I can agree in many circumstances with McCuen.
Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:
Quote:
"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.
but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.
He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).
I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.
They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.
Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...
Questions for consideration
First Ken, reference your wisdom about the importance of the larger urban cities as far as the outer regions. I accept that what you say is true because it makes sense from a less western perspective and given the population dispersal.
That said, if we go with that then more efforts should be made to help establish stability in outer regions and of course the enemy should be kept on the defensive. In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.
If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from. Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.
Long and short-
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.
Thought's
Priorities are the issue; hot spots are more important than urban locales.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ron Humphrey
...In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.
Note I am not suggesting the cities be ignored, simply that they should not be a priority item. Cities in such nations are, at this stage, primarily a market location (thus the importance of roads -- to both the good and bad guys...), they do not serve as a base for much of anything.
Quote:
If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from...
True; not more stability, just stability. I question the statement "that's where the host nation must project its power from." I don't think that's necessarily correct -- or desirable.
Quote:
Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.
That does not track with what I'm hearing on one level yet I can acknowledge the logic -- and thus we need to be careful not to overdo our effort...
Quote:
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.
(emphasis added / kw)
I thought that's what we were doing? Though I doubt the picture will change much...
Sorry for the lack of clarity
Did not mean to infer that ANA is slacking in their efforts at all but rather was referring to possible issues of giving too much help so as to actually keep them from growing and gaining experience in the way they should.
From what I know they are getting it right. Just commenting in the overall approach context.
As to projection of power, although I think I understand the concern with this approach I question if it's not required given that even in countries where most of the outer areas are almost autonomous the central governing authority has to be able to tie in somehow be it through physical, military, political, or social.
So Power in the most general of definitions not necessarily kinetic;)
It's a way, no question and it does have merit.
Problem is that you do that; most of the bad guys in the cities just lay low and chill and chat with your patrols, smiling broadly and improving their English, while some of them move to the boonies -- and not as reluctantly or in as small numbers as in Iraq; the crowds in cities are a recent phenomenon in Afghanistan, they're basically country boys. They can climb those hills like mountain goats and a guy in armor isn't going to catch them.
When they get out of town, they'll join up with new hires from Pakistan and start rolling up the hinterlands; then you've got a full scale war on your hands. I'll guarantee you they will move faster than we do under current conditions...
The key to that is more Aviation; the key to more aviation is longer tours for the airplane units.
No easy solutions there... :(
I agree with him re: Pakistan but I think he's being a little unfair to a lot of people. Pakistan is trying, it's just devilishly difficult for them and it will take some years yet. We all can wish that weren't so but I suspect it will remain troublesome for another couple of years at least.
Understand, I'm not disagreeing with you or him, merely playing devil's advocate and pointing out minor things he elides.
He does make two very important points:
Quote:
"(And doing this would not take nearly as many extra troops as some people think, but rather a different focus of operations)."
Totally true but problematic due to this:
Quote:
"...partly because of poor coalition management, partly because of the strategic distraction and resource scarcity caused by Iraq, and partly because, to date, we have given only episodic attention to the war.
While the last two items are true, the first is the major problem and will remain so. Something about the "U" in MOOSEMUSS, I think. That, most unfortunately, is unlikely to improve. As I said, no easy solutions...
After smacking myself in the head for not
catching that, I called a neighbor who's a USAR CA guy who returned from Kandahar less than a year ago. He says that if The good Doctor is correct, the population of K-town has more than tripled in a year. He, too is dubious. I have another contact with fairly recent experience and current acquaintances there. I'll try to get hold of him this weekend.
This comment:
Quote:
"I'm frankly quite shocked Dr. Kilcullen would make such a huge error."
made me smile as I recalled making a similar comment years ago (when I was new to BIG staffs in high places) about a sharp young Action Officer's strange boo-boo to an old Colonel who smiled and pointed out that you can assign a guy a project he absolutely hates and after 90 days of working on it he'll defend it to the death; they, he said "...marry their programs and lose sight of how ugly the Bride was..."
ADDED: Sunday, 16 Nov 08. Around 2015 local, talked to the one who had also been to Kandahar on his last tour. He too is highly skeptical and really doubts that percentage of urban dwellers but will ask some who are there during the coming week for a current assessment.
Someone's reading me, Pt. II
It seems like the city strategy wins ...
http://feeds.reuters.com/~r/reuters/...4B601U20081207
Quote:
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Most of the additional U.S. troops heading to Afghanistan early next year will be deployed near Kabul, reflecting worries about the capital's vulnerability, The New York Times reported in Sunday editions.
Citing U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan, the Times said the plans for incoming brigades would result in fewer or no reinforcements being available, at least for the time being, for areas of Afghanistan where the insurgency is most acute.
The focus on the capital also meant most of the new troops would not be deployed with the main goal of containing the cross-border insurgent flow from their rear bases in Pakistan -- something U.S. commanders would like and Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also recommended, the Times said.
And the cost estimate is....
From the current issue of Foreign Affairs
Quote:
Afghanistan needs larger and more effective security forces, but it also needs to be able to sustain those security forces. A decree signed by President Karzai in December 2002 would have capped the Afghan National Army at 70,000 troops (it had reached 66,000 by mid-2008). U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has since announced a plan to increase that number to 122,000, as well as add 82,000 police, for a total of 204,000 in the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such increases, however, would require additional international trainers and mentors -- which are, quite simply, not available in the foreseeable future -- and maintaining such a force would far exceed the means of such a destitute country. Current estimates of the annual cost are around $2.5 billion for the army and $1 billion for the police. Last year, the Afghan government collected about 7 percent of a licit GDP estimated at $9.6 billion in revenue -- about $670 million. Thus, even if Afghanistan's economy experienced uninterrupted real growth of 9 percent per year, and if revenue extraction nearly doubled, to 12 percent (both unrealistic forecasts), in ten years the total domestic revenue of the Afghan government would be about $2.5 billion a year. Projected pipelines and mines might add $500 million toward the end of this period. In short, the army and the police alone would cost significantly more than Afghanistan's total revenue.
Many have therefore proposed long-term international financing of the ANSF; after all, even $5 billion a year is much less than the cost of an international force deployment. But sustaining, as opposed to training or equipping, security forces through foreign grants would pose political problems. It would be impossible to build Afghan institutions on the basis of U.S. supplemental appropriations, which is how the training and equipping of the ANSF are mostly funded. Sustaining a national army or national police force requires multiyear planning, impossible without a recurrent appropriation -- which would mean integrating ANSF planning into that of the United States' and other NATO members' budgets, even if the funds were disbursed through a single trust fund. And an ANSF funded from those budgets would have to meet international or other national, rather than Afghan, legal requirements. Decisions on funding would be taken by the U.S. Congress and other foreign bodies, not the Afghan National Assembly. The ANSF would take actions that foreign taxpayers might be reluctant to fund. Such long-term international involvement is simply not tenable.