The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...Oct06/kipp.pdf
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The Human Terrain System: A CORDS for the 21st Century
http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/C...Oct06/kipp.pdf
18 October Wall Street Journal (Paid subscription required) - Problems Afflict U.S. Army Program To Advise Iraqis by Greg Jaffe.
Much more at the link for those who have a paid WSJ subscription or access to DoD's Current News Service (Early Bird)...Quote:
One of the biggest shocks for Lt. Col. Nick Demas and his troops came before they even deployed to Iraq.
The colonel's soldiers, most of them inexperienced reservists from Maryland, had been tapped to serve as advisers to the Iraqi army. Their job was to live with, train and mentor an Iraqi force buffeted by poor morale, desertions and corruption.
President Bush has touted such advisory teams as key to the U.S. strategy for stabilizing Iraq and bringing American troops home. So Col. Demas and his troops expected some of the best instruction the Army had to offer. What they got was a "phenomenal waste of time," the colonel wrote from Iraq last fall, in a report to his superiors.
"In my 28 years of military service I have never seen such an appalling approach to training," he wrote. "Nowhere else in the Army system would this have been acceptable." His soldiers received only a few hours of instruction in Arabic language, Iraqi culture and advising foreign forces, says Col. Demas, who had previously served in Special Forces units...
Senior U.S. military officers in Iraq and the Pentagon say their primary focus is getting Iraqi forces to take over more of the fighting as quickly as possible so U.S. forces can pull back. The 10- to 12-man advisory teams are central to that effort.
In recent weeks, Army officials overseeing the advisory program have begun to acknowledge the gap between the Army's words and deeds. This summer, after two years of biting reviews, the Army rushed to revamp the training advisers receive. It also has begun to assign more experienced troops to advisory teams. "I think we are going to be doing it much, much better than what you have seen in the past," says Gen. Richard Cody, the Army's vice chief of staff.
Internal Army reviews and interviews with dozens of advisers show that, thus far, the Army hasn't treated the advisory program as a priority. The job has often fallen to the military's less seasoned second team: reservists, guardsmen and retirees called back to active duty. A 48-page Army study, finished in May and marked "For Official Use Only," concluded that 10- to 12-man advisory teams are too small and "do not have the experience to advise in the various areas they are assigned."...
To date, the U.S. has trained and equipped about 307,800 Iraqi army and police forces, up from 196,600 a year ago. But three years into the war, these Iraqi forces don't seem to be improving fast enough to curb surging violence. Daily attacks in Iraq have risen to record levels, and attrition among Iraqi forces remains high. In areas like the restive al Anbar Province, Iraqi units have, on average, only 55% of the soldiers they are supposed to, senior U.S. military officials say.
Other factors, of course, are also contributing to the violence. Centuries-old sectarian grudges and political turmoil are feeding unrest. Both must be addressed through some form of reconciliation, military officials say.
For many advisers, the growing turmoil has been frustrating. "I know we've made a difference. But the insurgency has also become better, more lethal and more capable in my time here," wrote Capt. Phillip Carter, who advised Iraqi police, in an email last month as he prepared to return home. "In theory things should get better with the development of capable Iraqi Army and police units. That's not happening."...
Top Army officials also are trying to change a culture that discourages good officers from taking advisory posts. Over the past decade, the path to success has been through conventional combat jobs in big brigades. Gen. Peter Schoomaker, the Army's top officer, uses a track analogy to describe the problem. The Army, he says, is full of specialists, or "single-event people." To prevail in today's wars, he says, he needs "pentathletes" with a broader range of experiences.
Last month Gen. Schoomaker's vice chief of staff stressed in a memo to Army officers that serving on an advisory team was "the Army's No. 1 personnel priority" and was exactly the kind of broadening experience the Army chief had been touting.
To fix the advisory program, some military officials say sweeping institutional change is needed. "When there is a limited pool of people for both kinds of jobs -- combat and advisory -- it's clear where the best people will go," says Dale Andrade, a counterinsurgency specialist at the Army's Center of Military History. "The military will always keep its best and brightest in traditionally important combat jobs. Only when forced will this change."
One option under consideration is to double the number of advisers to about 7,000, from about 3,500, by tearing apart some traditional combat brigades and assigning officers and senior soldiers to advisory teams. That would ensure that some of the Army's best officers would take advisory jobs. It would also allow Army officials to double the size of the teams -- which the officials say are too small -- to about 20 troops each.
But doing so would require a change in mind-set for the Army, where training centers and personnel systems are built almost entirely around the 4,000-soldier brigades. It would also be risky. As the number of big U.S. combat brigades decreased, Iraqi units and their advisers would have to pick up the security slack...
Kaur, it's a *very* interesting article. My gut feeling, at the moment, is that the proposed HTS is wonderfully designed to sell politically to Washington, and will be an unmitigated disaster during implementation. Here's why
Two points are obvious in this statement. First, where are they going to get the trained analysts? They are listed as MA/PhD in Cultural Anthropology or Sociology with "Priority selection will go to those who have published, studied, lived, and taught in the region." This is going to spark off all sorts of anger and reaction in the academic community about spying. If we go back to the time of Vietnam, which is where they seem to be coming from, the riots on the campuses then will seem mild in comparison.Quote:
The core building block of the system will be a five-person Human Terrain Team (HTT) that will be embedded in each forward-deployed brigade or regimental staff. The HTT will provide the commander with experienced officers, NCOs, and civilian social scientists trained and skilled in cultural data research and analysis.
The second point is operational. The HTS will be embedded at the Brigade level. This will, IMHO, give some brigade commanders a feeling that they have met their "warm and fuzzy" requirements, but I don't see it actually doing that much. Honestly, if I was designing he system, I would have a brigade level co-ordination team, but I would also have people either embedded in or cross-trained at the company level - battalion at the least. I think that this second point ties in to one of their core claims:
Again, on the surface this sounds good but, if you look a little deeper, it is a piece of techno-babble. Five people at teh brigade level will maintain institutional memory? Get real!Quote:
At the same time, to overcome the kinds of problems now typically encountered when in-place units attempt to transfer knowledge about their area of operations upon relief in place, HTS will provide for the complete transfer of HTT personnel together with the HTT database to the incoming commander upon transfer of authority. This will give the incoming commander and unit immediate “institutional memory” about the people and culture of its area of operations.
Again, the basic concept is good, but the operationalization is designed for failure. First off, as many here have noted, information flows through personal relationships, not a relationship between an Iraqi or an Afghan and a database. This *might* be overcome if the program was operationalized at battalion or company level where, as part of the training / deployment cycle, units who are about to take over can access the information on "their" area several months in advance, follow it up regularly, and establish personal relationships while out of the field.
One final point I want to make about the program as discussed in that article, comes from one of the authors' suggestions for what to do with the database:
Great! What disciple of Stalin thought this up? Did they even consider the effects on the supposed target populations (Iraq and Afghanistan) of the existence of a database that lists every act of "collaboration" with coalition forces?!? Haven't these people even heard of hackers? Have they considered the "home front" reaction to creating such a database?Quote:
Data will cover such subjects as key regional personalities, social structures, links between clans and families, economic issues, public communications, agricultural production, and the like.....
Other U.S. Government agencies will also have access to the central database. And finally, to facilitate economic development and security, the compiled databases will eventually be turned over to the new governments of Iraq and Afghanistan to enable them to more fully exercise sovereignty over their territory and to assist with economic development.
[emphasis added]
I will freely admit that I am taking the worst possible reaction to this idea. After all, I always thought that it was best to be ready with a GoTH plan if necessary :D
Okay, one final, nasty, comment and I'll leave it alone.
Two quotes (actually paraphrases) come to mind - "Mirror, mirror on the wall" is the first. This concept is, when all is said and done, being sold as a magic bullet solution. The second is - "They may have won all the wars, but we had all the good PowerPoints". If this goes ahead as planned, I may just have to filk a version of this (with apologies to Tom Lehrer).Quote:
The HTT’s tool kit is Mapping Human Terrain (MAP-HT) software, an automated database and presentation tool that allows teams to gather, store, manipulate, and provide cultural data from hundreds of categories.
Marc
Marc:
I have downloaded and read the same article. I think this is an academic frosting as a solution. Perhaps we should adapt some of the tactics of the French, well documented in Dave Galula's "Pacification in Algeria: 1956 to 1958" , which can be downloaded from the RAND website, and other lessons of Vietnam cirula 1951. The French put French officers and NCO in charge of Vietnamese units, but unfortuately did not carry through with succession planning. As a result, there were few capable Vietnamese officers when the French left. Maybe this is worth a try in Iraq since the level of the Iraqi units is far below the technical proficency we experienced with the Vietnamese Marine in 1967. If you would like first-hand description of experiences of those of us who were COVANs in Vietnam, take a look at “Communion in Conflict: The Marine Advisor Vietnam 1954-1973” (Fairfax, VA: USMC Advisor Publications, 2006) Volume III by Thomas D. Affourit, especially the narrative by Colonel Croizant, the first Marine advisor. This harks back to the constabulary efforts in Nicaragua, Cuba , and the Banana Wars. It may be worth a look...
I agree with your critique of this article, Marc. Teams like this should be down at the company level, with perhaps a coordinating team at brigade level to give them some staff clout. The company teams should be at least five people strong, with twice that at brigade level so that there are enough experienced "boots on the ground" at that level to keep their concerns in front of the commander. I'm also not sure if the proposed composition of the HTT (and would those being "studied" really want to be known as "Human Terrain?" That's maybe another question for another post...;) ) would give it enough credibility within the brigade to make it effective. Two fuzzy civilian types and mid-grade officers or enlisted led by a major or LtCol from any available branch? May not go over well with the more enthused combat arms types.
As an aside, I found some of the historical assertions interesting. When they saywhen referring to CORDS in Vietnam, those same statistics are the subject of debate among historians. Some assert that CORDS only worked where it would naturally work, and didn't work in areas where it was needed.Quote:
it is hard to argue with statistics from that era
One of the adavntages of CORD, which was really coming togther in 1968 under General Abrahms, was the whole issue of unity of command of all of the pieces (military, economic, political, NGO, CIA and gaggle of organizations). I had just finished my third tour and had left Vietnam so I did not have an opportunity to observe this first hand. I do know that when I was a COVAN there were all kinds of people in different dress and uniform with their own agendas running around in Saigon, and sometime in the field,bumping into each other, which made accomplishing the mission difficult.
Honestly, I was really and truly mad after reading that article. Outside of the fact that, IMHO, it just won't work, it also breaches every code of academic ethics (we can always argue later whether or not that is an oxymoron :)) and, while it may sell in Washington, it will just make matters much worse on the political home front.
Sorry about the rant, but sometimes I just feel like performing some radical surgery on some people to remove unused portions of their anatomy - in this case, their brains! (Sheesh, I really am steamed about this! Time to chill)
I'll try and track down a copy and read it.
Steve, you raise a really good point about whether or not people would like to be reffered to as "Human Terrain". I would seriously doubt it :). And when you say
I think you are right on the money. Let's face it - most of us academic types (Selil obviously excepted) just don't have the training and, frequently, the mind-set to handle combat situations. Hey, our idea of an intense firefight is a cocktail party at the faculty club. Man, they are rough ;)Quote:
Two fuzzy civilian types and mid-grade officers or enlisted led by a major or LtCol from any available branch? May not go over well with the more enthused combat arms types.
Marc
I would have expected something better from Grau, honestly. The database idea is especially horrible, since as Marc pointed out it raises all sorts of security and later use questions that don't seem to have been thought through. Even if you toss out the home front issue, the operational impact of what happens when (not if) that database falls into the wrong hands is stunning. Remember the whole VA fiasco? "Uh...sorry, sir...but one of our translators took the entire HTT database home on his laptop and someone stole it."
Set at the company level, with the same level of support and NO comprehensive database (as these often turn into solutions in and of themselves instead of tools), and with a better name, this might work. But as currently structured it's not looking too promising.
I've got to agree with that. I was talking with a friend of mine last night who is one of the top DB people in Canada about some of the problems with databases. He raised a really interesting point - databases don't actually correlate "knowledge", just preconceptions. Jim (my DB friend) has been working on and off on developing semantic DB structures which actually do correlate information. This could, actually, be very useful, especially for reconstruction activities and, if it doesn't have personal information in it, might be a good tool.
Honestly, the idea of a socio-cultural DB isn't too bad - again with no private information in it. As a resource, I suspect it could be very useful. Still, that doesn't address the issue of people on the ground who have to deal with people. Honestly, I think the best way to handle that would be to have a good company level team, good grass roots cross training, and "personal" introductions by the unit leaving of their counterparts coming in.
Besides, if the "more enthused combat arms types" (thanks, Steve) actually own the process there will be more buy-in and a more pragmatic approach.
Marc
I find this kind of interesting.
I can’t imagine that the population of social scientists has suddenly increased substantially within academia. Considering the number of individuals choosing the hard road of social science, those with an interest to work within DOD, those who won’t be considered foreign nationals and thus not suitable, those who speak the language fluently, and the number who “can” work with DOD all three that are left are going to be busy working on other projects.Quote:
HTS will have reach back connectivity to a network of subject-matter experts now being assembled from throughout the department of Defense, the interagency domain, and academia.
I’m imagining a faculty member explaining to the human studies board that his current research/activity is in the employ of the department of defense providing observational and strategic analysis, and tactical information, for the subjugation and manipulation of an indigent foreign population.
Are there are a lot of anthropologists working with GIS?Quote:
The analyst will be a qualified cultural anthropologist or sociologist competent with geographical imaging software and fluent enough in the local language to perform field research
Am I wrong in thinking that these are going to be forward deployed individuals? The people filling these billets are going to be forward of the line of departure, and in fact the “focus groups” held by the academic will be direct parts of enculturation and in contact with the population and likely in the environment? If this is the case how is a non-uniformed individual deriving intelligence within a combat zone being viewed by the Geneva Convention?
In asymmetrical combat environments we already see a significant issue with civilian employees and dealing with the fall out of these non-combatants (who aid and supply the military) getting snatched. How many grey beard pacifist professors getting snatched will it take before the effort of protection overwhelms the value of the intelligence gathering and dissemination?
I’m quite allergic to violence and find that getting fatter, older, and balder to be a worthy life long goal. I told a certain flag officer I was to old, fat, and out of shape to ever be in the service again. He told me they (the Marines) could fix two of those three problems easily and I wouldn’t be getting any younger.Quote:
Originally Posted by marct
Of course, the concept of "foreign national" does create some interesting problems in a coalition, doesn't it? So, would that mean that I, as a Canadian, would be considered on in Iraq, but not Afghanistan?:cool:
Especially since "secret research" is specifically prohibited by the American Anthropology Association's code of ethics. So, hmm, lets see .... Okay, I've got the sales pitch right now "Can't find a job in the Academy? No problems! Join HTT and you will NEVER work in academia again! (some exceptions apply, contact your local recruiter for further information)"
Nope. There are some, mainly in urban anthropology, and a fair number of archaeologists who use GIS, but not many Cultural Anthropologists. Too much like math for most of us <shudder>. We tend to prefer a more "traditional", hermeneutics-based approach which allows us to discover all of the multifold ways in which the poor oppressed people we are studying have been systematically destroyed by Capitalist, Imperialist, neo-Colonial state actors and their armoured myrmidons for the advantage of the sinister and heartless multi-national corporations (Okay, so my tounge is frimly planted in my cheek).
That's a good point. I must admit, the temptation to suggest a commission to Major for PhDs, along with the concommitant question of what they would be (a MAJOR pain the the ____) is great, but I will restrain myself.
Not too many! We already have that as something of a problem in some areas of the world with archaeologists and anthropologists being shot - and they weren't even working as spies or analysts then. Even someone in good shape without proper training would be a liability.
Marc
Hi Folks, this appeared in the Times Higher Education Supplement.
MarcQuote:
Life-risking 'spy' plan pulled
Phil Baty
Published: 20 October 2006
Academic protests have forced the Foreign Office to delay an anti-terror project. Phil Baty reports
Two research councils put plans to enlist academics in the War on Terror on hold this week after they were accused of risking the lives of British researchers in Muslim countries.
The Times Higher learnt that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had been inviting selected academics to bid for funding under a £1.3 million project called "Combating Terrorism by Countering Radicalisation". The project is focused on countries identified by MI5's Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre.
The FCO project, run in partnership with the Economic and Social Research Council and the Arts and Humanities Research Council, provoked a furious response from academics who claimed it was tantamount to asking researchers to act as spies for British intelligence.
Critics claimed the move endangered the lives of researchers, particularly social scientists and their sources in Muslim countries, whether working on the project or not.
The ESRC this week delayed the project to enable further consultation as a result of serious concerns raised by academics through The Times Higher.
Details of the project emerged as The Times Higher obtained a new version of controversial government guidance on combating extremism on UK campuses.
This suggests that university staff are trained by Special Branch officers to spot and report extremist behaviour.
According to documents seen by The Times Higher, the FCO project will examine six regions - Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, North Africa and the Gulf and six specific countries, including Turkey, Jordan and Sudan.
Academics would be asked to "scope the growth in influence and membership of extremist Islamist groups in the past 20 years", "name key figures and key groups" and "understand the use of theological legitimisation for violence".
"Key topics" include "radicalisation drivers and counterstrategies in each of the countries studied" and "future trends likely to increase/decrease radicalisation".
James Fairhead, an anthropology professor at Sussex University who sits on both the ESRC's strategic research board and international committee, has written to ESRC governors expressing concern that the project has had "input" from MI5.
In a letter written last week, he said he was "appalled" that the project has not been considered formally by either of the ESRC boards he sits on and brought the independence of the ESRC into question.
He said that the project "might endanger British social scientists overseas". He told The Times Higher that he was "deeply worried" that academics would be expected to name extremists.
John Gledhill, chair of the Association of Social Anthropologists, said:
"This raises fundamental ethical issues. People feel that it smacks of the Cold War use of academics in counter-insurgency activities - essentially using academics as spies."
In a letter to members, he said that the issue was part of the "war against terror's increasing influence on academic life".
Martha Mundy, reader in anthropology at the London School of Economics, circulated a letter to members of the anthropology association warning of the physical danger to academics and wider concerns about independence of research. She says the programme entailed a series of specific "intelligence-driven" questions that "start from the premise of a link between Islamism, radicalisation (nowhere defined) and terrorism".
"Such a programme should be neither funded by, nor administered through, the AHRC and the ESRC, as it violates the principles of transparent competition, " Dr Mundy writes.
Philip Esler, AHRC chief executive, said: "It is appropriate that the AHRC enables the powerful intellectual resources in the UK to focus on particular public policy issues."
A spokeswoman for the ESRC said the charge that the project was driven by intelligence was "wholly inaccurate".
"This is academic-driven research with an academic basis," she said. "This is crucial for our integrity." She also confirmed that it would be open to full competition.
Adrian Alsop, director of research at the ESRC, said that while the projects would involve some "limited" fieldwork, all would be subject to rigorous ethical approval to ensure researchers' safety.
He said the process had been "transparent and open", with 100 academics attending three seminars on the subject. An FCO spokesman said that the office was working with the research councils to ensure that the work was independent, transparent, academically sound and properly peer-reviewed.
Finally getting caught up in updating the SWJ Library. Tonight's additions include two Vietnam War-Era handbooks. Hat tip to Council member Jedburgh for sending these in to the SWJ! Many thanks...
Military Assistance and Training Advisory Course (MATA) Handbook for Vietnam - US Army Special Warfare School Handbook, January 1966. Reference material for the military advisor in Vietnam. Reflects doctrine as taught at the Special Warfare School in the 1960's and early '70's. The handbook was prepared for use in the MATA courses of instruction and served as a ready reference for advisors in Vietnam.
Handbook for Military Support of Pacification - US Military Assistance Command Vietnam handbook, February 1968. Developed as a basic reference document. Designed for use by US, RVN and other other coalition military personnel.
26 November NY Times editorial - Learning From Iraq.
Quote:
While politicians from both parties spin out their versions of Iraqs that should have been, could have been and just maybe still might be, the Army has taken on a far more useful project: figuring out why the Bush administration’s military plans worked out so badly and drawing lessons for future conflicts.
That effort is a welcome sign that despite six years of ideologically driven dictates from Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon, Army leaders remain usefully focused on the real world, where actual soldiers daily put their lives on the line for their country and where the quality of military planning goes a long way toward determining whether their sacrifices help achieve America’s national purposes.
Two hopeful examples are the latest draft of a new Army field manual that will be taught to officers at all levels beginning next year and a series of oral history interviews conducted with Iraqi and American officers involved in the disappointing efforts to establish and train Iraqi security forces. Last week, The Los Angeles Times published details of some of the major changes being incorporated into the new field manual, while The Washington Post reported on some of the lessons learned in the Iraqi training programs.
The field manual, the Army’s basic guidebook for war, peacekeeping and counterinsurgency, quietly jettisons the single most disastrous innovation of the Rumsfeld era. That is the misconceived notion that the size and composition of an American intervention force should be based only on what is needed to defeat the organized armed forces of an enemy government, instead of also taking into account the needs of providing security and stability for the civilian population for which the United States will then be responsible...
There is a pretty good site that has a number of excellent early (Vietnam-era) articles on the theory and practice of counterinsurgency. Forgive me if this has been posted previously.
Moise's Bibliography
The Kit Carson Scout Program 1966-1968, prepared by the Chieu Hoi Division of MACCORDS on 18 Jan 68
Unfortunately, the pdf file is missing page 2 of the original document.
Very nice!
The same Bill Cowan who shows up as a commentator on Fox News every now and then?Quote:
Kit Carson Scouts by Captain William Cowan, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette, October 1969.
JFQ, 4th Qtr 07: The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Warfare
Quote:
In the mid-1990s, the Phoenix program was considered an artifact of historical interest but with little relevance to the contemporary world. I therefore analyzed the program primarily from a historian’s perspective in the first edition of Phoenix and the Birds of Prey, making few references to the present or future. Readers interested in future applicability were left to draw their own conclusions from the history. A decade later, Iraq and Afghanistan have brought the study of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism back into fashion. For this reason, the new edition contains this additional chapter summarizing the principal lessons.....
RAND, 14 Jul 09: The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Counterinsurgency
Quote:
One of the principal requirements of counterinsurgency is the ability to disrupt or destroy not just the insurgency’s military capabilities but also the infrastructure that supports the insurgent forces. This infrastructure provides, among other things, the critical intelligence, recruiting, and logistics functions that enable insurgents to contend with counterinsurgent forces that are often much more capable in a purely military sense. During the Vietnam War, one of the main efforts to attack the insurgent infrastructure was known as the Phoenix Program. Phoenix has subsequently become highly controversial, and its lessons for contemporary counterinsurgency can be overdrawn. However, a careful assessment of Phoenix does provide some suggestions for improving current efforts against insurgent infrastructure.
Just in case the subject re-appears: an article on SWJ Blog: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7927 and from a Canadian journal 'The Theoretical Aspect of Targeted Killings: The Phoenix Program as a Case Study': http://digitization.ucalgary.ca/jmss...viewFile/57/67
davidbfpo
The articles linked above are all worthwhile and deserve DLing for future reference. However, they look at CORDS-Phoenix from a non-Vietnamese viewpoint. For example, the 2009 Canadian article (cited by David) does not cite Tran's "Pacification".
The story of the GVN's pacification programs (including CORDS-Phoenix) was told by Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (1977; one of the Indochina Monographs - 7mb DL), who was a key player in the programs. All being said, "pacification" had to be laregly a South Vietnamese effort - the problem was their "insurgency" or "guerrilla war"; not ours. Tran tells the story of that effort - the good, the bad and the ugly.
One can classify the "Viet Cong" activities in the South in more than one way, legally and militarily. The articles linked above call it an "insurgency" - as do many books written on Vietnam (those that elect not to treat it as a "conventional" war). The Vietnamese Communists looked at it differently.
Their view was that the successful August 1945 Insurrection (ending their Revolutionary War) led to a unified Vietnam (as a nation-state), with Ho's government its recognized government (agreements with the French, 1945-1946). The French then reneged and attacked the Viet Minh (their view). The French and their Vietnamese puppets then occupied most of the country.
Thus, the following First Indochina War was in Viet Minh terms a Resistence War (with their guerrilla forces, North and South, being akin to the French Resistence of WWII). DPB and the Geneva Accords gave validity to North Vietnam, but a unified Vietnam (not Two Vietnams) was the North's goal. The formation of the RVN under Diem, and growing US involvement, was simply regarded as the same thing as the French occupation under its puppets.
The result by the early 1960s was a mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare (as defined in FM 31-21 from that time). Thus, from the first 2006 article linked above:
The end result was a juncture of conventional and unconventional forces (made up of guerrilla and auxilliary forces and underground cadres) - as called for by our own doctrine in FM 31-21. Thus, the Vietnam War did not involve an insurgency (as opposed to the situations in Malaya and the Philippines, which were true insurgencies). Rather, Vietnam was more akin to Indonesia - also where a successful Revolutionary War ended in 1945, followed by a foreign occupation and Resistence War. Fortunately for us (the US), the Indonesia Revolution was largely bourgeois nationalistic (albeit anti-Western). That feature led to the eradication of Indonesian Communism in 1965-1966; and to formation of ASEAN, which changed the SE Asian picture by 1968.Quote:
In Vietnam, the U.S. military faced arguably the most complex, effective, lethal insurgency in history. The enemy was no rag-tag band lurking in the jungle, but rather a combination of guerrillas, political cadre, and modern main-force units capable of standing toe to toe with the U.S. military. Any one of these would have been significant, but in combination they presented a formidable threat.
When U.S. ground forces intervened in South Vietnam in 1965, estimates of enemy guerrilla and Communist Party front strength stood at more than 300,000. In addition, Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese main forces numbered almost 230,000—and that number grew to 685,000 by the time of the Communist victory in 1975. These main forces were organized into regiments and divisions, and between 1965 and 1968 the enemy emphasized main-force war rather than insurgency.[1] During the war the Communists launched three conventional offensives: the 1968 Tet Offensive, the 1972 Easter Offensive, and the final offensive in 1975. All were major campaigns by any standard. Clearly, the insurgency and the enemy main forces had to be dealt with simultaneously.
1. Thomas C. Thayer, How to Analyze a War Without Fronts: Vietnam, 1965-72 (Washington, DC: Defense Research Projects Agency, 1975), 788-89.
I'll take a better look at the Canadian article re: its Targeted Killings thesis - which issue, I believe, is covered in other threads.
said... but it was also an insurgency. The winners have their myth - based on their perception of truth - but it remains the victors myth. We have our own myths... As some of us quipped at the time, the VN war was not one war 12 years long but rather 12 wars, each one year long (for the US, that is). Actually, there is another set of dimensions that need to be considered. It was a different war in each of the 6 military regions, in the air, and at sea. At some point, however, adding dimensions simply become counterproductive. In the end, I would argue that what we look at should depend on the question we are asking, remembering the complexity all the while.
Cheers
JohnT
I wouldn't disagree with you that US authors classify the Viet Cong as an "insurgency". That view is not new (soup was eaten off a knife long before Nagl) - because it fit the US political posture. That was that SVN was an independent nation state with legitimate governace over all of the population in SVN. Thus, any citizen of SVN who took up arms against the RVN was an "insurgent".
E.g., a brief Wilfian definition of insurgency (here):
There were at least two problems with the US-GVN approach. One (more minor) is that it gave credence to the NLF (National Liberation Front) as as a South Vietnamese group, independent of the DRV government and the Lao Dong (CP of Vietnam). We know that was nonsense, but it led to bi-furcated thinking - an "insurgency" threat in the South and a conventional threat from the North.Quote:
They become an insurgency when they try to replace the existing government as that which exercises authority over them, and use violent means to secure that policy.
The second was the VietComs did not look at the war in that manner. In their view, the "existing government" in the South (RVN) was not "that which exercised authority over them". "Them" being the Viet Cong. Their government was the government of Hanoi, ruling over a unified Vietnam (albeit half-occupied by the US and its SV puppets). In essence, their argument was the same as that of the French Resistence - their government was the Free French in exile; the Vichy government being a puppet of the Germans.
What followed from these two very different positions was even more critical. The VietCom effort (a combined PAVN and NLF effort, which was FM 31-21 in effect) had Unity of Command - Hanoi's control over the NLF was exercised through COSVN. Our (US and RVN) efforts (counterinsurgency vs NLF; conventional vs PAVN/NVA; and bombing of NV) had no unity - in effect, three separate wars (further divided by your annual iterations - another of our defaults).
Fortunately for us, the other events in SE Asia of the 60s and 70s turned out well for us (US) - so, we clearly won in SE Asia as a whole region. But, SVN was lost (I don't concede that was due to US failures alone - see this post) to what I perceive as being a superior concept of that armed conflict by the VietComs on a strategic level.
Dwell on my iconoclastic suggestions for a bit. E.g., that we should have treated the NLF and Viet Cong as an unconventional force (it using concepts similar to FM 31-21), as opposed to treating it as an "insurgency".
Best regards
Mike
to the extent that you argue for a totally unified effort by the DRV that included the NLF and VC as controlled agents. One problem that the Lao Dong party had was that its southern (and to a lesser degree central) VN affiliates - essentially the NLF - was too independent. This also held for the VC. Tet 68 had the positive effect for the DRV (and PAVN) of getting rid of a troublesome ally/agent that could not be completely trusted. The other part of the story is that when the PAVN seized all of SVN in 1975 one of the first acts of the new govt was to purge the NLF. At the same time, we should not make too much of the divisions w/in the VietComs...
Ah, well, time for a beer...
Cheers
JohnT
no real disagreement on several of your points.
1. Agreed - the NLF included many Vietnamese nationalists (e.g., Al Santoli, To Bear Any Burden, 1985, had some of them tell their stories).Quote:
[1] One problem that the Lao Dong party had was that its southern (and to a lesser degree central) VN affiliates - essentially the NLF - was too independent. This also held for the VC. [2] Tet 68 had the positive effect for the DRV (and PAVN) of getting rid of a troublesome ally/agent that could not be completely trusted. [3] The other part of the story is that when the PAVN seized all of SVN in 1975 one of the first acts of the new govt was to purge the NLF.
2. Agreed - Tet 68 saved the LD hit squads a lot of future work.
3. Agreed - The Victory Parade story (Santoli, pp.18-19) of Truong Nhu Tang (Minister of Justice, NLF 1960-1976) proves your point. He noticed no PRG or NLF flags or uniforms (2 weeks after Saigon's fall). In reply to Truong's question, GEN Van Tien Dung (CO of the NVA) replied coldly that "the armed forces are now unified". The parade was followed by people disappearing or forced into "re-education".
Note that I said that Hanoi had Unity of Command over its conventional and unconventional forces. I did not say that the members of those forces were monoliths and unified on every point, especially political. As the Zhivago commisar said: "As the military struggle winds down, the political struggle intensifies."
I also am not claiming some secret recipe which would have saved South Vietnam, had we looked at the conflict as involving a combined conventional and unconventional effort by Hanoi.
Bob Jones has at times mentioned counter-unconventional warfare (or words to that effect). I don't know whether he (and the other SF folks here) see a substantial difference between counter-unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency.
I do know that unconventional warfare has been very successful for the guerrillas (Spain 1808, Russia 1812, Russia & Yugoslavia in WWII; but, I suppose, those can be explained because of the successes of their allied conventional forces - as also Vietnam). There must be examples of successful counter-unconventional warfare - but not in my brain-dead state tonite.
Any input on counter-unconventional warfare is welcome - I'm already out on a limb. :)
Cheers with your beers - have a virtual one on me.
Mike
Addendum: One comment by COL Jones is here:
He also has mentioned "counter-unconventional warfare" in connection with counter-irregular warfare, here.Quote:
One mission set that does not exist that I believe is helpful is that of "counter unconventional warfare." This would be the entire family of engagement that one would employ to stop an outside entitiy from waging UW in a given state/populace. It would include the full DIME, CT, etc. I beleive this is more helpful than just labeling a state as "rogue" or an organization as "terrorist" At the end of the day do we need to "defeat" AQ, or do we simply need to neutralize them? In fact there are many that think that AQ is fading due to its overreliance on violent ways, and failure to adapt more political wings like the IRA and Hezbollah. If this is true, I think instead of cheering the demise, we need to be very concerned about what replaces them. The conditions that gave rise to AQ still exist in spades. Here I agree with Gentile, there is no victory. By changing our campaign to a more holistic counterUW campaign aimed at neutralizing AQ by rendering them irrelevant to the populaces they seek to influence we have a better chance of not giving rise to a second, more sophisticated generation of non-state actor that comes in behind them to continue the mission. Counter UW works for states also. Clearly we do not want to "defeat" Iran to prevent them from waging UW in Iraq, or Lebannon, but we do need to devise a sophisticated, holistic scheme of engagement to counter this UW effort and it destabilizing effects that are counter to our national interests.
Quote:
SOF could profit from developing "Counter unconventional warfare" as a tool in our kitbag
Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
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Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
by Heather M. Brown
Download the Full Article: Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
In the mid-to-late 1960s, Americans became increasingly concerned with the strategic decision-making of U.S. leaders regarding the military’s presence in Vietnam. One of the most controversial decisions of the era was ratified on 7 January 1962, when the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army were given authorization under Operation RANCH HAND, to deploy the herbicides 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetate (2,4,5-T) and 2,4-dicholorophenoxyacetate (2,4-D), commonly known by its code name, Agent Orange, on South Vietnam. Operation RANCH HAND directed the herbicide spraying project from U.S. Air Force C-123 twin-engine aircraft, U.S. Army helicopters and infantry hand sprayers.
Download the Full Article: Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam
Heather Marie Brown received her undergraduate degree from Texas State University-San Marcos in December 2010 as a double-major in History and Political Science.
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Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy
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The latest posted issue of Parameters (Winter of 2010-2011) is probably well worth reading because we most likely have not learned well our lessons from the past (What did Cohen and Gooch say about military failures in their book Military Misfortune – all military failures can be attributed for failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate).
Note the authors are a "who's who" of some of our great thinkers, generals, theorists, practitioners, and historians (well I guess Ambrose has had his issues!). Given the recent comparisons between Afghanistan and Vietnam I recommend one article in particular by the eminent strategist and mentor to so many of us, Colonel (Ret) John Collins' article from 1978 - Vietnam Postmortem: A Senseless Strategy. COL Collins' article should probably be mandatory reading for decision makers before we embark on any future Afghanistans or Iraqs so we do not have a failure to learn, failure to adapt, and failure to anticipate again (a dream of fantasy I know!).
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The War Over the Vietnam War
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History: Vietnam in HD
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New Hampshire and Vietnam
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How Could Vietnam Happen?
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Assessing Pacification in Vietnam: We Won the Counterinsurgency War!
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Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam
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Military Advisors Reflect on Vietnam War Experiences
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Viewpoint: Counterinsurgency Lessons From Vietnam
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Book Review: Marigold: The Last Chance for Peace in Vietnam
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Why the U.S. Lost the Vietnam War
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Village Stability Operations: An Historical Perspective from Vietnam to Afghanistan
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Preventing the Barbarization of Warfare: The USMC CAP Program in Vietnam
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The Haunting Rhymes of America’s Wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan: Why Metrics Still Matter
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