Tom, I like your phrasing about
the balancing act. About what I expected. Especially since we have a propensity to ignore our own doctrine on such things as command relationships - witness UNOSOM II:rolleyes:
Cheers
JohnT
Rotating Into (and Out Of) The Advisor Corps
I appreciate the learned discussion the NYT Op-Ed on an Advisor Corps generated, but I feel the need to clear up a persistent misunderstanding about my Advisor Corps proposal. It is not a BRANCH--like the Military Police Corps or the Adjutant General's Corps--but a UNIT, like the XVIIIth ABN Corps or the III Corps. Thus, soldiers rotate into and out of it. The original CNAS paper was pretty clear on this point:
"This proposed organization would solve the vast majority of the problems afflicting embedded combat advisors—providing them with doctrine, training, and a permanent home. Service members would be transferred to the Advisor Corps for a standard three-year Army tour of duty, during which they should expect to deploy for one year and then hand off the mission to the next advisory division, facilitating the consolidation of lessons learned. Upon the end of their combat tours, some advisors could remain at the Advisor Corps as trainers and doctrine writers, while others could return to the conventional Army sporting their new “Combat Advisor” tab—which should give them a competitive advantage for promotion as the advisory mission becomes the main effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan over the next few years."
The proposed increase in the size of the Afghan National Army, from 80,000 to 120,000, will only increase the already unmet demand for Combat Advisors. We need to do that task better, and we need to do it soon. The discussion on the Small Wars Journal is important in building consensus at least on that need, if not on how to solve the problems afflicting our current answer to this pressing problem.
Multitude of valid thoughts....my 2 cents worth
I tend to try to learn from history and view those lessons as they apply today. Many are in agreement that current force structure/force taskings are misutilizing todays forces. Many think various branchs should grow, the military should grow, and the debate goes on. My number one questions is why do we even do rotations/tours? It is my personal belief that when the order was given we should have gone with everything we own. Not half our force and relay later on units rotating out. If we would have brought the full brunt of our military from the beginning would we be in the situation we are? We would have enough SF to conduct FID/COIN operations, conventional forces to #1. Secure all borders (we can't do that here) nothing in nothing out, 2# Man damn never every city, town, village. We could lock the entire country down. Unfortunately our politicians and society has deemed war a game to be played fairly, humanely, and without true force. How many times did units rotate out of WWII? I remember reading a few years back about guys who were gone for 7 years straight. I look at it like this, we do it the right way over a period of five years straight or do we play this game for 10-15 years.
Don't remember who posted about the SF growth and subsequent postings. Problem is the Army's inate ability to manage personnel. They knew for years close to 50% of SF would be retirement eligable over a 5 year period, guess what they did just that retired and went elsewhere. So the Army says hey 20 years ago we brought guys off the streets straight into SF it worked then why not now. Problem is that huge 50% of retirees. 20 years ago a few sprinkled inexperienced guys could be trained, mentored, and developed by seniors without a ripple effect throughout the force. Not mention these college educated, 4 years SF experience with multiple tours are ripe for every other agency and private sector jobs out there, how many are stick around? If I'm not mistaken the average age in SF has gone from 32 years to 27years...huge experience and maturity gap.
What all this does is tie into the fact that everyone wants to do everyone elses job. Conventional forces want to do what SF does, guys in SF want to do what Infantry guys do and so on and so on. If everyone stayed within their capabilities and scope of things they would stay busier than ever and we would be leaps and bounds ahead of where we are currently. Yes there are many great individuals throughout the force and many different entities actually conduct joint operations as it should be. Unfortunately for everyone of those there is more not doing this.
Sorry I kinda rambled have a million more thoughts but will spare you those and save them for later.
Additionally the human relationships and stability
Quote:
"Excessive rotations and ratios of 6 or 7 to 1 are certainly undesireable. 4 to 1 I guess should be the goal. But the current armed forces still have a structure that is designed for a full-scale blow-up in case of mobilisation with a very top heavy structure. Also don't forget all the perks and promotions that come with deployments - everybody wants a piece!"
One of the issues with constantly rotating units is the lack of stability in regions. One unit does things one way the next unit reinvents the wheel and this cycle keeps repeating itself. I'll play my own devil's advocate in that I know this can also be beneficial in the fact that different approachs and views can solve problems as well. Unfortunately about the time you build a good working, trusting relationship with the local population your tours done and the relationship building starts again. Additionally with unit rotations this could be minimized by rotating the same units in the same areas, many of the local population will remember many of the units personnel thereby building the relationship quicker. This also needs to happen here at home between the SOF community and conventional forces. There is no reason why SOF units and conventional forces cannot link up and train together prior to deployment, this alone would prevent a lot infighting and help establish each others roles within BCT AORs. When BCT commanders have a good feel for the forces within their AOR, a solid working relationship built prior to deployment, and their capabilities and assets they bring to the table these CDRs are much more likely to utilize them properly.
Quote:
want to expand SF (or the entire force) precipitously. My focus was pretty long term. IMHO SF should never reduce quality - I am skeptical of direct accession. Would much rather see SF accessing real sergeants than ones who just came on board.
A realistic approach to this would be direct accession of mid level NCOs. Bring them into the SF Groups for a 90-120 day assessment period. After that time of assessment you would either make them 18 series or they would return to their normal capacity. This would mainly work within MOS that are compatible ie 11B = 18B, wouldn't be able to this for medics but many of these guys could go to the school house later to receive medical training. This additionally would help fill the void with seasoned NCOs without taking them out of the fight for 12-24 months for formal training. There use to be a policy in place to be able to do this don't know if they still exist or not but would be a great way to boost the force, down side is many conventional forces would be losing quality NCOs that otherwise might not have made the switch.
Standardized HN forces training
Might be misplaced here but I think it goes along with the subject. We all have our personal preferences on what to train the HN forces in. In here lies part of the problem. Along with deciding the proper force to use to train HN forces we need to standardize their training across the board. Accordingly this training is based on the type of HN force unit. Many of the basic tasks can be and should be trained identically throughout the host nation. A standard POI should be developed for all basic tasks for all forces to use to train HN forces. This would help HN forces training progression along with replacement units knowing the HN forces level of training and capabilities. In a dream world this would be easy to implement, but unfortunately many of us know we have a difficult time doing this with our own forces. Would like to know your thoughts on this?
Developing Host Nation Engagement
Hey ODB,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
ODB
...This would help HN forces training progression along with replacement units knowing the HN forces level of training and capabilities. In a dream world this would be easy to implement, but unfortunately many of us know we have a difficult time doing this with our own forces. Would like to know your thoughts on this?
Good points.
It wasn't long ago (circa 2003) that only Army CA, FAOs and G-5 personnel received training in the execution of host nation relations. That said, they had little to do with developing operational doctrine (once known as "host nation engagement strategies") for the theater CINCs or ASCC. Before we begin training based on HN capabilities (or shortcomings), a little lesson in relations at the tactical level is in order.
BTW, welcome aboard First Class :p
Regards, Stan
When an author chooses to join the debate
on his own work, it is wise, perhaps, to listen to what he has to say.:D John Nagl's post caused me to go to the original CNAS piece (which I confess, I had not read- Sorry John:o). It is well thought out and, more importantly, makes the case to solve certain current problems.
That still leaves some of the issues we've discussed here as relevant and raises a few others. The original piece does not, for instance, address the command relationship question in the field. What, for example, is the relationship between the Advisor Corps commander in his role as advisor to the MOD and the Joint Force Commander? And with the Ambassador? Not that these are unresolvable issues but they will come up - perhaps more strongly with a MTOE organization than ad hoc ones.
Another issue is doctrine proponency. As I understand it the Advisor Corps would be a deployable unit - in some cases the primary one (hopefully most of the time). The Imperial XVIII Airborne Corps doesn't write airborne doctrine - TRADOC institutions do. So, what John is proposing is that the 4 star TRADOC commander cede his responsibility for advisor doctrine to the 3 star commander of the Advisor Corps. I know, we all felt that we in the field knew what the doctrine should be much better than any doctrine writers. But, did we have the time to do it right? My greatest frustrations were not that somebody else was writing the doctrine but that my (and others like me) comments, critiques, and objections were not being taken seriously and were simply ignored. This aspect of the proposal needs, IMO, refinement to resolve a potential problem that is sure to arise. My own suggestion would be an Advisor Corps LNO cell at CAC where, I think, the doctrine proponency should reside.
One more issue is how long the Advisor Corps should exist. I don't think I have seen a better way to address current problems which will exist for some period of time. But if the Army needs to expand to meet a new peer threat will we continue to need the Advisor Corps of 20,000? Alternatively, is an Advisor Corps the best solution for the long term or would expanded SF do better?
What about task organizing BnAT with elements of an SFODA?
Worth the debate. Thanks John, for sending us back to the original full piece.
Cheers
JohnT
I too returned to the original proposal to refresh my memory.
Said item is refreshed about as well as it can be -- but I did not change my mind.
The Advisory Corps is not a good idea. Some reasons why:
As slowly as we react, given a decision to do that today, it would take three years to stand up. Will it be required or desired in three years? Possibly, possibly not
Will it probably be required in three years and into the future. Possibly in the three year window, beyond that, I'm quite skeptical. My suspicion is that Congress is going to be very skeptical of any large commitment to FID (emphasis on large) anywhere in the world for some time. As they should be.
I say they should be because we do not do FID at all well. The Advisory Corps idea envisions a series of one year tours and the theory is that the Corps will force or ensconce continuity of effort. I submit that rotations of those in command will not provide the continuity envisioned. The fix to that is to make it a five or six year tour with three or four spent in the AO. Don't think that will fly and lacking that, the rotation will adversely impact the Advisory effort.
If my very flaky Math skills are correct, the Advisory corps would require a rotating crop of over 600 MAJ, 120 LTC and over 34 COL. While I believe the US Army to be over-officered, I don't think the overage will cover that at all well and I submit that rank structure will effectively remove the field Grade complement of over 10 BCT -- or strip a lot of staffs (which may be a good thing...). I do not think the Army can afford an Advisory Corps.
Using the ask for fifteen, expect ten and get five rationale, what about an Advisory Division? That means your problem is only a third as large. That is still quite high cost for a capability that MAY be required -- and may not be...
Capability to provide adequate language training spaces(and in which languages?) is highly suspect.
Better to adapt the T-MAAG concept and keep the Advisory element training at Riley going while ramping up language training and developing accelerated language training (six to 12 weeks) to minimal conversational competence in likely languages.
A far greater problem than our admittedly ad-hoc and in some ways flawed current advisory effort is our tendency to short change our nominal allies in the host nation on equipment. Troops without shoes using hand me down will tend to have problems.
I have no question that attempts to pull us into small wars will occur for the next few years. I do question the way some propose to handle them. We should play to our strength, not deliberately plan to do something we have proven we do not do well.
You caught me in a misspeak -- shoulda said
the Army does not do large scale FID well. One of those cases where I knew what I meant but no one else did because I said it poorly. :(
I did mention large scale with respect to Congress and future commitments. I should have made clear the big ones were my concern in all cases. I apologize for my error.
I agree the CentAm efforts went well and I strongly agree with your statements here about the advisability of using SF in that role. I also agree that we have done others here and there fairly well but I note that none were massive efforts requiring the bulk of the Army -- those haven't worked out well from the Philippines forward.
My concern is that the big Army and far more importantly, the Nation, do not have the patience or inclination to do it well on a large scale. The troops are capable of adapting to it and I contend that if Joe is trained for COIN, he can adapt to conventional war with no problem. Conversely, if trained for conventional war, he can also adapt to COIN but the transition is not as smooth. Joe is not the problem. Nor are the LTs and CPTs -- it's the senior NCOs and Officers that have the adaptation problem. That can be rectified but if it is, then you're likely to be confronted with a difficult adaptation being done for no reason because of no commitments to do that by the time you complete the adaptation.
That because the Nation doesn't want to do it. My belief is that the Nation put its head in the sand post Viet Nam and will want to do so again even though this war cost far less than did Viet Nam (in everything except money and we have so much more of that now than we did then it really doesn't count as 'more'). Given that factor, the senior leadership of the Army is likely to want to replicate the actions of their predecessor's post VN and eschew COIN. That would be a bad mistake. We have to possess the capability but we should aim to do it on a small scale and let the pros do it if it is remotely possible.
There's no dichotomy there; we need to be prepared to do it on a large scale -- we just emphatically do not need to go looking for an excuse to do it.
Parkinson's Law and capabilities come to mind... :D