectives.

I don't think I am engaging in Feith-based intelligence analysis by simply raising the point, asking what others think, and whether there is analysis and literature out there to offer evidence for or against the "conclusion"…I'm trying to get on the right track and perhaps have an interesting discussion in the meantime. I do however think America's current enemies have drawn their own conclusions about instances where the U.S. lacked resolve…

There were indeed good reasons not to have started the war in Iraq, as we can see today. But had the U.S. had the will to wage the war “properly” from the beginning and been [more] successful, perhaps the bad reasons would not now be so emphasized? Iraq will certainly be a mistake if the United States is not successful or largely perceived to have failed. If the U.S. is able to achieve something close to its original policy goal of a friendly, stable Iraqi leadership and society with some form of thriving representative government, then it is less likely that Iraq will be deemed a mistake. Some may argue this was never possible, but I believe that the full military, diplomatic, political, industrial, etc. might of the United States, if effectively employed, would have resulted in a different situation than what we are facing today (and of course a willingness to correct mistakes, adapt, etc.). The U.S. must avoid getting into conflicts it does not have the will to win.

The U.S. did indeed achieve all the successes in the South that you all mentioned…for now. But the war between the Koreas is still not over; there is no final victor as of yet. North Korea still presents the ROK, the U.S., and the region with significant challenges; there is still the potential for more war. The U.S., the ROK, and others make what are tantamount to extortion payments…this is not victory. A case can be made that these challenges are a possible result of not having decisively defeated the North Koreans 55 years ago.

I know General Westmoreland believed that the U.S. "held the line" against communism for ten years and that Vietnam was a demonstration of U.S. resolve to fight communism. This may very well be, but Vietnam was also a demonstration of the limits of U.S. resolve. In this way the war was a failure.

Thank you for leaving what I consider a controversial post. I agree with Tom Odom's comments. As much as I wish we decisively defeated N. Korea, the political situation was not in favor of escalating a land war in Asia. As a democracy, political consideration is paramount in war decision making. Public support waned for the Korean War after stalemate persisted beginning in the spring of '51. Our war-weary citizens would not have stood for a large war in Asia only six years after WWII peace was concluded.

Vietnam was a reaction to a number of different things, including Kennedy's impotence regarding the construction of the Berlin Wall and the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation. Mao's Revolutionary War concept also resonated outside China, with its implementation by Ho Chi Minh and Giap during the war in Indochina.

Losing a war is not necessarily detrimonious to a superpower. Hell, the Brits lost during the "Great Game" in Central Asia but it hardly affected their power. The "win" in the Boer War was less than decisive. The Russians may have lost the Russo-Japanese War, but they continued to influence world affairs for the next 100 years.

What is necessary to remember is losing in Iraq is not the end of the world for the U.S. I feel it might actually suit our strategic goals. The first, keeping extremists divided and fighting amongst themselves in a country far away from our own, siphoning their energy. Two, if the situation escalated into a regional war, Syria and Iran would have to engage. Their involvement would aid our goals-weakening their state governments through fiscal and human loss. Third, if chaos broke out in the Middle East, might the U.S. not have a reason to intervene in the region to "protect our interests?" Our interests would be oil fields and oil production. Who knows where we might cordon off and control.

Real politik is not naivete; it is based on fact and a sense of what public support for military operations might be.

Menning, I agree that just six years after WWII, the American public would not have tolerated a more bloody and protracted war. But political leaders should not get the nation involved in conflicts it knows the nation does not support. If the need to enter conflict is so vital to national interests that leaders believe the nation must get involved, then it is the responsibility of those leaders to explain clearly to the American people: why war is necessary, the goal, and how the country will achieve that goal. In short, political leaders must mobilize the nation, lead, and pursue policies and strategies that will result in victory. When there are setbacks, leaders must adjust and regain momentum while maintaining national will until victory is achieved.

I like your points about Vietnam being a reaction to a number of things, many of which were instances of U.S. weakness.

I don’t see how losing in Iraq…failing to achieve something close to our objectives or whatever…will in the end be in our best interests. Playing enemies off against each other, prolonging strife and suffering of people in the region with the eventual possibility/expectation of having to invade again would not help America. The best outcome is a stable, secure, and peaceful Iraq, with some form of representative government allied with the United States. Successfully killing, capturing, and dismantling hostile terrorist and insurgent groups would be part of this outcome, as well as seriously weakening regional actors hostile to U.S. interests. Keeping our enemies divided and siphoning their energy will never result in decisive victory, which is what the U.S. should strive for.

But realistically speaking, the U.S. probably just didn’t have the will to win in Korea and Vietnam…obviously. I think this is bad…but not the end of the U.S., just like Iraq won’t be. However, the U.S. will be weakened by defeat. Who knows what would happen with other state and non-state actors in the event of a U.S. defeat, but whatever happens probably won’t strengthen the U.S. position in the world.

This is an interesting debate.

To my mind, Great Powers must fight many different kinds of conflicts, balancing aims with resources. Some of our more important victories, such as the Cold War, involved sometimes intense restraint on the use of force while pursuing strategic rather than tactical victories.

The U.S. military has not really fought many clear-cut victories. In the Revolutionary War and War of 1812, Britain more or less quit fighting but preserved and possibly enhanced its national standing and empire for the next century.

The Mexican-American War was probably a major, lasting victory in that the United States was able to annex California and New Mexico. However, these events still inform our sometimes tense relations with Latin America, whereas most Americans are unaware the war involved a U.S. military occupation of Mexico City.

The U.S. Civil War had a decisive military victory, but the postwar period had many unsatisfactory elements, including the successful use of terror tactics to undermine the role of Federal troops in ensuring voting rights for all citizens. With the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, barring Federal troops from safeguarding polling booths and protecting desegregated state legislatures, the country remained effectively partitioned for generations.

The United States only really asserted itself as a Great Power beginning with the Spanish American War, which resulted in a sort of ambivalent and short-lived empire. The Panama Canal was an important use of military power and administration in a non warfighting role. In World War I, the United States contributed to victory, but the peace was deeply flawed -- The Central Powers realized they were militarily defeated and achieved an armistice to prevent the destruction of their homelands.

In truth, the real historic aberration may have been World War II. The U.S. was uniquely (though not totally) united around the war aim and willing to achieve total victory over enemy militaries and peoples, followed-up by forceful plans to dominate and transform former enemy societies. The confluence of factors which created World War II is unlikely ever to be repeated.

The decisive destruction of an enemy force is a military tactic. Compelling or convincing an adversarial society to alter behavior or comply with demands is a strategic goal, and this can be achieved through many means.

VinceC, thanks for your insight. There certainly have been times when the U.S. military had mixed results and that is one of the things I tried to articulate with this post, while asking the question: what are the consequences of not achieving victory? Concur completely that destructive force is only part of a strategy, but it is probably the one aspect of strategy that most underpins the others. Ultimately, the capacity to destroy external threats is what makes civilization and national survival even possible (I did not mean to destroy, but the capacity to destroy). That is not to say that destructive force alone leads to success--it doesn't--but having the capacity to use it and decisively use it when necessary completely changes a nation's standing in the world. Case in point: the Soviet Union.

The Soviets weren't a particularly strong economic power or moral authority; western nations paid attention to them because they were aggressive and feared. Russia's influence declined considerably after the break-up of the Soviet Union as its military might diminished. This led to independence for Eastern Europe as these countries knew they no longer had to fear Soviet coercion. The world is paying more attention to Russia now that it has announced plans to develop new technology and weapons systems and showcased a willingness to exert aggression, i.e. harassment and suspected assassination of dissidents and political enemies, strong arming neighbors by withholding gas and oil, and so on.

If North Korea did not, apparently, possess a few nuclear weapons with the potential capacity to create more and have a perceived willingness to use/share them under the right circumstances, no one would be nearly as concerned about them as if it possessed a purely conventional army. And if North Korea did not have a formidable conventional army either, no one would care much for what it said or did at all. Had we defeated the North Korean communists 55 years ago, certainly no one would be worried about them now.

The reason anyone even pays attention to Islamic terrorists is because they commit extreme acts of violence and threaten to commit more if they do not get what they want. When a nation loses credibility in the area of using influence and force (in all its forms—the “many means” to compel an adversary that you mention) to achieve national objectives and protect national interests, those who have no qualms about using force against that nation or its interests will fight it. We must ask ourselves what the result of America's mixed military success and lack of resolve means to our enemies, but also to our allies. Your brief summary of American military history brings up some very valid points; perhaps U.S. success as a result of WWII was so dramatic and unprecedented that it caused some to forget that maybe the U.S. has not historically had too many clear-cut victories. Maybe it also speaks well of the U.S. in that it could be or could have been much more coercive in its use of power (belligerent), but has historically chosen not to do so.

Who knows whether events leading to a national effort on the order of WWII will ever again coalesce. It depends a lot, I think, on how strong we allow our enemies to become and what they decide to do to us and our allies when they possess a certain level of political, military, and economic strength. Our enemies are very clear on what they want to do and it is not in our best interests. If they were strong enough and if the U.S. and its allies were weak enough, I think we have to take them at their word and believe they would try to kill, subjugate, and conquer as much of the West as possible. I know you said that great powers must often fight different-sized conflicts of varying import and can accept varying outcomes. This is the case, but I am not so sure this is a good thing or the right thing over the long term. If the U.S. and its allies had a track record of consistent, decisive victory in conflicts large and small, its enemies or potential enemies would not be as bold in challenging them. Isn’t that a good thing for the United States?

Vince, what do you think the current and future consequences are for America with its mixed history of success in conflict? For its allies? How do you think America’s enemies perceive this and how do you think they will exploit it?

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Vince, what do you think the current and future consequences are for America with its mixed history of success in conflict? For its allies? How do you think America’s enemies perceive this and how do you think they will exploit it?

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My experience is in international cooperation, and that's where my personal opinions and preferences lie. The American ideal in the international arena, unlike earlier empires, is based on the notion that we are exporting our founding principles -- Democracy; life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; free markets; tolerance, etc. -- and that our means to promote and attain these principles are an ever-changing work in progress.

Collectively, the people of United States have shown again and again they seek to lead the world not by the authoritarian application of strength but by moral example, and they want to lead the world toward democracy and mutual tolerance. That was actually one of Lincoln's strongest motives in fighting to maintain national union -- he believed splitting the country would prove that the founding ideals were not strong enough to sustain a cohesive nation.

In the 21st century, if we want to lead like-minded nations and peoples (many of which owe their current existence to our actions) we must lead by example, by consensus and by persuasion. This is tough, but more enduring than the alternatives. I think like-minded allies and partners include the NATO members; the European Union and its aspirants; the Pacific Rim democracies and partners, such as Australia and South Korea; the emerging democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent polling shows that Muslim-majority countries also seek democratic government and religious freedom, but on their own terms, not imposed by outsiders.

The qualities of a strong, capable leader are the same for nations as they are for individuals. If we think back to the best leaders we've served, it is likely the majority of them were consensus builders who showed restraint and paid attention to sound advice from subordinates. As co-inheritors (with our allies) of the ideals (and fallacies) of Western Civilization and values, our ideal of leadership is little changed from those principles outlined by Shakespeare in his 94th Sonnet:

They that have power to hurt and will do none,
That do not do the thing they most do show, [ie., those who restrain themselves from doing what they most clearly are capable of doing]
Who, moving others, are themselves as stone,
Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow,
They rightly do inherit heaven's graces
And husband nature's riches from expense;
They are the lords and owners of their faces,
Others but stewards of their excellence.

Unlike more martial societies, the Western ethic is to use "force as a last resort" and demonstrate that the most effective use of power is to restrain its use, as was done so carefully in the Cold War. An interesting application of U.S. military power took place with the intervention in Haiti. The threat, delivered by a trusted intermediary, that American paratroopers were in the air and en route to Port au Prince, prepared for combat, was enough to convince the regime to capitulate and accede to the international supervision of an elected government.

If the United States leads by moral example and secures international legitimacy with others who want to promote shared values, then setbacks are collective problems, not just our problems. This in turn allows us to continue our moral leadership, which is based as much on the Marshall Plan and sticking with South Korea after the 1953 armistice as it is on the World War II fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities.

Bolshevism is not a bad analogy to the world's current assault by radical Islamists who seek worldwide governance. Their concerns are class-based as well as culturally based. They seek to reshape and transform societies on a new ideal, replacing what they view to be corrupt and worn-out ideas and concepts that they find oppressive. Bolshevism was a genuine world threat from perhaps 1905 until the late 1980s, and it lingers in many places still. It took over nations and whole regions. It inspired passionate young fanatics who could care less about macro-economic (or theological) principles, but who had no more exciting prospects in their lives than to energetically pursue revolution and upheaval (this is in part an offshoot of the human evolutionary need for young adults to forcefully break away from the tribe, which is why teenagers can be such a pain in the *** even when they're just trying to borrow the car, not blow you up). Today, Bolshevism and Communism have been proved to be dead-end ideas, and they are extremely unlikely to spark enough collective enthusiasm to overthrow any sitting governments. But it pretty much took a century, a terrible and violent century, for that to happen. And Bolsevism was beaten as much by ideas and collective prosperity as it was by the application of military power. Which is not to say that military power -- and threat of its use -- did not play a central tactical role in the strategic victory.

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Originally Posted by Menning

What is necessary to remember is losing in Iraq is not the end of the world for the U.S. I feel it might actually suit our strategic goals. The first, keeping extremists divided and fighting amongst themselves in a country far away from our own, siphoning their energy. Two, if the situation escalated into a regional war, Syria and Iran would have to engage. Their involvement would aid our goals-weakening their state governments through fiscal and human loss. Third, if chaos broke out in the Middle East, might the U.S. not have a reason to intervene in the region to "protect our interests?" Our interests would be oil fields and oil production. Who knows where we might cordon off and control.

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Pardon me while I stray from history.... I would like to add the particularly unorthodox view that a loss in Iraq might, if handled properly, be useful to American strategic objectives in this struggle. I would submit that the target audience in this struggle is not Al Q or any of the other sub/inter/supra-national insurgent groups. Rather, it is the rest of the world that is mostly on the fence. I think that this population bristles at the way that the US acts in the world -- whether their interpretations are correct is irrelevant -- and that a show of humility might go a long way to mollifying that irritation. If defeat in Iraq were handled correctly, and with a large degree of magnanimity, the US could probably end up ahead of the game.

Quite frankly, as much as there was an intense desire to strike back in the aftermath of 9/11 -- and I'm a New Yorker, the loss is still incomprehensible to me -- a better course of action might have been to work on the problems that lead these young men to join such movements as Al Q. Had American actions been targetted to shore up the support of the world's population as a means of making the existence of such groups increasingly untenable, we might be in a very different place today. (Ok, I'm no Pollyanna -- this problem might have been solved only to be replaced by another, just as the Cold War ended only to be replaced by another threat. But we're dealing with one problem at a time, because otherwise our heads would explode.) Skip the war and go straight to the Marshall Plan. If we were going to send troops to the Middle East, it ought to have been as the Palestinian defense force. Because as people have pointed out in this thread, war winning is not about the battlefield but the peace that follows. How you shape that is what really matters in war.