Pity, it's a good paper...out somewhere between the roar of generator and the plaintive cry of an UPS it's helped a dim bulb to flare at least momentarily.
Hmmm...after reading this...the acronym OPEC springs to mind. :wry:
So, with this definition of corruption (#1 in particular) at hand how do we approach the concept of State Owned Enterprises (or hybrid SOE's) such as China Telecom, Lenovo, Deutsche Bahn, GM (?), certain banks, certain oil companies, and other smaller versions of the same concept in a conflict zone?
How about our approach to private businesses in a conflict zone?
We might say that we have two basic choices when it comes to SOE's or private entities in a conflict zone: ignore or enable.
My assumption is that if the majority of the workforce demographic in a city or town are indeed working the opportunities for mischief makers are decreased. Workers can find typically work in both SOE's or private business if they are present.
My assumption is that SOE's are typically inefficient and so they may be seen as typically employing more workers than would a comparable private business. SOE presence does not depend as greatly upon a stable environment as does a private institution.
My assumption is that private businesses typically use capital fairly efficiently (depending upon the economic framework in which they must work) and their presence is indicative of a fairly stable environment.
So...if a grunt (standing in as proxy for the typcial USG actor) ignores both the SOE and private business in a particular conflict zone does that mean the problems associated with unemployment go away? Is there an economic choice to be made which can help to pacify a conflict zone?
Do the concepts of Jugaad, Guanxi, or Shanzhai apply in a economic context in a conflict zone? How about the primarily post conflict experiences of W. Edward Demming and Jospeh Juran?