What's not to approve, Firn. He tells what he's seen.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Firn
Another piece on (Afghan) Marksmanship, Ken White might not approve, but it offers in any case a good springboard for an discussion...
And we've all seen the same thing on TV -- and in our own services. It's nice to think that we, particularly us gun happy Merkuns, are all great shooters but the reality is most services don't train it very well nowadays and the 'spray and pray' syndrome can strike western units as well. :eek: :D
Like Chivers, apparently, I'm a big fan of really thorough weapons training and aimed fire. The Afghans are not alone in trying to save money and time by doing an inadequate job of training not only marksmanship but the even more important subject of fire control and distribution.
Automatic weapons are a part of the problem; the automatic capability is significantly undertrained and overused for very little if any real benefit...
There's a minor problem with that approach.
I totally agree with it, have trained and retained and had good units -- while that initial set was there. When the replacements came in -- and they always eventually do if not from casualties then from ETS -- things dropped a notch...
If you're deployed when that time hits, you do not have the option of taking a three month break to train every new guy. You have to receive 'trained replacements' and make them work. In Iraq with a low casualty and redeploy for cause rate , that may not have been a problem but at other times I've seen a 25-30 rotation rate in combat per quarter.
There's another problem. I have no doubt the Schmedlap or Sam Damon Co/Bn/Bde would be a great unit. OTOH, I have every reason to suspect that the Heebly or Massengale Co/Bn/Bde would create more problems than either would solve. Heebly makes Courtney Massengale look like the careerist he is and Heebly is a straight arrow who invariably means well -- but he's dumber than a box of hammers. Court is a smart Dude but his, um, priority allocation process is not too good...
You'd also have the problem of getting SSG J. Phugabosky in from the Heebly Bde who's himself only partly trained himself and then getting him up to speed to train your new guys...
For what you suggest to work, the Army would have to be smaller than it is (quality control would excise a bunch of folks), the personnel system would promote only on proven merit and capability, not 'best qualified' and a large bureaucracy that purchases, supplies, maintains, moves, medicates and such like would have to get trained somehow -- just in case they had to deploy. The current Personnel system would have to go; you need water walker leaders; the existing system is geared to provide paper qualified leaders.
There is a way. It's pretty well proven that new organizations, particularly if they are lean, function well. As they age, they become more and more bureaucratic and only a few exceptional outfits are consistently top notch. There is a deterioration curve in effectiveness that is extremely difficult to halt. I seem to recall a study some years ago that posited five years was the norm before inertia set in.
Thus, regeneration has advantages. Now all we have to do is figure out how to regenerate every Brigade at about three to five year intervals -- and convince the Per Weenies to leave everyone in the same job the whole time. Oh yeah -- and find people that'll accept that setup (I think that part is easy and the large number willing might surprise the Per folks who would absolutely hate the idea -- 'cause then, who needs a Per system...).
Yes, I know that means a third of the force would be unavailable at any given time. Nothing really new in that.
Of course, one thing that would be quite helpful is for the Army to realize that the types of unit, organization, training, equipment and even people who can and will soldier around the world in what is nominally peace time are a whole different ball game from the mass Army needed to fight a major war against a near peer. Our big problem is that the US Army, from WW I forward has had a delusion that they can just shrink in peacetime and rapidly expand for a war. Doesn't really work that way. There are those who will say we did it in a few months for WW II. Not really, the Army started pre mobilizing itself in late 1938, the draft was instituted in 1940 as was a massive reequipment program -- yet, the US Army arguably was not really effective prior to late 1943, arguably late 1944. That's really four years, not a few months. Not complaining, that was really a phenomenal performance -- I'm not at all sure we could replicate it today...