Agree with Steve. The SWM has to be taken in
context -- in particular context of the times. Things change. I did things in Korea that were not supposed to be done in Viet Nam. I'm sure we did things in VN that no one can legally do today. I suppose we're better off for that but I do have to wonder occasionally... :wry:
The SWM is like every other piece of military gospel I've read -- and that's a bunch, I'm old and it's my only hobby :D -- it has its uses and its suggestions (that's all they are) must be applied with caution and an appreciation (METT-TC like) for the specifics of the situation. Same thing applies to Orde Wingate, Clausewitz, Belisaurius, Sun Tzu, Khalid ibn Walid and all the nominal experts and savants of today. Even applies to my personal pet, Subatai... :cool:
Even doctrine must be regarded skeptically. One has to know it well, apply it usually but always be prepared to interpolate and modify.
Apply anyone else's solutions of the times to your tactical, operational -- or strategic -- problems of the moment without a great deal of thought and you'll be in trouble.
Heh. Funny you cite the 1976 edition of FM 100-5...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Gian P Gentile
...as I see things is that nobody has the 1976 version of 100-5 (active defense) on reading lists and as "must reads" before deploying to Iraq or Astan...unlike other great works from the past the have an element of timelessness and ongoing relevance to them (eg., Thuycidies, Clausewitz, Callwell, Lawrence, to name a few)...
That was one of several items of 'doctrine' -- some much more current -- I had in mind just above. :D
I agree with all your named authors as having merit but would submit they too can lead one astray if not placed in context and modified IAW the actual situation of the moment. No one has yet come up with a golden bullet, many can provide a few silver bullets... ;)
Funny you should mention Callwell
Gian. I wrote a piece back in 95 - published in Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement (before I became its editor and it went out of business:rolleyes:) called "Little Wars, Small Wars, LIC, OOTW, the GAP, and Things That Go Bump in the Night." Near the beginning of the piece, I discussed Callwell and the SWM and argued that the authors of the SWM were very much acquainted with Callwell, Indeed, their discussion of what Small Wars are parallels his - with one major exception. The Marines who wroted the SWM rejected wars of imperial conquest in their manual - something Colonel Callwell applauded.
The SWM is mostly TTP. In that sense it resembles the new COIN manual FM 3-24, or rather 3-24 resembles the SWM. Some TTP has changed over the decades; some remains the same. If there is a need to use mounted troops and pack animals then the SWM is a good source (Afghanistan anyone?). Gospel it is not. But it is a fascinating look at a point in the evolution of Small Wars. Certainly, one can go back to classical times to look for examples of insurgencies and other small wars that look much like those of the present. It is interesting to read Josephus' account of the Jewish revolt in light of, say the FLN's revolution in Algeria and Kilcullen's enemy centric v. population centric strategies. Obviously, Callwell is another point on the timeline - closer to the Banana Wars that are the focus of the SWM than is Josephus - but the issues we are discussing here reflect those from past records, wars, and writers from antiquity to the present.
Cheers
JohnT
Sorry I’m a bit late for the dance…
But a death in the immediate family, and all the logistics that entails, and getting my youngest spawn off to Basra (who as a matter of fact just rung us up to let us know she was in Kuwait awaiting transport) has occupied a fair a mount of my time as of late. :cool:
On another thread here I pontificated:
“In many respects I agree with Gentile’s concerns and do not believe he is anti-COIN. The Army needs to have a robust capability to fight in both types of warfare. IMHO it is much easier for a Soldier who is highly trained in the complexities of employing the variety of weapons systems in conventional warfare to quickly adapt to a COIN/LIC/IW situation than it is for a Soldier who is trained predominantly in COIN to function at his optimum when thrust into the chaos of conventional war.
Soldiers, after all, are trained to obey orders, but to follow orders they need the skills. Conventional warfare requires solid skill sets, many of which that are also useful in COIN. COIN is more of an intellectual exercise requiring a common sense approach, an understanding of human behavior, and empathy with the local population, skills not necessarily taught or quantified in an FM.”
How we train is how we fight and at present training does seem to be slipping further towards being overly COIN centric, to the detriment of those hard skills Soldiers and Marines need. IMHO an “Advisor Corps” of the magnitude that Nagl recommends would strip away too many valuable troops from the main force. Better to develop an “Advisor Cadre,” place it within ARSOC or SOCOM, expand ARSOC to allow for sufficient personnel, make a fair amount of the strength Guard and Reserve, stop using SOF predominantly in DA, and tie them closer to State in some areas.
As to the SWM, it must be taken in the context and era for which it was written. The Marine Corps that fought in the “Banana Wars” of the 20s and 30s was not the Marine Corps that emerged from the Pacific Campaign. The genesis of that Marine Corps was Culebra and Quantico, not Haiti and Nicaragua. What I feel the “Banana Wars” contributed to the senior combat leaders in WW II was a taste of close quarters combat. At any level entering combat for the first time is a mind-boggling experience. There is great advantage to having combat vets in leadership positions when a unit enters combat for the first time, especially a green unit.
We do not need a COIN operated Army (or Marine Corps) we need a robust conventional Army and Marine Corps that is also capable of COIN and savvy in limited operations in conjunction with State in nation building/rebuilding.
To me that entails a greater fostering of professional inquisitiveness on the part of all ranks. I cracked open St Karl as a corporal, fortunately for me it was an abridged version but still, like Gian noted, it made little sense to me at the time and even made my head hurt a bit. :D But as I read more works by other theorists, delved into doctrine, and explored military history it made returning back to the old German dude easier and he started to make sense. To me John Boyd’s massive briefing “Patterns of Conflict” was less theoretical and more a revelation of how military history and theory all flowed together like a massive quilt writ large across the ages. That one should look at it all holistically and not try to cherry pick favorite strategies or theories. I am reminded of the introduction to the Encyclopedia Britannica’s series The Great Books. In it the editors posit that a “great conversation’ was occurring throughout the millennia between the Greek philosophers to those of the 20th Century. That each work of literature built on what came before. I see military theory and history entwined in a similar “conversation” across the ages. It’s tougher to see where you’re going if you don’t understand where you’ve been.
The Army we need is one well versed in conducting complex combat operations against a peer foe and can also decisively wage COIN.
Tact is only part of diplomacy
Posted by Gian,
Quote:
The point that Wilf and I and others are making is that the notion as is literally stated that soldiers are diplomats is just simply folly. They are not, they are combat soldiers and as wilf has pointed out they need to be able to do the basic functions and skills of combat soldiers. If they can do that, then they can step into different directions to do coin, stability ops, nation building etc.
There are those among us who want to limit the definition of diplomat to one who practices diplomacy to facilitate relationships and agreements between nation-states. I know this will come as a surprise to many of you, but I think the definition is lacking (I know you heard this song from me before in regards to insurgency, etc., and I'm back on that soap box again, Ken couldn't bury it deep enough to keep me from finding it again :)).
This definition is fine for the State Department an organization, because as the name implies they conduct diplomacy between nation-"states". However, I think some of their young turks would agree with where I'm going with this argument. Diplomacy can't not be restricted to the protocols between nation-states (as though it ever could), because we're dealing not only with States but tribes, gangs, extended families, insurgent groups, militias and an assortment of other Stateless groups. Groups that I, and many of you, have dealt with over the years to develop relationships and work out agreements. That process is nothing less than diplomacy. I'm from one country, they're from another, and I'm working out our relationship and possibly agreements to better enable me to accomplish my mission.
Soldiers do this all over Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world far from where most State Department diplomats tread. It is not folly that soldiers practice diplomacy, it is essential. However, I'll agree with you that not "all" Soldiers practice diplomacy, nor should they, but I believe Nagl was speaking to a group of graduating officers?
In support of this argument, I refer to Bob's World's post,
Quote:
In those cases where armed opposition is encountered only from irregular forces under the leadership of malcontents or unrecognized officials, the mission is one of diplomacy rather than military.”
This was written before Gulala, so a tip of my beret to the Marines of our past who actually understood insurgent warfare quite well at one time.
Quote:
In the conventional war, military action, seconded by diplomacy, propa-ganda, and economic pressure, is generally the principal way to achieve the goal. Politics as an instrument of war tends to take a back seat and emerges again—as an instrument—when the fighting ends . . . The picture is differ-ent in the revolutionary war. The objective being the population itself, the operations designed to win it over (for the insurgent) or to keep it at least submissive (for the counterinsurgent) are essentially of a political nature. In this case, consequently, political action remains foremost throughout the war. It is not enough for the government to set political goals, to determine how much military force is applicable, to enter into alliances, or to break them; politics becomes an active instrument of operation.And so intricate is the interplay between the political and the military actions that they cannot be tidily separated; on the contrary, every military move has to be weighed with regard to its political effects, and vice versa.—
David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare
In the end we may disagree on the term diplomacy, but I don't know what else you would call it?
Jump up on that box. Bill...
I didn't bury your soap box very well, left it partly visible so you could find it, I weakened three boards in the 'platform' with saw cuts and put a bear trap inside -- be careful how often and where you use that box... :D
There may be some here who restrict diplomacy to nation states but I'm not one of them -- the issue is not who our side talks to; tribes, clans, gangs, militias all need to be talked to. No question and I said that above.
The issue is who talks for our side. Or, more correctly who determines what will be said by our side
If you want the Armed Forces to engage in setting foreign policy and / or law enforcement policy; that's cool -- many will agree with you. I don't and I don't think the Constitution does.
The Politicians and the foreign Policy gurus need to determine, broadly WHAT is said. -- on a local level, certainly military folks will have to talk and they hopefully will do that diplomatically and IAW the policy laid down by our silly-villian masters -- but that ain't diplomacy. Diplomacy is not a military function. Conduct of relations diplomatically, yes -- conduct diplomacy? Not IMO.
It's being done now to an extent because the GeoCom CinCs are there but that needs to be changed and if everyone in the Army comes up with their own definition for diplomacy, then Congress will get more confused than it already is and the Army will be operating in a sphere that isn't their business...
You asked:
Quote:
"In the end we may disagree on the term diplomacy, but I don't know what else you would call it?"
Why do we have to disagree? I'm not at all sure we do. I'm merely saying that the civilian uberstructure sets the policy, the parameters of 'diplomacy' and the troops on the ground exercise that policy in the conduct of their relations and negotiations with locals of all kinds and they do that talking with tact and diplomatically. :cool: