Legitimacy of PMCs in Public Discourse

I'm doing a research project on the development of the legitimacy of PMCs in public discourse (specifically American). Despite a history of suspicion and distrust, as well as international law which condemns the use of "mercenaries" (however defined), PMCs have not only gained access to political ears but some might suggest that they have become essential to modern warfighting. Some questions I will be asking and (hopefully) answering:

Are PMCs considered any more or less legitimate now than anytime previously (probably with a focus on the American Revolution, and perhaps the Italian Wars, but suggestions for any other conflict is welcome). If there is difference, what public/ideological/legal norms have changed and why?

What present political conditions enable the use of PMCs? Specifically, what factor(s) compels a state to forgo its monopolistic right to violence? Are these factors related to the prominence of state-sponsored terrorist organizations? (Essentially, are PMCs and state-sponsored terrorists, legal questions aside, two peas from the same pod?)

What is the long-term impact of security privatization on national and military strategy? (Everyone has an opinion on that question :cool:)

I have a handful of sources with which to start -- if anyone has any good reads to suggest, they are welcome.

I thought Robert Young Pelton's Licensed to Kill was very good. Probably worth reading Brookings' Peter Singer's stuff too.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

Are PMCs considered any more or less legitimate now than anytime previously (probably with a focus on the American Revolution, and perhaps the Italian Wars, but suggestions for any other conflict is welcome). If there is difference, what public/ideological/legal norms have changed and why?

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I have huge problems with PMCs, when it comes to men carrying guns and thus ceasing to be civilian service providers to aid CSS or other functions.

a.) There is an irreconcilable conflict between military effectiveness and commercial profitability, unless you both pay and penalise based purely on results.

b.) They are not sworn. They are there to make money, and thus have no legitimacy at all. As there are huge problems with legitimacy of combatants on operations, PMC just make it more problematic. The US/UK/NATO use of PMCs has made it just about impossible to address the issue of 4,000 armed Chinese "oil industry personnel" turning up somewhere in Africa.

c.) Based on talking to men taking their R&R in Bangkok, (my home for two years) and casting about for opinion from others, I suggest there are considerable grounds to doubt the training, skills and professionalism of a great many PMC operators, regardless of their previous military service.

...and the fact that we use civilian service providers to aid CSS is symptomatic of wanting to operate in a way that is probably grossly inefficient/less than effective and probably unwise. Contracting out CSS functions may be something that good armies should not do.

Is there a disconnect between the military leadership and the political leadership on the use of PMCs of whatever nature?

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

I'm doing a research project on the development of the legitimacy of PMCs in public discourse (specifically American).

What is the long-term impact of security privatization on national and military strategy? (Everyone has an opinion on that question :cool:)

I have a handful of sources with which to start -- if anyone has any good reads to suggest, they are welcome.

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Public War, Private Fight? The United States and Private Military Companies, Deborah C. Kidwell. Paper #12. (PDF)

there is a long history of the US military using private contractors in many ways. From the Revolution on, much of military logistics was handled by civilian suttlers (contractors). In the Indian Wars, civilian scouts were hired by the Army.

The recent contracting push and PMCs has come from a variety of sources. One is ideological and comes from the UK with PM Thatcher's move to have the government compete with the private sector to provide services. There was some of this in the Reagan years and after in the Clinton era in the US. Post-Cold War downsizing is another source. Note that in the wake of downsizing after major wars there is often an upsurge in mercenaries. In the 60s, many demobilized French and British soldiers were the source of merc units in the Congo and Nigeria. In the 90s, Executive Outcomes was largely made up of former SADF. MPRI was founded by former Chief of Staff of the US Army, Carl Vuono, and others.

There is also a wholly legitimate tradition of private security companies who long have provided external security at US Embassies. among these are firms like Wakenhut which provided embassy security in El Salvador during the war years of the 80s. They were also the contractor at the US embassy in Guatemala during the same time. These guys did and still do carry guns and perform a legitimate security role (must disagree with you on this minor point, Wilf;)).

I've said before on a number of these threads that I believe we have made too much use of contractors - that there are a number of functions that are inherently governmental; allowing the private sector to do them risks turning government policy over to private corporations no matter how patriotic their leaders. That said, there are clearly functions that are better done by the private sector and some that could be done by either. PMCs can fall into any of these categories - indeed, the same company can be in all 3 on the basis of different contracts.:rolleyes: To me, the answer is to get the private sector out of those areas that are inherently governmental as rapidly as possible and use contractors and PMCs where they are appropriate. what is needed is clear policy guidance! With which, I will now get the heck off my soapbox.:wry:

Cheers

JohnT

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Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

There is also a wholly legitimate tradition of private security companies who long have provided external security at US Embassies. among these are firms like Wakenhut which provided embassy security in El Salvador during the war years of the 80s. They were also the contractor at the US embassy in Guatemala during the same time. These guys did and still do carry guns and perform a legitimate security role (must disagree with you on this minor point, Wilf;)).

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I may not have made myself clear. Private Armed Security personnel may be appropriate in certain circumstances, and where there is a strict legal framework for their employment. I understand Armed Private Security is widespread in the US.

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Originally Posted by William F. Owen

a.) There is an irreconcilable conflict between military effectiveness and commercial profitability, unless you both pay and penalise based purely on results.

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... but military intervention and economic efficiency didn't meet each other yet as well.

Mercs did some fine jobs in the past because of their ability to form ad-hoc organizations, make do with minimal logistics and so on. I remember that I've read about mercenaries in Western Africa crushing completely incompetent marauding civil war parties (the guys who provide so funny photos).
They did so with a couple dozen mercenaries, some hundred hired Africans, some months training and then they simply did their mission.
I cannot remember the exact example, but I think it was done in Sierra Leone or Liberia.
A U.N. or national mission (even the experienced French) would have been casualty-averse and by comparison very inefficient.


Mercenaries are in my opinion a cyclic phenomenon. The Western nations didn't employ them much in the Cold War (the British had a private army in North Africa during WW2). Well, we might consider subsidized foreign non-state forces like 1980's Mujaheddin as mercenaries - in that case, there would have been a smaller break.

Btw; I consider the "Sons of Iraq" as mercenaries as well.

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Originally Posted by AmericanPride

What present political conditions enable the use of PMCs? Specifically, what factor(s) compels a state to forgo its monopolistic right to violence? Are these factors related to the prominence of state-sponsored terrorist organizations? (Essentially, are PMCs and state-sponsored terrorists, legal questions aside, two peas from the same pod?)

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One research avenue I would look into is the role of neoliberalism (John touched on this a few posts down). Some would argue that the likes of armed PMC's employed alongside U.S. military forces in a warzone is a direct result of unrestrained neoliberal ideology. Critiques of neoliberalism on the far left abound, but I would look into paleoconservative critiques (Andrew Bacevich, Pat Buchanan, etc). Also the role of plausible deniability, and the "privatization" of covert action in the Iran-Contra era, which I think dovetails with your state-sponsored terrorism question (very interesting and provocative, btw).

Granite State mentioned RYP's book, I thought it was pretty good. Recently I read a few chapters in Scahill's Blackwater book and had to put it down, it was aweful. There is Blackwater is worthy of some criticism if not condemnation, but this is not an excuse runaway hyperbole, mangling of facts, poor grasp of security issues, and a polyanna conception of international relations. On a related note, I saw the movie War Inc. recently, I enjoy some of Cusack's films and Grosse Point Blank is one of my favorites, the subject is certainly ripe for satire but this film is just aweful.

Didn't really think you were going that far but couldn't resist:).

Private armed security forces are very common in the US. They provide access security to all sorts of government and private buildings and they are spoken of disparagingly as "Rent-a-cops." I would put them in the intermediate area I mentioned as performing a function that could be either govt or private - depending on the circumstances/

Cheers

JohnT

Fuchs,

The South African PMC Executive Outcomes is usually linked to Sierra Leone, assisting the government assert control; a quick Google suggests that there was a link to Liberia, but not fighting there. My memory is not that good, but I am sure Executive Outcomes were active before the UN intervened and then left. The UN, with large Indian & Pakistani contingents, had some success, but some attribute real success to the small UK intervention.

Secondly, the description of large mercenary forces in Africa in the 1960's, ven into Biafra / NIgerian Civil War, is not accurate. In my reading years ago the mercenary forces, e.g. in the Congo were small and had personnel from many countries, including South Africa.

davidbfpo