This here is my work truck, my other car is vette
Quote:
The way forward in Iraq and in the broader “War on Terror” calls for a bifurcated military , organized into two distinct but supporting elements.
I liked the post, it provides some great ideas that I hope will lead to examining what we need to spend our money on.
I don't agree with a bifurcated military though. I think its too much along the lines of what we'd love to see. On the one hand you have this conventional force that we equip and train to fight a quick, knock down drag-out fight, on the other you have this force that in today's world would pretty much stay deployed. What sounds strange about that?
One, war is chance. So which horse do you trot out to the races?
Two, consider the problems with manning and equipping. If your deployment OPTEMPO for one is higher then the other, but your manning requirements are roughly the same - you start to go down the road of unpleasant comparisons. One example is the Air Force and the ground services - Right now the ground services ask about the value of the F-22 in light of the burden the ground services are bearing. Imagine if you have the same argument, but this time between a "War Winning" ground service and a "Peace Winning" ground service. You don't have to look far to know where the $$$ is to be made for Industry - Its with your major War Winning technologies. Industry has the more effective lobbyists, and Industry knows there is not much money to be made in winning the peace. So we have a nasty competition in which the "work truck" gets unleaded and used tires, and the "vette" gets premium and armor all - even though it rarely gets driven.
Now if everybody was willing to serve and and if money for Defense was not an object - then I'd say bring it on. But money is an issue, and will always be because the public does not see foreign policy as the superior issue amongst all their other concerns.
I do think that the concept is useful for public debate because it reconsiders what we see our military being used for, and perhaps it can be used to articulate to the public how we are using our military towards political ends, and how those political ends affect them at home, or potentially will affect them. I think it brings out the debate of how we use the entire DIME and perhaps how those capabilities should be restructured to face the challenges we have at hand. I think it should help political leaders consider how we employ the "M" in the DIME and when its appropriate to do so with its human and financial costs, the problems it can solve and the problems it can create - - you can't pursue a policy that resorts to bringing the "hammer" out of your tool box every time - every problem is not a nail. If you want to use the "M" for all your problems then you need to fund it with a very capable tool box. Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the ground services and the military in general - it helps s look at how we spend the money we've been allocated. What are our priorities? The last is perhaps the most important, because the well is not bottomless -fiscal responsibility starts with deciding how you apply the resources at hand. While at the tactical level we demonstrate great depth of agility, what do we express in our strategic culture?
Any solution that promises to solve all of our problems probably does two things - it creates new problems somewhere that are often more difficult to solve then the original ones - because you didn’t see them coming, and it rarely addresses the real problem because it assumes the hardest choices away. Since we can't fix this Inter-Agency stuff, we'll just make us another "Peace Army" that can do it for us. Your still using the hammer, just instead of a claw, you have a ball pen hammer. The military is still doing the job we know OGAs are better suited to do.
Hat Tip to Fernando though for an outstanding look at a very tough subject and for bringing it together under one heading.
