Any thoughts on the impending change out of the MNF-I C3? Heard the incumbent is headed to be CG at Benning and his replacement is the current Northcom J3, who last saw the AO as a div G3 staff guy in DS/DS.
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Any thoughts on the impending change out of the MNF-I C3? Heard the incumbent is headed to be CG at Benning and his replacement is the current Northcom J3, who last saw the AO as a div G3 staff guy in DS/DS.
This just turned up on my e-mail. May be of interest to those here.
Quote:
PETRAEUS, AFGHANISTAN AND THE LESSONS OF IRAQ
By George Friedman
Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded the surge in Iraq, was recommended April 23 by U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to be (CENTCOM). If confirmed by the U.S. Senate, this means Petraeus would remain in ultimate command of the war in Iraq while also taking command in Afghanistan. Days after the recommendation, there was yet another unsuccessful attempt on the life of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on April 27. Then, media reports May 3 maintained the United States might strengthen its forces in Afghanistan to make up for shortfalls in NATO commitments. Across the border in Pakistan, April 25, the first fruits of the Pakistani government's efforts to increase its -- though these talks appeared to collapse April 28. Clearly, there appears to be movement with regard to Afghanistan. The question is whether this movement is an illusion -- and if it is not an illusion, where is the movement going?
Petraeus' probable command in Afghanistan appears to be the most important of these developments. In Iraq, Petraeus changed the nature of the war. The change he brought to bear there was not so much military as political. Certainly, he deployed his forces differently than his predecessors, dispersing some of them in small units based in villages and neighborhoods contested by insurgents. That was not a trivial change, but it was not as important as the process of political discussions he began with local leaders.
The first phase of the U.S. counterinsurgency, which lasted from the beginning of the Iraqi insurgency in mid-2003 until the U.S. surge in early 2007, essentially consisted of a three-way civil war, in which the United States, the Sunni insurgents and the Shiite militias fought each other. The American strategic goal appears to have been to defeat both the insurgents and the militias, while allowing them to attrit each other and civilian communities.
Reshaping the Struggle in Iraq
Petraeus reshaped the battle by observing that the civil war was much more than a three-way struggle. Tensions also existed within both the Iraqi Sunni and the Shiite communities. Petraeus' strategy was to exploit those tensions, splitting both his opponents and forming alliances with some of them. Petraeus recognized that political power in the Sunni community rested with the traditional tribal leaders -- the sheikhs -- and that these sheikhs were both divided among themselves, and most important, extremely worried about the foreign jihadist fighters from al Qaeda.
Al Qaeda ultimately wanted to replace the sheikhs as leaders of their respective communities. It used its influence with younger, more radical Sunnis to create a new cadre of leaders. The more U.S. pressure on the Sunni community as a whole, the less room for maneuver the sheikhs had. U.S. policy was inadvertently strengthening al Qaeda by making the sheikhs dependent on its force against the United States. Similarly, the Shiite community was split along multiple lines, with Iran deeply involved with multiple factions.
Petraeus changed U.S. policy from what was essentially warfare against the Sunnis in particular, but also the Shia, as undifferentiated entities. He sought to recruit elements previously regarded as irredeemable, and with threats, bribes and other inducements, forced open splits among Sunnis and Shia. In doing so, Petraeus also opened lines to the Iranians, who used their fear of a civil war among the Shia -- and a disastrous loss of influence by Iran -- to suppress both intra-Shiite violence and Shiite violence against Sunnis.
The result of this complex political maneuvering coupled with the judicious use of military force was a decline in casualties not only among American forces, but also among Iraqis from intercommunal warfare. The situation has not by any means resolved itself, but Petraeus’ strategy expanded splits in the Sunni and Shiite communities that he tried to exploit. The most important thing Petraeus did was to reduce the cohesion of U.S. enemies by recognizing they were not in fact a cohesive entity, and moving forward on that basis.
The verdict is far from in on the success of Petraeus' strategy in Iraq. The conflict has subsided, but certainly has not concluded. Indeed, we have seen increased attacks in Sunni regions recently, while conflict with radical Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr’s forces in Baghdad is increasing. In many ways, the success of Petraeus’ strategy depends on Iran continuing to perceive the United States as a long-term presence in Iraq, and continuing to regard suppressing conflict among Shia important so the Iraqi Shia can constitute a united bloc in the government of Iraq. But the strategy is not foolproof; should the jihadists and some of the Sunni sheikhs decide to stage a countersurge in the months ahead of the U.S. election, the fabric of political relations would unravel with startling speed, and the military situation would change dramatically. Petraeus certainly has improved the situation. He has not won the war.
The Afghan Challenge
Applying Petraeus' politico-military strategy to will be difficult. First, the ratio of forces to population there is even worse than in Iraq, making the application of decisive military force even more difficult. But even more important, unlike in Iraq -- where the U.S. effort began purely on a military track -- U.S. involvement in Afghanistan began on a political track much like Petraeus brought to bear in Iraq in 2007.
As we have pointed out many times, the United States did not actually invade Afghanistan in October 2001. That would have been impossible 30 days after 9/11. Instead, the United States made political arrangements with anti-Taliban factions and tribes to use their force in conjunction with U.S. airpower. The payoff for these factions and tribes was freedom from the Taliban and domination of the national government of Afghanistan, or at least their respective regions.
The first level of force the U.S. introduced into Afghanistan was a handful of CIA operatives followed by a small number of U.S. Army Special Forces teams and other special operations forces units. Their mission was to coordinate operations of new U.S. allies among the Northern Alliance -- which had been under Russian influence -- and among the Afghan Shia and Tajiks, who had been under Iranian influence. The solution ran through Moscow and Tehran on the strategic level, and then to these local forces on the tactical level.
Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007. This strategy was followed from the beginning in Afghanistan. Having forced the Taliban to retreat and disperse, the United States failed to prevent the Taliban from regrouping for two reasons. First, the political alliances it tried to create were too unstable and backed by too little U.S. force. Second, the Taliban enjoyed sanctuary in Pakistan, which Islamabad was unable or unwilling to deny them. As a result, the Taliban regrouped and re-emerged as a capable force, challenging insufficient U.S. and NATO forces on the ground
Less than an invasion, it was a political operation backed up with airpower and a small number of U.S. ground forces. In other words, it looked very much like the strategy that Petraeus implemented in Iraq in 2007.
160 000+ troops is a small number in Iraq?? Maybe George had one too many beers when he wrote that sentence. Why he wants to compare a few hundred Air Force special operators to target JDAMS with a 160 000 man force is quite a bit beyond me. The two campaigns neither began the same way nor look the same way now.
I guess Friedman is groping to show how Petraeus may approach the challenge in Afghanistan, but he seems to be laboring under several misconceptions.
Firstly, the 'Taliban' that has re-emerged is not the same organization that we crushed in 2001. In fact, 'Taliban' is little more than a label of convenience for those too lazy or too ignorant to really dig into what is going on in Afghanistan right now. There are at least four major insurgent organizations operating in Afghanistan now, alongside and sometimes in cooperation with criminal traffickers of various stripes. Their motivation ranges from reestablishing the caliphate to creating Pashtunistan to protecting the poppy trade to simply making a living as an insurgent. Their support comes from disaffected tribes, aspirant warlords, criminals, the transport mafia, trans-national terrorists, Pakistani pols and soldiers with a Machiavellian bent, and the huge pool of unemployed young men with no particular homeland, future, or tribal loyalties. In other words, its a Byzantine mess that makes Iraq look like Switzerland by comparison.
Secondly, there is no possibility of a coherent strategic approach to 'winning' in Afghanistan. The current command structure will not allow it; NATO has the unity and command discipline of the French host at Agincourt. Each province is essentially a fiefdom within which the various responsible nations pursue those operations they deem necessary. The non-military side of the house is, if possible, even less coherent.
Thirdly, Petraeus is not in charge in Afghanistan. ISAF is a NATO headquarters; even when an American is commanding ISAF he is (technically) responsible to a NATO Joint Force Commander in Europe. Some may pooh-pooh this as a convenient fiction, but it is not, believe me. Yes, we are running our own separate war in Afghanistan alongside the NATO effort, and McNeil and his successors are likely to listen when Petraeus speaks, but I'm not sure Friedman really grasps the command dynamic in that theater.
The Petraeus Doctrine by Andrew J. Bacevich, The Atlantic, October 2008 issue.
Iraq-style counterinsurgency is fast becoming the US Army’s organizing principle. Is our military preparing to fight the next war, or the last one?
Much more at The Atlantic.Quote:
For a military accustomed to quick, easy victories, the trials and tribulations of the Iraq War have come as a rude awakening. To its credit, the officer corps has responded not with excuses but with introspection. One result, especially evident within the US Army, has been the beginning of a Great Debate of sorts.
Anyone who cares about the Army’s health should take considerable encouragement from this intellectual ferment. Yet anyone who cares about future US national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.
What makes this debate noteworthy is not only its substance, but its character—the who and the how.
The military remains a hierarchical organization in which orders come from the top down. Yet as the officer corps grapples with its experience in Iraq, fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up. In today’s Army, the most-creative thinkers are not generals but mid-career officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels.
Like any bureaucracy, today’s military prefers to project a united front when dealing with the outside world, keeping internal dissent under wraps. Nonetheless, the Great Debate is unfolding in plain view in publications outside the Pentagon’s purview, among them print magazines such as Armed Forces Journal, the Web-based Small Wars Journal, and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.
The chief participants in this debate - all Iraq War veterans - fixate on two large questions. First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong? Second, how should the hard-earned lessons of Iraq inform future policy? Hovering in the background of this Iraq-centered debate is another war that none of the debaters experienced personally - namely, Vietnam.
The protagonists fall into two camps: Crusaders and Conservatives...
political observer and strategist. Alas, I think he also proves yet again that his military strategy and observation capability is somewhat less well refined.
Everyone should be applauding the Army for having this debate instead of wringing their hands in concern over decisions being made by the Armed Forces that will effectively determine national strategy. We tried that once; the Weinberger and Powell Doctrines. How'd that work out?
John Nagl has some good points -- and some, IMO, less good. Gian Gentile has some good points -- and also some, IMO, less good. We need a balanced total spectrum force. Nagl, Gentile, Bacevich, White and the combined brain power of the last four and next three SAMS Courses have no clue what the next war will be like. The Armed Forces have to be ready for all types of current and possible future warfare. The 9/11 debacle and the last few years have proven that, we cannot predict what the civilian masters will direct; what we can do is prepare to cover the total spectrum of warfare, like it or not. It will not be easy and rice bowls will have to be broken but I have no doubt that will occur.
I've read a lot of Bacevich - my only general criticism is that sometimes he uses loaded terms to make his points - in short, a bit of over-advocacy at times. Of course, his critics on policy can be even more over-loaded. "Wacko Bacevich ... leftist ... socialist" (LOL) was one comment by one of my email correspondents. After a bit more of that "wacko" stuff - on both sides - we decided to play a nice game of chess. He got clobbered - hint, I cheat.
Now, more seriously, I agree with Ken that AB is a bit off here - since I don't see the danger.
It is possible that the choices will default to the military (AB last para.), but that is not a military problem.Quote:
AB article
Yet anyone who cares about future U.S. national-security strategy should view the debate with considerable concern: it threatens to encroach upon matters that civilian policy makers, not soldiers, should decide.
Here is my take (very much IMO).
My view is the equation: policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics -- ideas move up and down the food chain. If they don't, the system breaks down. Note: I am not suggesting micro-manipulation from the top to the bottom. Ken and others can explain better how well that worked in Korea and Vietnam.
My concern is whether the politicians (politics and policy people) are capable of understanding, much less properly applying, the ideas that move up the foodchain to them. When Congress gets a 10-15% positive approval rating, we have a definite competence problem at the policy level. When perhaps a dozen or so (maybe there were more - that is what I recall) read one version or another of the DCI's WMD report pre-OIF, we know we have a problem.
And, yup, I read the public version - and was not impressed (too many lawyerly weasel-words in the bold-faced paragraphs and too many stale facts). I thought (and still do) that the policy behind OIF I was justified for other reasons.
Also read MG Scales article from another thread. Don't know him, only his TV persona (to me, positive). Isolated out his 9 bullet poiints, and thought - how many congresspeople could even begin to understand what he was proposing ? The executive branch may be somewhat more competent.
What our policy makers seem to do too often (IMO) is to buy the flavor of the day - not a recipe for success; and probably a recipe to get too many good people killed.
Expressed policy (morphing critter that it is) does make a difference - since it is the measure by which one determines whether the armed conflict is "won" or "lost".
PS: We won the Southeast Asian "War Games" hands down - based on the expressed policy. You might dwell on that one. That comment is not made lightly, but after considerable decades-long thought.
Not as strong as his interview with Moyers.
Being easily identified as a "Crusader", I think he mischaracterizes Nagl's arguments. I have never heard Nagl call for what he characterizes above. He has called for more focus on counterinsurgency and a standing advisory corps, which is a long way from Prof. Bacevich's caricature.Quote:
Gentile does not doubt that counter*insurgencies will figure in the Army’s future. Yet he questions Nagl’s certainty that situations resembling Iraq should become an all-but-exclusive preoccupation. Historically, expectations that the next war will resemble the last one have seldom served the military well.
.....
Embedded within this argument over military matters is a more fundamental and ideologically charged argument about basic policy. By calling for an Army configured mostly to wage stability operations ...
Likewise, I disagree with COL Gentile, as many on this board know.
I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.
Prof. Bacevich's argument doesn't advance the ball beyond this binary debate we've been having for months.
As I called for at the Armor conference in May - we must do both. I believe we can. And I call on all sides to stop hyperventilating about coin-only or conventional only focus and propose what we should look like - in structure and education - for full spectrum conflict in the future.
Does anyone think if we start a Big Wars Journal/Council some of the consistant concerns might be addressed.
Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone. As a I have said before, there is advice for Politicians, and advice for soldiers. Soldiers do what they are told. (compare and contrast the behaviour of Allenby with MacArthur.) Most of what I read relating to grand strategy seems not to want to make that distinction, and seems incapable of grasping the importance of that same distinction.
What is more, I am not really sure the study "strategy" and especially "grand strategy" is a true discipline. Part of me hopes it is, because it seems like an area where you can suggest all sorts of things without having to take responsibility for the outcomes. :)
Small Wars are the new Big Wars. It's just fashion! (-and this board does an excellent job of addressing both!)
Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.
What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.
I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".
Exactly. A part of the problem is a general lack of military knowledge among the denizens of the Executive Branch (to include DoD) and among Congressional staffrers (Added to which Congresscritters have 'interests' which may be at odds with strategic or military sense...). The Armed forces will do the strategic planning by default much as they picked up the nation building jobs of Agriculture, Commerce, State and USAID due to their inability to do so initially. In the end, the civilian control will still be there...Too true...Quote:
My concern is whether the politicians (politics and policy people) are capable of understanding, much less properly applying, the ideas that move up the foodchain to them. When Congress gets a 10-15% positive approval rating, we have a definite competence problem at the policy level. When perhaps a dozen or so (maybe there were more - that is what I recall) read one version or another of the DCI's WMD report pre-OIF, we know we have a problem.
. . .
What our policy makers seem to do too often (IMO) is to buy the flavor of the day - not a recipe for success; and probably a recipe to get too many good people killed.
That is a very astute -- and IMO, correct -- comment.Quote:
PS: We won the Southeast Asian "War Games" hands down - based on the expressed policy. You might dwell on that one. That comment is not made lightly, but after considerable decades-long thought.
Let me also repost Wilf's comment; it's important:Quote:
Personally, I am very comfortable with small wars and COIN. Big Wars are real cans of worms.. but... having an Army that is prepared to do both is not hard! It just requires money, and good leadership. Anyone with a 14-year olds reading ability can be trained to do it.
What is more, you don't/won't have a choice. Wars in the 21st Century will contain elements of both, just as "old war" did. Both elements will rise and fall independently of each other and without warning.
I think this is pretty obvious to all the observers who don't have "skin" in the "Future of the US Army game".
The equation was my attempt to do at least two things:Quote:
from wilf
Personally I don't know of many folks who understand the differentiation between policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics, and I include myself. Little I read today shows me that I am alone.
1. To distinguish between the primary focus of civilian input (policy) and the rest of the chain (strategy <> operations <> tactics), which IMO should be the focus of military designers, planners and tacticians.
2. To emphasize that there has to be communications between levels; so, the "<>" sign. E.g., policy (what the civilian policy makers want) obviously will control the military designer's design (let's call that strategy). However, the range of designs will obviously be controlled by the then-current capabilities of what the military can do (operations <> tactics). So, strategy will then feed back into policy - we can do A, B and C, but not D and E.
Admittedly, the terms (policy <> strategy <> operations <> tactics) are squishy in each application. E.g., in Vietnam (leaving its policy <> strategy issues on the shelf), we had many, many operations (Operation Dewey Canyon, which just came out of my skull for no special reason, etc.). Each of them had its own planning and tactics (many of which were the same or similar as those employed in other operations).
Now, if we draw back a bit to a larger geographic picture (Southeast Asia), we could look at Vietnam as one operation, Malaya CT as another and the Philippines Huk thing as another. In that sense, Operation Dewey Canyon in Vietnam starts to look more like a tactic in that broader context.
Note that I am not trying to cram these concepts into neat little boxes because that ain't possible. And I don't care what specific terms are used - the equation works in my mind, but to each their own - so long as we can still communicate the concepts.
Another point I was trying to make is that civilian policy makers have to know what they are asking the military to do - and be willling to listen if it can't. There seems a tendency by pols to believe that, just because we have the best military in the world, it can do everything at a moment's notice without failures. And, many times it has done just that.
But, the imposition of policy without consideration of then-current capabilities can kill people. E.g., we had a choice between at least two policies in OIF I:
1. Invade and Leave.
2. Invade and Occupy.
The resultant military design, planning and tactics (strategy <> operations <> tactics) would be quite different in each case - I'd leave it to the military to develop those, within its capabilities.
If that is ignored, we have a truism that is not trite - if we were math types, we might call it an axiom.
If we had a legal remedy for that kind of "gross professional negligence" (which we don't - except the ballot box), my legal guns would be aimed much less at the military, and much more at the policy makers - especially those who seem to have morphed the policy in mid-stream.Quote:
from Cavguy
I think it was gross professional negligence that we entered Iraq 2003 with no institutional foundation in COIN. It will be gross professional negligence if we face another conflict (after these have subsided and there is a chance to retrain) and aren't prepared conventionally either.
Israel trained it's army to fight counter-insurgency and had trouble fighting Hezbollah.
It's approximately the difference between police work and conventional warfare. Mixing the two jobs in one unit, or mixing the units in one job, tends to be stressful. Loosely, a soldier has to shoot first and maybe ask questions later. A cop has to work in the opposite order and defuse a situation. You can't defuse Hezbollah.
And you can't defuse the Russian troops in Georgia. Although the small wars experts might be of use to the Georgians, as they were to the Afghans not so long ago.
The US military, focused on SOCOM, mixed the immiscible in Iraq. But also think of the Kent State shootings, a case of unfriendly fire. And think of the IDF in southern Lebanon.
The only solution is agility.
With respect that is slightly simplistic. The conduct of the 2nd Lebanon War had far more to do with non-sensical operational aims than it did with tactical conduct. 90% of what tactical shortcomings there were can be attributed to under-funding of training. The regular infantry units, fresh from their regular training, had far fewer problems than the reserve units.
The British Army handled it just fine with 1 BR Corps in Germany providing units to Northern Ireland for 38 years. Again it was correctly funded and planned for.Quote:
It's approximately the difference between police work and conventional warfare. Mixing the two jobs in one unit, or mixing the units in one job, tends to be stressful.
OK, it may be, but I don't understand how.Quote:
The only solution is agility.
two stressful jobs is stressful.
Not that I've figured out what bearing Kent State has on any of this...:confused:
I shall agree with CAVGUY, the framing of this dialogue as an all or nothing issue has really strained my last reserve of patience.:mad: You would think we were in an election year:p
An apt analogy might be the following....
Two neighbors on opposite ends of the street are celebrating the arrival of new year. One is banging pots & pans to create a racket, the other is using fireworks. Each notices the other and in the midst of continuing their racket begin a shouting match ridiculing the other as using an inappropriate form of noise maker for the new year's festivities.... Everyone else on the block just wishes the two idiots would go to bed, the novelty of their disagreement wearing off nearly 10 seconds into the new year.
Or put another way, I don't care that the sky is falling or the earth is rising... the clouds are fluffy and won't hurt anyone.
Or put another way, thank god the war news day has become quiet enough that these issues are hot topics of discussion. Something must be going well.
Live well and row
Fred Talpiot, we tend not to like "drive by postings" here. You might do well to introduce yourself. Here
Hack, it can't going so well for the media if they need to add this stuff to get enough column inches to satisfy their advdertisers.Quote:
Originally Posted by hacksaw
I didn't know they taught casuistry at A & M. :DQuote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
Yep, September. Time to beat the dead horse again.
If the Armed Forces can be equally prepared for both COIN and conventional ("it's easy...the clouds are fluffy...the British Army handled it just fine...I believe we can) why did SEC Gates in the latest NDS specifically say we'll have to accept risk by concentrating on the wars we are currently fighting? Why is field artillery broken? Why have we virtually stopped training for conventional warfighting above the company/battalion level?
Look, being prepared for war at any level goes well beyond training in the field or on the ranges. It includes buying the right type of equipment, training staffs, building force structure, allocating time in institutional courses, writing doctrine, allowing senior leaders the chance to move around units larger than battalions, building the right type of logistical pipelines. To say that we can have companies or maneuver battalions trained for both coin and con misses the point. To say that all we need is enough time or money ignores the fact that we have neither.
People say we can be prepared for both. I look around and see that we have apparently stopped preparing for conventional warfighting. I would love to have somebody point out to me how we are keeping our powder dry should a conflict arise with larger stakes than those bet on Iraq or Afghanistan.
I remember in the first Gulf War how the British Army absolutely gutted itself to field a single armored division. Just as one example, whole regiments of operational tanks in Germany had to be cannibalized to provide spares for the Gulf. I'm afraid we are heading toward a similar crunch.
Choosing between COIN and Con is not a false dichotomy. It's moot to say that armed forces can be prepared equally for both; armed forces won't, not in the real world of constrained resources.
I don't think anyone said it was easy. It's perfectly doable, and you may have to do both. It's not a choice. As to all the problems, these are the result of choices.
Then you have to choose, and the choice must be explicitly recognised as that cause by limited resources and not the US fighting man as being too stupid to achieve the require level of competency.Quote:
To say that we can have companies or maneuver battalions trained for both coin and con misses the point. To say that all we need is enough time or money ignores the fact that we have neither.
A problem that was caused solely by deploying a 1 BR Corps Division, outside the 1 BR Corps area, into a desert. Do something you have never planned for or resourced and problems are sure to occur.Quote:
I remember in the first Gulf War how the British Army absolutely gutted itself to field a single armored division. Just as one example, whole regiments of operational tanks in Germany had to be cannibalized to provide spares for the Gulf. I'm afraid we are heading toward a similar crunch.
I agree. It's not a false dichotomy. It just means you CON army is badly suited to the more prevalent form of conflict and your COIN Army might not/cannot fulfil its actual reason for being. Until I joined this forum it never occurred to me that it was even an issue.Quote:
Choosing between COIN and Con is not a false dichotomy. It's moot to say that armed forces can be prepared equally for both; armed forces won't, not in the real world of constrained resources.
Eden,
You are mixing up the arguement. While in the midst of a war, you prepare for that war and that has nothing to do with the article or this thread...
This thread is about beyond OIF & OEF, and determining the aim point so that it drives DOTMLPF/resource allocation...
The position of those of us who don't think the sky is falling, is the following...
We can have an Army fully competent in conventional/high end , without throwing out the COIN baby with the bath water. This is especially true if you reward/promote those of such traits that have some flexibility of thought (did I hear anyone say well rounded warrior).
Really what is it about what has worked in Iraq that is in direct opposition to successful conventional warfighting, really name the task and tell me how an adjustment of conditions or standards wouldn't update it. Not to mention, exactly which fight can you envision that we win and won't need to transition to stability or other "unconventional" operations.
Now if you want to have a debate no the proper balance/weighting of unit training and DOTMLPF is appropriate given our best guess about the future... OK that is a discussion worthy of the brain cells we'd expend.
However, if a person advocates that the catastrophic threat of a conventional defeat mandates that we return to the good ole days of the mid 80s to early 2000s, then they fail to recognize that Irregular War is the most regular of all other types of irregular activity (unless we include bowel activity).
Speaking of which I must end NOW!
Here is my main criticism of Bacevich's piece:
Classifying the two sides of the debate as Crusaders vs. Conservatives seems remarkably unfair.
In Bacevich's description the "Crusaders" become COIN ideologues instead of what they should be viewed as: COIN innovators. I don't mean innovators in the sense that they have re-invented the wheel here (how groundbreaking the operations and tactics behind the "Surge" strategy are is the subject of another conversation).
Petraeus, Nagl, McMaster, and those like them haven't fought for COIN because its always the right answer- they have argued that a COIN strategy is best for THIS war. None of them strike me as so committed as seeing COIN as the panacea to future conflicts. Moreover, these innovators are as aware as anyone of just how hard and resource intensive COIN can be. To successfully implement a COIN strategy in every future conflict would be expensive, counterproductive, and maybe even dangerous.
Nagl, for example, has recently been pushing to increase US training capacity (more of a FID capability). The COIN innovators dont qualify as COIN ideologues: they are asymmetrically focused, perhaps, but not blinded by a crusade for COIN. To suggest otherwise, as I read Bacevich doing, seems to miss the point: strategic flexibility is the only cure to a rigid adherence to prior assumptions- this will be even more true in the future.
Bacevich is a guy that I have incredible respect for. He, more than anyone, has reason to study and understand this era of conflict; not only because of his profession, but also his personal loss. I reference him a lot in my grad school work and was relatively impressed with this article. He left me a little wanting for solutions, but maybe that was his point.
...and CPTs and LTsQuote:
The military remains a hierarchical organization in which orders come from the top down. Yet as the officer corps grapples with its experience in Iraq, fresh ideas are coming from the bottom up. In today’s Army, the most-creative thinkers are not generals but mid-career officers—lieutenant colonels and colonels.
Hey, all right!Quote:
Nonetheless, the Great Debate is unfolding in plain view in publications outside the Pentagon’s purview, among them print magazines such as Armed Forces Journal, the Web-based Small Wars Journal, and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.
Where do we start?Quote:
First, why, after its promising start, did Operation Iraqi Freedom go so badly wrong?
He called us Crusaders. I can live with that.Quote:
The protagonists fall into two camps: Crusaders and Conservatives.
AmenQuote:
Typical of this generation is Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, once the top U.S. commander in Baghdad, who in late 2003 was still describing the brewing insurgency as “strategically and operationally insignificant,” when the lowliest buck sergeant knew otherwise.
The think tank is CNAS, who offer a "Bacevich Fellowship", established in memory of the author's son.Quote:
After serving in Iraq as a battalion operations officer, Nagl helped rewrite the Army’s counterinsurgency manual and commanded the unit that prepares U.S. soldiers to train Iraqi security forces. (Earlier this year, he left the Army to accept a position with a Washington think tank.)
Not to insinuate that the Army doesn't need Warriors...just ones that are independent thinkers and decision makers, requiring a whole host of abilities. We aren't there yet, but we are getting better.Quote:
It also implies changing the culture of the officer corps. An Army that since Vietnam has self-consciously cultivated a battle-oriented warrior ethos will instead emphasize, in Nagl’s words, “the intellectual tools necessary to foster host-nation political and economic development.”
Leading to the discussion of the criticality (or not) of diminishing "combat skills" for many in the Army. Particularly guys like me, who have all but forgotten the basics of our jobs; like how to compute manual Artillery safety. Partly my fault, but an epidemic, nonetheless.Quote:
According to the emerging Petrae*us Doctrine, the Army (like it or not) is entering an era in which armed conflict will be protracted, ambiguous, and continuous—with the application of force becoming a lesser part of the soldier’s repertoire.
I don't know if "constabulary" is the right word. Maybe semantics, but how do we define the role of "constabulary" in COIN. When I think of Constabulary Force, I can only think of post WWII Germany. Iraq and AFG are totally different; kinetic fights exist, we have an actual enemy there, etc. The only similarity would be population control/basic policing, right?Quote:
All of this forms a backdrop to Gentile’s core concern: that an infatuation with stability operations will lead the Army to reinvent itself as “a constabulary,” adept perhaps at nation-building but shorn of adequate capacity for conventional war-fighting.
But this is the fight right now. If NTC maintained a Force on Force only approach, the Army would be remiss in not training its' units for their missions. It would only make sense this is going on.Quote:
The concern is not idle. A recent article in Army magazine notes that the Army’s National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California, long “renowned for its force-on-force conventional warfare maneuver training,” has now “switched gears,” focusing exclusively on counter*insurgency warfare. Rather than practicing how to attack the hill, its trainees now learn about “spending money instead of blood, and negotiating the cultural labyrinth through rapport and rapprochement.”
Note what I said previously. The FA is pursuing other routes to "stay relevant", but it's not easy. I see we've picked up the "EWO" mission for our warrants. Innovations like Excalibur will help us in our fight to stay relevant, as well. I'm an opposer of any advocate of the FA picking up the FID or MTT mission solely. I don't think that would ever happen. Although right now, I'd argue the Army is leaning on the FA pretty heavily to fill Transition Teams. In regards to the COIN fight, I don't think we are as "dead" as other branches, namely the ADA and CHEM Corps. I would argue the point "FA plays a limited role"...maybe from the Schoolhouse view, but FA Soldiers are totally engaged, doing a plethora of jobs, some they are trained for, some not.Quote:
The officer corps itself recognizes that conventional-warfare capabilities are already eroding. In a widely circulated white paper, three former brigade commanders declare that the Army’s field-artillery branch—which plays a limited role in stability operations, but is crucial when there is serious fighting to be done—may soon be all but incapable of providing accurate and timely fire support. Field artillery, the authors write, has become a “dead branch walking.”
Can't we do both?Quote:
Observers differ on whether the Long War’s underlying purpose is democratic transformation or imperial domination: Did the Bush administration invade Iraq to liberate that country or to control it?
So is mine. It's a fine line. Remember that this is an all volunteer force. If a jingoistic FP becomes the standard, we might not have as many volunteers.Quote:
When Gentile charges Nagl with believing that there are “no limits to what American military power … can accomplish,” his real gripe is with the likes of Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.
I think there are not only viable solutions to this quandary, but literal comprimises that we can make. What about organizing conventional "war-fighting" divisions or brigades and organize others as COIN units? Why wouldn't this be a legitimate option? Of course, if we are in a long and protracted COIN war, the "conventional" units won't have to deploy, in theory. In a conventional fight, do the COIN units stay home? That is the first red flag I can think of.Quote:
The effect of Nagl’s military reforms, Gentile believes, will be to reduce or preclude that possibility, allowing questions of the second order (How should we organize our Army?) to crowd out those of the first (What should be our Army’s purpose?).
Kudos to Bacevich for keeping this flame burning bright for all of us to debate.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7610405.stmQuote:
BBC
Page last updated at 13:11 GMT, Thursday, 11 September 2008 14:11 UK
No victory in Iraq, says Petraeus
The outgoing commander of US troops in Iraq, Gen David Petraeus, has said that he will never declare victory there.....
.....
He said he did not know that he would ever use the word "victory": "This is not the sort of struggle where you take a hill, plant the flag and go home to a victory parade... it's not war with a simple slogan."
At same link, a one minute video clip.
I think the article makes a lot more sense when paralleled with the cover article of the same issue:
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200810/mccain
which attempts to continue the Vietnam/Iraq analogy into parallels between McCain and his father, who remained optimistic about Abrams' improvements in Vietnam up until Saigon fell, with the implication that "your father was grossly wrong about South Vietnam, isn't the same true about Iraq?"
The only similarity I can see between the "SE Asian conflicts" people short-hand as "Vietnam" and Iraq is that both involved Americans. Am I missing something? Drawing parallels between the two is not something that any serious student of military history or science should be doing.
...and if they are, is it true and is it useful?
Well, it's useful for any number of political reasons, though from the standpoint of the murky American relationship with limited war there are certainly more parallels to be drawn than about the conflicts themselves.
It just struck me reading Goldberg's article that hmm.... I heard this argument before....about 20 pages ago made by Bacevich concerning the tie between "Crusaders" and Vietnam revisionists. I did not mean to say it would make any more sense of his arguments, just place them in the context that I believe he and the editors of the Atlantic intended them to be read.
Hi,
While I was doing another paper for school out of curiosity, I found this podcast online of a lecture that Gen. Petraeus gave yesterday at Harvard. It's very amazing and I highly recommend checking it out, since I saw a blog here posted on Petraeus and leadership. Please let me know what you think:D
http://www.vamortgagecenter.com/blog...ch-at-harvard/
Naomi
Hi everyone,:D
Here is the link to another lecture that Gen. Petraeus gave a few days ago at KSU. Here it is:
http://ome.ksu.edu/lectures/landon/bio/petraeus.html
Naomi
This might have been shown earlier, but at the current time (2200 PST) General Petraeus is giving a presentation at the World Affairs Council on CSPAN.
None of his presentation would surprise anyone here, but it's always interesting to watch a master of his trade talk about his topic of passion. He's also incredibly humble and presents the truth, warts and all. I often wonder how he made it so far in the Army. :p
You reminded me of an old story...
E9 to E5: Don't ask why - just do it!
E5 to E9: C'mon - you didn't make E9 by never asking "why"...
E9 to E5: No - but that's damn sure how I made E6.
But yeah, honest leadership is always appreciated. :wry:
I just watched the entire lecture at the World Affairs site from a link to the full length video on youtube. Here it is: http://wacsf.vportal.net/?fileid=5876
I was very amazed by the presentation, but I'm a civilian and find military things foreign and fascinating.:D
Is it just me, or has General Petraeus completely dropped off the radar scope? The military 'faces' of Afghanistan seem to have become Mullen and McChrystal. Why has Petraeus turned invisible in the debate over troop levels, strategy, and tactics all of a sudden? Any insights from the group?
He's probably busy working behind the scenes right now trying to balance the political and military efforts. Once his thinik tank group finishes their work (similar to what many are doing here on SWC), I'm sure he'll go public to start framing and selling the way ahead.
One question that I was considering. Since AFRICOM has stood up, I wonder how well the horizontal communication is between the the two commands, state, and the NSC regarding AQ? I imagine that coordination would be a full time job just coordinating.
v/r
Mike
to fix CentCom? :D
Ever heard of Humpty Dumpty:D
Not enough king's horses and men for that job
Why should he publicly weigh in? Do we really need every 4-star in the chain of command joining the public debate before senior leadership has clearly articulated our strategy?
It seems like it's probably more a unity of command issue. The war is in the capable hands of GEN McChrystal; what is the benefit of CENTCOM publicly contradicting anything coming from either CJCS or theater?
Hacksaw: Accurately and regrettably...:(
Adrienne: Accurately and sensibly. :cool:
That's sort of my point. McChrystal works for Petraeus - technically - at least when he's not wearing his NATO hat. And Petraeus is the strategic commander, while McChrystal is working at the operational level. If anybody should be articulating the military strategy for Afghanistan, it should be Petraeus. It's as if Omar Bradley was spokesman for our strategy to beat the Nazis in 1944.
I mean, Petraeus was front man for the Surge in Iraq. By most accounts he performed well in that role. Has he been cut out of the picture because the current administration wants McChrystal to be the poster child for Afghan strategy? Or because he is too closely associated in the public mind with Iraq and/or the Bush administration? Or because we've completely lost the bubble on the difference between strategy, operations, and tactics? Or because he doesn't fully agree with the proposed solutions?
Really, I'm just curious, because it seems odd that he has fallen so completely off the radar scope.
question.
Going back to Iraq, Petraeus "worked for" CENTCOM but really never did. When Fallon tried to impose the chain of command he was asked to retire. Today, Odierno works for Petraeus - probably more so than the latter worked for Fallon - but Petraeus is letting odierno run his show, at least in public.
Afghanistan is more complex. On the one hand CENTCOM is the higher HQ; on the other SACEUR. Managing the Petraeus - Stavridis relationship must be interesting to say the least. I'm not even going into the commander/ambassador relationship - we've done that before:confused: Suffice that Petraeus is consistent in his public treatment of his two "subordinates."
My personal view is that the UCP does not serve us well when we set up a 4 star command in a theater. The theater commander is operating above the operational level and is analogous to a GCC with political as well as military responsibilities. We should,I think, treat him as if he were a GCCand make all the GCCs supporting commanders. What we call it is less important than how we do it,
Cheers
JohnT
As you know, I'm not a Goldwater Nichols fan though I do acknowledge it did some things that needed doing. Just think like many US Laws, it overdid what it was trying to do. :eek:
That said, I despaired of ever getting it changed but your suggestion placed in bold is mindbogglingy brilliant -- and doable... :cool:
We can work out how to deal with the Stormin' Normans...:D
Hmm. Mayhap some Specified Commands as well... :rolleyes:
I've seen it happen again and again. When a commander has to deal with two or three levels of war (strategy, operations, and tactics), he becomes less effective. Invariably, his attention and energy is drawn upward, and the lower levels suffer because of it. This is especially true in Afghanistan, a problem exacerbated by the dysfunctional C2 set-up. In the ideal world, McChrystal would be afforded some top-cover by the guy who is actually responsible for strategy within the region - which leads me to my original question posed at the start of the thread.
The way I understand it, GEN McChrystal was directly tasked by the Pentagon/White House to prepare his report on the situation in Afghanistan. It went through CENTCOM then to the Pentagon, where his resource requests will be reviewed. I would imagine if there are any significant disagreements between Petraeus/McChrystal they're being worked out before anything is submitted.
I'm sure GEN Petraeus knows there is nothing to be gained by standing in the way of communications between the administration and its theater commander. It's been that way since at least 2007, when Bush stopped trusting what he was hearing from the Pentagon/Tampa and wanted to speak directly to the CG in Iraq. The theater commanders were essentially functioning as GCCs, with direct communications between Baghdad and the Pentagon/White House. When Admiral Fallon got involved it only complicated things, pissed everyone off and made it harder for Petraeus to do his job.
Add to that reports/rumors of tension with the Obama administration during its early days over Odierno and Petraeus's attempt to talk Obama out of the 16-month withdrawal plan for Iraq, and he's probably smart to keep his head down right now.
It's consistent with the way he's treating Iraq, as well. When is the last time you have seen him say anything about Iraq since the aforementioned discussions on withdrawal timelines? Exactly. He trusts his generals and recognizes there's nothing to be gained by taking a public role in these discusisons.
From a bureaucratic perspective, I think one of GEN Petraeus' roles would be to provide support for GEN McChrystal when the latter has a policy difference with his civilian counterpart (Ambassador Eikenberry) that has to be kicked up to the next level. The CENTCOM Commander is the logical counterpart to SRAP Holbrooke although I sometimes think that it might even require CJCS or SecDef involvement if preparing for bureaucratic combat with Ambassador Holbrooke.
Got a couple of questions for you:
What authority was given to super ambassadors like Holbrooke and how was it given?
Do you know if the President has given clear authority to either Eikenberry or McChrystal in Afghanistan? (I doubt he has...)
Cheers
JohnT