Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War
Parameters, Summer 2007:
Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War
Quote:
...This article makes four arguments. First, it shows that there has been a cultural turn toward an anthropological approach to war. As part of this cultural turn, some historians and strategists argue that there is an undifferentiated nonwestern way of war, to be found in both strategic texts and historical behavior, and that eastern and western warfare are intrinsically different. Second, it argues that classic writings do not support this notion. Such a notion oversimplifies the western strategic tradition, and overstates its differences with eastern conceptions ofwar. Third,when it comes to understanding the actual behavior of cultures at war, the cultural turn is empirically unviable. There are toomany exceptions and qualifications that must be made to the picture of two conflicting eastern and western ways of war. Finally, by depicting culture as the driver of military history, the culture turn notion risks being politically naïve. This can result in overlooking the many moments where strategic cultures do not control states, but where states control strategic cultures, and where the differences between conflicting approaches to war are dictated less by cultural traditions and more by the hard realities of power, weakness, and pragmatism....
Analytic advantages of Institutional / organizational analysis
Hi Tom,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
Agreed, Marc. here is an extract from the same up coming article....
Preference for Fire Power Over Manpower
• Preference for Offense Over Defense
• Preference for Technologically Complex Over Simple
• Preference for Speedy Resolution Over Extended Operations
• Preference for Destruction Over Defeat of Our Enemies
This is the type of "institutional vectors" that are probably better for figuring out a strategic culture than the ones I've seen listed elsewhere. Obviously I haven't read the article yet, but let me toss in a few observations on each of the points.
- Preference for Fire Power Over Manpower: probably derives from the initial professionalization of the US Army post-Revolution, tied in with class elements in the early 1800's (e.g. Artillery had the highest social status tied in with education).
- Preference for Offense Over Defense: probably derives from geography (i.e. sea bounded) with limited continental conflict.
- Preference for Technologically Complex Over Simple: a paradoxical relationship, probably rooted in the early industrial revolution and the general cultural paradigm of "tinkering". Converted into a solid institution during WWII (the "Military-Industrial Complex"). Reinforced after WWII in international trade, and currently under massive attack from economic competitors.
- Preference for Speedy Resolution Over Extended Operations: a "classic" problem with democracies, also exacerbated by distance to combat operations area. Strongly related to preference for offense over defense, and tied to "go over THERE, fix the problem and come HOME". Also supported in foundation myths of the Revolution with the militias and the general lack of a warrior aristocracy.
- Preference for Destruction Over Defeat of Our Enemies: possibly deriving from an early imperative to "crush" invaders tied in with the actual combat technologies available during the first 100 years of the US army (e.g. muzzle loaders, line based warfare, etc.). Also possibly tied in with invasion and destruction of First Nations groups, especially the campaigns against the Iroquois in the Revolution and against the souther nations under Andrew Jackson.
*********
One of the reasons why I prefer an institutional / organizational analysis over a "national culture" analysis when looking at "strategic culture" is that we have a much more flexible model that avoids many of the flaws Porter points out. Before going any further, I had better clarify a couple of definitions I am using:
- Institution - used in the classic Malinowskian sense, an "institution" is not the same as an organization. It is the cultural grounding and justification for individual organizations. Possibly the easiest way to think of it is as the sum total of potential organizational forms relating to a particular cultural "need".
- Organization - used in the more "normal" sense, and organization is a particular "incarnation" or "avatar" of an institution. While Malinowski's analytic model is useful for organizations, I think a better model is the professionalization model of Andrew Abbot, especially since it includes the various maneuvering and conflict between organizations operating in the same institutional arena.
The relationship between organizations and institutions is a complex one that operates both ways. Organizations fight each other for control of "task areas" and, depending on how they play out in reality, may end up with socially constructed monopolies in these task areas (until the next fight over them). These task area fights may actually shift the definition of an "institution" over time or with a really major disaster or success (think of cavalry in WW I).
At the level of the institution itself, it is, as I mentioned, the sum potential of organizational forms including myths / stories (often overlooked as a really important source of generative ideas). These myths / stories (folk "history" if you will, cf. Wm Von Humbolt Steve :D) offer the germs of task area operations. For example, if a culture has a lot of stories about fading and raiding (which all pastoralist cultures do), that will be a "top of mind" tactic. But those same pastoralist cultures may also have other stories; certainly they exist in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan!
So, if this is going to be a useful analytic form, we have to look at both organizations and institutions - not "national cultures". We also have to look at how task areas are shifted between institutions; the fight over the term "jihadi" (vs. irhabi) comes to mind.
Anyway, sorry for the rambling in this post. I'm prepping for that article with Steve right now and my brain is playing through models.
Marc
Random thoughts are good...
Hi Ken,
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
Good post but some random thoughts occur.
"* Preference for Fire Power Over Manpower: probably derives from the initial professionalization of the US Army post-Revolution, tied in with class elements in the early 1800's (e.g. Artillery had the highest social status tied in with education)."
Or from the intuitive knowledge that a bullet is better than a sword. In the US, the technology to provide better firepower than the opponents had has always been the case (whether it was fielded or not is a different issue). That and concern for ones troops are more contributive than class elements.
All depends on the situation, sword vs. bullet, especially when it's a muzzle loader <shrug>. As far as the US having better firepower than heir opponents, that really hasn't always been the case. For example, the US got trashed badly in the War of 1812 partially due to better British equipment and training. Again, in WW II, if you look at the tanks being fielded, the US's Shermans and Sheridans were trash compared with the German Tiger IVs and King Tigers. It wasn't quality in WW II, it was quantity.
I think you may be right about the concern for troop casualties, but I suspect the class element was still operative. Probably a good bar topic :).
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
"* Preference for Technologically Complex Over Simple: a paradoxical relationship, probably rooted in the early industrial revolution and the general cultural paradigm of "tinkering". Converted into a solid institution during WWII (the "Military-Industrial Complex"). Reinforced after WWII in international trade, and currently under massive attack from economic competitors."
Or from the fact that Congress is willing to pay big bucks for hardware built in many districts while being less willing to fund good solid training. Culture?
Could be. I certainly suspect that that is one f the things hat kept that vector alive and well.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
"* Preference for Speedy Resolution Over Extended Operations: a "classic" problem with democracies, also exacerbated by distance to combat operations area. Strongly related to preference for offense over defense, and tied to "go over THERE, fix the problem and come HOME". Also supported in foundation myths of the Revolution with the militias and the general lack of a warrior aristocracy."
Or from two generations accustomed to sound bites and TV shows that wrap it all up in an hour. Culture rears its ugly head...
Nah, you guys had that well before sound byte culture :D. I'll admit, he vector has been accelerated like crazy as a result of it, but it was certainly operational in WW I.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ken White
"* Preference for Destruction Over Defeat of Our Enemies: possibly deriving from an early imperative to "crush" invaders tied in with the actual combat technologies available during the first 100 years of the US army (e.g. muzzle loaders, line based warfare, etc.). Also possibly tied in with invasion and destruction of First Nations groups, especially the campaigns against the Iroquois in the Revolution and against the souther nations under Andrew Jackson."
We can agree on that one. Nations do have personalities and cultural traits... :)
Yup, they're just pretty lousy predictors for specifics, except in the negative :eek:.
Marc
Thanks Marc; Good point, Tom
We can agree on 1812 and the quantity versus quality elements but all muzzle-loaders weren't equal, the rifled types had significant benefits. Probably just as well for the nascent US that Feguson's Rifle didn't reach mass issue, either as a result of his demise at King's Mountain or the British Army bureaucracy of the time or both.
Also agree that the lack of patience is indeed a long standing US trait; it was apparent as far back as Louisbourg in 1745...
I'd suggest that the national traits also are fairly good as predictors of positive things, for instance, I'd never expect to meet an impolite Canadian, an Australian who eschewed alcohol, either a Frenchman or Italian who did not like good food or a Briton without a dry sense of humor. Or an American who wouldn't help if asked. ;)
You're correct in that the whole bit is a good bar topic. Causation for minor problems that can be remediated is valuable knowledge, that for imponderable and essentially unalterable things like national cultures / characteristics / traits or whatever tag one is comfortable applying tend to be of little more than academic or esoteric interest. In this case, the issue is really the identified trends and I, for one, agree with the list as far as it goes. They have been characteristic and evidenced in all our wars with only minor exceptions.
The fortunate thing is that generally at the tactical level, the troops over the years have made it work -- still are doing so now. At the Operational level, failure to acknowledge those trends by too many senior folks has in the past been and is today a problem. At the Strategic level, most US Administrations have ignored them totally.
The principal point, it seems to me is not how or why the trends exist but why we do not acknowledge them and adjust our efforts both in training and on operations accordingly. There is some indication that efforts to adjust are being undertaken by the Army and the Marines but I suspect that the bureaucracy will move on this ponderously if at all and there is no indication that the political masters will consider the factors in their planning.
As Tom said:
"Not necessarily, Marc. Our enemies have on occasion been quite successful in using these tendencies against us."
All too true...
Thanks, Marc. I'll forego my Narses joke...
Good points all.
I've aways had a suspicion that the carpet fibers in the offices of the upper echelons might be highly allergenic and that might be why they did not adapt as well as did the lower plebes...
Seriously, those trends are IMO fact and I have for years tried to get folks in high places to consider them in their planning. I succeeded with a few, unfortunately while a very few of them got to two stars, only one made it to three stars and none higher where they could truly influence things. I cannot understand why the penchant for the highly elevated is to ignore reality and pursue the chimera of how they would like things to be. :confused:
As many note on the other thread, LTC Paul Yingling surfaced part of it. It seems protecting the institution is more important than doing what needs to be done...