Defining "instrumentality"
Hi Wilf & Ken,
My problem with your answers is the implicit breadth of your concept of what the word "instrumental" means in this context, which seems to be all violent actions north of an epileptic seizure. :D
Taken to that grand extent, sure, most violence can be defined as purposeful toward an end but when all things are something, then nothing is. Common sense and five minutes observation at a busy intersection in a bad neigborhood at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening will disabuse anyone of the idea that all violence has rational root causes. Sometimes the pretext for violence is a nominal excuse.
Too broad a definition to be useful analytically, in my view. Perhaps WM's suggestion of reframing the debate is more productive
Or, more likely, there is nothing to debate?
'Instrumental' to me as Wilf stated simply means it has a purpose other than recreational; whether said purpose is rational or not is neither said or implied.
Though I could make a valid case for any conflict being at least partly irrational. Necessary perhaps but still irrational... :wry:
In any event, I'm not at all sure that debate is merited. Quite the contrary.
As we are stuck on semantics, no.
Hi Ken,
Sorry I can't buy the premise that all organized violence is "instrumental" minus violent acts that might be "recreational" in nature, though "fun" per se cannot be excluded as a byproduct of the former.
I will wish you a Happy New year though! Cheers!
Applying Clausewitz to Insurgency
How does one best apply Clausewitz's insights on warfare to the realm of Insurgency and counterinsurgency? Reasonable minds can differ, and it is a topic worthy of debate as it strikes to the heart of designing effective strategies, and crafting successful campaign plans for many of the operations we find ourselves embroiled in in the Irregular dominated environment we face today.
The attached paper, written by COL John C Buckley II back in 1995 when he was a Major at Leavenworth does an excellent job of tackling this complex subject. He uses the American experience in Vietnam and the British experience in Ireland to explore his take on a proper application of Clausewitz. Regardless of if you agree or disagree with his position, this is a piece of work well worth considering.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf Alas not working try below.
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc...c=GetTRDoc.pdf
Carl the great fits in my pantheon along
with all the other 20 or so who have good things to offer -- but no total solution because there is none. People are too complex and dynamic (Well, not me; the dynamic bit... :D ) and warfare is too subject to change for anyone to have all the answers.
Having said all that, I totally agree with you that insurgency in general and modern insurgency in particular was a little beyond Clausewitz. He offers little help in how to oppose or support it.
Cogent comment. We are still wedded not only to the Cold War
but to WW II lessons not learned. I'm unsure how to break that mindset but after many years in and a few outside watching the operation, I'm firmly convinced we will continue to have major problems unless we modernize thinking xonsiderably.
That slam, BTW, applies every bit as much to the Civilian Politicians and appointees and to the pundits as it does to the Armed Forces. I'm the old guy but I think all those groups are in a time warp and that the Armed forces are thus constrained to be there as well...