Radical Ideas for Iraq

9 August Los Angeles Times commentary - Radical Ideas for Iraq by Max Boot.

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... The security situation in Baghdad has been in free fall since the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra on Feb. 22. In retrospect, that attack appears to be a turning point when the chief problem in Iraq went from being a Sunni-dominated insurgency to a civil war in which Shiite and Sunni militias are equally culpable. The result has been a horrifying surge in violence, with about 100 Iraqis dying every day, the bulk of them in Baghdad.

To restore order in the capital, I suggested adding at least 35,000 U.S. troops — in line with Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez's comment in 2004 that he needed two divisions to control Baghdad. But that's not what Bush is sending. To bolster the 9,000 U.S. troops already in the capital, he is sending another brigade from northern Iraq, for a total of 13,000 U.S. troops, or less than one division. There will be an equal number of Iraqi troops — along with 35,000 Iraqi police officers, who are so sectarian and corrupt that they are more part of the problem than the solution.

If Bush thinks that a force this size can secure a city of more than 6 million people, he's not listening to the best professional military advice. An additional problem is that moving troops around Iraq, instead of sending extra units, may improve the situation in one spot but worsen the environment elsewhere. As a "senior American military official" in Iraq told McClatchy News Service, "You can't do clear-and-hold with the force structure we have."

If the present strategy doesn't work, what's the alternative? The most radical course would be a total U.S. withdrawal. The likely result would be an all-out civil war in which Iraqi casualties could easily soar to 1,000 a day and the price of oil could go above $100 a barrel. Proposals to carve up Iraq into three separate states — Sunni, Shiite and Kurd — would not ameliorate the violence because major cities such as Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk are full of different religious and ethnic groups that would fight for control...

But there's another course short of withdrawal: reducing U.S. forces from today's level of 130,000 to under 50,000 and changing their focus from conducting combat operations to assisting Iraqi forces. The money saved from downsizing the U.S. presence could be used to better train and equip more Iraqi units. A smaller U.S. commitment also would be more sustainable over the long term. This is the option favored within the U.S. Special Forces community, in which the dominant view is that most American soldiers in Iraq, with their scant knowledge of the local language and customs, are more of a hindrance than a help to the counterinsurgency effort.

Make no mistake: This is a high-risk strategy. The drawdown of U.S. troops could catalyze the Iraqis into getting their own house in order, or it could lead to a more rapid and violent disintegration of the rickety structure that now exists.

Which path should we take? My preference remains deploying more soldiers, not fewer. A couple of divisions in Baghdad, if skillfully led, might be able to replicate the success that Col. H.R. McMaster's 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment had in pacifying the western city of Tall Afar, where the troops-to-civilians ratio was 10 times higher than in Baghdad today. But at this point, I am also open to a substantial reduction in troop numbers because the current strategy just isn't working...

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I tend to think something like this is worth a try. I guess I am at the point where I think almost anything is worth a try. Our current plan doesn’t seem to be working. Since we are obviously unwilling to raise the number of troops why not try cutting them? Maybe we have created a goldilocks situation for the guerillas? Staying the course may sound good as a political slogan but if we don't know when to change tacit we are sure to run aground.

The "Iraqis will solve all their own (and therefore our) problems" bugaboo needs to die a swift and brutal death. Since 2003, US forces have relied on a strategy of stabilizing the situation just long enough for Iraqis to do the actual work of enforcing law and order in their country. If you think that's worked great so far you can stop reading now.

Iraqi troops and police are:
-Poorly trained
-Undisciplined
-Cowardly
-Corrupt
-Affiliated with sectarian militias/criminals/sunni nationalists/al Qaeda
-Poorly equipped
and
-underfunded

Giving Iraqi troops more training, weapons, equipment, new uniforms, higher pay or ice cream sundaes will not quell the insurgency, disarm shi'ite or kurdish militias or produce safe streets for Baghdad or any other city or province. This is because we are ignoring the reasons for those problems listed above.

A major part of the problem is that many Iraqis have an axe to grind and they smart enough not to tell us about it. Thus, we get Interior Ministry death squads, cops on the take and soldiers who will happily look the other way while insurgents bury an artillery shell to blow up the next American they see walking past.

Another problem is that the insurgents are more than willing to commit the most heinous, barbaric acts upon the families of collaborators with the Americans - not to mention what they do to the collaborators, themselves. The most highly trained and best equipped Iraqi commando can still be turned by kidnapping his sister or his wife or his mother - who has no training or weapons.

This war will not be won by handing it off to such folk as currently fill the ranks of the Iraqi Army and Police. Nor are the problems there solvable until the long term political and social issues involved are worked out.

I'm not saying that this war cannot be won and that a shining beacon of democracy and goodness will never take root in Iraq. I am saying that holding on until the Iraqis take over is NOT a realistic outcome. The Iraqis will NEVER be ready, given the current political situation and current insurgent tactics. Iraqi government forces which are not blatantly sectarian will continually fail for reasons of cowardice, graft, ideology and (most importantly) family honor and self preservation.

I agree with your assessment of the capabilities of Iraqi forces however I wonder if forcing more responsibility on them maybe the only solution. I don’t know about organizations but I have seen people who were low performers rise to the occasion when placed under pressure; maybe an army could do the same. It sort of thrown them in the river and they will learn to swim; or maybe more like thrown them of a cliff and they will learn to fly. It is certainly not ideal but things haven’t been ideal there for sometime.

Letting the Iraqi forces do the whole "sink or swim" thing is a political non starter for the administration - the resulting chaos would look like failure and increase pressures to accelerate the drawdown of remaining troops.

Likewise, an increase in the US commitment is also a political nonstarter.

A complete withdrawal from Baghdad and Anbar province (which I would favor) is obviously off the table.

A realignment - away from Anbar province and Baghdad toward quieter southern areas - might have some effect. It would allow US troops to seal and clear sectors that aren't as volatile and thereby build some lasting institutions. Baghdad, especially Sadr City, and Anbar province will have to wait. We can rescue the south (the north doesn't need it). Once a durable coalition of Kurds and Shiites forms on the ground, with democratic institutions and competent military and police, you can begin making inroads into the toughest towns - with or without the presence of US forces.

Why would you support a withdrawal from Anbar?

Jones_RE,

I think you have identified the one of the fundamental problems precisely. Anything that may make it appear as if everything is not going to plan is a non-starter. Some sort of structural flaw with in our modern society/government is ensuring that most politicians will never risk the appearance of failure, even though this zero defects attitude ensures failure.

Stu,

The structural flaw in our society is bad, but not unbeatable. However, the current administration is famous for its inability to admit mistakes, its message discipline, and intolerance of debate (not dissent, debate). This is partly due to the character of the commander in chief and partly due to a conscious decision to have the un-Clinton administration. While this attitude may (does) run a more efficient White House, it makes for shoddy staff work down in the administrative agencies (like the Pentagon).

Culpeper-

I don't support pulling out of Anbar. I do support moving the bulk of our regular troops elsewhere. The special operations types can have Anbar to themselves, with a couple of heavy armor QRFs to back them up. I do support concentrating our efforts on southern and northern Iraq for a couple of reasons. The main one is this: in counter insurgency warfare, one should start with small and easy operations. Secure a small village, not a city. Work on an area that is somewhat friendly, or at least neutral, not the heartland of the enemy's strongest supporters. A small operation is more likely to be successful. The odds tilt even more in your favor if the enemy is weak in that area. It gives you a chance to show that the government is capable stating a rational course of action and then actually executing it.

Small operations have other benefits. They're more tolerant of slight mistakes in execution and technique, for example. Your men may not have all the right cultural training. Maybe they're IED search procedures aren't as good as they ought to be or something. Better to find that out in a small village where there will only be a few IEDs than in Fallujah where there will be 50 or 100 of them. Reconstruction and civil development are easier in a small operation, too.

In a nutshell, I feel that we could secure real peace and a functioning economy for most of Iraq in a surprisingly short time. We simply have to be cold blooded enough to write off the Sunnis for now. Moqtada al Sadr's power base is in Baghdad, so he's largely a non-factor. That leaves SCIRI (whom we're working with) and its Badr Brigades. Once a proper COIN census is performed and police in the area receive reasonable training and supervision it'll be a snap to keep Sunni terrorists out of the area of operations (like asking Mississippians to spot a New Yorker). A few will get in, but not enough to murder every last cop that works with us like they manage in Ramadi or something. Sadrists from up north will be slightly trickier, but not impossible. They have less call for murdering Shiites anyway.

If we can get an economy moving and a functional government in southern Iraq then we can use those areas as a base to begin recruiting and training a very strong local (provincial and city) police presence. That'll provide continuing defense against Sunni insurgents. The whole area will serve to provide a source of army recruits (who will be less afraid for their families and themselves on leave) who will be more effective.

Sunnis will probably leave government. Baghdad will become a battleground like no other. Americans will not be dying there, so it's not our problem. When we eventually pull out all our remaining troops, the Shiites and Kurds will have a functioning democracy (tinged with Islam) and plenty of oil revenues to keep their economy afloat. They'll have halfway honest cops and halfway decent soldiers, enough to keep the worst attacks out although there will be civil war for many years to come. Eventually the country may split or there may be a political deal that saves everyone.

Basically, I think that COIN techniques practiced by the US Army cannot save Anbar province from the insurgents on the current commitment. No other troops are coming. But a broken dish is better than no plate at all. And if America and the world can see some progress coming out of Iraq then our reputation is arguably saved as well. Maybe with a couple years of lower death tolls for US troops and more smiling, friendly Iraqis (as opposed to the corpse dragging, shouting kind) popular support for the war will rise enough to finish the job.

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Originally Posted by Stu-6

Jones_RE,

I think you have identified the one of the fundamental problems precisely. Anything that may make it appear as if everything is not going to plan is a non-starter. Some sort of structural flaw with in our modern society/government is ensuring that most politicians will never risk the appearance of failure, even though this zero defects attitude ensures failure.

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That is purely philosophical and biased because you are describing the history of politics in America not just "modern society/government". This "sort of structural flaw" has been around since America was established and has seen more success than failure. One structural flaw comes to mind. The Sedition Act of 1918. With it, President Wilson was able to ensure success with World War I. When it was no longer needed it was repealed. You'll have to excuse politicians because almost all of them are not military strategists. It's the nature of the beast but it does not ensure failure.

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Originally Posted by Jones_RE

Stu,

The structural flaw in our society is bad, but not unbeatable. However, the current administration is famous for its inability to admit mistakes, its message discipline, and intolerance of debate (not dissent, debate). This is partly due to the character of the commander in chief and partly due to a conscious decision to have the un-Clinton administration. While this attitude may (does) run a more efficient White House, it makes for shoddy staff work down in the administrative agencies (like the Pentagon).

Culpeper-

I don't support pulling out of Anbar. I do support moving the bulk of our regular troops elsewhere. The special operations types can have Anbar to themselves, with a couple of heavy armor QRFs to back them up. I do support concentrating our efforts on southern and northern Iraq for a couple of reasons. The main one is this: in counter insurgency warfare, one should start with small and easy operations. Secure a small village, not a city. Work on an area that is somewhat friendly, or at least neutral, not the heartland of the enemy's strongest supporters. A small operation is more likely to be successful. The odds tilt even more in your favor if the enemy is weak in that area. It gives you a chance to show that the government is capable stating a rational course of action and then actually executing it.

Small operations have other benefits. They're more tolerant of slight mistakes in execution and technique, for example. Your men may not have all the right cultural training. Maybe they're IED search procedures aren't as good as they ought to be or something. Better to find that out in a small village where there will only be a few IEDs than in Fallujah where there will be 50 or 100 of them. Reconstruction and civil development are easier in a small operation, too.

In a nutshell, I feel that we could secure real peace and a functioning economy for most of Iraq in a surprisingly short time. We simply have to be cold blooded enough to write off the Sunnis for now. Moqtada al Sadr's power base is in Baghdad, so he's largely a non-factor. That leaves SCIRI (whom we're working with) and its Badr Brigades. Once a proper COIN census is performed and police in the area receive reasonable training and supervision it'll be a snap to keep Sunni terrorists out of the area of operations (like asking Mississippians to spot a New Yorker). A few will get in, but not enough to murder every last cop that works with us like they manage in Ramadi or something. Sadrists from up north will be slightly trickier, but not impossible. They have less call for murdering Shiites anyway.

If we can get an economy moving and a functional government in southern Iraq then we can use those areas as a base to begin recruiting and training a very strong local (provincial and city) police presence. That'll provide continuing defense against Sunni insurgents. The whole area will serve to provide a source of army recruits (who will be less afraid for their families and themselves on leave) who will be more effective.

Sunnis will probably leave government. Baghdad will become a battleground like no other. Americans will not be dying there, so it's not our problem. When we eventually pull out all our remaining troops, the Shiites and Kurds will have a functioning democracy (tinged with Islam) and plenty of oil revenues to keep their economy afloat. They'll have halfway honest cops and halfway decent soldiers, enough to keep the worst attacks out although there will be civil war for many years to come. Eventually the country may split or there may be a political deal that saves everyone.

Basically, I think that COIN techniques practiced by the US Army cannot save Anbar province from the insurgents on the current commitment. No other troops are coming. But a broken dish is better than no plate at all. And if America and the world can see some progress coming out of Iraq then our reputation is arguably saved as well. Maybe with a couple years of lower death tolls for US troops and more smiling, friendly Iraqis (as opposed to the corpse dragging, shouting kind) popular support for the war will rise enough to finish the job.

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Thank you for the clarification. You originally posted that you were in favor of a complete withdrawal from Anbar and I couldn't understand that. Nevertheless, your retort makes more sense. However, we tried giving entire areas of operations to Special Forces (SOG) with QRFs (Hatchet Forces) at the cost of losing a lot of the most best trained fighting soldiers and airmen. Special Forces are good at training indigenous troops and gathering intelligence but they can't control an entire region the size of Anbar with small teams going in and out of garrison. The Recon teams become the hunted and the entire area remains "Chairlie's Point". We have a lot of Green Berets and supporting aircrew that just went missing/killed in Laos and Cambodia for the exact same reasons you support the same idea for Anbar with no great success in stopping the flow up and down the trail. Also, we really don't need to start at the village level in the North and South because those areas aren't the problem to begin with. But you do have a point. The USMC had a great program in Vietnam by putting a small team in a small village and have them stay there to help the community. One of the few civil affairs successes of that conflict that I can think of. I also agree that we can always lose the Sunnis by writing them off. But more of a permanent nature. I'm sure there are plenty of Kurds and Shiites that would be more than happy to help out. Realistically, since the enemy is right there in Anbar is the current policy of slowly bleeding him to death all that bad?

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Originally Posted by Culpeper

That is purely philosophical and biased because you are describing the history of politics in America not just "modern society/government". This "sort of structural flaw" has been around since America was established and has seen more success than failure. One structural flaw comes to mind. The Sedition Act of 1918. With it, President Wilson was able to ensure success with World War I. When it was no longer needed it was repealed. You'll have to excuse politicians because almost all of them are not military strategists. It's the nature of the beast but it does not ensure failure.

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While the roots of any structural problem would go back centuries the actual flaws may only have come about due to resent changes in . . . politics, technology, society, etc. For instance the basic structure of United States government was created long before the 24 hour news cycle, blogers, the entrenched two party system, or million dollar campaigns to name a few; all of things change the perception the citizens have of the government. Add to that changes in societal perceptions about the role of government, the US role in the world, etc. and you create a situation where what at one time was unperceivable defect can become a fatal flaw.

Politicians not being strategist is irrelevant; by in large they don’t need to be, any more than a general needs to know how to drive a tank. Lincoln success as commander in chief despite his lack of relevant experience is famous. What he did have was a willingness to admit failure and find the people he need to allow him to prevail. If we accept Lincoln as being a product of his time and not exceptional than something has changed since the current president is no Abraham Lincoln. If we accept Lincoln as being exceptional (more likely in my opinion) then we are still left with the issues of how we choose average presidents since we can not always wait for a great man to come and save us from ourselves.

Gentlemen, I'm not sure what structural flaw in our society you're referring to, but I don't think we need or desire a society structured to execute wars. War is an endeavor that we should engage in out of necessity, not choice. Our society should be structured to support democracy and a free market economy (with the appropriate safe guards). I find the finger pointing at our society for our strategy shortfalls alarming. The problem in Iraq isn't “our” society’s structure; it is our lack of a workable strategy. Everyone is tired of hearing the "continue the course" mantra.

Unfortunately Jones' assessment about the Iraqi military and police in an earlier post where he bluntly (but accurately) described their shortfalls to include: poor training, undisciplined, corrupt, cowardly, poorly equipped, etc., prevents our current strategy from succeeding. I would argue that any soldier in any army would be cowardly (or lack the will to fight) if he wasn't self confident due to poor training, poor equipment, and poor leadership, then add the social factors where he doesn't even believe in what we're trying to accomplish. His loyalty rests primarily with his tribe. Is that 100% across the board, absolutely not, but is it a majority of soldiers and policemen? I think so.

In my mind some of the key questions are:

If we stay the course what are the possible outcomes?

How (if possible) can we fix the structural problems in the Iraqi armed forces? What do we change?

Can we increase the number of coalition troops on the ground?

(Probably not, although more troops are needed to provide adequate security, there is an incredible economic and political cost associated with doing so. Furthermore, many Iraqis see the U.S. as the bad guys now, so what nation would or could provide additional troops? If it isn’t possible, then this is not a feasible course of action and should be discarded)

If we downsize what are the possible outcomes? Civil war (there has been a civil war), but what are the possible outcomes of the civil war? Perhaps the disintegration of Iraq into multiple nations, or perhaps an uneasy truce? Chaos and lawlessness which create a safe have for highly trained and experienced terrorists very capable of exporting their craft to neighboring countries?

We need realistic courses of action, and that will require some creative thinking on our part.

Personally I see two possibly related structural flaws. First as I stated earlier, is the fact that we now appear to have leadership that is incapable of admitting anything did not go as planned. Second, the fact that we get into wars without a realistically plan for seeing them through to a satisfactory conclusion. Some wound see these as problems with the current government, which I think is fair, but that still begs the question of how they got elected twice.

Part of the problem comes from America's "great power" status. The perception of strength gives people great confidence about entering a war. Understanding strength is one thing. Understanding leverage, agility and endurance, on the other hand . . . .

An inability to alter course is simply a function of the current administration. Partly, our chief executive considers it a strength. Partly, hawks in the defense department (and the world, generally) can find plenty of "success" in Iraq. There is an elected government (only a small percentage of Sunnis voted, and it hasn't stopped the violence). There are hundreds of thousands of Iraqis in the security forces (some of them are insurgents, some are militia, many are cowards, the rest are incompetent or ill equipped). Many insurgents have been killed or captured (but many more are recruited every day). Lots of Iraqis say they want us to stay (lots of Iraqis say they want us all to die, too). Lots of Iraqis say they're grateful for the invasion (lots of Iraqis want us the hell out of their hair). Everything is a matter of opinion and degree. To what degree do the parenthetical statements above detract from our accomplishments? If you're Don Rumsfeld, the answer is: very little.

The cost of this war to the administration is bearable. They know we lack the political capital, capability and target set for another invasion. Even the cost of defeat is not catastrophic to the administration. This is because they can prevent that defeat as long as soldiers remain on the ground. The cost of a change of strategy to the administration is too high to contemplate. They would have no credibility in foreign affairs and no pull with Congress. It would be a 3 year lame duck presidency, the worst in history.

I still don't understand this dogma of leadership allegedly not admitting something may have went wrong (you might want to read the first paragraph of the op/ed) and that wars go according to some static public plan from beginning to end as well as how all the before mentioned correlates with our Electoral College system as of the year 2000. Personally, I think post election stress syndrome is not the topic. I could be wrong. I haven't learned the company language yet. And who said doves can't kill? It took two to kill this topic.