Hundreds of Bodies Found in Soviet-Era Prison
The Moscow Times quotes a BBC report, "An underground prison dating back to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has been found on the northern outskirts of Kabul."
Quote:
"This is a big mass grave from the Russian days," said General Ali Shah Paktiwal, a senior police official, the BBC reported.
The Defense Ministry could not be reached for comment Friday afternoon. But retired general Makhmud Gareyev, who served as senior military adviser to the Afghan government from 1989 to 1992, told Interfax on Friday that the BBC report was "disinformation."
"Maintaining underground prisons is a tradition of the mujahedeen," Gareyev told Interfax.
Paktiwal, the Afghan police official, told the BBC that the prison was located at a base that had belonged to the country's communist-era defense ministry.
"There are at least 15 rooms full of dead bodies," he said, adding that more rooms could still be discovered underground, the BBC reported.
In 2006, NATO-led forces found a mass grave in Afghanistan that was also believed to contain victims of the country's communist government. Some 2,000 bodies were found near the notorious Pul-e-Charkhi prison east of Kabul.
L. Grau's "Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos"
Moderator's note: I have today 16th Jan '09 consolidated several threads on the Soviet experience in Afghanistan. In January 2013 several, small thread located and merged here - mainly on intelligence aspects..In January 2015 several old posts (held elsewhere were released here).
Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos: The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan, By Mr. Les Grau, FMSO-JRIC Analyst. This article was previously published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, April-June 2007, Volume 20 Number 2.
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc...Withdrawal.pdf
The Soviet experience in and leaving Afghanistan
Somehow in all these years I missed this:
The Limits of Soviet Airpower: The Bear Versus the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, 1979-1989
Quote:
This manuscript analyzes the failure of Soviet air and ground forces to defeat the Afghan mujahideen during the nine-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In pursuit of this objective, Soviet military strategy underwent a process of increasing radicalization that eventually resulted in a sanctioned policy of terror by Soviet air and land forces. During this period, airpower played a critical role in this campaign of terror by providing the platforms for punitive bombardment, chemical attack, aerial mining, troop insertion, and fire support. The ability of a relatively ill-equipped and technologically inferior opponent to force the eventual withdrawal of one of the world’s most vaunted military powers has broader implications for contemporary political and military leaders. Soviet military operations against the mujahideen in Afghanistan, from December 1979 until the withdrawal of the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in February 1989, provide an instructive case study for evaluating the efficacy of airpower as an instrument of coercion. The Afghanistan example offers an excellent historical case for measuring the inherent limitations of airpower as a coercive instrument in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations.
Soviets experience in Afghanistan (consolidated thread)
Recently a former Soviet (Red) Army general reflected upon his experiences in Afghanistan and the situation today.
This was his opening:
Quote:
Our mission was never to win. The Soviet Army was sent in to prop up a corrupt regime and the AFG leadership was all too happy to stand back, stay in the safety of their guarded compounds in Kabul, and let the Russians do the fighting for them. "They refused to do anything for the benefit of the people. In his mind, "from the perspective of the average Afghan, little has changed since".
davidbfpo
Mountain Pass battlefield again
Thanks to MPayson for pointing at this.
Let slip the dogs of war, Paul McGeough (Australian), writes on the Soviet and current campaigning at Satukandav Pass, Paktia Province: http://www.smh.com.au/world/let-slip...0925-g6bi.html (This item will be copied to the 'Soviet General comments' thread).
davidbfpo
Soviet Intelligence Operations in Afghanistan
Any good works out there on Soviet intelligence operations in their Afghanistan war?
How they were organized? Where they focused? What methods were used? Successes and failures?
Soviets experience in Afghanistan (consolidated thread)
From a comment left by poster "1110" on the blog:
Russian Advice on Afghanistan
I found a lot to agree with and a lot with which to disagree. I felt like a lot of the article was posturing and manipulative, but I tend to read a lot into fairly innocous statements.
For example:
Quote:
It is not only the nature of war and its means that have changed; the whole world has evolved.
Disagree.
Quote:
Officials in Brussels and Washington who are thinking of a rapid exit strategy for the ISAF mission are engaged in elaborating on a suicide plan. Withdrawal without victory might cause a political collapse of Western security structures.
Ehh...
Quote:
A “successful end” to the operation in Afghanistan will not come simply with the death of Osama bin Laden. The minimum that we require from NATO is consolidating a stable political regime in the country and preventing Talibanization of the entire region.
That is the Russian position. We are ready to help NATO implement its U.N. Security Council mandate in Afghanistan. We are utterly dissatisfied with the mood of capitulation at NATO headquarters, be it under the cover of “humanistic pacifism” or pragmatism.
Fair enough.
Quote:
That said, we are training CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces — an operational formation of elite units from Russia and our allies in Central Asia — in case of a NATO fiasco.
At first, sounds cool, but... huh? What are these elite units going to do? Be the Uzbek Border Patrol?
New Paper on Soviet Advisory Effort in Afghanistan
I just found this recent report from the Cold War International History Project “The Blind leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-Insurgency and Nation-Building in Afghanistan.” As described in the paper, this addresses a less discussed aspect of the Soviet experience there. While I believe that we should be careful in taking direct lessons from the Soviet experience, some of the issues raised are worth considering in light of our own efforts.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/p..._Web_Final.pdf
Quote:
"It [this paper] will show that Soviet leaders believed that they needed to undertake a nation-building project in order to stabilize the country and bring their troops home. Nation building in this context involved developing a successful governing party, extending the reach of the party and the government into rural zones throughout the country, and providing material incentives to help the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) gain legitimacy. Building socialism was not a goal in itself—Soviet leaders believed the country was not ripe for socialism and urged their tutees in the PDPA to move away from a revolutionary agenda. The goal was political stabilization, with nation-building as its major tool. That this often looked like socialism stemmed from two factors: one, that the PDPA leaders thought of themselves as revolutionary Marxists and shed this coat only reluctantly, and two, that the advisers sent by Moscow, particularly the party and agricultural advisers, only knew how to replicate their experience in the USSR and likewise could not (or would not) shed the ideological approach that was natural to them."
How much difficulty do we have in shedding our own ideological approach, if that is what is necessary?
Phil Ridderhof USMC
Afgansty: The russians in afghanistan, 1979-89
A book review of 'AFGANSTY: THE RUSSIANS IN AFGHANISTAN, 1979-89' by Roderic Braithwaite, a former UK Ambassador in the USSR, who IIRC can take a decidedly unorthodox viewpoint on affairs:http://www.spectator.co.uk/books/676...ifferent.thtml
The review opens with
Quote:
There used to be two rules of successful imperialism. First, don’t invade Russia. Second, don’t invade Afghanistan. As Rodric Braithwaite points out, invading the latter country itself offers no real difficulties. The Afghans abandon their strongholds and take to the hills, allowing the invader to enjoy the illusion of power in Kabul, with a puppet leader installed in the Bala Hissar, the old palace fortress. The problems come later, as a long war of attrition achieves little and finally obliges the invader to cut his losses and run.
Ends with:
Quote:
His book has the great merit of treating the episode as a unique and horrific experience, while allowing the reader to draw his own parallels with the British involvement in Afghanistan in the 19th century, and indeed the present day.
Afghansty: serialised (2 0f 2)
Part 2:http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russ...nistan-part-ii
On a very different aspect of the war, the impact on the veterans and their families. Some echoes here of the USA and Vietnam.
Near the end is this:
Quote:
And indeed the failures were not military. Neither the Soviet army in Afghanistan nor the American army in Vietnam was defeated: they held the ground and eventually withdrew in good order. The failures in both cases were failures of intelligence, of judgement, and of assessment. Both the Americans and the Russians set themselves unattainable strategic goals. Neither were able to achieve their main political objective: a friendly, stable regime which would share their ideological and political goals.
Soviet SOF veteran on the Muj
Thanks to Kings of War (KoW) for this:
Quote:
...He had quite a lot of such photos of fierce looking Mujahids because for the most part what his work had involved was walking around Afghanistan with a bag full of money and favours, living on his wits, and hiring one band of Mujahideen to go kill some other band one month and vice versa the next.
Link:http://kingsofwar.org.uk/2011/07/eph...nd-desiderata/
There is a b&w photo of three tribesmen from a Russian website and this text which explains a lot about the locals: Using a Google translation
Quote:
Baluchi nomads who inhabited the southern provinces were mostly are friendly, but still had a warlike reputation and never parted with their weapons. Sometimes act as agents agreed, taking a service fee by the same weapon. Beluji Nomads, found in the southern Provinces, Were the Most Part for Friendly, BUT due to fierce warrior Their Reputation They Were Never met When Carrying Weapons.
Link:http://afgan.ru/39/mfoto20.htm
Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in wartime The Soviet Experience
A RAND report 'Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in wartime The Soviet
Experience' that has appeared and not picked up before; hat tip to an Indian magazine.
RAND's summary:
Quote:
Security force assistance, specifically the development of Afghanistan's security forces, is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces. This report provides an overview of Soviet efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces, specifically, the Afghan military, police, and intelligence services. It covers the time period from 1920–1989, with specific focus on the period of the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, from 1979–1989. To do so, it draws on Western, Soviet, and Russian historical sources and interviews in Kabul and Moscow with individuals involved on the Soviet side and on the Afghan side. It concludes with comparisons with and lessons for ongoing security force assistance in Afghanistan.
Link:http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1078.html
For those who have little time maybe the final chapter is what you seek:
Quote:
Conclusion: Parallels, Disconnects, and What the International Security Assistance Force Can Learn from the Soviet Experience
Or the Indian magazine's review, pg.17:
Quote:
She concludes that the ISAF could learn some lessons from the Soviet experience in terms of a greater Soviet willingness to deploy large numbers of police advisors, well-matched in rank and age to Afghan counterparts, better retention in volunteer Sarandoy force as well as the dangers of relying on militia
Link:http://zenpundit.com/wp-content/uplo...ommunityed.pdf
Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Book Review Twofer
Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Book Review Twofer
Entry Excerpt:
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Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.
Parallel frontlines: ten years of Soviet and American occupation compared
Cross refer Post 4, entitled 'Parallel frontlines: ten years of Soviet and American occupation compared' on the Ten myths about Afghanistan thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14262
RAF learning lessons paper
Came across this short article whilst looking for something else: 'What are the enduring lessons of the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan 1979-1988 and what can the RAF learn from the Soviet experience?' by a RAF officer, Squadron Leader Fowler on a course and published in the UK Defence Academy Yearbook 2009.
Link and go to Pg.190:www.da.mod.uk/.../424148-Defence-Academy-Yearbook-2009.pdf
KGB veteran: a small glimpse into his ways
An intriguing semi-obituary of a Soviet era KGB senior officer who committed suicide in March 2012, added here as the comments on the Soviet role in Afghanistan fit better:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._spy?page=full
Quote:
Shebarshin's Afghan years convinced him of the futility of any occupation of that unruly, martial land and revealed the depth of the cooked intelligence that launched the Red Army's intervention and doggedly supported the failed military adventure for nine long years.
Even better is the tale of the crashed SU-25, which has a quirky end:
Quote:
The Pakistanis, on America's behalf, made the colonel the usual offer: a condo in Phoenix, a Ford F-150 pickup truck, a good dog, and a good life.
Leaving Afghanistan: is the USA following the USSR strategy?
A fascinating Parameters article, hat tip to SWJ Blog, entitled 'Leaving the Graveyard: The Soviet Union’s Withdrawal From Afghanistan':http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/P...r/Fivecoat.pdf
Quote:
The Soviet military strategy combined control of the cities and population, security of the major roads, an aggressive train and equip program for the Afghan military, and focused military operations to eliminate insurgent strongholds. From 1985 to 1989, the Soviet Union helped the DRA forces grow from 252,900 troops to 329,000 troops in a joint force comprised of KhAD,
ministry of interior, and army forces
Quote:
The United States’ military strategy in Afghanistan in 2012 is similar to the 40th Army’s: control the population, secure the roads, fight the insurgency in the south and east, and train and equip the Afghan forces. Like the Soviet Union, the United States has struggled to secure the population (an estimated 36 percent of key terrain districts were under government control in September 2010) with significantly less combat power—11.2 security forces per 1,000 citizens. With a projected decline in coalition and Afghan combat power, the United States and its Afghan allies are at a security high watermark. As the number of forces decline, tough decisions will have to be made
The author is optimistic that a political strategy, with deadlines that are kept, with a stronger air force and intelligence service (for intell and para-military arm) will be enough for a Kabul regime to fulfil Western and Afghan needs.
I wonder if the ANSF realise that after 2014, if they fight, their chances of being KIA / wounded will greatly increase. With less air support, logistic support (inc. medical treatment) and more.
Worth a read, although the information ops aspect will need a lot of work in Afghanistan.
Will the USA & allies learn from the Soviets?
Ryan Evans, an analyst with field experience in Helmand and a Ph.D. student @ Kings Wars Studies has written a FP review of three books on the Soviet experience:
Quote:
Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Roderic Braithwaite, Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89 (London: Profile Books, 2011) and Artemy M. Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011)
Many here I suspect will agree with this passage, with my emphasis:
Quote:
There are many aspects of the Soviet experience relevant to the current U.S.-led campaign, but none are more relevant to the present day than the Soviet efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement and withdraw their military forces. On these aspects of the war before the war, these three books have a great deal to say, primarily by way of three key lessons: Even a "reconciliation" that promises substantial government concessions may not succeed. Timing is everything. Pakistan is not to be trusted.
Link:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...in_afghanistan
The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan: Getting History Right
A Lawfare review of the Soviet experience after President Trump's confusion over history; as the Editor explains:
Quote:
President Trump's justification of his foreign policy often draws on bizarre theories and bad history. One of the worst recent instances was his claim that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan because of terrorism. This is wrong, but it raises the question of why Moscow did invade. Seth Jones of CSIS dissects Trump's claim and, drawing on Soviet archives, lays out the rationale behind Moscow's decisions.
There are several links within.
Link:https://www.lawfareblog.com/soviet-e...-history-right
