On the quality of participation
This is my opinion. As such it is clearly open to challenge. But it is based on a fair historical perspective and so might be worth something. At the height of the COIN revival I was fearful that we would fall back into the default mode of trying to forget about small wars as we did after Vietnam. We also did the same after every single major war we have fought. After the Revolution we fought Indians in the Northwest Territories and Florida but then along came the War of 1812 with a major conventional enemy (and we darn near lost the war). After New Orleans we fought Indians again all over the West. Then along came the Mexican War against a major conventional enemy and Scott, Taylor, and Doniphan led us to victory. After that we had to learn to fight Indians all over again. In 1861 along came the civil war with West Pointers fighting West Pointers. Big armies on the move. Lots of technical innovation. After it was all over and Sheridan had scared the French out of Mexico massing 50,000 troops on the border, we had to learn to fight Indians again. Then we fought Spain in 1898 - it is amazing how many former Confederate generals marched again to the sound of the guns in the blue and khaki uniforms of the US, Fitzhugh Lee and William Oates come to mind. In the aftermath, the dirty little wars in the Philippines and Caribbean raised up and Pershing chased Pancho Villa all over Northern Mexico but we had to learn that these weren't the kinds of wars we were prepared to fight because people were not only not learning the lessons, they weren't even recording them. WWI was followed by the Banana Wars which only the Marines were interested enough to record but they were also preparing for the next big one. They published their Small Wars Manual at almost the same time as their Tentative Landing Operations Manual which was a major influence on conventional operations in WWII.
The point of all this is that neither our political nor our military leaders like the small, nasty, dirty wars. We all want to fight the "big one" (why are we pivoting toward Asia? - not merely for the obvious and real threat of China). As the small wars wind down, interest fall off among both military and civilian national security analysts. This leaves the door open for smart, intelligent challenges to the prevailing wisdom of small wars - challenges like those of Gian Gentile both on these pages and his new book. As for our junior officers, they are looking at being assigned to units planning against conventional conflicts with China (perhaps) and certainly not toward Iraq now seen in the media as a totally foolish effort without any redeeming social virtue or Afghanistan which our president says we are leaving in 2014 regardless of conditions on the ground. The Administration has floated the idea of no residual force of any kind - the zero option. and who wants to be the last casualty of a war we have deemed is not worth fighting anyway? As a result, interest in our broad topic has died down.
This fact - loss of broader interest - makes our forum (Journal and Council alike) all the more important. Here we can not only record the lessons we needed to learn but debate them and, perhaps, allow the next generation to actually learn them and not make the same mistakes that we and previous generations made.
On that note
Cheers
JohnT
I don't see any fresh thinking on Small Wars....
An an outsider to the military, I don't see much difference between some of supposed "retreat into conventional mode" and the "small wars are important" types.
I see a comfortable retreat into familiar arguments about familiar topics using overly represented and familiar examples by some proponents of the study of small wars--with no real reflection on what might have happened in the past decade or so and no opening up of the discussion on a theoretical or practical level.
Why the constant retreat to a few examples that seem to keep cropping up, the British in Malaya, Algeria, the Indian Wars, the Phillipines?
For the study of the Afghan campaign, a very careful full-rounded study of various South Asian insurgencies (outside the comfortable frameworks often presented on SA insurgencies here, same old same old, even the Indian General that wrote an article on COIN basically just repeated "hearts and minds") might be interesting.
I feel I spend too much time commenting already and would prefer to read academic papers or books on "small wars areas of interest" to me that don't seem to be covered much here. If I find interesting things, I will post--time permitting.
The moderators are awesome. The commenters and contributors are awesome.
David is absolutely terrific as a moderator.
But if the study of small wars is so important why are those interested always circling around the same few topics in the same way? I see nothing new, just the same old half-conceived notions of American history and practice regarding small wars.
It's a fascinating topic so where is the robust study and argumentation outside a little social science and some tactical discussion?
Best to all.
Not everything can be that clear with an opinion
Hey Madhu,
Would almost tend to agree with you. However, seems all the lessons learned from the past and our members' vast knowledge of the same has fallen on deaf ears.
We are not always meandering in the past, but sharing what we may feel has indeed been overlooked and deserves a relook or, we feel a need to share what our past revealed.
As duly noted, most of us come from military backgrounds and are in one form or another, still serving.
Not everything herein is Small Wars, but most everything has something to do with what may eventually occur and has often been overlooked by far more intelligent beings.
Regards, Stan
Thanks for the correction and point of agreement
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
Actually, both the Indian War and the Philippines are poorly-studied here. Brian Linn is one of the few scholars who actually has devoted a great deal of time and attention to the Philippines (at least the period from 1898 through 1910 or so), and his work is outstanding. The Indian Wars tend to be rather spotty, and often the focus is on a specific individual or battle rather than a longer-term view of the conflicts. There are a few outstanding scholars to be sure, but some areas remain very neglected and would certainly repay study. That doesn't mean that they are the "be all and end all" of small wars, but to assume that they've been mined out would be a mistake.
I agree that there is a lot of (misplaced) focus on areas like Malaya and Algeria. There's also little attention paid to things that have happened in both Central and South America.
Thanks for the comment too, Stan.
I tend to paint with too broad a brush in order to make a point. It's not a good habit. That's one reason I want to read more academic works. I need to break this habit. If I read more, I would have already known your point....
At least we all agree on one thing, we need more study and to keep the study alive, current and vibrant. I think one area that I have a kind of cultural disconnect from the military (or maybe the blogs I read?) is that I'm not really looking for quick "lessons learned" in the sense of "oh, look at what those guys did."
I have certain curiosities or questions about conflicts and want to read up on the questions because I think that current COIN doctrine oversimplifies the history of some campaigns used as a model. Gian Gentile in his book says that the models are too rigid and prevent a kind of grand improvisation (not minor tactical improvisations) or tailoring of a counterinsurgency campaign toward a specific conflict in all its peculiarities.
I have such a different narrative of colonial small wars in my head because of my ethnic background that sometimes it's like I'm from Venus and you all are from Mars.
Well, naturally that, given that I'm posting on a site about small wars....
Lost Lessons & Fresh Thinking: a challenge for SWC
The catalyst for this thread's creation comes from the discussion in the re-opened thread 'Recruiting for SWC members because....':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=3837
A couple of relevant posts have been edited and copied over.
Perhaps this challenge has appeared before in discussions and maybe even a thread, for as one recent poster noted:
Quote:
Groundhog Day. I felt like I was making the same arguments over and over.
Bill Moore's 4 points and one other
Bill's four points/challenges are at the heart of the issue. Let me tak a stab at each:
1. The shift toward Asia was, in fact, made for perfectly valid strategic reasons. But it also has the effect of reemphasizing the "big one". The issue here is whether the legitimate concern over a potential peer competitor is at the expense of the more constant small wars threats and capabilities. It is an issue of balance and one we have not done well with over time.
2. It is not the fact that there are more small wars than big ones but rather that the history of the military of the US (and the colonies before we were a country) saw much more engagement in both numbers of cases and longer periods than big war engagements. If past is prologue, then we need to keep studying the small wars along with the big ones and be prepared to fight them.
3. The Army as an institution did turn its institutional back on small wars after Vietnam. Although there were pockets where an institutional memory was retained - LTC Don Vought at CGSC (Fort Leavenworth) salvaged all the stuff on COIN in the 70s and stored the documents under the heading of "Terrorism" (which was then in vogue). In the 93 I had a student there who on his deployment to Haiti the next year lamented that he had not paid more attention to what we were giving him with regard to small wars - and he was a good one. My big army counterparts in the 80s did not pay much attention to anything that was going on in SOUTHCOM because it really was not career enhancing. Yet, if that was the whole picture, we would never have had David Petraeus, H.R. McMaster (who was in the CGSC class during my tenure and published his well received book that year),or some of the other leaders of the COIN resurgence. Again, I would argue that the issue os one of balance.
4. Bill, I don't think that you can avoid addressing policy and strategy in any discussion of the application of military power. Saint Carl (aka CvC) made the point that "war is the extension of politik (translates as both politic and policy depending on constext) with the addition of other means." That, to me, means that the "strategic corporal" is not confined to the USMC. What we do at the tactical and operational levels have profound impacts on the strategic and higher levels. A Salvadoran student of mine at Leavenworth stated in class that the decision taken during the FMLN 89 offensive to murder the Jesuit leadership of the U of Central America (and their housekeeper and her daughter) very nearly defeated the Salvadoran government and armed forces. It was a decision taken by a Colonel who happened to command the military academy (not functioning at the time) but gained command of the city because of the attack Clear case of tactical stupidity resulting in strategic and political disaster.
Last point: In my recent review essay in the Journal (w/Amb Ed Corr) we noted the difference between assisting a funtitoning government and military and having to create one because we have destroyed what previously existed and are now the occupying power. We noted that this situation was analogous to what Callwell called Imperial Policing or what the Marines later practiced in the Banana Wars. We agree with Neustadt and May (Madhu, see their THINKING IN TIME) that analogies must be used with great care but we also cannot escape their use. If we are the occupying power then WE must nation build - an obligation under the laws of war. If we are a supporting power then the host government must nation build if it does not want to see an insurgency return. How we and our allies undertake those tasks is a question that is always frought with peril. I would simply add that we did reasonably well in these tasks in both set of circumstances in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Peru between 1983 and 1995. All 4 are reasonably well functioing democracies two or more decades later.
Cheers
JohnT
These are the kinds of discussions
that I found so very stimulating when I first found SWJ. thanks Bill.
Perhaps the distinction between FID, SFA, and occupation operations points in the direction of how we should educate and train the force. FID is an SF mission. I find it difficult to see how most conventional unit personnel can undertake the full spectrum of FID but they certainly can undertake parts of the mission. Those parts are what we call SFA (or is that term no longer in use?) In an occupation we have to do many things ourselves and we most certainly need a doctrine for them - concur with you on that Bill (along with much else).
I wonder if the aversion at senior levels (both political and military) to call de facto occupations by that name is related to the desire for a "cleaner" conventional war. (God help us if we ever really have to fight one of those against a peer or near peer competitor because it will be bloodier than anything we have seen in a long, long time.) That said, we need to think about how we prepare for the full spectrum of conflict as well as prepare our officers to provide good advice to the civilian policy makers. We do have some good programs in place. DOS has a number of military officers assigned to the Bureau of Pol-Mil Affairs while DOD has a significant number of current or former DOS people. You may recall ASD-SO/LIC Allen Holmes during the Clinton Administration who was a career Foreign Service officer. More recently, Mike Sheehan (who graduated from Leavenworth in June 1992 as I arrived) went to work for his old grad school prof, Madelaine Albright, at both the US Mission to the UN and then at State. When Mike retired from the Army (he was SF) he went to work at State as a civilian, then NYC, and just retired from DOD where he too was ASD-SO/LIC. Lots of examples and a number of paths of this kind, only some of which are institutionalized by programs like FAO. Seems to me that a good place to start is to research what programs actually exist and see if they prepare officers to think beyond the operational and tactical so that they can provide both appropriate advice and participate fully and effectively in policy debates as they get to positions where those debates take place. I would note that some take place as low as the Ambassador's Country Team in the field and on the Interagency Policy Committees in DC (where military representation can be as low as LTC/CDR on occasion).
Cheers
JohnT
Models need care and feeding; no I mean social science models :)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
John T. Fishel
Last point: In my recent review essay in the Journal (w/Amb Ed Corr) we noted the difference between assisting a funtitoning government and military and having to create one because we have destroyed what previously existed and are now the occupying power. We noted that this situation was analogous to what Callwell called Imperial Policing or what the Marines later practiced in the Banana Wars. We agree with Neustadt and May (Madhu, see their THINKING IN TIME) that analogies must be used with great care but we also cannot escape their use. If we are the occupying power then WE must nation build - an obligation under the laws of war. If we are a supporting power then the host government must nation build if it does not want to see an insurgency return. How we and our allies undertake those tasks is a question that is always frought with peril. I would simply add that we did reasonably well in these tasks in both set of circumstances in Grenada, Panama, El Salvador, and Peru between 1983 and 1995. All 4 are reasonably well functioing democracies two or more decades later.
Cheers
JohnT
I'm pretty sure the other kind don't eat much and so don't need feeding.
Sorry, bad joke. And the following is not about the SWORD model, but a more generalized comment on the fascination of a British imperial history without a more full rounded study of what other colonial contemporaries said, colonial population histories and viewpoints, and newer research based on declassified materials.
I understand the need for models but what I don't understand is the return to people like Calwell without adding more current information to the mix. Models need to be updated from time to time and reviewed from the vantage point of more current information.
The entire second half of the twentieth century into the twenty-first in South Asia is all about nation building, what is this fascination with British imperial policing? If you are interested in nation building, then you have to understand more about it than models frozen in a point in time.
It's hard to build a nation when its educated classes are sometimes targeted for assasination and some of this too via some proxy effort that is ignored for a variety of reasons.
There is current research that taps into a broader range of information on the subject of nation building and, yet, the models discussed here seem frozen in time.
I listened to Rufus Phillips on the John Batchelor show once (I think it was him) and the understanding of the region sounded like the 1980's.
When the strategic endstate is viewed differently by at least one ally in the mix, you can't just outsource some of your counterinsurgency work through that very military. And, the history shows that attempts to change the national calculus fails time and time again. That was the point of the Komer quote I included to your article.
The literature is rich on the subject of nation building in South Asia, it's gone far beyond 90's era peacekeeping literature and all I'd like to see is some of this included in the discussion.
Occupations, colonial imperial policing, wars of conquest (Indian wars), how do these relate to the medium sized wars of Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan?
The models shove too many different types of conflicts together, we can't do some of the things we did during the Indian wars or during colonial times. That doesn't mean we don't study them, but it does mean you understand their limitations as models for contemporary conflict.
And you have to first know something about the world into which you are introducing the model. Ignorance of the basic strategic set up is not a good way to go. That's why I say the discussion becomes thin. People are not interested in this and yet it is vitally important.
As Ken White said, we do small and large wars pretty good, it's our history with medium wars as an expeditionary third party that are problematic.
The models should make this distinction. Maybe they do.
Please ban me for my own good, someone, please?
I was only supposed to check in for a few minutes as a break from writing something else, and now look what you've all done?
I really don't mean my comments to sound hostile, I love the direction this conversation is taking and in that spirit I will try and post articles that support what I mean about different ways of looking at nation building.
For instance, I had posted an article from India Review about how the internationalization of Kashmir may have contributed to its intractibility as a conflict (although regional powers are responsible).
I think a neglected area of study is the way in which our own post WW2 security structure has reached its limits and is contributing to instability and preventing nation building, or at least, impeding it.
That is the value of looking at newer research and the questions it asks.
Good comments, all.
New times needs new alliances!
New times needs new alliances!
If the USA is going to get involved in future 'small wars', especially in new areas of conflict, amidst Muslims and those unused to them it needs to change. Call them advisers, regional brigades, SOF or whatever.
My point is that beforehand Americans serving with others has far more benefit, yes under foreign command. It is highly unlikely anyone can predict where those 'small wars' will be. Let alone which ones American politicians will decide warrant their "blood & treasure".
New times need no alliances!
Of course, that's my personal negative view of coalitions and alliances, new world orders, nation-building and global force projections. However, within those constraints, everything is on the table - from FID and SFA to nuclear weapons. So, I can't avoid addressing your proposal, which in WWI terms was "amalgamation".
I'd tender the argument that support or opposition to amalgamation depends on one's biases for or against alliances and coalitions, trust or distrust for allies and partners, and the variant endgoals of the parties. In my world, biases are not a sin, but are essential to playing the game - and taking them into account is essential to winning. Biases determine the "facts" and the "rules".
Continuing with WWI and the AEF, we had three major sets of players: Lloyd George - Haig (amalgamation), Clemenceau - Foch (amalgamation) and Wilson - Pershing (non-amalgamation). Each set was outstandingly ruthless (despite soaring rhetoric) in securing its nation's political endgoals.
Now contrary to my conclusion (pro-Pershing in applying military ways and means to reach the ultimate political end - BTW I reject it, the Wilsonian New World Order; but it wasn't Pershing's province to question that - life was easier for him because he largely believed in it) is David Trask's 1993, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Modern War Studies).
Quote:
Underscoring an emerging revisionist view of the American Expeditionary Forces, David Trask argues that the performances of the AEF and General John J. Pershing were much more flawed than conventional accounts have suggested. This can best be seen, he shows, by analyzing coalition warfare at the level of grand tactics--i.e., campaign military operations.
The AEF didn't perform well in France, Trask contends, because it was committed as an independent force before it had time to train and gain experience. President Wilson and General Pershing's initial insistence on an independent American force rather than an integration with existing French and British armies resulted in costly delays and bitter victories in the decisive Allied counteroffensives against Ludendorff and the Central Powers.
Using a tactic uncommon in previous studies of the AEF, David Trask views the campaign of 1918 through the eyes of the highest-ranking of field commanders, including Pershing, Marshal Ferdinand Foch of the Allied and Associated Powers, and General Erich Ludendorff of the Central Powers.
Trask's portrayal of Pershing reveals a self-righteous leader who was unwilling to correct initial misconceptions that marred the doctrine and training of the AEF. Consequently, Trask demonstrates, Pershing's stormy relations with Allied military and civilian leader seriously undermined the AEF and its efforts to conduct coalition warfare.
No surprise (given Trask being the author) that this book is simply outstanding in its research and depth. It also was written just after Gulf I, when alliances and coalitions, new world orders, and military arts revolutions were all the rage. Thus, I detect a positive bias for alliances and coalitions - and for a more "cosmopolitan" than "national" approach.
Why bring up this case study of a century-old "Large War" (with 1000+pp. in reading both sides - which is a requirement to learn from it) in a modern "Small Wars" thread on Lessons Learned ? Because its lessons apply to every war involving partners - and the material is excellent.
Regards
Mike
New times needs new alliances! Part 2
Perhaps the USA and its main allies can encourage regional coalitions, with a joint command with US / allied contributions before combat. I appreciate AFRICOM has spent considerable time supporting such regional training and exercise packages.
I have stressed before combat simply as regional only combat / peacekeeping operations should be preferable to a direct US / allied action, shades of Mali and Somalia.
A number of nations, not only in Africa, have a clear political position on limiting partnership with the USA and some allies. Those nations also face a potential, if not actual threat from AQ plus, but appear to be reluctant to use their "treasure" and risk their blood.
All this ignores the missing dimension - countering the jihadist message.
