Exactly. We agree on the problem
but see different solutions...
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Originally Posted by
Global Scout
Now, almost five years after we invaded Iraq conventional officers are now considering the obvious, which is clearly one of many examples of why we need Special Forces. The Marines, unlike the Army, embraced these types of activities early in the fight...
Yes and no, some Army units defied the Sanchez 'wisdom' and did that. The bigger issue is why did not the initial Army units into Iraq know what to do in the situation in which they found themselves?
Simply because they hadn't trained for it. BCTP in those days; you won the war with a final attack, turned off the lights and the computers and left the room. Armies do what they're trained for; the US Army found itself in a situation it had not trained for and it floundered -- that's a lick on 20 plus years of very senior leadership and the then commanders in Iraq...
There will never be enough Special Forces to do a wholesale attack and occupation.
I'd also submit that if both SF and the rest of the Army would start talking to each other instead of acting like a pair of females who wore the same dress to a party, they both might learn something...
(and yes, I know SOCOM is part of the problem)
Maybe there's hope, I heard 3d Gp and the 82d pulled off a good op not long ago...:cool:
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"...Now the question is should conventional forces be controlling indigenous recon elements, especially those operating in civilian garb? If you are the only players in town, then by all means, but if you have specialized forces that are more capable of training, equiping, advising, and controlling these type of operations (which can go terribly wrong when poorly planned, especially the risk of blue on blue if if you have a bunch of nervous E2's controlled by a LT in the battlespace), why would you? Pardon my bitterness, but after seeing some clown operations downrange I have my doubts."
Sort of sums up the problem, doesn't it? What if those specialized forces are not available in the quantities required due to either sheer numbers or diversion to other missions?
Why is that E2 nervous? Why are you not prepared to trust his LT? Because neither has been adequately trained and we know that.
The issue is not who does what, it's what forces we have and how well they're trained. On that score, even SOF can screw the pooch on occasion, foul ups are not confined to the big Army. There was this suburban full of interesting gear my son's rifle platoon from the 82d found in the street back on OIF2... :D
I've seen a lot of clown operations on both sides of the SOF / conventional fence. Combat'll do that. One of the worst firefights I saw in VN was between two Mike Force Companies...
I'll also mention that a recurring theme from both Afghanistan and Iraq in addition to the major point I cite below is that there is a lack of unity of command...
"...You can't compare our Army to the Brits. Our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts.[/QUOTE]
I agree that our conventional forces are not as well trained for these types of conflicts. That's the real point here, is it not?
Given the absolute fact that the US Army recognized as far back as 1986 that these types of conflict would be the future norm, whose fault is that?
However, you can compare our Army to the Brits, I do it all the time. There's one massive difference -- the Brits train well on the basics; we ignore the basics. Every after action report I've seen, every CALL bulletin, everyone I've talked to (and that includes some SOF folks... ;) ) who's been in any of the three current theaters says the same thing -- we do not do the basics well.
The point is, as you so amply illustrate, we don't train well enough.
Our problem with the basics is not that we don't
recognize them and know they need to be trained, it's a combination of philosophy, cost and human fallibility.
Most of our initial entry training, officer and enlisted is based on WW II models (which in turn was predicated on WW I models). Those techniques worked marginally for a large mass Army of draftees and by the end of WW II, were generally fair. However, given the fact that the US Army has been at peace since 1945 (I know parts of it have not been but the institution has been..) and given the general softening of society, the mothers of America are not willing to accept a significant number of injuries to their kids in training. Thus those items that can be injurious are softened or eliminated.
The broader problem is that the Army has not adapted to the fact that Joe Entrant, 2007 version, is far more mentally capable (and less emotionally and physically capable but not terribly so) of absorbing more and better training. We train a mile wide and an inch deep; many of the basics are taught but only superficially and they are not drilled in (a critical point). Initial entry training for combat arms enlisted folks should be around 32 weeks -- it's only a little over half that in many cases; Officer accession training should be about a year, it's less than half that. So the philosophy is bad.
In fairness, the Marines do better.
The Army believes it cannot afford to train an individual for more than his or her next job. This is obviously fallacious because at any institutional level, the trainees or students will almost invariably perform the duties of at least one more rank step and most likely two before they get additional training -- this is just dumb; by refusing to spend the money up front, we make subsequent training more expensive, shortchange those trained -- and we get people killed unnecessarily due to that. The Tillman case comes to mind. So the cost factor is very real and very false logic.
Then there's human fallibility. It's a big problem but I'll cite just two examples. Immediate action on an M16/M4 is simple but calls for drilling and muscle memory or it doesn't become the reflex action it should be. This may have changed but 30 years ago, the solution was not to drill it in but to extend the time allotted to perform the action to save training time (and go easy on the Drill Sergeants). Hopefully, they are no longer teaching any use of the forward assist assembly and I don't know what that time is today but if it's more than five seconds...
The second item is that those tasks which garner low pass rates in training are not trained in the schools and training centers in many cases, they are flagged out for "in unit training." Not because they're too difficult in all cases for the institution to train but because the low pass rate makes the school or center look bad. There's more but those are two examples.
Then there's the fact that units don't have time in too many cases to properly train because of the same three factors -- but that's another thread.
Some of my best friends are in SOCOM...
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Originally Posted by
Global Scout
. . .
thank you for recognizing that SOCOM is part of the problem for SF, but the reality is they are not "the" problem.
True and under some Commanders, they've been helpful at removing the bars. That will continue to vary. The big Army mindset on the part of some senior folks therein is also part of the problem. It's complex and not easily solved but it needs to be, I think...
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... As for 3d Gp and the 82d working together, that happens plenty of times at the Co and below level, where there are no political agendas, only a desire to win. Too bad most of the times you do it, you have to hide the cooperation from higher.
True, yet I think this one was a top down effort in both chains; not there so can't say for sure. In any event, the guys on the ground do generally work it out; if we could fix the budget and spaces problem we could get rid of some of the feuding. :o
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Please tell your son to return my stuff! (only joking)
I didn't know you were in the Navy! Quelle horreur... :D
The size of the plate, the learning curve, the # of requirements in addressing risk
A good chunk of exchanges in the last 4 or 5 posts. CAVGUY brought up a good point in a meeting we were both at yesterday – the training plate is really only so big, and attempts to just keep piling stuff on top of it means it does not really get absorbed, it gets finger drilled (could mean it gets done –but not to anyone’s real benefit), or everything loses its importance. So what does belong in the PME? What should be emphasized up front? I think you have to begin by looking at what we are expected to do, that no one else is – wage land war – conduct ground combat operations (I’m a ground guy, and as Joint as I am – people construct cities on land). The next step is to look at the wide ranging conditions and missions associated with that (incidentally there is a piece in today’s paper quoting Rep Skelton on pushing DoD to review service roles and missions).
This I think is where things start to get greyer – what a state requires its military to do – there are the enduring things – provide security for the state (don’t let the Huns into the gates), and there are the important, but “more” temporal interests – that while remaining vital – such as stability in a particualr region where we require ourselves and others to have access to secure strategic resources to fuel economies – are not “quite” the same as meeting an opposite's uniformed army upon which the outcome may likely decide the course of a declared war.
In 2005 DoD issued Directive 3000.5 that put stability operations on par with other types of operations. This also coincides with Army doctrine that now reflects “full spectrum” as description of what we do. For those unfamiliar with 3000.5 I think its purpose was to lay out a number of tasks that are to be accomplished (many are still in the process or may not have fulfilled the spirit of the directive) that would help us address our current shortfalls for the wars we are in, and what many say are more the norm then the exception (I hate to attempt to tell the future – it always surprises me some - warning BAITED AMBUSH here out in front of the FLOT and in a FFA :)). As far as I know there has been no report card on how we’ve done in implementing it. Why would that be? I have a theory – to direct a service or agency to become the executor raises the question of resources (time, people, focus and yes money – but more of the other 3 I think since money still only gets you some of the second, none of the first and the 3rd…) – so what falls off the plate? Who takes responsibility for saying – you no longer have to do this at all, do it well, or do it not so well – and what do the latter 2 mean when others start to apportion blame?
I think some of it comes back to the golden mean – you don’t make too many radical departures from the golden mean in what is inherently a conservative organization (we conserve/preserve the security of our state).
So I think this leads to a learning curve where we depart from the very basic and enduring responsibilities. What Ken has said and I agree with, is that maybe our perception of the need for a learning curve is at least parlty in our head (what I mean is the time required to address new and relative unfamiliar conditions -METT-TC) - and that we can do much better with the Army of 2008 then the one of 1917 and 1941. We do need to scrape some of the empty carbs, and over kill off the plate to make room for the things that matter, but to do so we are going to have to get comfortable with excepting risk, and the best way to mitigate that is to make a better investment in people – which ties us into a number of other threads like the ones on leadership and retention.
I think there is linkage between what our civilian leadership want us to do based on their short term perception, and the enduring roles that don’t always forward in their objectives because they don’t (all) understand what it takes to build and sustain a military and its competencies. There we have to temper their expectations.
I wrote all this because I’m thinking about the level where senior leaders who must interact with policy must articulate the risk to policy objectives (near and far) by pursuing a particular course of action that ripples across the Strategic to the Tactical.
Increasing the amount of time available to train officers and NCOs outside of their units has a proportionate effect on a number of areas. Other agencies don’t even have the luxury we do with regard to sending their folks to levels of education and training – their bench is not big enough. If DoS fills a ILE/CGSC seat with a butt, nobody backfills that guy or gal (however I think the CAC recently said he’d work with agencies willing to do so by backfilling the seat with a uniformed guy/gal of like specialty – good for them/good for us). We have that luxury – no BN CMD slot generally goes unfilled (for very long) when a LTC(P) goes to AWC (Army War College). OPTEMPO in the current war has made that harder to do, but we’re still managing to get guys education – and in many cases we’ve figured out ways to get them some advanced civil schooling (ACS) both as a benefit to the individual, the Army, and the nation. I’d also say that time away from a platoon or company to attend additional training is not always a good thing – the experience of leading, commanding and yes even doing staff work – is invaluable to leader development –given our broad requirements – to include those outline in the GN Act – you get barely enough of the first two – but given we spend a great deal of time on staff supporting other CDRs and units – the last is also critical.
I’m not trying to take senior leaders off the hook in making room for more and better training that will better prepare us for the variety of conditions we face in meeting our responsibilities to the men and women we lead. However, identifying the risks so that everybody goes in pretty much with eyes wide open is critical to making things work in a manner that won’t haunt us down the road – we don’t want to be playing Jenga and not know it. I believe we can and should do better – there is room to be doing things smarter – but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with – goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation.
Best, Rob
Creating, Managing and Sustaining a Training Base
A few other thoughts come to mind with regard to establishing, sustaining and changing a training base – the first is on self imposed requirements – who do we want teaching at our schools and courses, who do we want writing our doctrine, who do we want running our service academies? Why do we want folks with operational experience doing that, say turning it over completely to contractors – who regardless of their experience, might not either have the same vested interest, or the more recent ground truth? What does that do to the equation of managing the force?
How about considering something like forecasting requirements? It could be for CL V (ammunition) – a STRAC table is supposed to provide a unit an idea of what related training it does, and how often – but it also determines how much ammunition is to be ordered, how much space is required on the installation to hold it, how much the producer of that ammunition can expect to have to make the following year – etc.
The same can be said about levels of training – we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had – and that by doing so we’d be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea – and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible.
If we create requirements for example that certain types of units have the x- amount of capacity for various levels of proficiency in a skill set(s) (we already do this by MTO&E) then that establishes the training base requirements that must sustained in order to meet those needs – i.e. if you create the need for more snipers for example, then your capacity to train those new sniper requirements needs to grow in order to meet it (you could resource it internally, or you could outsource it). My point is that with an increased investment in training, there is an increased investment somewhere along the training and sustaining base – and also along the rest of the DOTMLPF – more of something in this case equates to more of something else as well – this is also true when we move things around – the consequences for moving the Armor School to Benning with its 400 tanks – more AHA space, more competition for ranges, more motor pools and maintenance bays, etc. If we want more training on tanks for example – its more of something else, risk associated with not doing so, or some substitute that while more efficient might not be more effective – we’re back to tough choices.
Anyway – as we go down the path – its worthwhile to consider the ripples.
Best, Rob
Some great thoughts, Rob.
Sam's post is also great and he's correct in that the Army has a tendency to adhere to "crawl, walk, run" at all costs without considering the fact that some can walk when they get there and some can even run (and that is particularly true at levels above entry -- how many in your Advanced course had already commanded companies...).
Addressing your comments in order of your two latest posts:
Yes, the training plates (plural) are only so big. The question to me is what is allocated to which plate. I suggest, for Officers, that the Basic courses are far too short and the Advanced courses (and CGSC) are far too long *. The same applies to NCOES which is largely seen a as a joke by most NCOs (that may have changed recently, I know they're trying to change it); initial entry training is too short and the levels of NCOES are all too long (and too garrison oriented). So the total plate allocation doesn't need to increase, nor do we need to pile much else on -- rather, we need to take some esoterica off -- we just need to tune the allocation between the plates.
* Shy Meyer tried to fix thatin the late 70s, the bureaucracy won.
Stability operations may or may not need to be on a par with other operations (whatever that means) the fact remains that the Army's primary mission is land warfare and keeping said Huns away from the gate. If the Army can do that, it is more than capable of adapting to other minor missions. As you say, predicting the future is a virtual impossibility and we should not waste time and effort trying to do so.
You say -- and I totally agree -- that we need to get comfortable accepting risk. That is a profound and important statement and our failure in ever increasing amounts over the last 30 plus years to be willing to do that is a large part of the problem. We have become a comfortable bureaucracy and we like it. That needs to change.
You correctly illustrate the conflicting demands of time in the unit versus time spent away in education or training -- and that is a knotty problem. I think there is no one answer or 'typical' set of answers. People vary; all do not absorb knowledge or skills at the same rate and thus each individual's path must vary. That is very difficult to accommodate but we should at least try; good leaders and commanders do that for their people -- but the institution does not try. It should.
Allied to that though is another time impact -- length of tours. If I had a nickel for every senior Officer I've heard say "...just about the time I learned what the job entailed and became effective, I moved..." I'd send you a whopping check to take the entire Kansas chapter of SWJ to KC for steaks and buckets of beer...
That needs a hard look. I've often said DOPMA is dangerous and I really believe that. A lot of congressionally imposed stuff to achieve "fairness" in promotions is antithetical to best military practice.
That brings up an aside of our penchant for adopting civilian education, training and management practices which should be totally stopped...
You say:
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"I believe we can and should do better there is room to be doing things smarter but I also believe things are not as simple as identifying which things to make longer, or do away with goes back to understanding the complex nature of war and the men and women we send to wage it in the ends/ways/means equation."
Couldn't agree more.
Going on to your next post, you suggest using contractors for training -- I agree that their use could and probably should be expanded but with the caveat that the majority need to be old retired heads and in uniform, ala Junior ROTC instructors.
Doctrine writers should be serving folks, period -- do not let a civilian, even one who's retired, anywhere near that. The folks that write it need to be the folks who are going to execute it, period. :eek:
You also said:
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"The same can be said about levels of training we were having a discussion the other day about levels of training for advisors. A sharp SNCO here said that what we might be wise to do is establish different levels of capability based on the amount of training or experiences an advisor had and that by doing so wed be capable of knowing what that guy could do. I thought it was a great idea and its one we do in other areas. Another reason I thought it was great is I could see its utility to managing the training base and for planners trying to decide if a COA was feasible."
I thought that's what we did? :confused:
and:
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"were back to tough choices."
Always been true and we have a bad tendency not to make those because we don't think it through and tend to take the easiest solutions. We like to avoid risk... :mad:
