Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
It doesn't really come out in this essay, but does in his other writings (and in conversations with him). At the risk of oversimplifying, Ralph basically says write off the wahabi/Arab element of the Islamic world right now, and solidify our ties with the other parts--India, Malaysia, Indonesia, etc. He is a great fan of the Kurds and believes strongly the U.S. should remain their protector.
While I haven't discussed it with him recently, I think he's conflicted on the Iraq conflict writ large. He is certainly takes more of a "mailed fist"/Roman/German/Luttwak approach to counterinsurgency. Personally, I think that illustrates the great bifurcation of thinking on counterinsurgency today: Ralph, Ed Luttwak, etc. believe it is, in fact, war, and that we hurt ourselves by stressing "hearts and minds." The other school, descended from the British and French approaches of the 20th century, believe that the combat component is secondary and stress legitimacy and "hearts and minds."
Increasingly, I don't fall into either camp. I don't think the United States can be very good at either approach. The first takes a bloodlust we simply don't have (and which would destroy our leadership among the rest of the world as other nations increasingly loath and fear us). The second takes a degree of cultural acuity and patience that we do not posses. Thus I favor a strategy which says we will do FID/hearts and minds in those very rare cases where it is likely to work with a reasonable degree of effort and within our short attention span (e.g. El Salvador). Otherwise, we should either participate in a multinational trusteeship if the world has the stomach for it; otherwise, simply contain and cauterize insurgencies.