Rubber boots to inside Foggy Bottom
Three articles on DRC and Rwanda, two in FP, one by Jason Stearns, ex-UN expert on the Congo and one refers to another blogsite where Jason Stearns is the author.
Rwandan Ghosts: Benghazi isn't the biggest blight on Susan Rice's record, by Jason Stearns:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...osts?page=full
In Rebel Country: How did 1,000 skinny militiamen in rubber boots conquer a city of 1 million people in a matter of hours?:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...goma?page=full
This one I liked, the first is historical and aimed at US policy-making.
The third is really a pointer to Jason Stearns blogsite:
Quote:
The Rift Valley Institute's Usalama Project is delighted to announce the launch of the first two reports in a series of publications on armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). You can download both reports from our website.
The first Usalama report is an account of the origins and trajectory of the new M23 rebellion and its alleged relationship with the Rwandan government. The second report traces the deeper history of conflict in the CNDP's and M23's stronghold, North Kivu province.
Link:http://congosiasa.blogspot.co.uk/201...a-project.html
conflict mapping: the M23
Another good piece on M23 and their real motives by IPIS.
Mapping Conflict Motives: M23
Quote:
Download the full report at:
http://www.ipisresearch.be/att/20121...otives_M23.pdf
Antwerp, 30/11/2012 - In light of the recent occupation of Goma by M23 and the renewed risk of large-scale armed conflict in the DRC, IPIS is publishing an update to its 2007-2010 ‘mapping conflict motives’ report series focussing specifically on the intentions of M23.
The M23 rebels display clear political ambition and a tendency to establish political control over territory, while challenging Kinshasa’s authority – strategic interests they might share with Rwanda.
When M23 was created, it claimed that it was seeking the correct and complete implementation of an agreement signed between the CNDP and the Congolese Government on 23 March 2009. After the capture of Bunagana and Rutshuru, its demands changed. By November, grievances regarding the alleged lack of implementation of the 23 March 2009 agreement featured less and less prominently in M23’s discourse.
M23’s strategy on the battlefield does not indicate that protecting the Tutsi population is its most urgent concern. Likewise, its proclaimed intention to “neutralise” the FDLR is not apparent from its military actions. Furthermore, it is striking that M23 currently does not control any important mining areas and has not attacked any mines, and thus, for now, is not seeking to maximise its profits from the mineral trade. However M23’s control over Goma is characterised by targeted looting and the facilitation of illegal exports of mineral stocks.
Since 2004, IPIS has published various reports on the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The European Network for Central Africa (EURAC) assessed that an accurate understanding of M23’s motives among stakeholders will be crucial for dealing with the current escalation of conflict. IPIS volunteered to provide such analysis. The content of the report does not necessarily reflect the position of EURAC.
The researchers wish to stress that the situation on the ground is subject to constant change. M23 is a recent movement, created less than a mere seven months prior to this analysis; there are new developments almost every day. Most of the information used exists in the public domain. When insufficient sources were available, additional information was gathered by IPIS researchers working on related topics in South Kivu, and through telephone interviews.
Few up dates on the DRC situation
First of all, for those who would like to follow the situation on the ground, please find below a link to the ICG inter-active map, now available in english.
http://crisisgroup.be/maps/kivu-map/...-francais.html
On the ground nothing much new since November last year when the M23 rebel group took Goma, the largest city of North Kivu, during nearly a week, before stepping back under combined US and UK pressures on Rwanda.
On the diplomatic front, things are not moving neither in Kampala were DRC government and M23 are conducting a round of negotiations under the facilitation of ICGLR and mediated by Uganda, 2012 ICGLR chairman.
The interresting development of this massive failure of the UN mission in DRC is the "experimental" deployment of drones (Unarmed) to monitor the border between DRC and Rwanda.
Rwanda was first being extremely opposed to this proposition (Rwanda wants ‘clarity’ on UN drone plans for DR Congo, http://en.starafrica.com/news/rwanda...-dr-congo.html ; Rwanda opposes use of drones by the UN in eastern Congo, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...90802720130109), this against other ICGLR members as Uganda, which alledgely also provided support to M23. (Kinshasa, Kampala back U.N. plan for eastern Congo drones, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...90A11X20130111)
Finally, the Kagame regime agreed for a deployment of drones to support the Joint Verification Mechanism, which Rwanda is part of, and supposed to monitor the military and armed groups movements on the border.
Rwanda backs UN plan to deploy spy drones in eastern Congo
Quote:
On Monday, Kagame, who had earlier opposed the UN plan to deploy the drones, said he had "no problem" with it.
"I have no problem... if they think it can help... it is up to them," Kagame told reporters in the Rwandan capital Kigali. However, he asked how the deployment of the drones in Congo would "contribute towards peace."
http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/01...lan-for-congo/
An impressive Uturn from the more and more isolated Kigali regime who is now seeking to get back the budget aid that was frozen after the active support of the RPF to M23 was disclosed.
Peace talks in eastern DRC face uncertain outcome
An IISS Strategic Comment, which opens with:
Quote:
Peace negotiations between the March 23 (M23) rebel movement and the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been under way for three months. They follow a seven-month conflict in the east of the country, which started in May when former rebels in the Congolese army mutinied, citing the government's failure to implement the provisions of a 2009 peace deal, under which they had been integrated into the army.
In the first round of talks, the two sides agreed on an evaluation of the unsuccessful 23 March 2009 deal, from which the M23 took its name, outlining the provisions in the deal that had not been implemented, such as the creation of a national reconciliation mechanism. However, the next stage of negotiations – to establish a peace premised on the reintegration of rebel soldiers – has provoked confused reports. Different sources in Uganda and the DRC have suggested that a resumption of hostilities and a successful closure of the talks are both imminent. The reports likely reflect the structure of the M23, which has begun to splinter into two discrete factions.
It ends with, I would suggest with a lot of prayer required, as the "carrot & stick" approach is clearly not working. Referring to a twin-track peace process:
Quote:
...their success is likely to depend entirely on levels of participation and the commitment of the international community, particularly the government of Rwanda, to ending over two decades of regional conflict.
Link:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...rtain-outcome/