negotiating with insurgents?

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09-22-2009
Adrienne

negotiating with insurgents?

The NPR item today looks at the problems of applying the strategy we used in Iraq to Afghanistan. I was wondering if others agree with the statement that there are no deals that can be worked out with insurgents in Afghanistan? I don't know the situation that well so I'm really interested in others' perspectives.

Also, not following the logic that the sectarian violence was so bad in Iraq that everyone just wanted order (agree), but in Afghanistan the violence is so bad that everyone has just stopped caring? 2006 in Iraq was an absolute bloodbath, and the population was hopeless about the possibilty that things could get better. But that didn't stop them from establishing Sons of Iraq (with our backing), neighborhood watches, and other mechanisms to bring about some degree of order. Why wouldn't the Afghanis also try to seek some kind of order/stability if given the opportunity/our support?

Quote:

In Afghanistan War Report, Echoes Of Iraq
by Kevin Whitelaw

David Gilkey/NPRGen. Stanley McChrystal, the commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, has submitted a grim report to the Obama administration that warns of failure without additional U.S. troops and a change in strategy.

It is hard to ignore the echoes of another recent war when reading Gen. Stanley McChrystal's leaked report that warns about looming failure Afghanistan without additional U.S. troops.

The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan never refers explicitly to the U.S. experience in Iraq (other than to note the ongoing drawdown in U.S. forces), but that conflict clearly underlies his grim analysis and some of key counterinsurgency lessons that he draws upon.

Military officials have been signaling for weeks that more troops are necessary to quell the Taliban insurgency and establish security in Afghanistan. McChrystal's confidential report to the Pentagon and the administration was leaked to The Washington Post this week, offering insight into the military's assessment of the war and the challenges facing President Obama.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/s...ryId=113060662
09-23-2009
tequila

I think you highlighted one of the main differences between the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies. The Sunni Iraqi insurgency was defeated --- by the U.S. military and more importantly by the massive wave of ethnic cleansing and sectarian massacre in Baghdad and environs 2005-2007, when more than a million Sunnis fled the country. It was under pressure from the Shia militias, the Americans, and faced the prospect of being overtaken from within by al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Sunni insurgent groups sought refuge with the Americans, the most powerful party in the mix and also the one most open to accommodation, and brought the Sunni insurgency largely to an end.

The Taliban and associated anti-coalition movements in Afghanistan, comparatively, are in a position of strength. They have been on the upswing since 2005 and are claiming more and more parts of the country. There is no massive sectarian violence against the Pashtuns. Coalition pressure on the insurgency is much weaker, due to the size and spread of the population and the comparatively smaller number of effective combat troops. Meanwhile the Taliban has no fear of being subsumed by al-Qaeda leadership --- it has a longstanding and fruitful partnership, rather than a violent rivalry. If you're an Afghan insurgent, why negotiate with the infidels and their lackeys? Better to just win, like you've been doing for the past four years.
09-23-2009
Bob's World

Negotiation should always be on the table

Quote:

Originally Posted by tequila

I think you highlighted one of the main differences between the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies. The Sunni Iraqi insurgency was defeated --- by the U.S. military and more importantly by the massive wave of ethnic cleansing and sectarian massacre in Baghdad and environs 2005-2007, when more than a million Sunnis fled the country. It was under pressure from the Shia militias, the Americans, and faced the prospect of being overtaken from within by al-Qaeda in Iraq. The Sunni insurgent groups sought refuge with the Americans, the most powerful party in the mix and also the one most open to accommodation, and brought the Sunni insurgency largely to an end.

The Taliban and associated anti-coalition movements in Afghanistan, comparatively, are in a position of strength. They have been on the upswing since 2005 and are claiming more and more parts of the country. There is no massive sectarian violence against the Pashtuns. Coalition pressure on the insurgency is much weaker, due to the size and spread of the population and the comparatively smaller number of effective combat troops. Meanwhile the Taliban has no fear of being subsumed by al-Qaeda leadership --- it has a longstanding and fruitful partnership, rather than a violent rivalry. If you're an Afghan insurgent, why negotiate with the infidels and their lackeys? Better to just win, like you've been doing for the past four years.

This is just one more problem with labeling everyone as a "terrorist," it leads to a application of the "never negotiate with terrorists" rule where it has absolutely no bearing. Insurgency in politics, and politics is compromise. Certainly there may be times that are not good for negotiation, and some leaders that you don't want to negotiate with, but as a rule, yes, the Karzai government should be in negotiations with insurgents in Afghanistan, and the Pakis should be in negotiation with their insurgents as well. Could be a role for the US or the UN to oversee some sort of three-way talks as well.
09-23-2009
tequila

Agree with Bob that negotiations are not always bad and should never be ruled out, even with "terrorists."

However certain things have to be taken into account. The record of the Taliban in Pakistan has been awful --- their 'accords' with the Pak Army have been violated over and over again. The Taliban in Afghanistan have a similarly unreliable record. Conditions in Afghanistan now are hardly conducive to negotiations that would benefit the GoA or ourselves.
10-30-2009
davidbfpo

Updates

At IISS (London based think tank) earlier this month Dr Davood Moradian, Senior Policy Advisor to the Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, spoke on 'Reconciliation with the Taliban: The View from Kabul': http://www.iiss.org/events-calendar/...ew-from-kabul/

Here are two paragraphs:

Quote:

In my view, prior to any form of engagement with the Taliban, it is imperative to know more about them, including their organization, motivation and background. From the outset, I must admit the Taliban, as their invisible leader, have been under-studied by most of us.

In order to acquire a better understanding of the Taliban, we can identify four pillars and components that constitute the Taliban as a movement. These four includes external institutional support; their ideological component; a hospitable social context and financial support and motivation, including the drug money. Any counter-Taliban strategy must address all these factors and pillars.

Provides a good summary and this time from an Afghan.

I know elsewhere SWC learnt a British retired general is advising General McCrystal on encouraging defections. He was interviewed two weeks ago in: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/new...cle6873537.ece

davidbfpo
10-30-2009
tequila

Saw this at Spencer Ackerman's site:

Allies turn Afghan insurgents into partners

Excellent detail-filled article by Sean Naylor. Most interesting points to me:

Quote:

...

The Afghans call them the “upset brothers,” the low- and mid-level fighters who are fighting for money or to gain revenge for some perceived injustice, or because they are being coerced, rather than for ideological reasons or out of a lust for power. The phrase has caught on with ISAF.
It is these “upset brothers” at whom the reintegration initiative is targeted.

“The reasons why people fight will be different in different villages and different communities in different parts of the country, but a lot of the drivers of instability and a lot of the drivers for the reasons why these individuals fight are indeed rectifiable,” said Col. Chris Kolenda, a special adviser to ISAF commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal and director of strategy for reintegration.

...

Coalition officials have monitored insurgents talking about the reintegration effort, Flynn said. The essence of the conversations is that the insurgents want to know what the finished reintegration plan will be, he added.

...

The most high-profile example of insurgents seeking to reintegrate occurred in the wake of the killing of Ghulam Yahya Akbari on Oct. 9, the so-called “Tajik Taliban” commander, who, together with his two sons, had carried out a reign of terror across parts of western Afghanistan.

After his sons were killed late this summer, “Yahya became even more relentless in his prosecution of suicide attacks and rockets into Herat airfield, etc.,” Flynn said. Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan conducted “a very effective man-hunting campaign against him, and it eventually paid off,” he said.

“When he was killed it was like the weight of the world was taken off a couple of fairly large swaths of people,” Flynn said. “The prices of foodstuffs went down in certain bazaars and markets out there because Yahya was jacking them up ... More bazaars opened up. And then, of course, once this sort of weight of intimidation came off of the shoulders of these people, many of the fighters said, ‘Hey, I’m done.’”

As a result of the coalition killing “a guy who acted as though he was invincible … somewhere between a hundred and 200 fighters [have given up],” Flynn said. “That’s pretty significant.”

In the case of Yahya, it required killing a commander to persuade his fighters to give up. In Helmand, all it took to get “a couple of hundred” insurgents off the battlefield was for coalition forces to remove some local Taliban commanders from their targeting list, Flynn said.

Some of those fighters have reintegrated into their communities, “and some provide intelligence — and it’s still very dangerous for them,” Flynn said, adding that “in some cases” coalition forces are paying the former insurgents for that intelligence.

But while the coalition forces may pay for intelligence, they are determined not to pay insurgents simply to quit fighting. “This is not a ‘pay for don’t play, pay for don’t fight’ sort of scenario,” Kolenda said.

ISAF officials are at pains to stress that there is a difference between reintegration, which is aimed at low- and mid-level fighters, and reconciliation, which refers to political accommodation with senior insurgent leaders.

The officials are adamant that arranging political reconciliation is not their job. “That’s the business of the government of Afghanistan, and we’re absolutely not getting involved in that,” Dutton said.