Heh, I think more people would get tricked into philsophy if they knew that all the arguments and logic and thinking were actually just a vehicle for very dry wit.
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Heh, I think more people would get tricked into philsophy if they knew that all the arguments and logic and thinking were actually just a vehicle for very dry wit.
I just started his "Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal". Given my interest in American frontier history and rifles, I don't know how I missed Ewald until now.
Ewald' diary, plus his works "Treatise on Partisan Warfare" and "A Treatise on the Duties of Light Troops," are said tho have influenced British Rifle Officers Sir John Moore and Colonel Coote-Manningham.
His treatises are next on my list after his diary.
The Sharpe's Rifles Series was written just for you, mate!Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
I've probably read half of them! :) They're not bad when I'm in the mood for fiction.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
I'm finding this Hessian Jaeger diary interesting at the moment though. I've discovered something from North American frontier history that I was only vaguely familiar with.
'The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S Military for Modern Wars' by David Ucko
'In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan' by Seth Jones
'The American Culture of War' by Adrian Lewis
'Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems' by Michael Howlett and M. Ramesh
'Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security' by Richard Betts
'A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle Easts' by Lawrence Freedman
Strategic Theory is anything but dull and to think I get paid a scholarship to do this :D
War of the Flea by Robert Taber
The Savage Wars of Peace by Max Boot
The Ayatollah Begs To Differ by Hooman Majd
Hella Nation(audio) By Evan Wright
LTC (ret) Jim Channon's "First Earth Battalion" also can be found here. I feel like I'd fail urinalysis just for reading this. He was decades ahead of his time in places and a complete flake. If you can get past the New Age stuff, he bandies about some ideas that were way ahead of the time (1979).
Kind of like Heinlein; Heinlein envisioned cellphones, waterbeds, teleoperated manipulators, robotic housecleaning devices like the Roomba, and others, but the flying cars, common space travel, and his vision of computers were way off.
I will probably finish War of the Flea tonight (thought it was pretty good) and just picked up Max Boot's "War Made New." Anybody read the latter?Quote:
Originally Posted by OfTheTroops
On the fiction side I recently inhaled Dan Brown's The Lost Symbol, and Daniel Levine's The Last Ember (which was great right up until the end, where it got to be a bit too much).
On the nonfiction side of things, I'm concurrently reading The Sling and The Stone by Hammes and Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla. :D
Next on the stack are Brave New War by John Robb, and a more in-depth re-read of Maurice's Strategikon.
I have begun reading Conrad Black's biography of Richard Nixon (IMO one of America's great and under-rated presidents) as well as D. M. Glantz's The Seige of Leningrad: 900 Days of Terror. Although I have rated Glantz' work very highly in the past it has often had the character and feel of direct translations of Soviet works rather than reflecting his own critical appraisal of events. I am happy to say that Leningrad features more of his own opinion as well as the usually high standard of scholarship. I am thinking about purchasing Clash of Titans next.
All of these are available for free at the Online Library of the American Revolution in the South (approximate title) along with dozens and dozens of other things. Link below.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
http://lib.jrshelby.com/
Since I am in an Anglophile trend with the Sharpe's series, I started Carlo D'Este's Warlord on Churchill.
Also reading Bernard Cornwell's small auto-biographical essay on how and why Sharpe came to be.
The parallel role of parents (or lack of) is startling
Tom
Rifleman and Tom,
You'd enjoy 'Fusiliers: How the British Army lost America but learned to fight' by Mark Urban (Pub. 2007 hardback and 2008 paperback).
My copy has a cover quote 'Superb. An inspiring account' Bernard Cornwell.
Enough said.
I did mention this book before, so apologies if aware already.
davidbfpo
Is this the book, David? I could not find one that matched your title exactlyQuote:
Fusiliers: The Saga of a British Redcoat Regiment in the American Revolution (Paperback) by Mark Urban (Author)
Tom
I just re read the Nomos of the Earth by Carl Schmitt. Not easy reading but amazing.
Yes, sorry I didn't check Amazon etc for variations.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
david
Anyone have a recommendation for a book on complex adaptive systems or systems/complexity theory that is worth reading? I'm looking for something that will be helpful for applying as a frame of reference/analysis, rather than getting into the nuts and bolts of how to really set up the mathematical/modeling sort of analysis that this can get into.
On a reading note, just (finally) finished Rashid's "Descent into Chaos" and found it relatively informative and useful, although I did skim over a lot of his details. Picking Sheehan's "Bright and Shining Lie" back up to finish off the parts I haven't read once and for all. I think it is an excellent and topical book.
I'm currently reading "Military Orientalism" by Patrick Porter. I'm barely halfway through the introduction but it seems to be a study of how culture informs strategy- and especially how Western militaries misread, or purposely choose to ignore the realities of fighting a non-European/American opponent. Familiar stuff to this crowd I'm afraid. I bought it because it's part of a series along with "The Accidental Guerilla".
I also just finished "Afghanistan And the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare" by Hy S. Rothstein.
Here's a review of that book I posted elsewhere:
Quote:
"This deceptively slim volume by Hy Rothstein (former career Special Forces officer and current Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School ) is part diatribe and part lament about military policy in relation to the prosecution of the war in Afghanistan and the implementation of Army Special Forces.
Using Organizational Theory, Rothstein delineates the missteps taken by conventionally minded war planners with narrow parochial interests who shaped America's role and conduct in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2006. Keep in mind, that this book is written specifically about the Rumsfeld-era. The rest of the book is devoted to an explanation of what Special Forces were originally intended to be (a Foreign Internal Defense/ oriented organization) rather than a unit designed or dedicated to "hyper-conventional" direct action "Ranger style" missions. He carefully describes the "Delta-envy" felt by the Army Special Forces community and how it has resulted in a diminished unconventional warfare capacity.
Ultimately he argues for a more population-centric, politically-aware grand strategy in low intensity warfighting. Additionally he argues for a separate service for Special Forces so its leadership can have a seat at the policymaking table instead of relying on Army/JCS leadership to present alternatives to conventional warfare as possible solutions for all problems that potentially require military force. "
What I found most interesting in Urban's book was the discussion on the fact that the British Army of the 18th and early 19th Century kept forgetting what it had learrned about "small wars" and underwent a debate similar to the current debate in the US Army about what kind of force structure to maintain.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
The more things change . . .
No doubt because they wanted to get back to fighting "real" wars :wry:Quote:
Originally Posted by wm
I am not a military historian but after 1815 (Battle of Waterloo mainly) the British Army (which then did not include the Imperial Indian Army) did not fight a "real" war till the Crimean War 1853-56, which was in alliance with France, Turkey and part of Italy. Then there was a long gap till 1914. Post-1945 there has only been one year when the Britsih Army was not on active operations.Quote:
No doubt because they wanted to get back to fighting "real" wars.
Just a point.
davidbfpo
Understand. Point was that many armies discount or completely ignore relevant experience until someone else remainds them none too gently. No issues with the long stretch of colonial brush wars with one exception. The 2nd Boer had many of the elements of the Great War to come.Quote:
Originally Posted by davidbfpo
As a historian and a lessons learned guy, I have come to believe that militaries don't really learn until blood is spilled. A lesson not paid for is not a lesson--it's that "history stuff". I actually had that one tossed at me by a flag officer several years ago regarding convoys and convoy security TTPs.
That is why--and I know Wilf will appreciate this one--it is inevitable and often necessary to cloak the old in the new so folks will listen.
Best
Tom
What about the Boer War did the British not consider a "real" war? They were certainly on the receiving end of some "real" marksmanship!
Off topic, but pity the U.S. didn't adopt the 7x57 Mauser. It would have been a far better choice than the .30-40 Krag and, I hate to admit it, the .30-06 Springfield too.
I think that a lot of lessons are learned and carried forward, but it is a cult of personality thing. For example, Sir Garnet Wlsey had his ring, which was able to apply lessons learneduntil its members died, passed out of service, or passed out of favor (as happened to Redvers Buller in that second--or maybe third if you count the Zulu War--"small war" in South Africa). The US Army has had its "rings" as well. I'm sure we could all recount and reminsice about those "rings" at our leisure. The point is that I think Armies (and hierarchical organizations in general) tend to apply only those things that the current leadership values. The German Army learned what to avoid from WWI in the interwar years, but, after France 1940, I submit quickly "forgot" those important lessons when the Fuhrer through the OKW marginalized von Brauchitsch and the OKH to put his personal leadership stamp on the conduct of the ground war.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
A similar tendency would be the opinion of many U.S. Army and Marine officers that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan do not count as "real war", despite the fact that the two combined undoubtedly stretched U.S. ground forces near the breaking point.Quote:
What about the Boer War did the British not consider a "real" war? They were certainly on the receiving end of some "real" marksmanship!
that the stretching occurred over a long period to a small US Force as opposed to a 'real war' shooting past the breaking point of elements of a larger force in a very short period of time.Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
It's all about intensity. To discount the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as not 'real wars' is foolish and incorrect and in some cases is stupid as its predicated on the fact the opponent is not 'first class' -- that's stupid because they can kill you just as dead as can a better trained and equipped foe...:mad:
To say neither war is high intensity combat against a peer or near peer competitor is true and is saying a quite different thing. One Corps or even one Division taking the KIA toll for Afghanistan from 2001 to date in one day is a whole different kind of war; the Bulge in Europe, 1944-45 saw over 16K KIA in a little over a month. Not long after that, Iwo Jima saw over 6K KIA in about the same amount of time.
Look at the first year and a half of the war and you will see. The commanders considered the Boers illterate peasants--peasants yes, illiterate no--who would fold at the first whiff of gunpowder. Even Churchill who actually saw the threat felt compelled to point out the Brits were going to need twice as many troops. He was proved wrong. They started around 100K and Winnie said 200k. War ended with 400K.Quote:
Originally Posted by Rifleman
Boers used superior rifles with absolute mastery of the ground--Spion Kop is a classic on the risks of occupying high but not the highest ground. They also fought from dug in positions that resisted artillery.
Other lesson was railroads are marvelous for supplies and disastrous for tactical flexibility. The Brits were tied to the rails and the Boers could raid at will. Breaking the cycle lead to population control at its worst: the concentration camp.
I like the 7x57; I have a CZ 550 full stock in that caliber. But I still prefer my 1903 in 30-06.
Tom
Sadly very true, and which is why Military Thought has really got to become the formalised study of the past to gain knowledge and skills to apply to the future.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
We say we do it.... but we do not.
Peter Mansoor's "Baghdad at Sunrise" or Dexter Filkin's "The Forever War": which should I pick up next?
That's good for catching up to the benchmark - where we should already be, but aren't.Quote:
Originally Posted by William F. Owen
The world is nevertheless changing and it requires new balances and new ideas as well. The innovative thought is important to address that.
It's not enough to adopt old innovations, ideas and insights.
I have both on the shelf, but have only read Filkin's book so far. That said, it is a deep and emotional read. The book is stories and observations from his travels during The Long War. Some really exciting and sad stuff, definitely a must read.
Quote:
Originally Posted by karaka
Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia.
Feeding my poli-sci side. Not the most involving read, but a good way to refocus on the importance of informal networks and power relations after focusing on state-level relations for so long.
Now reading After Hegemony, Nagel's the Sling and the Stone, and Xenophon's Anabasis
You dirty dirty realist.Quote:
Originally Posted by tequila
Am finishing up William Manchester's bio of MacArthur (American Caesar).
MacArthur's actions in post-war Japan are ripe for what can be done WRT nation-building.
Sadly, the "global network" makes things too interconnected today to allow an individual that level of autonomy; nor is any entity (nation, military, criminal enterprise, economic aid, diplomatic resolve, etc.) able to be that decisive.
Cap'n Jake,Quote:
Originally Posted by Cap'nJake
I think you are wrong it is possible for an individual to be decisive. The US retired General Jacques "Joe" Klein led a remarkable UN mission in Eastern Slavonia, a Serb rebel enclave in Croatia, which was re-integrated with robust action: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_...estern_Sirmium
IIRC he was backed by "interested parties", with a UN mandate, which both Croatia and local parties had to accept and a robust Jordanian Army battallion which gave him "muscle".
Cannot recall other UN missions which had such a figure and mission.
davidbfpo
I just finished Tommy Franks' American Soldier. Did anybody else's BS alarm go off constantly as they read this?
I have Filkin's and have read Mansoor's. "Baghdad" is a great book, well written, interesting and from a civilian's point of view, it opened up a whole new world about how an effective brigade did things in unconventional and relatively conventional roles.Quote:
Originally Posted by karaka
Doing a little 'light' reading on some topics outside of small wars. All three are philosophical in nature but explore science, religion, and capitalism in very definitive ways.
1. Why does E=MC^2 by Brian Cox and Jeff Forshaw
2. A New Earth by Eckhart Tolle
3. Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand
Next up is Tom and Stan's most excellent adventure. It was on back order at Border's, but the assistant was well aware of the author:D.
Mike
Ayn is a bit of a crazy person, but can (sometimes) be fun to read nonetheless. The recent book of her Q&As was particularly interesting to me. You should check it out if you are interested in some of her philosophy.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
I haven't started atlas shrugged yet. I want to read it b/c it has profoundly impacted many of our current heads of business and politics. From a short biography that I read about her, she seems to write her philosophies to justify her own lifestyle- similar to Immanuel Kant. We'll see. The other two books are really good. Cox and Forshaw have written a prose book to explain modern physics to laymen like me :D.Quote:
Originally Posted by Zack
I'm not really a huge fan of reading fiction for philosophy, as you often have to wade though a whole bunch of nonsense to elicit a view that in any case isn't explicitly spelled out. Her nonfiction philosophical works like Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, the Virtue of Selfishness and Capitalism the Unknown Ideal (or for a good overview her "For the New Intellectual") provide a much denser explanation for her views, and allow you to avoid reading a dreadful behemoth like Atlas Shrugged (1200 pages of bliss it is not). But if you enjoy pain, then you may well love it :DQuote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Mike a better Ayn Rand book for you and shorter is her collection of essays called Philosophy: Who Needs It? It starts with an address she gave to the cadets at West Point, which I posted on here a few years back.Quote:
Originally Posted by MikeF
Note to self- consult the council prior to buying new books :p.Quote:
Originally Posted by Zack
Thanks for the advice Slap/Zack.
Just finished Dexter Filkin's The Forever War. Easily one of the most enjoyable books I've read this year. For a journo he does a bloody good job at describing the lunacy of half the things that happen.
A review by an academic expert of a book The Third Alternative: Between Authoritarianism and Surrender (by an AQ author; NT Google):http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=24121
The review author has written on Ending Jihadism: the transformation of Armed Islamist Groups:http://www.carnegieendowment.org/arb...&article=23805Quote:
The book is the latest development in what can be called a second wave of modern Islamist de-radicalization.
The new body of literature, which is composed of more than 30 books, mainly deconstructs the eight major arguments of jihadism: al-hakimmiyya (God’s exclusive right to legislate), al-riddah (apostasy, mainly of ruling regimes), al-jihad/qital (fighting) for the Islamic state, jihad al-daf‘ (defensive jihad), ahkam al-diyar (rules of conduct in the “abode of Islam” and the “abode of infidelity”), methods for sociopolitical change, the inevitability of confrontation, and the “neo-crusader” arguments.
(Concludes}Most post-jihadist literature does not take a clear stance on democracy. But accepting the “other,” moderating rhetoric and behavior, and participating in electoral politics may be the only viable options for these groups if they want to remain politically significant. In other words, if jihadism heralded the inevitability of armed confrontation, post-jihadism might well entail the inevitable acceptance of democratization.
Will copy this to the 'What are you reading' thread.
davidbfpo
Hat tip to Steve Coll, who has written a short commentary on new writing on the Taliban:http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...w-taliban.html I have picked one sentence:Read more: http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...#ixzz0WgkGhQdSQuote:
It is an outstanding and important collection—just the sort of locally specific, openly debatable, scholarly analysis about the diverse structures and leaders of the Taliban that will be required more and more if the international community is ever to understand the insurgents and divine how to prevent a second Taliban revolution.
The book's website is:http://cup.columbia.edu/book/978-0-2...he-new-taliban
davidbfpo
PS Copied to the 'What are you reading' thread.
I finally got around to reading the Small Wars Manual, USMC 1940 version. It is the remarkable work it was cracked up to be. I kept thinking to my self "Gee, we knew all this stuff in 1940." In parts of it, each sentence seemed to deserve an essay unto itself. The Strongest Tribe was like that too.
Now I am interested in the various small wars that caused the Manual to be written. Does anyone have recommendations beyond the two listed in the SWJ reading list-Banana Wars and With the Old Corps in Nicaragua?
Carl,
I would recommend Keith B. Bickel, Mars Learning: The Marine Corp’s Development of Small Wars Doctrine, 1915-1940 (2000) as possibly of interest to you. Focus's more on the institutional learning than on the 'small wars' themselves, and lessons derived from those wars, though.
TT
carl, something I wanted to pursue but don't have the time to do was trying to find the operations log books that were kept per the recomendation in the Small Wars Manual. I believe these still exist because a while back I found a link at some Marine Corps history site that kept AAR's from past operations they went back a long time. Not all were online but many were. I don't have the link anymore but it had something to do with the Marine Corps Museum site as I remember.Quote:
Originally Posted by carl