Sep 2010 TRADOC Senior Leader's Conference
I’ll be attending the Sep 2010 TSLC as part of General Dempsey’s staff. Although I’m a planner in the Commander’s Planning Group, I will be there as a group facilitator and observer. The theme for the TSLC will be: An Army in Transition – Preparing our Army for the future in an era of persistent conflict. Topics will include the Army’s conceptual foundation, warfighting function concepts, Leader development and an overview of the profession of arms. These topics have long range effects on the future of our Army. The new Army Capstone Concept and Operating Concept will have cascading effects throughout the DOTMLPF realm.
Since Adam Bonifant has moved on to other things, Bill Jakola and I intend to provide the forum live updates as salient points emerge from the conference. I hope to provide the SWJ members information that will generate discussion within the larger military community
If anyone wants to know more your welcome to ping me or Bill Jakola.
v/r
Jason Thomas
Any live coverage from TSLC Sep 2010?
Jason - Great to see you moved up to TRADOC staff and your continued involvement with GEN Dempsey's initiatives.
It was interesting to see the integration of live blogging and coverage from the Small Wars Journal during last year's TSLC. Hopefully that will continue this year. I look forward to following it.
Bob
Thanks for the response...
Understand the rowing requirement...
Mostly answered my question... let me see if I can interpret and you can confirm or deny...
1. Identify relevant historical examples/vignettes that TRADOC should consider incorporating/using to inform training, leader development and doctrine development (I guess that means an annotated list)?
2. A white paper/info paper that crosswalks key themes of the Army Operating Concept into WfF concepts and subsequently into TRADOC Core Competencies as defined by TR 10-5?
3. Follow-on to #2, maybe an EXSUM of conversations that captures gaps and redundancies identified in the earlier discussion, for use / response from the appropriate CoE/CDID that either confirms or disputes the TSLC findings?
4. White Paper describing situation, challenges, proposed solutions with proposed leads, recommended taskings for proposed leads to respond back to CG TRADOC/the next TSLC?
I suggest the above only because unless products are produced, taskings assigned, progressed tracked, etc etc... a TSLC becomes a BOGSAT (which has value in terms of CG, TRADOC clarifying his intent to subordinate School/Center leaders, building the team, etc) and a golf outing...
Live well and row brother
The Purpose of this TRADOC Senior Leader Conference
We want to ignite a discussion across the Army and beyond to take stock after nine years of war of where we are as a profession of arms and draw lessons to better prepare for future challenges.
When I listen to General Dempsey, I hear him lay out this discussion as a way to drive a series of cascading concepts that informs development and execution across Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTML-PF) domains.
The newly published Army Operating Concept (AOC) 2016 -2028 will drive our vocabulary to get beyond defining ourselves by what our enemy, opponents, or adversaries are doing to us, e.g., COIN in counterinsurgency we are defining ourselves by how we react to the insurgent.
FM 3-0 and the Tennessee chart depicting full spectrum operations (FSO) tends to constrain thinking into thematically exclusive bins of Offense, Defense, Stability and Civil Support Operations. However, the AOC now provides further expansion of FSO with the addition of two roles--Wide Area Security (WAS) and Combined Arms Maneuver (CAM). WAS is providing security, over wide areas so as a progenitor or condition setter of other missions e.g., COIN, Foreign Internal Defense, Counter Terror, or Humanitarian Operations. CAM is familiar to most as the archetypical Fulda Gap Army the U.S. possessed in the 1980s; but we may need to update this view in light of both technological and organization changes we have made specifically the interconnectivity, transparency, and speed of information and all the tools we now possess to collect, manage, and employ data, and the development of the modular Brigade force.
So our intent for this TSLC is to advance this discussion based on our experiences over the last nine years. We want to help answer what these changes mean to us as a Profession of Arms; what are we doing about them; how are we going to educate the next generation of Army leaders.
Expand the Way We Use our Capabilities.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Bill, I like the addition of WAS and CAM, but was perplexed by your statement that we need to move beyond the Fulda Gap scenario when we discuss CAM? Looking forward to your future posts.
Sorry, for taking so long to respond; this conference has kept us pretty busy. We have had some particularly interesting discussions between and among TRADOC senior leaders.
Just to clarify what I was driving at in my reference to moving beyond a particular scenario, I did not mean to abandon the Fulda Gap capability but rather to expand it and more particularly to define how we might use it in other was to help resolve future conflicts.
Just as we should not have walked away from our Wide Area Security experience and capabilities we had developed during the Vietnam War, we should retain the Fulda Gap CAM experience and capability but reframe it for the next conflict. The problem with any such preparation is we do not have a crystal ball and do not know what that future conflict will look like or even who will oppose us. Therefore, I as others, seek to expand the way we think about using the capabilities we already have.
For example, can we use the current modular brigade force to conduct the type of major combat we envisioned in the Fulda Gap during the 1980s, or have our forces changed so much that such a scenario is not easily achievable; but might we use the current force in a different way to stop, or deter a comparable threat.
We need to challenge our assumptions and constantly look for the weak signal that might indicate a future challenge and figure out ways to prepare the force to respond in a timely manner to keep small problems small.
Bill Jakola
re: SJPONeill, Terms of CAM and WAS
In my thinking, CAM and WAS are core competencies. What I mean by that is they are two broad capabilities that the Army must be prepared to do (just like the requirement for initial entry). CAM and WAS help achieve particular goals and set conditions for influencing the environment. CAM achieves physical, temporal and psychological advantage. WAS consolidates those gains, stabilizes the environment and allows freedom of movement and action. The operational environment informs which competency we must focus on and in what mixture. Through different combinations of offense/defense/stability ops we can then set conditions that satisfy the operational and strategic requirements on the ground. Through the use of CAM and was the commander has a force capable of moving up and downd the spectrum of conflict. His trick becomes identifying and manging transitions as the environment changes due to his actions. All of these things enable true FSO and reduces the requirement for force optimization (COIN or MCO) it places us in a position to conduct both as required.
Sharing and Communicating - Getting Over the Obstacles
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bill Jakola
We want to ignite a discussion across the Army and beyond to take stock after nine years of war of where we are as a profession of arms and draw lessons to better prepare for future challenges.
GEN Chiarellia, the Army's VCSA, asked a very similar question on the CAC blogs back in February of this year.
In Provide Me Your Perspectives he wrote:
Quote:
In the past eight years plus our Army has transformed its organization, how it fights across the spectrum of conflict, and how we create and define mission success. From where I sit, it has been an amazing performance, but I wonder about the long term impact persistent conflict is having on our Army, our shared values, and our professional military culture.
I am interested in gaining your perspectives on how eight years of war, modularity, decentralized operations, and ARFORGEN have affected our core leadership attributes. I believe that a professional dialogue is essential to clarifying the issues we need to address to ensure the future health of our Army.
GEN Pete Chiarelli, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army
Between February and early September his query drew over 70 public comments.
The distribution of the comments is very interesting and, in my opinion, very enlightening as to the relative acceptance of open and transparent communication methods.
I broke the respondents down into five general categories: Civilian, Officers 1 (CW1 through O-5), Officers 2 (O6+), Enlisted, and Indeterminate/Anonymous.
Civilian - A handful of comments (less than 10 or so)
Enlisted - Several comments - ranging from SSG to CSM - about a dozen total.
Officers 1 - 30+ (Several warrant officers, a few Captains, mostly Majors [or equivalent] and a few Lieutenant Colonels)
Officers 2 - Five responses. Four Colonels and a follow-up comment, on Feburary 19th, from the VCSA.
In that comment he thanked everyone that had responded thus far and encouraged readers to continue spreading the word.
Analysis
This blog article and solicitation of comments is public facing and not restricted to CAC only. Across the entire Army, when solicited directly by the VCSA for feedback, only four Colonels responded and no general officers. :(
On March 1st BG Cardon, in his capacity as then acting CAC CG, initiated a CAC tasker "Encourage participation in VCSA blog post" which sent out to all organizations within CAC. In that tasker he did not direct participation, stressing that partication was encouraged but not mandated. At the same time, he emphasized that the Directors of the subordinate organizations should be leading by example.
Anyone caring to examine the comments in the article referenced above will readily note that tasker and the associated encouragement to partcipate provided no measurable results.
Profession of Arms Conversation
Hello all. My name is Chip Colbert, I'm also a part of GEN Dempsey's planning group, and I'm here at TSLC along with Jason and Bill.
Today's topic is focused on the discussion Bill mentioned the other day about our Profession of Arms. As I sat in on the discussion this morning, a fairly difficult question came to mind. Before I pose the question I need to provide some background and context.
We had the opportunity to listen to several great speakers this morning - to include GEN (R) Sullivan and GEN (R) Franks. Dr. Don Snider spent a good deal of time talking about a recently released white paper on the profession of arms and a forthcoming Soldiers' handbook called Army: Profession of Arms. Dr. Snider defined a profession as a social organization for doing expert work. If the Army is truly a profession, how do we define what constitutes our expert work and knowledge? The expert work is land combat and the White Paper and the Soldiers' handbook state our expert knowledge can be grouped into four fields: Military-technical, Moral-ethical, Political-cultural, and Human Development. #Of those four fields, Dr. Snider made the point, which I completely agree with, that the Human Development field is the most important for the success of our force - both current and future.
OK, so here comes the question. Our Army is faced with the dual challenge of winning our current wars while simultaneously preparing for future armed conflict. #Due to the past nine years of war, we've obviously and necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis and priority on tactical and operational assignments and experience - or to use this lexicon, the military-technical field of knowledge. Accordingly, I think we've devalued our professional military education system, ACS opportunities, and other broadening experiences that take people out of the fight - the Human Development field.
I'm not saying this is wrong because we obviously have to do this in order to ensure we prevail in today's fights. #The question I'm struggling with is how do we restore some balance between the two? #How do we ensure proficiency in the Military-Technical field while simultaneously prioritizing the Human Development field to continue developing our leaders for tomorrow's fight(s)?
Interested in people's comments and feedback. # # # # # # ##
Sad but totally predictable...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
BobKing
GEN Chiarellia, the Army's VCSA, asked a very similar question on the CAC blogs back in February of this year.Feburary 19th, from the VCSA...Anyone caring to examine the comments in the article referenced above will readily note that tasker and the associated encouragement to partcipate provided no measurable results.
Many Civilians do not know enough to contribute meaningfully, many who do will not contribute for fear of stating or having a different position than they THINK their Boss holds...
Many NCOs do not eat sleep live and breathe Army and most do not believe their good advice is properly respected so they tend not to have too many comments in such forums, real or virtual -- unless you strike a nerve, then they'll respond. One on one, most will respond pretty well.
Most of the WOs and Co grades will tell you what they think; most of the Majors probably will, some LTCs will. Many will not particiapate because they think their words will be ignored -- or someone's already made their point; most do not feel the need to post just to see their name on a comment.
Most Colonels are like civilians with respect to their Bosses positions. Generals are pretty much the same...
Don't know the Vice Chief. I do know that some GOs invite and accept discussion while some invite it but accept only those items that coincide with their views. Still others may seem to invite discussion but they really don't while a few seriously object to discussion. I suspect the Vice Chief fits in one of those blocs and that most of the COLs and GOs know pretty much where in that spectrum he fits. That may have a bearing in addition to the factors above. :wry:
Anecdote. Peace story, staff type: I once talked to a pretty good General Officer who was upset that he didn't know what was happening and that he thus had to operate in the reactive mode. I suggested the answer to his problem was MBWA -- Management By Walking Around, he sholud just wander about the Hindquarters and talk to the Action Officers to get a feel for things. He called four days later and said he'd tried that, didn't work. Mine was the only shop where the resident Colonel or his Deputy didn't appear and hover as soon as the General wandered in from the hallway...:rolleyes:
Unless that syndrome disappears from the Army and subordinate are ENCOURAGED to speak their minds without fear, this and future Vice Chiefs will not get many takers in open forums on any topic likely to be even slightly controversial...
How do we ensure proficiency in the Military-Technical field while simultaneously pri
1. Put the loggies, bean-counters and HR 'experts' The more we go down the HR path, the more we treat our humans as simply resources) back in their respective boxes. Yes, we all need to be 'fiscally prudent' and apply due diligence to our use of the tax-payers coin. OK, got that, we're a professional organisation and there are many other branches of government that need to tighten up their belts before the military gets squeezed anymore. Don't allow the 'efficiency' experts focussed on saving bucks to rationalise changes to to training that affect effectiveness e.g. yes, simulation has its place and is a useful tool but it should not one second be a replacement for time in the field/on the job. Similarly online learning has its place but is still not a substitute for face to face engagement between both peer groups and students/instructors.
2. Let soldiers (in this discussion soldiers = all members in uniform, NCO and commissioned) do what they want to do which is train. Give them every opportunity to apply and develop both their technical skills and experience, and their leadership ability at all levels from the newest soldier upwards. Along the same lines of professional development, encourage soldiers to read and talk about what they are reading - this may be somewhat deflating for some more senior staff as they get trounced in discussion with junior members.
3. Encourage them to follow the military as a career: 3-4 year hitches are not enough to development a smart professional soldiery that understands the contemporary environment - if this is to be an era of persistent conflict, then we don't want that experience walking out...
4. I think the experimentation with wikis, etc at CAC is a good thing (a damn good think even) as it both promotes soldier buy-in and engagement and also seeks to capture the knowledge and experience of the workface. This programme needs to be expanded as does the other side of the coin in making sure that soldiers have the best access to that current information that we can give them (I like the comments in the Sep 10 C4ISR Journal here).
On a much smaller scale...
As a battery commander, I had a sign right in my line of sight (LBWA)... constant reminder that if i was in my office odds were that there was something more important I should be doing... BN CDR got it... S3 didn't... he wanted to know why he could always get in touch with my XO but it took up to 2-3 hours to get a return call from me... I'd ask what he wanted, I'd then answer didn't my XO answer your question... then he'd say hem and haw and say yes, but I wanted an answer from you... to which I would respond for the umteenth time... Bob is empowered to answer your questions, that is why I've chained him to his desk... specifically to run the admin of the battery and answer staff questions... he knows his left and right limits and will tell you if he has to talk to me first... I will live with whatever he commits the battery to doing... but I will not sit at my desk on the off chance that you or the commander might call...
Two different S3s, each took 6 mths to train... and I can assure you it wasn't always comfortable knowing exactly what actually was going on... but if necessary I could adjust the azimuth before the BN or BDE CDR did so for me... only two rules of communication in my unit... rule 1) Never say, "I can't believe" for there is nothing we can't believe... can't fathom, don't understand, inconeivable... maybe, but everything is believable. Rule 2) never start a sentence with a disclaimor... e.g. "I don't want to sound like a smart ass" stop stop stop because no matter what you will sound like a smart ass... figure out what you need to say as constructively as possible... "Sir this is f@cked up beyond all recognition, we need to do x, y, and z first" that is perfectly acceptable and desired communication...
This approach was met with some significant push-back internally as well... PSGs, PLT LDRs and others were won't to hover and Soldiers were hesitant at first, but within 2 mths the culture had been changed... never been or were ever happier
The most important "new" thing the army needs is probably Perspective
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ChipColbert
OK, so here comes the question. Our Army is faced with the dual challenge of winning our current wars while simultaneously preparing for future armed conflict. #Due to the past nine years of war, we've obviously and necessarily placed a great deal of emphasis and priority on tactical and operational assignments and experience - or to use this lexicon, the military-technical field of knowledge. Accordingly, I think we've devalued our professional military education system, ACS opportunities, and other broadening experiences that take people out of the fight - the Human Development field.
Try looking at the past nine years as:
1. Not being war, and
2. Not being a problem that can be "won" through military action.
Then re-look both of your stated problems of dealing with the here and now while preparing for the potential armed conflicts of the future.
If not war, what is this and what should he military role be, and how should that role be framed?
- How can changing the context lead to shaping more effective engagement rather than simply simplifying the problem so that I can quit and go home?
What are the potential challenges that could both truly threaten us and be either deterred or defeated by military action?
- What threats can we deter, and how must we posture to do so?
- How does the military contribute to deterring those that are currently seen as "non-deterable" by most? Are there indirect ways that rob such organizations of the base of their support that can mitigate the problem? Conversely, are there ways that though well intended, will actually exacerbate the problem through engagement?
- What threats must we be prepared to defeat if not deterred, and are we postured to defeat those threats?
- What problems are cast as threats currently, but really don't pass the common sense test in today's environment? Are there policy solutions? If yes, come up with COAs and take them to the policy guys to consider. Use design to develop your position.
- What programs are crushing us with their cost, or diverting funding from programs that are arguably more important? Are there policy positions such as those described above driving these programs? Don't argue programs, assess policy.
The army is in the middle of a very tough problem-set. Being saddled with a large family of expectation driven by out-dated Cold War policies; along with a family of poorly conceived GWOT policies makes the problem-set tougher yet. Assess both, and then go back to higher and demand that they clarify what they really want, and what they really need you to do. We can't do it all, we can't buy it all. So lets buy and do what we really need.
Trade and not a profession?
KEN White quote:
Quote:
Our training and education does not inculcate the basics of our trade -- and it is a trade, not a profession IMO
I'm interested in hearing more about why you see it as a trade and not a profession.
Re: the most important "new" thing we need is perspective
While I agree with much of what you posted, I see that as being a much larger issue than the one I'm thinking of. Reframing how we view our challenges and how we see military force being employed to meet them is vitally important for the debate. However, while I can see how that process may alleviate optempo and may decrease our role and rate of employment, I don't think it changes the fact that - IMO - the Army still needs to reassess how much emphasis we place on tactical and operational assignments vice broadening and educational experiences.
In a recent interview with American Interest, Eliot Cohen said the Army is doing a good job of producing "capable brigade commanders" but that doesn't mean we're developing the next generation of strategic thinkers and general officers. I think this is due in large part because we are so focused on tactical assignments. Link to the interview is here:
http://www.the-american-interest.com....cfm?piece=857
Pardon some of us for being cynical...
Chip the dynamic of which you speak has very little to do with the Army's current OPTEMPO and the subsequent focus on tactical/operational assignments. While that may accurately describe the current atmospherics (not sure it does - but I'll accept it because it doesn't matter).... it has little to do with why the Army isn't producing "strategic thinkers"
Simply put, long before the current engagements, the Army was obcessively focused on tactical assignments... whether green tab or CTC O/C... and routinely weened out anyone who thought beyond the final 300m...
Don't get me wrong, those types of assignment and that type of focus is important... but it was virtually the only path to greater levels of responsibility...
I'll defer to some of our more "seasoned" members, but it is not uncommon to refer to a LTC/COL who couldn't get promoted as too smart for their own good.
That said... how many strategic thinkers do you really need??? You certainly need them in the right spaces, but I'm not entirely certain you need a bunch of strategic thinkers...
Get past the organizational bias that you have to have been IN/AR/Arty to be able to think big thoughts and you might find you have a whole lot more strategic thinkers that may seem appearant...
Thoughts?
