Sensitive Covert Action Notifications - Gang of Eight may be history...
The Congressional Research Service released a report 7 July 2009 regarding (what I perceive to be) a step backward in oversight procedures. LINK
From the Exec Summary:
Quote:
Legislation enacted in 1980 gave the executive branch authority to limit advance notification of especially sensitive covert actions to eight Members of Congress—the “Gang of Eight”—when the President determines that it is essential to limit prior notice in order to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting U.S. vital interests. In such cases, the executive branch is permitted by statute to limit notification to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and Senate majority and minority leaders, rather than to notify the full intelligence committees, as is required in cases involving covert actions determined to be less sensitive.
In approving this new procedure in 1980, during the Iran hostage crisis, Congress said it intended to preserve operational secrecy in those “rare” cases involving especially sensitive covert actions while providing the President with advance consultation with the leaders in Congress and the leadership of the intelligence committees who have special expertise and responsibility in intelligence matters. The intent appeared to some to be to provide the President, on a short-term basis, a greater degree of operational security as long as sensitive operations were underway. In 1991, in a further elaboration of its intent following the Iran-Contra Affair, Congressional report language stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible.
In its mark-up of the FY2010 Intelligence Authorization Act, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) eliminated the Gang of Eight statutory provision, adopting instead a statutory requirement that each of the intelligence committees establish written procedures to govern such notifications. According to Committee report language, the adopted provision vests the authority to limit such briefings with the committees, rather than the President. In approving the provision, the Committee rejected an amendment that would have authorized the Committee Chairman and Ranking Member to decide whether to comply with a presidential request to limit access to certain intelligence information, including covert actions. The rejected provision stipulated that if the Chairman and Ranking Member of each of the intelligence committees were unable to agree on whether or how to limit such access, access would be limited if the President so requested. (Emphasis added by AT)
With Congress considering a possible change, this memorandum describes the statutory provision authorizing Gang of Eight notifications, reviews the legislative history of the provision, and examines both the impact of such notifications on congressional oversight as well as options that Congress might consider to possibly improve oversight.
I recognise the need for oversight in our system of government -- checks and balances are good and appropriate. However, history has shown (over millenia) that this camel (a horse designed by committee) likely will run in the wrong direction more often than not.
This development concerns me. What say you all?
Marc, a re-read may be in order
Quote:
Originally Posted by
marct
Hi AT,
Hmmmm. I'm smelling camel as well with a possible wiff of Star Chamber added in. I never really liked the Gang of Eight provision, but this appears to be even more restrictive and give greater power to the President.
This latest development appears to be giving too much authority to the committees that love to produce camels, rather than to the executive. There are some good people on the Senate and House select committees on intelligence...and there are some overblown egos as well. It's the latter group that concerns me. Hence the mention of camel syndrome...
But more to the point, while oversight is built into our constitutional system for good reason, the more people who know a "secret" the faster it becomes public knowledge - at an exponential rate. The provision that was rejected, which would have reduced the "who needs to know" decisionmakers to the top two members of each committee (with the President having the ability to break a deadlock if necessary) was at least an acceptable middle ground. I suspect that the overblown egos in the House committee shot it down.
I am a highly inquisitive person (a good trait for an analyst!), and would love to know aaaalll of the details of a lot of different covert actions. I recognise, however, that there are situations where the cards must be held tightly to the vest, perhaps in perpetuity. There is a remarkable amount of wisdom in the "need to know, right to know, right to disclose" strictures.
Just my 2psi
Victoria
Past need not be prologue
but it usually is.:eek:
That said, IMO, the rule ought to be that the Committees' as a whole should be briefed. Release of classified information should be on not less than 80% of the Committee Members concurring. Abstentions should be treated as non-concurrence. Staffers should be very limited in number, non-partisan professionals, who are subject to the same laws as Executive Branch employees. A member who releases classified information as an individual should be subject to prosecution in the same manner and under the same laws as the staffers. Congress certainly has the authority to pass such legislation for it defines duties as an Intel Committee member to be only those for which there is committee concurrance (80%). Do something like this and you protect the information and create real oversight.
Will this happen? Of course not!:rolleyes:
Cheers
JohnT
