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September 2006 - The Marine Corps Gazette has posted the following three articles:
Preventing Atrocities by Capt Steven D. Danyluk, USMCR (Reprint from June 2000)
Crimes in Hostilities — Part I by Maj W. Hayes Parks, USMC (Reprint from August 1976)
Crimes in Hostilities — Part II by Maj W. Hayes Parks, USMC (Reprint from September 1976)
A friend has asked me to participate in the Mass Atrocity Response Operations Project or MARO. A joint program between Harvard University's Carr Center for Human Rights and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, MARO is decribed below:
MARO is looking for military and civilian leaders who have dealt with genocide on the ground or in planning to assist in this effort to equip the United States, other states, and regional and international actors to respond effectively to genocide and mass atrocity when directed by national leadership.Quote:
The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project aims to equip the United States, other states, and regional and international actors to respond effectively to genocide and mass atrocity when directed by national leadership.
Among the menu of options—including diplomatic, informational, and economic—it is essential to prepare potential military responses. In collaboration with the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, the MARO Project will harness professional military expertise to develop credible and realistic operational planning for responding to genocide and mass atrocity, when directed by National Command Authority. The MARO Project focuses on military operations to terminate and mitigate the effects of genocide and mass atrocity. When the complexities and challenges of using military force are well understood, states will be better prepared and more effective in responding to contingencies. Furthermore, greater awareness of the demands and dilemmas of military interventions should foster the development of preventive, non-military approaches, ultimately the preferable response to incipient crises.
If you would like to throw your name in the hat, contact me by PM or email and I will pass your name on to the planning group.
Best
Tom
Not quite ready (nor do I have the time right now) to let go of the hat, but I am curious. Please refresh this thread when significant updates hit the street.
Tom, will be interested what aspects of working with FSFs get covered.
Best, Rob
Tom,
Details are yet to be worked out on FSF. The project's current focus is designing an intervention mechanism in the form of an Annotated Planning Framework acceptable to the USG and allies. The intent is to broaden the range of participants beginning in 2009 to include US interagency and international partners. FSF considerations should come into play at that time.
Harry Phillips
Harry Welcome to the SWC. Stick around and join in.Quote:
Originally Posted by Harry Phillips
For the Council: Harry is the friend of whom I spoke.
Luckily until shooting computers becomes genocide I get to wave from the sidelines. The scope of this problem, the political issues, what appears to be futility just makes the task seem so daunting. Wowser. I'm not sure what the product from an effort like this would be, and what would a success look like? Mucho respect to all participants future and current.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Intresting.
But why invent water .......?
good luck
I share the same questions and concerns posed above. But after my experiences in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sudan and knowing how feckless the UN is in responding to such situations, I believe that doing something is better than doing nothing. Like all things of this sort, only time will tell how successful this effort is.
One other thing, I also believe in Clausewitz' admonishment to not over extend one's national resources. Collaborative work of this type may ultimately serve U.S. national and humanitarian interests somewhere down the road.
Harry
Mr. Phillips are they looking at this as military action or disaster relief? Those two operations are pretty different though on the surface they have similarities. In a situation like Rwanda or Bosnia the you can sit on the social elements engaged in war but how do you make them stop?
I totally agree that the UN has little to offer and often makes the situations worse. Please don't take anything I said as criticism. I'm just trying to get my mind around the topic much the same way I might think about the Hadron Collider (which I'm clueless about too). I figure every situation must be different but do you want to respond early and stop depredation or can you only respond after the fact in a recovery mode? During Rwanda one of the Army Generals said something along the lines of you can let them kill each other or go try and stop them and you can kill them for trying to kill each other. Misperception on my part perhaps but like most jobs those worth doing are difficult.
I am interested in this idea but have some questions, that others may share. What are you looking for? Full time employees? Forming a network or informal organization? What kind of qualifications should your candidates have?
...are they looking at this as military action or disaster relief?
...do you want to respond early and stop depredation or can you only respond after the fact in a recovery mode?
Thanks for your questions. And please note that I'm pretty thick skinned so no offense taken of any sort.
What the project endeavors to create is a planning tool for use by Combatant Command planners with a view towards both prevention and intervention. Nothing totally new about this, just a way of focusing the planning on genocide situations.
Following are excerpts from the annotated planning framework that has thus far been developed. Note that force composition is based on the following a. Immediate Intervention Forces, b. Sustainment and Response Forces, c. Stabilization Assistance Forces...for both prevention and intervention.
i. Prevention
a. Immediate Intervention Force (IIF) – prepared to immediately intervene in a mass atrocity
• This element might function as a small but potent symbol of intent to
intervene and stand as a flexible deterrent option for policy makers at the operational or strategic level.
• This element should be predominately infantry and range from company to
battalion-size depending on the situation, and have dedicated helicopter support.
b. Sustainment and Response Force (SRF) – designated to protect the Stabilization Assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed.
• This element functions as a larger reserve force intent if the smaller element is insufficient, or if the situation has a higher likelihood of escalating toward a mass atrocity.
• This element must be correspondingly larger than the IIF, i.e. if the IIF FDO
is company-sized, this must be a battalion. It should have robust ground
transport and some aviation assets in order to bolster a larger presence over a broader area and occupy key terrain.
c. Stabilization Assistance Force (SAF) Sustainment – designated to provide
combat service support to all force elements and humanitarian assistance
to the population effected by the atrocity
• This element acts as an FDO focused on the humanitarian aspects of the
potential atrocity. It should be scaled and organized according to the situation, i.e. a scenario within mountainous terrain at middle latitudes will call for a different medical mix than that at sea-level in the tropics.
ii. Intervention
a. Immediate Intervention Forces (IIF) – designated to immediately
intervene in ongoing atrocities
• This element can move very quickly to the areas where the atrocities are
happening to stop/detain those doing the killing.
• Bolstered by a robust supporting arms component, the IIF can quickly
overwhelm any opponent.
• It must have a medical element to care for those wounded before and during the intervention.
b. Sustainment and Response Forces (SRF)– designated to protect the humanitarian assistance elements, ensure the overall security of the area and provide quick response combat reinforcements as needed
• Provides immediate combat support to the IIF.
• Controls movement within the area of operations.
• Ensures security of victim and refugee encampments.
• Functions as the lead coordination element between coalition political and
military agencies.
c. Stabilization Assistance Forces (SAF) – task organized to support
immediate and prioritized large-scale medical, sanitary, infrastructure
requirements
• Provides immediate treatment for wounded and injured.
• Provides sanitary and secure areas for intermediate medical facilities.
• Functions as a coordinating element between the coalition's military and
humanitarian NGOs operating in the area.
Immediately, we are looking for senior officers (or retired officers) to join our core planning group during a meeting scheduled for 24 & 25 September 2008 in Washington DC.Quote:
Originally Posted by Abu Suleyman
We are not looking for full time employees as the project has its full time staff. Those of us on the core planning group volunteer our time and expertise in support of the project. At some juncture we will be engaging senior level civilian officials of the U.S. interagency and the international community. Qualifications first and foremost at this juncture have to do with military planning experience and experience as an operator in the field during complex peacekeeping/humanitarian operations and warfighting.
It is worth remembering, that in Rwanda, the key UN member states--especially France and the US--were well aware what was unfolding, but preferred not to act. While there is much fault that can be laid at the feet of the UN (notably DPKO), it does have to be noted that the caution shown by DPKO and the SG reflected its (accurate) assessment that the UNSC was unwilling to support a more robust mission, and instead likely to leave UNAMIR to dangle.Quote:
Originally Posted by selil
National interests outweigh international interests even at the Security Council. As a legislative body, the Council's inability to stop genocide points to the inherent challenges associated with competing national interests of Council members which in turn impacts on: the timeliness (or lack thereof) of decision making; issuing a mandate to protect via Security Council resolution; identifying member states to execute the mandate; and finally the actual execution by member states in support of a mandate.
I would recommend rounding up some of the old Kurdistan hands on this, like Peter Galbraith, as there are a few academics and humanitarians who responded or attempted to rally political will during the Anfal Campaigns in Iraqi Kurdistan during 1987-8. There are a few decent histories of Anfal out there, and a number of those who are authorities on the matter can be identified through those publications. Mike Amitay, formerly Executive Director of the Washington Kurdish Institute could probably guide you to the right folks. Galbraith was pulled in as Ambassador to Croatia in 1995 based on his advocacy against Anfal, but managed to tick someone off in the administration for being morally/philosophically consistent and was shown the door, if memory serves.
Speaking of Anfal, we had the RDJTF or QRDF or whatever we called the 82nd/101st/24th during that era. Dropping in light infantry rapid response folks to intervene would have been operationally feasible, no? What prevented it was national interst and lack of political will. That would seem to me to be a more important area to focus on - its a heck of a lot easier, IMO, to prepare military formations to respond in these situations than it is to convince our leadership that there is an imperative to do so, humanitarian or otherwise, in locations where compelling national interests are not easy to identify, if they exist at all. During Anfal it seems it was more important to have Saddam as a bulwark against Khomeni than it was to keep 100 grand or so folks out of mass graves.
If you'd like to get hold of some of the old Kurdistan crew, let me know, as I was part of that group of starry-eyed idealists.
Cheers,
Hi Folks,
Quote:
Originally Posted by Harry Phillips
I've got to agree with RB that they limiting factor is more political than pragmatic. It also strikes me that there is a rather thorny question that hasn't really been raised here, which is the question of what is the source of political legitimacy and authority for MARO?Quote:
Originally Posted by redbullets
Right now, there seem to be two, or possibly three, competing sources of legitimacy: UNSC resolution, alliance agreement, and/or individual national "authority". Under what political authority would MARO be operating?
I've read this thread twice and checked the MARO website. My question is how is genocide identified and then communicated enough to persuade external actors (nation states, NGOs etc) to call for action?
Secondly who investigates the genocide - before and after intervention?
Sadly we have the example of Darfur now and Rwanda a few years ago.
If there is no or very limited external access to a nation state / area where genocide is in prospect or has happened very little will happen.
davidbfpo
Thank you all for the last set of questions and comments.
for RB: I think anyone with insights to the Anfal campaigns would be of very high value to the MARO project. I especially believe individuals such as Peter Galbraith and Mike Amitay would bring a lot of credibility to the project at large. I would very much like to see them in dialogue with Sarah Sewell, the MARO project's lead.
MARCT: regarding political legitimacy. There is much work to be done regarding this issue and will be addressed in 2008 and 2009 after completion our initial work during this phase of the project. At this stage, the MARO project's focus is U.S. national authority and the annotated planning framework is intended for use by planners at the combatant commander level. There is however an awareness of the international community on the part of the project. A meeting is planned for the November timeframe to engage and inform international partners. Ultimately, Security Council or alliance resolutions backing U.S. initatives vis a vis genocide intervention, using the MARO construct, could potentially serve to provide international political authority. Again, there is much work to be done in this arena.
davidbfpo: very tough question. As a retired Army MI officer I've already sounded the alarm with respect to this and even made a recommendation for indepent/autonomous research to support our efforts through avenues such as the intelligence analysis program at Mercyhurst College. Your second point regarding access...anyone who has ever been on a UN mission understands it is only done after agreement on the part of parties to a conflict indicating they accept such a force. It's not always permissive as we know from places like Bosnia, Rwanda and now Darfur. Your question requires much more study.
Harry
Harry,
Thanks for the response on political authority. It is one of my bugaboos :wry:.
Let me toss out a (possibly) silly suggestion for monitoring and reporting. If I remember correctly, Stephen Marrin is at Mercyhurst and has been doing a lot of work on the issue of professionalization of "intelligence". You might want to talk with him and see if he would be interested in creating something like "Analysts Without Borders" (hey, I think I'm going to copyright that ;)) as an international, professional service group that monitors genocide and genocide in the making.
Mark,
I very much agree that such an effort is warranted. MARO's leadership has to determine if such an effort is possible...I think Stephen Marrin and Kris Wheaton would jump at the opportunity to explore this subject...Kris has already told me as much. It would greatly enhance the project in my professional opinion.
Harry
You may want to contact the Stimpson Center for International Peace on the subject, they're doing a study on genocide prevention you may be interested in. Ms. Victoria Holt is leading it, she gave an interesting interview session here at Leavenworth about two months ago. Several high-profile individuals are participating.
One of her points in discussion with me was that the UN has really cleaned up its peacekeeping act the last few years organizationally. The problem is overcoming the negative perceptions from the failed 1990's interventions.
Thanks,
Tori is very well informed about the MARO project. I last spoke to her just before her trip to Addis.
FYI: My last active duty assignment was as the UN's military planning officer for south Sudan and Darfur. I spent two years working for DPKO in New York, with UNMIS and AMIS in Sudan/Darfur, and with the AU in Addis. The planning I did set the stage for UNAMID...now let's see how it gets executed.
Harry
Harry
Link goes to a lengthy paper on preventing genocide and appropriate to add here: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7061
davidbfpo
Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, 5 May 2010
A Collaborative Effort Between the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
There is an existing thread on this subject:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/showthread.php?t=5598Quote:
A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military doctrine—but it should be. The United States does not currently recognize mass atrocities as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of responding to mass atrocities. As a result, the US is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation. This Military Planning Handbook is guided by the core belief that the nature of mass atrocity, and the focus of a mission to stop it, means that a MARO presents unique operational challenges requiring careful preparation and planning. This Handbook aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of mass atrocities and a common military approach to addressing them.....
Mass Atrocity Response Operations: A Military Planning Handbook, 5 May 2010
A Collaborative Effort Between the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.
Copied to this existing thread.Quote:
A Mass Atrocity Response Operation (MARO) describes a contingency operation to halt the widespread and systematic use of violence by state or non-state armed groups against non-combatants. The term MARO is not yet enshrined in military doctrine—but it should be. The United States does not currently recognize mass atrocities as a unique operational challenge, and there is no operational concept or doctrine that might help commanders understand the dynamics and demands of responding to mass atrocities. As a result, the US is not fully prepared to intervene effectively in a mass atrocity situation. This Military Planning Handbook is guided by the core belief that the nature of mass atrocity, and the focus of a mission to stop it, means that a MARO presents unique operational challenges requiring careful preparation and planning. This Handbook aims to create a shared understanding of the specific and even unique aspects of mass atrocities and a common military approach to addressing them.....
Wired picked up on this -
Quote:
When the Pentagon released its master strategy document earlier this year, the document contained an interesting phrase: The military needed to focus on “preventing human suffering due to mass atrocities or large-scale natural disasters abroad.”
The insertion of that line into the Quadrennial Defense Review marked a paradigm shift: Previous versions of the strategic plan included no such references to stopping “mass atrocities” as a military imperative. It was a quiet victory for advocates of a new vision of U.S. national power that would make genocide prevention a military priority.
Read More http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2010...#ixzz0nHv2b84a
This is the thread I know of on genocide / atrocities, if there's is a more recent one let me know. (Added) Maybe some of the issues have been covered in this newer thread 'Responsibility To Protect' aka R2P:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...&highlight=R2P
I've not seen any other reports so hat tip to the UK-based blogsite Open Democracy and their article opens with:Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/martin-...ity-preventionQuote:
In a speech at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) on 23 April 2012, President Barack Obama launched a "comprehensive strategy" to "prevent and respond to atrocities". He has charged his new Atrocities Prevention Board (APB) with "helping the US government identify and address atrocity threats, and oversee institutional changes that will make us more nimble and effective".
After the initial post (above) courtesy of a FP Blog emailing there are two points of view:http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/...pisrc=obinsite and http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/...ard_a_chance_0
Zenpundit has a commentary, try this for a critique:Link:http://zenpundit.com/?p=8197Quote:
The Atrocity Prevention Board is a great sounding bad idea that represents an impossible task in terms of Ways, unaffordable in terms of Means and unacheivable in relation to Ends. (Later) This is a bureaucratic brief for global micromanagement by the United States that makes the Bush Doctrine appear isolationist and parsimonious in comparison.
I rarely agree with Stephen Walt but generally do agree with Zenpundit. In this case, both of them have it right. That APB should have an All Points Bulletin issued to be killed on sight... :rolleyes:
As mentioned in this SWC post,
From "At Water's Edge" (which accords with Anne-Marie Slaughter) Whither the Atrocities Prevention Board?:
That was posted on December 29, 2011 (BTW: David Pressman and George Clooney are friends).Quote:
Back in August, President Obama signed into existence PSD-10, a Presidential Study Directive on Mass Atrocities. When it was first released, PSD-10 was well-received by liberal interventionists and those who believe that preventative diplomacy and coordinated action can head-off mass killings, Anne-Marie Slaughter and myself included. ...
...
... The Directive determined that an interagency study, led by the National Security Advisor, would be complete within 100 days, to determine the full mandate and make-up of the body, as well as its processes. The resulting Atrocities Prevention Board was to begin its work 120 days after the signature of PSD-10, on August 4, 2011. It has now been 147 days.
Since August 4th, precisely nothing has come out of the White House on the matter. There have been no stories written, in the mainstream media on the development of the Board since late August. None. Nothing on interagency squabbles that would prevent its creation, nothing on how close it is to launch, nothing on how David Pressman’s War Crimes, Atrocities and Civilian Protection directorate at the NSC is proceeding. Nothing.
From Human Rights First:
The personnel appointed to the board and its staff will show its direction, since they will shape its findings and proposed COAs. As the President stated in the Directive:Quote:
DNI Testimony Reiterates Administration Priorities on Genocide Prevention
2-10-2012
By Crimes Against Humanity Program
Last week, a little-noticed passage on mass atrocities made its way into the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) annual testimony to Congress. The passage reaffirmed the President’s proclamation that the prevention of mass atrocities and genocide is a core U.S. national security interest and moral responsibility, and committed the U.S. intelligence community (IC) to play a significant role in the forthcoming Atrocities Prevention Board.
The President appointed Samantha Power, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights, as chair. Nuff said.Quote:
In the face of a potential mass atrocity, our options are never limited to either sending in the military or standing by and doing nothing. The actions that can be taken are many: they range from economic to diplomatic interventions, and from non combat military actions to outright intervention. But ensuring that the full range of options is available requires a level of governmental organization that matches the methodical organization characteristic of mass killings.
Regards
Mike
And as Zenpundit so succinctly put it: "This is not likely to end well."Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
During the Balkan Wars and Rwandan Genocide in the 90s I was infuriated by the moral posturing of various political factions who clearly felt that expressions of disapproval and armed note taking were appropriate and effective responses to mass murder. This just institutionalizes the posturing.
I will be shocked if this APB turns out to accomplish anything more than allowing D.C. insiders and their friends to feel good about themselves, with the occasional small scale troop action thrown in when domestic political concerns indicate a distraction is needed to move the poll numbers.
The following text is from a SWC reader, who was responding to Post 26 and the first linked article (written unlike the others by a non-American):Quote:
The author raises serious considerations but appears to be off track with respect to the intent for the APB. Reading between the lines, one can construe this article as a criticism of preventive warfare policies or more specifically a diatribe against perceptions for the potential for military adventurism to take place. I do not agree with the criticism Here is my view.
First and foremost: Despite an almost unwavering disregard for the concept of R2P by the international community's military establishment, the APB is about just that. Call it what you will, genocide, mass atrocity, ethnic cleansing or what have you, the fact is that the concept of R2P is central to whatever kind of collective or unilateral response that takes place.
Secondly: There should be concern over the likes of the Samantha Powers and Susan Rice types in the world who promote the use of force in support of R2P, (from an emotive standpoint vice a calculated standpoint) without adequate consideration beforehand for issues such as collateral damage, vital national interests, and, how much force is necessary to get the job done along with the associated resources to do so.
Third: Idealism v. Realism - We have to consider that R2P is dangerous and dirty. It is not a clean, clinical, academic treatment sanitized of the goriness of war. It is about the tactical use of force, and all the inherent ugliness that controlled military violence brings, in support of protecting civilian populations at risk. In my view, R2P runs counter to the aims of civil society in the short term but clearly supports those aims in the long term.
Fourth: Clearly, from a purely historical context, there has been a lack of political will to engage on behalf of threatened populations using military force. Political inertia / indecisiveness and competing national interests contribute to a mindset of wanting to wait to see how things unfold before commiting to any type of substantive action. Just think in terms of what took place in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, and Myanmar.
Fifth: So what is the reality? The APB in my view is another feel good measure championed by idealists who harbor disdain for the use of military force and bemoan the use of military force in support of national interests, despite the fact that R2P emanates from the deepest most rudimentary core of human values. As such, they percieve those values as being somehow poltically manifest, and aligned with western values, without due consideration for the amount of violence that even the most minimal of military interventions entails.
In summary: The article is purely judgemental and speculative without consideration for the true purpose or intent of the APB -- establishing a mechanism to effect R2P collectively when required. The APB is an outgrowth from perceptions of political malfeasance and a need for personal as well as political atonement (aka Romeo Dallaire) as a result of mass atrocities which took place in the late Twentieth Century. The reality is that the APB will not drive military decision making in some constructive manner unless the collective western military establishment changes its views on R2P. In the meantime, innocent people will continue to die, cultures will continue to be lost, and national interests may or may not evolve to incorporate humanist interests as they related to the senseless killing of innocent civilians.
Your quote contains this summation:Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
""The reality is that the APB will not drive military decision making in some constructive manner unless the collective western military establishment changes its views on R2P. In the meantime, innocent people will continue to die, cultures will continue to be lost, and national interests may or may not evolve to incorporate humanist interests as they related to the senseless killing of innocent civilians.""
For the first phrase I extracted, I would certainly hope that the collective western military establishment does not change it's views. If they did and start intervening more often, that's the most likely way I can think of to kill more innocent civilians...
As an aside, he mentions Romeo Dallaire -- I am not a fan, not least because he fans this foolishness...
For the last thought in that extracted paragraph above -- as it was in the beginning, is now and forever shall be...
Ken,
I had the good forturne to spend a bit of time with Sen Dallaire last December. I picked him up at the airport and shared a couple of meals and conversations over a 2 day period. I agree with you regarding R2P, and shared my concerns with him. As you can imagine, his position on this is deeply personal and heavily shaped by his frustrations over his experience in Rwanda. But being ordered by people far away to stand by and do nothing while atrocities unfold around you and the unit you command is far different than a policy of launching our nation into the middle of every problem regardless of how small our interests or knowledge of why the conflict is hapneing are.
An honorable man of deep conviction. I believe you would be a fan of the man.
You may well be right. My current attitude however, is based on my strong personal penchant for turning off my radios... ;)Quote:
Originally Posted by Bob's World
Add deep distaste for meddling and one can develop some negativity.
Having said that, I'm also very much aware that one never knows in advance when or if one will indeed turn them off or go ahead and do the unpalatable and then have to live with the result. :o
Ken White has just commented above:Is that today an option for a unit commander? My question only applies to Western armies; who often have multiple means of communication and redundancy.Quote:
turning off my radios..
A "touch of Nelson" I think is out of date. There are enough people here who have "boots on the ground" experience to comment.
Sadly you're correct -- it is no longer an option. Or at least it's a more hazardous option in several respects due to that redundancy and excessive micromanagement. I knew that when I made the comment, I made it to signify an attitude, knowing those days were gone and you correctly understood that.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
Though I do not believe you're equally correct in that. However, I do acknowledge -- again sadly -- that many will agree that you are. Fortunately for us all, there will always be a few who just get things done in spite of bureaucratic and risk averse impediments. Who dares, wins -- and those who do not dare don't know what they're missing. :DQuote:
A "touch of Nelson" I think is out of date. There are enough people here who have "boots on the ground" experience to comment.
Times change, people adapt -- but all change is not necessarily an improvement and hewing to the rules is not always assured, desirable or even sometimes possible... :wry:
Col. Arthur D. Simons Center for the Study of Interagency Cooperation, InterAgency Journal 3-2, Special Edition: Prevention of Mass Atrocities
Quote:
Features
Foreword
by Robert R. Ulin
Introduction: Responding to Genocide in Principle and Practice
by John Mark Mattox
A New Era of Conflict Resolution
by Romo A. Dallaire
The Military Profession and Counter-Genocide Leadership
by Michael H. Hoffman
The Killing Fields, Ethnic Cleansing, and Genocide in Europe
by Hal Elliott Wert
Far From Nuremberg: The United States, War Crimes, and the International Criminal Court
by Mark M. Hull
Humanitarian Frames and Humanitarian Soft Power in Darfur
by Stephen M. Wisniew
Educating Officers on the Prevention of Mass Atrocities
by Charles E. Heller
Hat tip to the Australian Lowy Institute:The paper is on:http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c...act_id=2027396Quote:
Last Wednesday Sydney University academic Ben Goldsmith presented to the Lowy Institute his research on forecasting genocides.
After examining data from the early 70s onward, Goldsmith and his fellow researchers found four key factors that determine countries at high risk of genocide: infant mortality, the incidence of previous genocides or 'politicides', the percentage of the population serving in the military, and the incidence of political assassination.
Did this project make any progress?
JMA,Quote:
Originally Posted by JMA
The contact author's email is:ben.goldsmith@sydney.edu.au
This should be read alongside a separate thread:Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Catch All
Popped up via Twitter and I think sits here best. The intro:Link:http://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books...um-report-2016Quote:
The report of the 2016 Fort Leavenworth Ethics Symposium is now available. This symposium focused on the ethical issues inherent in humanitarian military operations and interventions. In this report, readers will find discussions on a broad series of topics such as the ethical challenges posed by genocide, hybrid warfare, and humanitarian operations conducted in megacities.