At the risk of being the third wheel on the cycle...
Strategy is good. So is Policy. Hopefully the two cross reference each other but mixing them up in a stew is inadvisable. Similarly, Executive Chefs and Chefs de Partie are both important but each has to do his or her job, mix 'em up and poor chow results. :(
I have to agree with Bill Moore and Dayuhan -- when you try to change the first sentence in the first paragraph of the first chapter of a Field Manual -- no matter how poor it is -- to reflect what is and should be a civilian policy decision you are going to lose and you just get yourself consigned to the 'Disregard all before Huh' pile. Governance is a civilian, foreign policy concern. It is not and should not be a US Army -- to include SF -- concern. If the Armed Forces are committed, then in our nation a civilian ordered that and the Army's job is to conduct combat operations suitable to the mission.
As several of us keep saying, you have the right idea but keep shooting at the wrong target. :eek:
Same thing is true of going after the Saudis. It plays well to the populists here and there but it's not going to happen and we all -- including the populists -- know a half dozen or more good reasons why. So what purpose is served by beating it into the ground? To show that you are an independent thinker? We know that.
As someone far wiser than I (lot of them about... :o ) once said, there's a fine line between admirable persistence and deplorable bullheadedness. You aren't there yet -- but I really don't think going there will do your cause one bit of good...
Hoo Boy. Can't leave you alone for a second...
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Originally Posted by
Bob's World
But the primary reason he does not have it is because the military has kidnapped COIN as warfare and their domain.
I think that's a specious comment with little grounding in reality. I can think of many reasons such a conversation has not probably not taken place with regard to several recent Presidents but that 'reason' you give isn't one of them -- even if it were true. I suggest there's a difference between 'default' and 'kidnap'...
IMO and I suspect that of many other -- not all -- Americans, such a conversation should not occur. I don't think you can say on the one hand:
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When I say the US must change the nature of its relationship with the Saudis I mean we must change our end of it. As to the relationship between the Saudi government and their own populace...
and suggest in the next breath that we should insert ourselves via the President in a private conversation saying to the King he must change his ways to do what we want. I'm inclined to believe that is, if not hypocritical, at least a very conflicted proposition.
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To claim that military can simply declare some aspect of governance as warfare, write a manual about it and thereby convert it to warfare is absurd.
Sweeping statement. "Absurd." Really? At the risk of being rude, allow me to point out that just because Robert C. Jones claims governance is the root of all insurgency and blithely ignores any evidence to the contrary does not portend that the world is going to convert to that view in the near future. I know you're aware that more people disagree with you than agree on that governance bit and while you may discount them and their opinions, your approach leads them to believe ignoring your opinions is possibly prudent.
To call a consensual approach absurd while proclaiming to have the only correct answer only makes you seem strident at the very least.
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Stable governments with solid relationships with their populaces are conducting COIN every single day and we don't call that warfare...That clean break and conversion from governance to warfare is a fiction. Manuals such as 3-24 contribute to that fiction.
Is it a fiction or is that merely a simplification for your purpose. Most of the several insurgencies in which I've been involved on four continents resulted from anything but a '"clean break" and no one I knew or know has claimed such clarity in transition other than you in that statement. Most of 'em are more than muddy. Unintended consequences rule...
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What is next...their own populace.
I don't see anything sensible to respond to in that paragraph so I just truncated it. :D
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But this gets us back to the role of an intervening power...To assume the status is create impossible conditions of illegitimacy that will feed the insurgent movement.
True. We can agree totally on that. We can agree that we would not have done it the way W. decided to do it. We may or may not agree that once he had so decided, the ball was in the court of the US of A Army -- and they blew it. We may agree that the Army should not have had to pick up that ball -- but we both have to acknowledge that they had to do that. So. Bad move but it's partly over and the Army simply did, not too poorly, what they had to do. We have elsewhere agreed several times it should not get to that point -- hopefully, ever again -- and you plead for a coherent grand strategy.
I keep telling you that is not going to happen, the best you can get in our political system is a fairly coherent long term policy. Instead of shooting for that, you wish to try for the Gold Ring. Have at it and I'll get to tell you as I have dozens of other old Colonels "I told you..." ;)
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...and hold ourselves responsible for the role US foreign policy over the past 100+ years has played in contributing to the conditions leading to current illegal violence directed at the US we will struggle with the GWOT as well. I really don't see a down side in demanding greater accountability in civil government.
Bad news, Bob -- we've been at it for over 220 years, not 100+. It's who we are, what we are. Our collective attention span doesn't grasp two decades, much less two centuries. You simply are not going to change that. Shame you can't accept that and work within logical parameters and American realities for achievable goals...
ADDENDUM:
I type slowly, should have reloaded the page and looked before I posted. Dayuhan said it faster and better, I agree with him. You really ought to consider that...
And this, from Dayuhan, is most important and got left out:
""The answer to our neglect of governance concerns is not to get the military involved in governance: that's a recipe for disaster. The answer is to let the military do its job, and develop a separate but coordinated capacity for dealing with the governance concerns"" (emphasis added / kw)
Shiite Deal Gives Militants New Afghan Access
http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010..._r=1&ref=world
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The bloodletting peaked in 2007 when Shiites drove Sunnis out of Parachinar, the regional government headquarters. Sunni Muslims retaliated by denying Shiite Muslims access to road. In some instances, Sunni militants have stopped buses on the road, taken out Shiite passengers and executed them.
The Shiite militias had to turn to the Haqqanis to strike a deal "because they are so strong. No one else is as strong," Bangash said.
This is one recent example of hundreds available. Warfare is about power, not good governance. No about CMO, IO, economic development in a situation like this will distract from those who hold coercive power. The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.
Some argue we're doing the same old thing, but I would argue we forfeited the use of effective military force starting in 2002, and then in 2004 in Iraq. We became overly focused on winning hearts, not convincing the populace that we held the most coercive power and intended to win.
Bob, no one's defending Old Quo (What part of China does he hail from...)
What three people are doing is suggesting that Bob's Way is not the only way to achieve some needed changes, that Bob's Way may be in fact a good idea that is simply incorrectly aimed, that Bob's Way would have a better chance of success if it posed fewer contrapositions. One cannot mind one's own business and not impose one's will on another and at the same times try to cajole him into doing it one's way...
Either we stay out of other government's business or we intrude or interfere in some way. Since the latter is the more likely course, I believe you and I would agree that militarily interfering is the last resort and generally not a good choice. Where we seem to disagree is how the Armed Forces should go about getting that point across to the policy makers. You appear to want the FlagOs to be pro-active and bulldoze the civilians into doing it the 'right way.' I contend that they should not try that (it will backfire, it always has every time we've tried it) and that the personnel turnover among said policy makers means your ideas will get little traction unless you produce a coherent, realistic, non contradictory approach that provides them political cover. IMO, you have not yet done that, in fact seem to refuse to even consider it.
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Second; I don't pick on the Saudis, I pick on the US-Saudi relationship. The difference is a substantial one. Our entire Middle Eastern policy is long overdue for a major overhaul. But a many say, this is all policy stuff and not the domain of the military to worry about. The problem is that the policy types see insurgency and counterinsurgency as warfare and not the domain of policy types to worry about. We are at a stalemate, and something has to break that stalemate
True on the first point, for brevity I shortchanged that point which I did and do understand. I agree on the second point. On the third point, I disagree -- it is NOT the place of DoD or the Armed Forces to dictate to the civilian heirarchy what policies should be.
You'll likely respond you do not intend to dictate. So you might say but your words written here do not convey anything less. Think about that.
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What I propose is that the military stepping up clarifying the roles of host nation, intervening nations, and what violence is warfare and what violence really isn't warfare is a critical initial step in breaking this cycle. To simply salute and say "we got it" is not helpful.
"Stepping up" equals dictation? Suggesting? Suggesting more strongly? Hinting? What? Precisely what do you propose the military do to get those points accepted?
Your "not helpful" comment, like the 'absurd' earlier is not going to help your sale pitch... ;)
Further, FWIW, the US Army has not simply saluted and started off on its own in my lifetime. They have generally resisted almost to the point of insubordination. If you can give me an instance where they have done what you say, I'd appreciate it.
Here's the crux of the seeming pile on (I can't help you with the Fussball games...) :wry:
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What I find interesting is that people can see regime change as ok; but employing a little firm, backroom influence between state leaders as inappropriate. I aways thought that warfare was supposed to be the "final argument of kings." We've gotten way too used to making it our opening statement.
No one here has said that or anything close to it -- what we are saying is that YOU contend we should not dictate to others and then consistently proceed to spell out the dictation that should be given. IOW, you appear to be talking out of both side of your mouth. Be nice in public, we must let them do it their way -- and if we don't like their way lambaste the hell out of 'em in private??? You contradict yourself on that issue.
Aside from the basic fact that privately urging can be publicly ignored, thus forcing a public action -- like regime change -- your proposals all seem to be overly idealistic, not reality based and as noted, contradictory. In one sense, it's the walk softly and carry a big stick bit, ala T.R (who was a hypocrtical little dickens almost as devious as his cousin...) and that's a good catch line -- it does not work well with people who do not bluff if they sense the nominal stick wielder is a bluffer. Our problem in the US is that the electorate sometimes goes for bluffers. Our History of evil doing as you see it is also a history of poor bluffs and follow through. Those things have arguably done us more damage than any of or all the evil. A series of no or poor use of the Armed Forces and poor bluffs and follow through by four prior Administrations from both parties almost certainly led to the latest two cases of regime change. You may not agree with regime change, I disagreed strongly with the previous sluffing. Regime change works. Sloppy but it does work. The backroom stuff has a fairly poor track record unless it is backed up with credible regime change capability - and will to use it.
On the final point; we lead with force too often -- I totally agree and further agree with many of your proposals to change that.
However, I respectfully suggest that your methodology in getting your approach to change adopted by the Armed Forces or the US Government will not sell in Peoria -- or Washington. IOW, yet again, I'm suggesting you have some good thoughts but some rather jarring contradictions and a sales approach that is unlikely to succeed. So this isn't so much a pile-on as a fourth or fifth suggestion to consider that. Consider it my semi annual contribution. ;)