It's because we're stupid
Quote:
Originally Posted by
omarali50
The US (or some parts of the US policy-making apparatus) keep repeating some line about the need to "deter Iran" which I just cannot figure out...
and some of us have an aggrandized sense of injury. There are also some who must have an 'enemy' against whom to fulminate or 'plan' -- strange though that is... :(
As Crowbat said, they're going to dominate parts of the ME and are going to influence things further afield. That's reality -- anathema to US politicians. :rolleyes:
Some illusions go around...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
The KSA could go a long way to solving some of their own internal revenue shortfall problems by rolling up a rich little neighbor or two
The Saudis don't have internal revenue shortfall problems. They had a budget surplus well up in the billions in 2010, and that's after cranking public spending up so high they had a hard time finding more things to spend money on.
Too often we base assessments of Saudi conditions on data and observations that reach back to the oil glut. Big mistake: times have changed. There's also a huge difference between the way this oil surge is being handled and the way the last one was handled: partly because they see the logic in it and partly because they're worried about expropriation of assets in the event of another major terror attack, most of the money is being invested within the country. Salaries in the civil service (the largest employer by far of Saudi citizens) have seen huge increases, and there's been huge spending on job-creating industries, schools, medical facilities, infrastructure, etc. That may be a blatant payoff, but it is working: there's a lot less anti-government sentiment than there once was. As with China, I really don't see major civil disorder happening in the KSA or the Gulf states unless there's a major economic shock. The tension of the mid/late 90s is largely gone.
We need to get it through our heads that we are not "providing" arms to the Saudis to advance our purposes. They are buying them, for their own purposes. Maybe silly purposes, and they may or not be achieving those purposes, but that's their choice. It's not about something we are doing to deter Iran, or for any other purposes. It's a business deal. They are initiating it. It's not us helping or using them. If we didn't sell the stuff they could buy equivalent stuff elsewhere. If we backed out of these deals, how many seconds would it be before alternative proposals from China, Russia, the UK, France, etc were on the table? The $120 billion that the GCC countries are spending on US arms is largely seen in that region as charity, and there is some merit in that perception.
The US is not protecting the Saudis from their own people, or enabling them to oppress their own people, or giving permission to oppress their own people. They can do that themselves, they don't ask our permission, and they don't care what we think. They are not dependent on us and we do not control them.
The actual amount of oil the Saudis sell the US is irrelevant. Even if we didn't buy a drop from them, the US would still be very concerned with keeping that oil flowing, because if it stopped, the people who were buying it would then compete with us to buy the oil we are buying, and prices for everyone would go through the roof. It's not about how much they sell us, it's about the percentage of overall world production they represent, and the very large percentage of world reserve production that they represent.
We fought Saddam when he threatened the Gulf oil supplies, and we would fight Iran if they threatened the Gulf oil supplies. This has nothing to do with protecting the Saudis or defending the Saudis. It has to do with protecting and defending ourselves. Quite aside from the fact that invading and absorbing your neighbors is illegal and unacceptable no matter what their form of government is, the US cannot allow that much oil to fall under the control of a government openly hostile to us. It's not about empowering the Saudis to oppress, it's not subservience, it's not us doing their bidding... it's just a common interest. Common interests are what make alliances, not similar political systems or similar ideas on government-populace relations.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Israel and the Gulf States work hard to keep the U.S. thinking of Iran as "the enemy." Iran is not the enemy, Iran is both the past and the future of that region.
Iran is part of the past and future of that region. So are Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and others.
The Iranian government also works hard to sustain the perception of hostility. They are deeply invested in that perception and they need it to continue. It's not just about the history. The Vietnamese have as much historical reason as the Iranians to dislike the US, but their government has astutely recognized that getting along with the US and the west is in their interest, and set the past aside. The Iranian government could do the same, if they chose to. They don't choose to. They have as much to do with sustaining hostility as we do, and they do it intentionally and for their own purposes.
Of course we have no quarrel with the Iranian people. We had no quarrel with the Japanese people in 1942, but we still fought a devastating war with the country. Hostility is a choice of government, and it's not just a blind reaction to past affronts. It's a decision and it reflects a purpose. That purpose may be the government's, not the people's, but it's governments that start wars.
I don't think "the Iranians" per se have any real desire to invade the states across the Gulf and start a region-wide war. I do suspect, though, that there are people in that Government who have some ambitions and ideas, and it is possible that they could choose to carry them out. If their people allow them to try, and follow them, there will be a big mess, even if we have no quarrel with their people.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Someday we will either let the tail wag the dog, and get us into a fight with Iran; or we will swallow our pride and re-establish relations with this important nation over their protests. I hope it is the latter.
I doubt that the current Iranian government would allow that to happen, even if we tried: that dance takes two. They need somebody to hate: a common enough ting in repressive, extremist governments.
For All The People In Egypt
Somewhat ambiguous situation, but progress...
Mubarak resigns, but apparently is not leaving the country. Have to wonder if any assurance were made about possible prosecution or other issues regarding his personal fortune. Also have to wonder whether he'll continue to have influence behind the scenes, and what role, if any, Suleiman will have. Did the army get fed up and act, or has this been orchestrated to get the crowds off the street, followed by business as usual with cosmetic changes?
We'll see. Certainly not a bad way for events to go, but it ain't over by a long shot.
On points previous:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
CrowBat
But Saddam was...OK, not "openly" but still... very friendly to the USA, back in the 1950s, again in the 1980s (see Rick Francona's "From Ally to Adversary", for example). His country was not only removed from the list of countries supporting terrorism, back in 1983, but it also received very "nice" loans, combat helicopters, and even ingredients for "senf". The ties became so close, that between 1986 and 1988, he several times requested deliveries of F-4 Phantom fighters. Indeed, even as of July 1990, he politely requested - and received - a "permission" (well, sort of it) for the "Kuwait business". And, if he would still be around to ask (not that I'm sorry he isn't), I'm sure even today he couldn't reasonably explain to himself, how come his person and his country then found itself on the receiving end of so much hatred and a major military attack by the same powers he has been said he is protecting against the Islamic extremism in Iran for an entire decade...
The 1950s were a long time ago; things change.
The idea that Saddam was a "US ally" during the Iran/Iraq war is a fairly common misconception, but it is definitely wrong. US policy then was effectively that neither side should be allowed to gain a decisive victory. There was never any illusion about Saddam being on our side or protecting anyone from Iranian imperialism; we just didn't want to see him lose, which could have left Iran in a dominant regional position. There was also no interest at all in seeing Saddam win. A cynical policy perhaps, and arguably one that extended a very destructive war, but by no means an unreasonable one.
The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting. It's fantasy, pure and simple. Everybody involved miscalculated: the US thought Saddam was going to negotiate with Kuwait and the troop movements were just a threat aimed at influencing the negotiations, Saddam thought the US would stop short of full-scale military action. He had no illusions about US approval, nor were there ever any bases for such illusions.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
CrowBat
Going back into "Devil's advocate mode" (until further notice): But, they did. They have supported US operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan, in 2001 and 2002. They wholeheartedly supported the case against Saddam, even applauded Bush and Powell in the UN. It's a "public secret" that a large number of the Tomahawks, plus a good deal of F-117- and B-1-attacks against Iraq in March 2003 went through the Iranian airspace - which would be impossible (at least equal to an act of war) without an agreement with Tehran. They have written almost a dozen of letters to the White House ever since, but never got a single response (BTW, in Iran it's considered as a "very brazen act", indeed "major offense" not to answer to somebody's letter). All they've got in response are threats, sanctions and yet more threats - all of these released through the media. So, what shall they do if the US simply refuses to get along with Iran (or, worse yet: have no clue how to do that)?
Obviously Iran was not going to have any complaint about US action against Saddam Hussein, or against a regime in Afghanistan heavily influenced by Wahhabi and Deobandi theology and ISI support, none of which are terribly sympathetic to the Shi'a.
Ask yourself: what exactly does Iran as a nation, or the Iranian people, gain from Iranian support for Hezbollah, or from the Iranian nuclear program, or from the constant decades-old deluge of frantic anti-US and anti-Israeli rhetoric? Iran gains nothing, but the regime gains the kind of permanent enemies that justify its existence. Without permanent enemies the regime might find its repression, corruption, and staggering economic mismanagement subject to more attention than they already get. Obviously the Iranian regime will not complain if the US acts in their interests (as in Iraq), but they will always find reasons to keep the hate going. They need to.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
CrowBat
But, now the US admin has a "problem": how to "explain" all of these sales to a country from which 14 out of 19 idiots from 9/11 came - plus provision of billions of US-taxpayer's money to Israel?
In what country in the world can you not find 14 idiots?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
CrowBat
And vice-versa: if this has to do with protecting the USA, West, rest of the world, Moon, the Mars people or whatever else, then why is the extremism spreading and the situation (see Iraq and Pakistan) worsening, instead of improving?
Who says extremism is spreading and the situation is worsening? Certainly prolonged US occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan has played into the hands of the extremists, but they're not having things their own way by any means. The end of the oil glut and the rush of prosperity in the Gulf has vastly reduced the appeal of radicalism there. AQ's efforts in SE Asia have fallen completely flat. It's a mixed situation and it's not running in one direction by any means.
I'm honestly not sure what point you're trying to make re arms sales to the KSA... clarification, ideally concise, would help.
Good post but I'll suggest an exception to one item.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
The idea that Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks, based on wildly distorted out of context excerpts from a diplomatic meeting. It's fantasy, pure and simple. Everybody involved miscalculated: the US thought Saddam was going to negotiate with Kuwait and the troop movements were just a threat aimed at influencing the negotiations, Saddam thought the US would stop short of full-scale military action. He had no illusions about US approval, nor were there ever any bases for such illusions.
I don't think that is at all correct. Ta'arof (LINK) rears its lovely Persian head. He asked for Kuwait simply by saying it was historic Iraqi territory; April Glaspie -- unknowing US career diplomat from Canada and nominal Arabist-- replied, variously, that it was not a major issue to the US. See this (LINK). I know it's the Wiki but it's probably as accurate as anything on this; we cannot know for sure what either Hussein or Glaspie really said. This from that Wiki entry:
Quote:
When these purported transcripts were made public, Glaspie was accused of having given tacit approval for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which took place on August 2, 1990. It was argued that Glaspie's statements that "We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts" and that "the Kuwait issue is not associated with America" were interpreted by Saddam as giving free rein to handle his disputes with Kuwait as he saw fit. It was also argued that Saddam would not have invaded Kuwait had he been given an explicit warning that such an invasion would be met with force by the United States.
To most Westerners and even most Asians, the nominal interchange would not have been viewed as permissive -- to a ME resident steeped in ta'arof , it was an invitation. While ta'arof is a Persian custom, the various Persian Empires embedded the concept firmly in all the races and peoples of the ME.
From that Glaspie Wiki entry:
Quote:
Journalist Edward Mortimer wrote in the New York Review of Books in November 1990:
“ It seems far more likely that Saddam Hussein went ahead with the invasion because he believed the US would not react with anything more than verbal condemnation. That was an inference he could well have drawn from his meeting with US Ambassador April Glaspie on July 25, and from statements by State Department officials in Washington at the same time publicly disavowing any US security commitments to Kuwait, but also from the success of both the Reagan and the Bush administrations in heading off attempts by the US Senate to impose sanctions on Iraq for previous breaches of international law.
I think Mortimer was correct. So, not only Glaspie but actions of US Administration played into Saddam's perception that he had at least tacit permission if not approval to do what he did...
Thus to say that "...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks..." is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade -- as Crowbat intimates...
The ME is the issue, not the US, not the west in general...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Dayuhan
I totally believe that Saddam constructed a situation that he could use to persuade others in the ME, and probably a fair number of his own generals, that he had a pass from the US. I just don't think he ever believed it himself.
I don't know and, in truth the answer to that is as irrelevant as was Glaspie and what she said. The issue is not what Saddam believed, it is what the broader ME believed. More important than any of that history is the fact the US does not do a good job of spreading its beneficence in the ME. A huge part of that is failure to give ta'arof its due.
I've met as many or more Persians that hate it as I have that liked it -- but they all practice it as do most in the ME. It is a documented fact that most Arab armies have an operational problem in that subordinates do not report accurately but rather tell their Boss what they believe he'd like to hear. Ta'arof. Attacks have not been launched due to a junior person being given command. Ta'arof. Most of the ME is quite willing to believe the evils of the US because we (a) ignore the rules of ta'arof and (b) tend to tell people what we think -- an absoute no-no.
Like any cultural trait, ta'arof has it devotees and its haters -- it also is often manipulated, not least by suggesting to another that ta'arof not be practiced -- while continuing oneself to practice it thereby scoring points on he or she who took you at your word and did not follow the rules.
Quote:
Looking at the sequence it seems fairly clear to me that the decision to invade was made well before the meeting with Glaspie.
No question.
Quote:
I can't imagine that Saddam saw that twaddle as corroboration of anything, or that he cared: the point was to pass on wrong information, not to gain information about US intentions that Glaspie could not, under the circumstances, have provided.
He probably did not and would have done what he was going to do even if she'd been more forceful. I believe that he called the meeting not only for the purpose you cite but also for the one I cite -- he got most people in the ME to accept that the very inconsistent US polices and the rather innocuous diplomatic gabble were tacit approval of his plans -- there certainly was no disapproval expressed...
Quote:
The idea (not coming from you but widespread) that Glaspie could have prevented the invasion by threatening force in response is of course silly...
It exists but I don't think it's widespread. Most people know:
Quote:
ambassadors can't make that kind of decision on their own. If there was fault it was higher up.
Yes. That failure to understand all we know about what we're doing is the crux of the matter. We spend millions to train foreign area specialists and then our policy makers let their egos get in the way and refuse to listen to people who know the area. See Korea, Viet Nam, Dominican Republic, Panama, Iraq and Afghanistan (among others, not least the Philippines...).
Quote:
The idea that the US deliberately baited Iraq into invading to give them an excuse to go into the region with major military force is even nuttier, though a whole lot of people still believe it. The Middle East is one of the few places in the world where reflexive acceptance of conspiracy theory is even more prevalent than it is in the US.
Again thank you for the corroboration. The "whole lot of people" who still believe it are by a large majority in the ME. They believe it because we got suckered and out-ta'arofed.;)
Quote:
My own reflex position is more the opposite: never attribute to conspiracy that which can be adequately explained by ####up.
No conspiracy cited by me, just a pure ####up on the part of several US Administrations, Secretaries of State and Ambasssadors. Poor April just happened to be the one that got caught up in the large scam. She and dipwad Joe Wilson...
As I said earlier: "Thus to say that '...Saddam asked for or received US permission to invade Kuwait is a complete load of bollocks...' is absolutely correct in Western terms. However, for a resident of the ME that statement is just as absolutely incorrect -- in their view, the US literally suggested that he invade."
That whole lot of people are the ones who are willing to believe Saddam got manipulated and the US is perfidious. Many there are going to believe that regardless but our pretty consistently inept diplomacy in the area is in large measure due to arrogance and an unwillingness to accept local norms into our calculations certainly exacerbates that. The invasion of Kuwait was but one small example.
From Israel, a voice outside the chorus...
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition...cracy-1.343011
Quote:
This was a civil uprising, one that did not suit the wild and violent image we insist on ascribing to all Arabs and to all Muslims. If only the square had been awash in blood, we would feel better. If only more heavily bearded young men and veiled virgins had gathered, we would be more sure of our predictions; if only Israeli flags had been burned in the streets, we could frighten ourselves and the whole world, saying we were right again.
Obviously a lot remains to be determined, but I don't think we or the Israelis should be hoping the new is a clone of the old, or even that it embraces similar foreign policies. I don't think we can expect a new regime to be pro-US down the line, and I think we can expect a somewhat more confrontational stance toward Israel. As long as it stops short of outright war or sponsorship of terror, this is not a bad thing at all. It could be a very good thing: an opportunity to show, not just tell, that we are willing and able to deal with regimes that don't see their interests as identical to ours.
Three things to watch during the transition...
Three factors that will make a difference...
1: Short-medium term management of economic subsidies
Americans think often in terms of liberty and freedom and the ability to change governance, but in much of the world desire #1 is economic opportunity and a better life. If people don't think democracy is getting them there, they are very likely to back a return to authoritarian rule. What's the point of having influence over government if government still doesn't give you what you want? Unfortunately, what people want is often low prices, high wages, plentiful jobs, low taxes, great government services, and a host of other contradictions. Economic trade-offs are often poorly understood.
One of the things that pushed Egypt over the edge was a withdrawal of subsidies, particularly on wheat. This was less about "neoliberal policies" than about reality: with the population soaring, wheat prices rising, a sagging pound and a rising trade deficit the subsidized imports were just not sustainable.
The economists are of course right: the subsidies are an abomination and must go. Dropping them all at once, though, is a sure way to popular disillusionment. My preference (not that anyone cares) would be to restore them, even with foreign aid paying part, with a clear schedule for a gradual phase-out and a clear explanation (assuming optimistically that someone will listen) of why they have to be phased out. It's hard to explain in places where the idea that "government should feed the people" is entrenched, but it needs to be done.
Management of subsidies needs to balance economic necessity with the need to maintain popular confidence and support. They have to end, but sudden withdrawal can trigger disorder that could lead to a radical rise or a military coup. Worth keeping an eye on how policies emerge: immediate termination of subsidies is a danger sign; maintaining them without a clear plan for phase-out supported by information (and ideally economic improvement, though that will take time) is as bad.
2. The emergence of political parties
There will be pressure to hold early elections, but that's not always a good idea. It's hard to hold an election without parties, and it will take time for meaningful parties to emerge. Egypt looks likely to avoid the scourge of party differentiation along ethnic or sectarian lines, but there are still potential problems.
Looking back to post-Marcos Philippines, the pre-Marcos two-party system did not re-emerge. Instead there were dozens of parties, often with no ideological differentiation and in many cases little more than vehicles for personal ambition: if your party doesn't nominate you, start a new one. That left positions contested by absurd numbers of candidates, with winners holding far less than a plurality and a minimal mandate. Choices were uncertain and based on personalities, not platforms, and it's common for people to jump parties and parties to shift coalitions for transient advantage.
Indonesia has runoff elections for the two top candidates if nobody gains a clear majority... expensive and cumbersome, but at least there's a mandate.
The emergence of parties will give a good indicator of how democracy is coming together, before policies or their impact are seen. How do parties differentiate? Do they represent distinct policy or ideological positions, or are they personality-dominated? Are small parties with similar views forming coalitions, or will they all run their own candidates? Will dominant parties be able to nominate candidates and remain together, or will leaders who don't get nominated break away?
3. Justice vs Reconciliation
Always a huge issue after a peaceful revolt succeeds. Who do you punish for corruption and human rights abuse? How far down the food chain do you go? Wherever you draw the line, the people above point to those below and ask "why me and not him". Push too hard and you can spark massive capital flight, disrupt government, even spark a coup. Give a free pass and you get major popular resentment and encourage more corruption. There's no right call and whatever they do will piss people off, but it will be very interesting to see how the transition government proceeds (likely they will kick it down the road), what positions the emerging parties take, and what is actually done when an elected government takes power.
