patronage and peacebuilding
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Originally Posted by
Entropy
I agree but still say it's a pretty big factor. As I've said many times now, Afghanistan isn't merely an insurgency - it's still in a civil war. And the Taliban aren't merely insurgents - they are the former power looking to regain what they once had.
I certainly agree that it is a civil war--as was Iraq for a time too.
However, the Afghan constitution per se has lots of wiggle room if the national leadership wanted to use Chapter 8 (especially Articles 2-3) creatively to devolve power and coopt local elements. That it doesn't do so is a function of both leadership choice and the (preexisting) social-political distribution of power.
Moreover, it is entirely possible for centralized administrations with centralizing constitutions to effectively coopt into the periphery in a decentralizing way--Morocco would be a case in point. The problem with Afghan patron-client structures may not be that they exist, but that they exist in such an inefficient, corrupt, and predatory manner.
As I've argued elsewhere, I don't think the development/peacebuilding/stabilization/COIN crowd has a good handle on this:
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...conceptually, the peacebuilding and reconstruction community has largely failed to deal with this, and that as a consequence there is a current and potentially growing disconnect in both theory and practice. How is it that patronage politics can be limited, contained, channeled, or attenuated in ways that create maximum benefits in terms of stability and legitimization, and the least damage in terms of corruption, inefficiency, inequality, and delegitimization? How is it that we encourage countries emerging from conflict to look more like Jordan and less like Yemen—both places where neopatrimonialism has played a key role in domestic politics, but with strikingly different developmental and institutional outcomes?
Why are patronage networks always the bad guy?
To quote BW: "....it created a national ponzi scheme of leadership and patronage that robs the government of local legitimacy and robs the locals of their wealth..."
Allow me to do some paraphrasing and intellectual thievery here (been thinking a few days about Mac McCallister's Agora post to which I'm starting to agree with more and more). Patronage is always eschewed as detrimental to good governance. Sure, JM wouldn't have approved, but that was the new nation of America under a completely different set of historical and cultural circumstances. How about if Kabul co-opts or install loyal (and effective) local patronage networks? Even during the Monarchy, hasn't the patronage network been one of Afghanistan's only effective governing tool primarily because of the limited direct reach of Kabul or 'illegitimacy' of the central government? Why do we keep thinking a central gov't under a republican/quasi-democratic Constitution will win hearts and minds and provide legitimacy? Because its all we know and that's the way its going to be come hell or high water apparently.
Rather than try and twist Karzai's arm to install NATO-approved Governors with a 'clean' record, why not allow him to install people who *he* knows can get the job done after we do the clearing and holding. By Karzai co-opting and controlling the already in-place patronage nets with a loyal governor or sub-district governor and extend that network to Kabul, we don't have to worry about forcing an alien government into the inner workings of the Afghan culture. The insurgency is flamed when we remove a traditional and effective patronage network and have someone installed with no popular means of economic support or 'MOUs' for his area. Development and rule of law/governance will come but it will have an Afghan face to it and the population will be more readily inclined to see legitimacy in a patronage network as long as it provides them with the bare minimums of security and economic development (or at least economic stability). A 'legitimate' and effective patronage network can erode the shadow governments simply by co-opting (strong-arming) the trade, production, kickbacks, taxing, etc away from illicit sources....after, of course, we provide initial clear & hold top-cover.
I realize this is getting off topic but patronage networks aren't inherently a bad thing, especially when they're effective and they are able to maintain order. It's also been effective in Afghanistan for an extremely long time. Did they ensure the democratic and civil rights of 100% of the population? No. Was there corruption, graft, and political backwardness? Yes. Will it look like an American or NATO solution? No. Did they provide at least a modicum of security and economic stability and maintain the status quo in a very volatile region of the world at very volatile times in recent history? Yes.
I'm not saying historical reversion is ever a good thing (that's what the Talibs want; atavism, right?) but understanding what works and more importantly, what they know works for them, is more critical than a forced adoption of democracy with a vanilla solution nationwide. My $.02.
Good Governance isn't about making people happy
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Originally Posted by
Ken White
Uh, forgive me but a number of folks here have, over the last couple of years offered considered and consistent responses to your thesis. As nearly as I can determine, you haven't cared other than superficially what any of them had to say.How very nice of you to condescend to admission that at one point you too were ignorant... :wry:No one has attempted to order you to do anything. Several have acknowledged the logic of your focus and some of your prescriptions while disagreeing with other prescriptions and your one size fits all approach. You offer counter argument which is predictably poor governance and / or lessons the American Revolution and picking on poor old George III. :wry:
Consider the possibility that some of us also progressed from accepting the common wisdom to omniscience -- then realized that the world and humans are not really that simple and that common wisdom exists for valid reasons. Many of us also realize that common wisdom is merely a broad guide and is not definitive...Is the implication here that a Civil War and an Insurgency are mutually exclusive?Nor am I...
Webster:
Belligerency: 1 : the state of being at war or in conflict; specifically : the status of a legally recognized belligerent state or nation.
What does that definition add to the clarity?
I submit it adds nothing. You Lawyers can get wrapped up in word games but no one else much cares. Most Lawyers know that there are varying definitions and vernacular uses of words but tend to strongly adhere to the definition that best serves them in presenting their case...
Specifically, groups of people who do not object to the governance of a State but who simply wish to seize power for themselves, crooks and / or various other non-state actors can precipitate an insurgency, engage in belligerent conduct (if not a de jure 'belligerency') or participate in a civil war -- or they can do both at the same time.
Over-define your 'rules' and you will inhibit your ability to respond to the actual problem. You continually carp that the US is still in the strait jacket of 'Cold War responses' yet propose replacing that strait jacket with your own design. ;)Using that rationale, the Taliban were the government, they must not have provided good governance because the Northern Alliance objected, we helped the NA overthrow the Talibs and now they want their power, such as it was, back. Apparently Karzai is seen as unable to provide good governance, the Talibs are seen as unable to provide good governance, the US / NATO / ISAF are unlikely to be seen as capable of providing good governance -- thus there is no solution to the problem as you define it. Yet, I suspect a solution of sorts that satisfies no one will appear.
'Good Governance' as you use it appears to be a code for 'making everyone happy' (I know you have explained that's not the case but you keep getting back, indirectly, to that premise as you do in your last couple of sentences quoted below...). Not going to happen. Thus we all suffer from bad governance. The issue is, per Ed McMahon, "How bad is it?"Uh, yes, we can agree on that last. If we had good governance and made everyone happy, they wouldn't do that... :rolleyes:
Like I said, the key is "How bad is it?" and as many have pointed out to you for some time, recognition of many subtle variations in the cause of insurgencies is necessary. There's never a one size fits all where humans are concerned...
The Tea Party crowd isn't happy under Obama; and the Liberals weren't happy under Bush. Our current "COIN" approach of focusing on development to buy off the populace appears to be rooted in trying to make people happy to win.
No, creating a perception of legitimacy has little indeed to do with making people happy, it is just gaining their acceptance that you deserve to be there. The Tea Party in large part accepts that Obama deserves to be there. Similarly creating perceptions of Justice under the law for all groups as little to do with making people happy; nor is treating all groups with respect or providing them with a structure that gives them the same hope that the liberals and Tea Parters use to sustain themselves between elections.
No, good governance has nothing to do with trying to make everyone happy. It has to do with creating governance that represents everybody equally, is from a source they recognize, and is within their power to change within the law.
The US Constitution and Bill of Rights provides such a construct. The current Afghan Constitution does not. I see it as a deal breaker flaw that we are ignoring in favor of doing just such efforts to try to "make people happy" instead. I am actually quite against trying to make everyone happy.