https://tanchoppa.files.wordpress.co...issile_624.jpg
Nice analysis from Tanchoppa
https://tanchoppa.wordpress.com/2012...a-parade-fake/
See also
https://jesamine1983.files.wordpress...ojanrabbit.jpg
Printable View
https://tanchoppa.files.wordpress.co...issile_624.jpg
Nice analysis from Tanchoppa
https://tanchoppa.wordpress.com/2012...a-parade-fake/
See also
https://jesamine1983.files.wordpress...ojanrabbit.jpg
Someone with a firm grasp of the blatantly obvious
https://www.yahoo.com/news/trump-say...-politics.htmlQuote:
WASHINGTON (AP) — North Korea's nuclear weapons development may be designed to take over archrival South Korea and coerce the United States into abandoning its close ally, a senior White House official said Tuesday, questioning the North's stated purpose of warding off a U.S. invasion.
Ruminating about Pyongyang's possible motivations, Matt Pottinger, the Asia director on President Donald Trump's National Security Council, said there may be some truth to claims that the North wants a nuclear deterrent to protect its communist dictatorship. But Pottinger said the country's robust conventional military has worked as a deterrent for decades.
Pottinger is partly correct. Certainly, Pyongyang believes that a nuclear deterrent will allow it to blackmail the international community to prop up the Kim dynasty materially as North Korea will be "too big to fail". This would echo the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, where the U.S. keeps Pakistan close more to ensure that its nuclear weapons are secure than because of Pakistan's "counter-terrorism efforts".
However, after the advent of U.S. precision-strike in Iraq, Yugoslavia, Iraq again and then Libya, it became clear that the KPA was obsolete and could be annihilated with impunity from the air. Therefore, while the KPA would deter a ground invasion and occupation, it could not prevent devastating airstrikes. Thus, Pyongyang does believe that only a nuclear deterrent will keep the B-2s at bay...
https://mwi.usma.edu/thunder-run-seo...oreas-war-plan
By Lt. Col. Raymond Farrell, Canadian Forces
Selected Excerpts:
Quote:
The North’s Attack Plan
...They therefore plan to win by striking quickly, by surprise, while ROK forces are still mobilizing, US reinforcements are not yet in theatre, and while our airpower is largely committed to overcoming the DPRK integrated air defense system and targeting WMD storage sites, launchers, and command, control, and communications (C3) networks.
Recognizing that ROK forces will be on some degree of heightened readiness during a crisis, the regime will use its formidable intelligence and special operations capability to obscure preparations for an attack and slow ROK responses. Its own past history of symbolic attacks, placing its forces on alert, and angry promises to destroy its enemies will actually work in its favor in this case: ROK/US intelligence agencies will expect some kind of posturing from the North and may therefore misidentify attack preparations as lesser actions. DPRK agents will also count on the psychological reluctance of the South Korean population and government to believe that war is imminent. They will actively seek to influence the ROK democratic decision-making process to get inside our decision cycle. In particular, ROK mobilization will require a political decision and every hour of delay imposed through threats, deception, information and cyber attacks, or direct action will have consequences. In the end, even if ROK/US commanders do recognize the signs of an attack before it begins, it will still take time to react. In that time, DPRK commanders hope to win.
There will be no need for detailed orders. Just as ROK forces know and rehearse their war plan, DPRK forces are largely in place, in numbers sufficient to achieve some local breakthroughs on the major routes towards Seoul—their first operational objective. North Korea will hope to begin mobilization before South Korea does, and thereby turn their currently modest advantage in numbers into a temporarily significant one. DPRK forces will rely, Soviet-style, on the use of overwhelming artillery and rocket fires to break through ROK prepared positions along the DMZ, while using deep fires to attack C3 nodes, routes forward, and mobilization centers. Strikes against targets in Seoul and the surrounding urban areas will have the additional useful effect of causing fear and choking routes with a panicked populace.
On the subject of routes it is worth considering the limited space for mechanized maneuver in central Korea: The eastern half of the peninsula is largely mountainous with roads running along valley floors. The grain of the country will tend to push DPRK forces southwest (towards Seoul). The western half of the peninsula around Seoul and the Han River system is slightly flatter, but at least south of the DMZ the land is now so built up that once major routes come under fire it will be slow going for both sides. It’s not good country for heavy forces, and until recently both sides planned to use mostly lighter infantry to fight on the line. Recent announced changes to ROK force structure see a much greater emphasis on heavy forces—perhaps to get more combat power out of a smaller overall force—but the terrain suggests that such forces will likely be difficult to maneuver. Furthermore, DPRK tactics emphasize the use of infiltration to achieve local penetrations and attack deeper, tactical targets. Their line formations include elite sub-elements specially trained for these tasks, and the terrain—whether urban or forested mountain—is ideal for it. Road-bound heavy forces will be especially susceptible to such tactics.
The final element in the DPRK plan is an extensive deep battle across the entire South Korean depth using some one hundred thousand special operations forces (SOF). An interesting feature of this war is that since both sides look and speak more or less alike, covert insertion and operation is easier for each side—but especially so for North Korean agents who may move freely within South Korea’s open society.
Some DPRK SOF will have been pre-positioned. More will be inserted by sea, air, and ground infiltration shortly before the main attack, exploiting—little-green-men-style—any public uncertainty or national command paralysis for temporary deniability. One of the main tasks for DPRK SOF in this preliminary phase will be to support the deception plan by encouraging and magnifying whatever confusion and chaos may accompany a crisis, and especially to foster political uncertainty and indecision in the critical hours before the main attack. Deniable attacks against political leadership, false-flag provocations, staged anti-war protests, terrorist attacks aimed at causing panic, and limited attacks against key C3 nodes will begin in this stage. This phase could last for days or even weeks, but hours are more likely.
Once DPRK main forces attack across the DMZ, the remaining DPRK SOF will surge south by sea and air towards targets in Seoul and in depth. Many will be destroyed en route by defending ROK forces, and more will be defeated at their objectives, but DPRK planners hope to overwhelm ROK defenses by sheer numbers of SOF and inflict temporary but serious damage while they still have operational surprise. SOF targets in this phase will be national C3 nodes, including political leadership, mobilization centres, airfields, ports and naval bases, and choke points on major routes. As with artillery strikes, fighting by SOF on objectives in Seoul will be aimed at heightening panic and demoralizing political leadership, and will be exploited by DPRK information warfare agencies to give the impression that the front has already reached the ROK capital.
With luck, DPRK planners hope to have main forces entering Seoul within the first week, from which position they can either transition to defense and negotiate from strength or, if conditions permit, push on to decisively defeat ROK forces.
But this plan is very optimistic. ROK planners understand it well and are prepared to counter it. Forces defending along the DMZ are in strong, prepared positions supported by obstacles. ROK C3 is hardened and redundant. Rear-area security forces are substantial and their plans are kept current and rehearsed. Even given some disruption by DPRK SOF, mobilization is expected to generate millions of men within days.
The Unknowns
There are three main variables which might affect this estimate: First, the combat performance of either side cannot be known for certain. My own guess is that ROK forces would fight very well—especially on defense. But there are ways in which North Korea may attempt to undermine ROK morale: Both sides consider the other to be cousins awaiting liberation and this could be used as part of a skillful information operations campaign—particularly if ROK forces seek to advance into the North. The possible combat performance of DPRK forces is even less predictable. On the one hand, the DPRK population has been brainwashed from birth. On the other hand, North Korea’s people fear their own leadership and are often on the brink of starvation. It is possible that they might fight fanatically, but also that, given a chance, they would turn on their leaders. We simply don’t know.
The second main variable is the potential DPRK use of WMD. Finding and killing these will be a high priority for ROK/US commanders, but it is possible that some will survive, especially in the first few days. The North’s leaders may decide to use chemical weapons for battlefield advantage or, if they fail to enter Seoul, may seek to blackmail the ROK government with the possibility of chemical or even nuclear attack against it. Of course the use, or even threatened use, of WMD might invite US retaliation in kind, but a desperate or simply risk-taking Kim regime could gamble that our side would blink first.
The third and related variable is what the DPRK regime would do in defeat. Facing defeat, it is possible that army commanders, or even their troops, would turn on the leadership and depose the regime. On the other hand, if Kim retains enough control over his forces but believes that he is on the brink of being deposed, it is possible that he could—with nothing left to lose—simply unleash whatever WMD he still possesses.
The Takeaway: DPRK Will Make it Ugly
Recognizing that in war nothing ever goes entirely as expected, and that there are some major unknowns, this is based on what we do know about North Korea’s force structure, its comparative strengths, and terrain and other considerations—along with my own assessment of how Korean War II would initially unfold. But regardless of how it played out, one thing is near certain: It would entail horrific destruction and suffering. Tens or hundreds of thousands could become casualties. In defeat, North Korea would become a 25-million strong humanitarian catastrophe. And that is just with conventional weapons: The possible consequences of attacking Seoul with WMD are almost too awful to contemplate. There is a role for force here—a strong ROK/US posture has certainly constrained North Korean aggression for decades—and in no way should DPRK threats be simply acceded to. But under current conditions, and given the scale of likely destruction, planners should strongly question whether each DPRK provocation—even the imminent development of a ICBM—justifies risking such a war.
https://mwi.usma.edu/thinking-north-korean-downfall/
By Maj. M.L. Kavanaugh
Quote:
He did it. Kim Jong Un defied the world, again. Despite the American warships, despite the Chinese pressure, North Korea’s leader tested another illicit missile. Even if the practice launch “fizzled,” as with gifts, it’s the thought that counts—and in this case, the thoughts are pretty disturbing. And he’s still got a nuke “all primed and ready” to test.
Of course, North Korea has conducted nuclear tests on five previous occasions, including twice last year (not to mention 24 provocative missile tests in the same twelve-month stretch)—and US aircraft carrier visits to the region are not rare. But the backdrop of palpably increased tensions against which these developments are taking place gives them a particularly ominous character.
While an outbreak of war remains unlikely, because this recent cycle continues a long, dangerous trend, we have to ask: What would a war to end the North Korean regime look like? What historical example could we reach to? It is critically important for planners to set their scales correctly to understand the scope war might entail. And in this case, the task’s enormity demands accurate forecasting.
Twenty years ago, an American commander in Korea estimated a war with North Korea would take a million lives and cost $1 trillion (and that was against a pre-nuclear North). More recently, about a year ago, the previous US commander in Korea, Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, testified to the US Congress that, “Given the size of [North Korean] forces and the weaponry involved,” a war there would be “akin to the Korean War and World War II—very complex, probably high casualty.” Translating this most recent assessment from alpha to numeric puts us somewhere between 40,000 and 400,000 battle deaths. That’s a lot, but, it does get us to a historical precedent. Another major Pacific operation featured similarly high casualty estimates: Operation Downfall. This was the planned invasion to defeat the Empire of Japan at the end of the Second World War—and it never actually happened because the Japanese surrendered before it kicked off. Still, thinking through the similarities is a worthy activity in the face of such a high-stakes endeavor.
The planning for Operation Downfall had many features that would be similar to a conventional assault on North Korea. The first is that against Japan, the US objective was unconditional surrender to remove a distant, significant threat to US vital interests. Against North Korea, the US objective is verifiable, complete surrender of its nuclear program, another distant, significant threat to US vital interests. The geographies have remarkable similarities, if one considers the combination of the nearly impenetrable DMZ and non-accessibility of the North Korean-Chinese border for US military use—a fact that makes North Korea into a sort of manmade island (like Japan 1945), which drives US military options centered on long-haul power projection and amphibious approaches. Also, in 1945, US war planners’ first assumption was they would be “opposed not only by the available organized military forces of the Empire, but also by a fanatically hostile population.” Modern North Korea is similarly hostile; loyalty is strong and a not-insignificant number of civilians will fight hard. Lastly, the defender’s strike threats are actually fairly comparable—Japan had thousands of kamikaze planes and kaiten (suicide) boats which acted as human-guided deep-strike munitions, while today’s North Korea similarly has thousands of missiles and rockets, which are tech-led deep-strike munitions. And both foes used years to dig in and improve defensive positions ready for oncoming attackers. 1945’s Empire of Japan and 2017’s North Korea pose many similar military challenges.
But they’re not the same—so, what makes these two operations different? First, the most obvious is the nuclear genie is out of the bottle now, having been let out at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nobody has the ability to question or “un-know” that nuclear weapons are indiscriminate and devastating; because we have two mushroom-clouded data points, today’s planners understand the gravity of the situation better than they did in 1945. Second, another departure point is that we live in an unconstrained media age today, where just about anybody with a laptop can get in the news game. Oppositely, the Second World War was a relatively controlled era, in which governments had much more say in how and when stories broke. A case in point is that New York Times journalist William Laurence was essentially given (and handled in the release of) the story on the first atomic bomb. Modern technology makes everyone a reporter and broadcaster; yesterday’s Edward R. Murrow and Tom Brokaw regularly get scooped by today’s smartphone-wielding Jane and John Q. Public—and while this means broader coverage, it also means public panic has the potential to escalate rapidly. Third, we live in a relatively multipolar world compared to the end of World War II, when much of the world lay in ruin and the United States was in a much more dominant position. Lastly, the lethality of today’s weapons technology threatens high casualty figures in societies where nations have fewer children and seem relatively less willing to spend them at war. Another contrasting data point.
What does it all mean? Stepping back from these broad points of comparison between planning Japan’s “Downfall,” and an invasion of modern North Korea—what can we learn?
Here are some initial thoughts, from the hip, that seem like useful crossover points in thinking through such a serious undertaking. Several considerations come to mind, the first of which is to be prepared to change demands and make concessions during the endgame-bargaining stage with your opponent to achieve swifter strategic victory. For example, in Japan, the United States ultimately dropped the pursuit of an unconditional surrender in favor of allowing one condition (letting the Emperor remain), thereby avoiding a long, drawn-out fight to compel the surrender of millions of Imperial Japanese soldiers still left in the Japanese home islands and in China. Second, technology like nuclear weapons might provide a way to a cost-effective outcome, but there’s no such thing as a cost-free outcome—use of such a weapon still carried a price in that the world held the United States accountable for using a fundamentally indiscriminate weapon that killed many innocent civilians (even if most agreed with its military necessity). And, with respect to the broader issue of ethics, we must think utilitarian when considering options for situations like Japan 1945 or North Korea 2017, because no matter what, somebody’s getting hurt, it’s just a question of who and how (i.e., even doing nothing is a choice that allows continued destabilizing nuclear progress and leaves millions of North Korean citizens in de facto slavery). It is imperative we seek the best outcome that minimizes harm and maximizes benefit. Lastly, coalition assembly is required, for such an enormous operation in the Pacific makes it necessary to break beyond service and international and institutional challenges. When it’s this big, we cannot fail.
History tempts us by demonstrating that we occasionally don’t have to follow through on our planning for the hard ones (like Japan’s “Downfall”). It gets us thinking: Maybe Kim Jong Un won’t push the next button? Maybe the North Koreans will come to the table? Maybe the United States won’t have to attack North Korea?
Or, this time, we might just have to follow through. And so while it’s natural to desperately want to avoid it, it’s necessary to start thinking through a North Korean “Downfall.”
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/...cid=spartandhpQuote:
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korea said on Monday that the missile it launched a day earlier was a new ballistic missile that can carry a large, heavy nuclear warhead, warning that the United States’ military bases in the Pacific were within its range.
North Korea launched what American officials called an intermediate-range ballistic missile on Sunday from the northwestern town of Kusong. The missile, believed to have a longer range than any other North Korean missile tested so far, landed in the sea between the North and Japan, sparking angry comments from President Trump, as well as from President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan.
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The North’s official Korean Central News Agency said on Monday that the new ground-to-ground missile, Hwasong-12, hit the targeted open water 489 miles away after soaring to an altitude of 1,312 miles. The missile was launched at a deliberately high angle so it would not fall too close to a neighboring country, the news agency said.
Mattis: Defeat-ISIS 'Annihilation' Campaign Accelerating, On War With N. Korea, NATO
Entry Excerpt:
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From the UK Defence-in-Depth blog an ex-NSC staff member, Dr. Paul Miller, which takes a broad view and here is a sample:There's also the Trump effect:Quote:
These three challenges—a difficult and destructive conventional war; a massive and expensive post-conflict operation; and a first-rate diplomatic challenge—mean that the Second Korean War would carry the biggest stakes of any initiative in American diplomacy in generations. And that is only considering the military, strategic, and diplomatic implications of a hypothetical war. The hardest part is political.
Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2017/06/07...ean-peninsula/Quote:
And even the best and most experienced staff in the world would not be able to compensate for an erratic and unconventional President who lacks foreign policy experience and appears unwilling to adapt to the steep learning curve.
"...assumed to be anti-ship missiles"
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/07/asia/n...nch/index.htmlQuote:
(CNN)North Korea fired four anti-ship missiles into the sea east of the Korean Peninsula Thursday, which the South Korean military said was intended to demonstrate its "precise targeting capability."
*
North Korea has launched 16 missiles in 10 tests so far in 2017, and Thursday's test was the fourth since new South Korean President Moon Jae-in took office in May.
From Rajan Menon at TomDispatch, published at War Is Boring: http://warisboring.com/avoiding-apoc...ean-peninsula/
Selected excerpts:
Quote:
So far the coercive tactics Trump has used to compel North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and cease testing ballistic missiles have included sanctions and asset freezes, military threats, and shows of force...
By now, this much ought to be clear, even to Trump. North Korea hasn’t been cowed into compliance by Washington’s warnings and military muscle flexing.
Clearly, the North’s leaders reject the proposition that American approval is required for them to build nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles.
Indeed, from Pyongyang’s perspective Trump may be the unpredictable one.
Many Americans know about the bombing of Dresden, Berlin, Hamburg, Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the deliberate targeting of civilians in an attempt to break their morale. But few know what happened to North Korea in the early 1950s.(edited to final passage)
In his haunting book On the Natural History of Destruction, W.G. Sebald writes that Germans did not discuss the wartime bombings because Nazi crimes made them hesitant to cast moral judgments on other states, no matter what they had done to Germany. There has been no such repression of memory or reticence by the state or the citizenry of North Korea.
North Korea dreams of turning out the lights
Op-Ed originally in the WSJ, June 9th 2017
http://hotair.com/headlines/archives...ut-the-lights/
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/03/north...n-reports.htmlQuote:
North Korea launched a missile on Tuesday, with Japan saying it appeared to have landed in the Japanese exclusive economic zone (EEZ), Reuters reported.
On its website, South Korean state news agency Yonhap cited South Korea's military as saying an unidentified ballistic missile launched from a location near the North's border with China at 9:40 a.m. local time.
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/...cid=spartandhpQuote:
After intensive study, Elleman, a former consultant at the Pentagon, and other specialists would report that they had detected multiple design features in the new North Korean missile engine that echo those of a 1960s-era Soviet workhorse called the RD-250*.
There is no record of Pyongyang’s obtaining blueprints for the Russian missile engine, and experts disagree on whether it ever did so. But the discovery of similarities has focused new attention on a question that has dogged U.S. analysts for at least the past two years: How has North Korea managed to make surprisingly rapid gains in its missile program, despite economic sanctions and a near-universal ban on exports of military technology to the impoverished communist state?
Lemme guess - long-since declassified hard-copy plans got pitched in a Kremlin dumpster ("Yuri, clean out this storage room. Yes, all of those file cabinets must go"). Someone trashpicked them and put them on their table at a Moscow flea market. NorK embassy flunky bought them for the equivalent of $5?:rolleyes:
* See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RD-250 & www.astronautix.com/r/rd-250.html
Robert E. Kelly at the Lowy Institute (Australia): Learning to live with a Nuclear North Korean ICBM (July 11, 2017)
There can be no preemptive attacks on North Korea by the U.S. because South Korea and Japan would “veto” such a decision due to the retaliation from North Korea that they would face. Were the U.S. to attack without consulting South Korea and Japan, these countries would probably withdraw from their alliances with the U.S. In addition, a U.S. attack may cause a shooting war between it and China. The U.S. has “learned to live” with Russian, Chinese and Pakistani nuclear weapons...
Recommendations:
- Continued sanctions: these measures have retarded North Korea’s development of a credible nuclear deterrent capable of reaching the CONUS, and sanctions relief offers leverage if North Korea ever decides to negotiate as Iran did for the JCPOA
- Working with China: given China’s decisive economic leverage over North Korea, cooperating with China is crucial. We should pressure China to do more and search for “smarter sanctions”
- Missile defense: although missile defense may be “expensive”, it is necessary, and Japan and South Korea should cease “whining” and work with the U.S. to construct “layered” missile defenses including Patriot BMD, Aegis BMD and THAAD, which are “defensive systems…they signal no offensive intention”
Richard Fontaine at the Center for a New American Security: Time to Lose Your Illusions on North Korea (July 7, 2017)
The U.S. needs to dispense with various illusions now that North Korea can theoretically strike Alaska and will probably soon have the capability to strike the CONUS with a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile:
- China Will Solve It: China will not pressure North Korea into denuclearization as this could cause that state to fail and remove a convenient buffer between China and U.S. and allied forces in South Korea
- South Korea and Japan Will Solve It: both countries have tolerated a direct North Korean threat for decades, and any nuclear-tipped ICBM would be targeted toward the U.S. and not them. Neither has the capability to remove the North Korean threat to them without the risk of unacceptable losses due to retaliation
- North Korea can be Wooed with the Right Balance of Incentives and Disincentives: North Korea only fears foreign intervention and has reportedly cited the fates of Qaddafi and Hussein who abandoned their WMD programs. North Korea believes that a credible nuclear deterrent is is “fundamental security guarantee and will not be induced into trading them away”. A more “realistic goal is a freeze in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and, more ambitiously, some rollback of them”
- Military Force Can Work: North Korea holds populations in South Korea and Japan at risk. In addition, there is no guarantee that the U.S. could secure escalation dominance and keep a war restricted to disarming North Korean nuclear and missile forces
The U.S. should pursue a strategy of deterrence based upon North Korea’s “essential rationality – or at least its survival instinct”
Recommendations:
- Missile defense
- Covert action: sabotage of North Korean weapons programs
- Sanctions: current sanctions on North Korea are “minor compared to those applied to Iran as it enriched uranium”. Sanctions should target the North Korean elite and those Chinese individuals and entities conducting business with them (“there is much more the U.S. can do unilaterally”)
- Information warfare: bombard North Korea with information detailing the state’s human rights abuses, encourage defections and sow distrust
- Trade-offs: do not appease Chinese or Russian aggression due to a myopic focus on North Korea, such as ending joint exercises with South Korea, which are essential in the event of conflict
John Nilsson-Wright at Chatham House: North Korea Missile Test Exposes How Trump Has Overplayed His Hand (July 5, 2017)
Recommendation: The U.S. could dispatch a senior diplomat to negotiate with Kim Jong-Un, and offer concessions such as a U.S. liaison mission in Pyongyang and “asymmetric conventional force reductions on the peninsula”
Mark Fitzpatrick at International Institute for Strategic Studies: Could a ‘double freeze’ be viable path to peace on Korean Peninsula? (July 5, 2017)
The Sino-Russian proposal for a freeze on U.S.-South Korean military exercises for a freeze in North Korean nuclear and missile tests has "upsides":
- Without flight testing, North Korea cannot develop a missile reliably capable of striking the CONUS
- “Most observers believe that rolling back the nuclear-weapons programme is unattainable for the time being”
- Discussing the proposal is a precondition for China to participate in pressuring North Korea further
- A ban on exports by North Korea of nuclear technology could be added
- A freeze would involve the return of IAEA inspectors
- Return to the failed 2012 “Leap Day Deal”
Loren B. Thompson at Lexington Institute: The Only Answer To North Korea’s Missiles That Won’t Make War More Likely (July 6, 2017)
David Santoro at Center for Strategic and International Studies: Don’t go ballistic! The least bad agenda after North Korea’s ICBM test (July 5, 2017)Quote:
It seems there is only one step the Trump administration can take that would not increase the likelihood of war and materially improve the safety of the American homeland. That step is to accelerate and expand the modest missile defense system called Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) that operates interceptors in Alaska and California.
Quote:
There is no reason to think that deterring and defending against a North Korea armed with nuclear-tipped ICBMs can’t work...
Recommendations:Quote:
Treating North Korea’s ICBM test as a game-changer is also counterproductive, for three reasons. First, that characterization suggests to Pyongyang that it is capable of deterring the United States…Second, the rhetoric of strategic game-changer suggests to Pyongyang that anything short of ICBM development is de facto acceptable, or “more” acceptable...Third, it is counterproductive to regard North Korea’s ICBM test as a game-changer because it suggests to regional allies, South Korea and Japan, that Washington only worries about North Korea when the US homeland is threatened.
- Forward-deploy U.S. tactical nuclear weapons
- Strengthen sanctions
- Pursue dialogue with North Korea to negotiate limitations on its arsenal
Jonathan D. Pollack at Brookings Institute: North Korea has tested an ICBM. Now what? (July 6, 2017)
Quote:
Calls for preemptive military action or outsourcing the issue to China are simply not credible…At the same time, widespread calls for renewed U.S. negotiations with North Korea make little sense.
Quote:
The only viable path is one that acknowledges the reality of the North’s nuclear weapons and missiles while explicitly denying any political legitimacy or implied permanence to these programs, and raises the costs to Pyongyang for its actions. We cannot expect to fully understand Pyongyang’s calculus of risk, but measures explicitly designed to heighten the pressures on the regime are essential.
Pending an appropriate African thread popping up, I'll just leave this here -
North Korea’s surprising, lucrative relationship with Africa
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/...cid=spartandhpQuote:
WINDHOEK, Namibia — Near the southern tip of Africa, 8,000 miles from Pyongyang, this capital city is an unlikely testament to North Korean industry.
There’s the futuristic national history museum, the sleek presidential palace, the sprawling defense headquarters and the shadowy munitions factory. They were built — or are still being constructed — by North Korea, for a profit.
For years, North Korea has used African nations like this one as financial lifelines, building infrastructure and selling weapons and other military equipment as sanctions mounted against its authoritarian regime. Although China is by far North Korea’s largest trading partner, the smaller African revenue streams have helped support the impoverished Hermit Kingdom, even as its leaders develop an ambitious nuclear weapons program in defiance of the international community.
These are the final opinions that I will be posting. Curiously, Heritage and RAND have been notably silent on how to address the July 4th "firework"...
Harry J. Kazianis from the Center for the National Interest at The Week: How America should handle the frightening North Korea problem (July 5, 2017)
Kazianis argues that a “defiant China” and “rogue North Korea” should be the top priority for the U.S., and that all other threats and issues, from Russia and Iran to the ongoing wars in the MENA region to counter-terrorism, should be secondary.
He refers to China as “the biggest foreign policy and national security dilemma of our lifetime”.
Recommendations:
- The U.S. should ensure that the Asia-Pacific region “should get the bulk of America’s attention”, rather than references to “pivots” or “rebalancing”
- The U.S. should make it clear that it will penalize China for supporting North Korea, and that at the minimum, China should pressure North Korea to cease testing and release the three American hostages
- More military assets need to be brought into the region, and the military expanded with more attack submarines and more missile defenses
- There should be no talks with North Korea given its treatment of Warmbier and as long as it holds hostages
- Crippling sanctions need to be imposed on any entities in any country transacting with North Korea
Former Defense Secretary Ash Carter on "CNN's State of the Union" (July 9, 2017)
On his and former SecDef Perry's 2006 calls for a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs: "that was a very different circumstance"
On American preparedness for a North Korean nuclear attack:
Quote:
Of course. Of course. We've -- we've been -- we've been at this since 1953. I personally have been at it since 1974. We have consistently improved our military capabilities. South Korea's capabilities have improved. We have deployed missile defenses, both short-range and long-range, consistently in -- in advance of what we anticipate the North Koreans will be doing, so that we always stay one step ahead of them. So, we're very prepared. But I think it's important not to take the idea of military action on the Korean Peninsula or war lightly. And this is a situation in which we need to get North Korea and China in a corner, and not put our president in a corner.
Quote:
The U.S. government is attempting to seize millions of dollars tied to North Korea from eight major banks after the rogue dictatorship announced on July 4 that it had developed a missile capable of reaching the United States.
Multiple newsoutlets#reported Thursday that the Justice Department has accused the banks of#processing more than#$700 million in#"prohibited" transactions since 2009.
http://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/us-...cid=spartandhpQuote:
The banks included in the court filings are#Bank of America Corp., Bank of New York Mellon Corp., Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, HSBC Holdings Plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Standard Chartered Plc and Wells Fargo & Co.
Some transactions were processed for#Dandong Zhicheng Metallic Material Co and four other "front" companies. Prosecutors said those groups tried to evade sanctions through the transactions, which would benefit North Korea's military and weapons programs.
John Schilling: What is True and Not True About North Korea’s Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation (July 10, 2017)
Introduction:
Quote:
After the frenzy of technical speculation over the successful launch of North Korea’s Hwasong-14 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the dust seems to be clearing and the emerging reality is that the North has an unreliable missile that can reach Alaska or Hawaii with a single nuclear warhead, and would be lucky to hit even a city-sized target. However, with a year or two of additional testing and development, it will likely become a missile that can reliably deliver a single nuclear warhead to targets along the US west coast, possibly with enough accuracy to destroy soft military targets like naval bases. In perhaps five years, North Korea may be able to incorporate a modest suite of decoys and penetration aids to challenge US missile defenses. Let’s hope US missile defenses are up to that challenge.
- The Hwasong-14 cannot carry multiple warheads or penetration aids at present, but probably will be able to carry the latter in several years. Multiple warheads would require at least a decade of nuclear and other tests to achieve
- The Hwasong-14 is new, but is based upon several previous North Korean missile designs, including the older Hwasong-12 and 13
- It can deliver a 500-600 kg nuclear payload with limited accuracy (similar to a U.S. Atlas and Thor ICBM) to targets on the U.S. west coast, with a CEP of a few miles
- More concerning than future MIRV possibilities are decoys and penetration aids to defeat U.S. missile defenses, which currently only work half the time during tests
- Although North Korea cannot built more ICBMs than U.S. interceptors, they can maintain a credible deterrent with a dozen decoys per ICBM
North Korea will probably try to imitate the UK’s Chevaline Program from the early 1970s, albeit while settling for less decoys per missile
Various: North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons (July 14, 2017)
Introduction:
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Thermal imagery analysis of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center indicates that from September 2016 through June 2017:
- The Radiochemical Laboratory operated intermittently and there have apparently been at least two unreported reprocessing campaigns to produce an undetermined amount of plutonium that can further increase North Korea’s nuclear weapons stockpile. This suggests batch rather than continuous processing of spent fuel rods from the 5 MWe Reactor during the period of analysis.
- Increased thermal activity was noted at the Uranium Enrichment Facility. It is unclear if this was the result of centrifuge operations or maintenance operations. Centrifuge operations would increase the North’s enriched uranium inventory; however, based on imagery alone, it is not possible to conclude whether the plant is producing low or highly enriched uranium.
- The thermal patterns at the probable Isotope/Tritium Production Facility have remained consistent, suggesting that the facility is not operational, or is operating at a very low level. This means, the facility is likely not producing tritium, which is an essential isotope used in the production of boosted yield nuclear weapons and hydrogen bombs.
- From December 2016 through January 2017, the thermal pattern over the Experimental Light Water Reactor (ELWR) was elevated. While that might indicate that the reactor was operational, the likelihood is low since the pattern does not appear in subsequent imagery over the last six months. It is possible that there are alternative explanations for the elevated pattern, for example, short-term activity at the ELWR such as the heating of pipes to prevent freezing. Regardless, any activity at the ELWR is cause for concern and bears continued monitoring.
- The 5 MWe Reactor has either been intermittently operating at a low-level or not operating. The notable exception to this was during December 2016 and January 2017 when thermal patterns suggests a higher level of operations.
http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/31/politi...ity/index.htmlQuote:
Washington (CNN)The US military has detected "highly unusual and unprecedented levels" of North Korean submarine activity and evidence of an "ejection test" in the days following Pyongyang's second intercontinental ballistic missile launch this month, a defense official told CNN on Monday.
An ejection test examines a missile's "cold-launch system," which uses high pressure steam to propel a missile out of the launch canister into the air before its engines ignite. That helps prevent flames and heat from the engine from damaging either the submarine, submersible barge or any nearby equipment used to launch the missile.
Carried out on land at Sinpo Naval Shipyard, Sunday's ejection test is the third time this month -- and fourth this year -- that North Korea has conducted a trial of the missile component that is critical to developing submarine launch capabilities, according to the US defense official.
From The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...=.c9578fd409ad
Introduction:
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North Korea has successfully produced a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can fit inside its missiles, crossing a key threshold on the path to becoming a full-fledged nuclear power, U.S. intelligence officials have concluded in a confidential assessment.
The new analysis completed last month by the Defense Intelligence Agency comes on the heels of another intelligence assessment that sharply raises the official estimate for the total number of bombs in the communist country’s atomic arsenal. The U.S. calculated last month that up to 60 nuclear weapons are now controlled by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Some independent experts believe the number of bombs is much smaller.
The findings are likely to deepen concerns about an evolving North Korean military threat that appears to be advancing far more rapidly than many experts had predicted. U.S. officials last month concluded that Pyongyang is also outpacing expectations in its effort to build an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking cities on the American mainland.
In Post 61 in JUly 2017, citing Michael Ellerman, ex-DoD and now IISS, amidst the linked report were two passages:Today IISS has circulated a short online commentary by Mr Ellerman, that starts with:Quote:
Elleman, the former Pentagon missile expert, believes that North Korea’s newest missile engine has a similar past. The designs were most likely obtained years ago, through rogue scientists or on the black market, only to surface recently as part of a newly energized missile program.Elleman is preparing to publish an analysis comparing the engine used in the Hwasong-12 and Hwasong-14 with the Soviet-era RD-250, using photos that highlight nearly identical features, including cooling tubes, exhaust nozzles and the four auxiliary engines that steer the rocket.
Link:https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voice...m-success-3abbQuote:
North Korea’s missile programme has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea has acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) from a foreign source.
Available evidence clearly indicates that the LPE is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14. An unknown number of these engines were probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine. North Korea’s need for an alternative to the failing Musudan and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred within the past two years.
Ukraine has responded to the allegations of involvement in assisting DPRK's missile engine development.
Link:https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-deni.../28675992.html
A regular SME visitor to South Korea (ROK) reports and starts with:Link:https://defenceindepth.co/2017/08/16...ummers-crisis/Quote:
Donald Trump’s war of words with Kim Jong-Un’s North Korea has dominated the international news cycle for the last several weeks. Yet here in South Korea if you didn’t turn on the news channels, you wouldn’t know it. There is no public panic. There are no obvious signs of intensified military activity. Daily routines remain unchanged.
(Later) In terms of the ebb and flow of civilian life in the South, the present crisis feels little different to previous episodes.
https://meduza.io/en/news/2017/08/15...lped-PyongyangQuote:
Ukrainian-made rocket engines could have been copied for use in North Korea’s missile program, but Ukrainian experts didn’t help Pyongyang, says Alexander Degtyarev, a chief designer at Yuzhmash, the Ukrainian state-owned rocket factory recently implicated in an article by The New York Times.
Degtyarev also recalled the 2012 espionage trial against two North Korean spies, who were sentenced to eight years in prison for trying to steal secrets from Yuzhmash. The factory manufactures the Russian-designed RD-250 engine, which The New York Times says may have reached North Korea from Ukraine.
Earlier, Yuzhmash issued a press statement arguing in detail why its engines aren’t being used in North Korea, claiming that the North Korean engines described in The New York Times’ story are unlike the RD-250.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-n...-idUSKCN1BA085Quote:
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - North Korea’s firing of a ballistic missile over Japan could increase pressure on Washington to consider shooting down future test launches, although there is no guarantee of success and U.S. officials are wary of a dangerous escalation with Pyongyang.
More attention is likely to focus on the prospects for intercepting a missile in flight after North Korea on Tuesday conducted one of its boldest missile tests in years, one government official said.
Such a decision would not be taken lightly given tensions over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
And while President Donald Trump has repeatedly vowed that “all options are on the table”, there has been no sign of any quick policy shift in Washington toward direct U.S. military action.
But Pyongyang’s launch of an intermediate-range Hwasong-12 missile over Japan’s northern Hokkaido island underscored how Trump’s tough rhetoric, pursuit of sanctions and occasional shows of military force around the Korean peninsula have done little to deter North Korea’s leader.
Meanwhile, WaPo spins predictably.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...=.bf894dacf478Quote:
North Korea’s launch of a ballistic missile over Japan was unprecedented, but President Trump’s response Tuesday was not — a renewal of his warning that “all options are on the table.” His tough talk may only serve to remind that the possibility of military action has not yet deterred North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
The missile launch seemed designed to wreak just the right amount of havoc: enough for Kim to show that he would not be cowed but not so much as to invite the “fire and fury” that Trump warned could follow continued North Korean threats.
The launch early Tuesday was the first test of such a sophisticated weapon over the landmass of a U.S. ally and an obvious warning to the United States that North Korea could easily target U.S. military facilities on Guam or elsewhere in the Pacific region.
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/04/w...sile-test.htmlQuote:
HONG KONG — One day after its latest nuclear test, North Korea appears to be making preparations to launch a ballistic missile, a South Korean official said Monday.
South Korea’s military has observed the preparations for a North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile test, Chang Kyung-soo, a South Korean Defense Ministry official, told lawmakers, The Associated Press reported.
On Sunday, North Korea carried out its sixth nuclear test, its most powerful by far. The underground blast triggered a magnitude 6.3 tremor centered at the testing site in the country’s northeast, the United States Geological Survey said. It was followed by a weaker tremor believed to have been the result of a collapse in the testing site.
The nuclear test followed threats against the American territory of Guam and weeks of missile tests, including launches demonstrating that North Korea had the capability to reach much of the United States.
Nothing like a "cold shower", an IISS commentary available via the newly discovered Survival Editor's Blog:http://www.iiss.org/en/politics%20an...l-embargo-883b
It ends with:Quote:
North Korea imports Chinese oil for the same reason that Germany imports Russian gas: because it is convenient (that is, economical) to do so. Would it be good news for North Korea if the oil stopped flowing? No. Is it likely to cripple the economy and force the government to change course on their foremost strategic priority? No. There are ample hydrocarbons in North Korea to substitute for those it imports from China, though maybe not 100% overnight. Overcoming Chinese opposition to an oil embargo, in other words, is unlikely to solve the larger problem.
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41275614Quote:
North Korea has fired a ballistic missile across Japan, creating new tension in the region after its nuclear bomb test less than two weeks ago.
The missile reached an altitude of about 770km (478 miles), travelling 3,700km before landing in the sea off Hokkaido, South Korea's military says.
It flew higher and further than one fired over Japan late last month.
Five Decades Analyzing North Korea and the Bomb: A 'Foreign Affairs' Anthology
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Chinese Approaches to Contingency Planning in a Collapsed North Korea
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Quote:
Last August, a secret message was passed from Washington to Cairo warning about a mysterious vessel steaming toward the Suez Canal. The bulk freighter named Jie Shun was flying Cambodian colors but had sailed from North Korea, the warning said, with a North Korean crew and an unknown cargo shrouded by heavy tarps.
Armed with this tip, customs agents were waiting when the ship entered Egyptian waters. They swarmed the vessel and discovered, concealed under bins of iron ore, a cache of more than 30,000 rocket-propelled grenades. It was, as a United Nations report later concluded, the “largest seizure of ammunition in the history of sanctions against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”
But who were the rockets for? The Jie Shun’s final secret would take months to resolve and would yield perhaps the biggest surprise of all: The buyers were the Egyptians themselves.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world...a14_story.html
Why We Are Where We Are With North Korea - And Where Do We Go From Here?
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CRS Report for Congress
North Korea Provocative Actions 1950-2007
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30004.pdf
36 pages, covers numerous incidents, including the 31 man commando unit that almost assassinated the ROK President in Seoul in 1968; North Korea attempt to kidnap a ROK couple in Belgrade in 1977; a success kidnapping operation of a ROK Actress and her film-director husband in Hong Kong in 1978; the 1983 bombing in Burma in an attempt to kill the ROK President; two North Korea agents planted a bomb on a Korea Airlines 707 in 1987 killing all aboard in an attempt to stop the 1988 Olympics being held in South Korea; and 2006 they conduct their first nuclear weapon test. A lot more in the study.
Bill,
I have been asking CRS to update this report for years but there has been not request from Congress to do so. Here is another resource on provocations in the past 25 years from CSIS' Beyond Parallel that you might find useful. https://beyondparallel.csis.org/25-y...-provocations/
Call you smell what SECDEF Mattis has brewing?
https://www.armytimes.com/digital-sh...plomacy-fails/Quote:
America’s relationship with North Korea remains a diplomatic one, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said Monday, but he urged members of the military to be prepared in case the situation breaks down.
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/10/1...war-plans.htmlQuote:
SEOUL, South Korea — North Korean hackers stole a vast cache of data, including classified wartime contingency plans jointly drawn by Washington and Seoul, when they breached the computer network of the South Korean military last year, a South Korean lawmaker said Tuesday.
http://www.newsweek.com/yellowstone-...ecorded-677387Quote:
WASHINGTON — The cybersecurity company FireEye says in a new report to private clients, obtained exclusively by NBC News, that hackers linked to North Korea recently targeted U.S. electric power companies with spearphishing emails.
The emails used fake invitations to a fundraiser to target victims, FireEye said. A victim who downloaded the invitation attached to the email would also be downloading malware into his or her computer network, according to the FireEye report. The company did not dispute NBC's characterization of the report, but declined to comment.
There is no evidence that the hacking attempts were successful, but FireEye assessed that the targeting of electric utilities could be related to increasing tensions between the U.S. and North Korea, potentially foreshadowing a disruptive cyberattack.
Please feel free to comment and critique...My thesis is that North Korea's WMD capabilities and conventional Seoul-threatening artillery can both be knocked out.
1. Washington confers with Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo and presents a plan to launch a disarming conventional first strike on North Korea with the objective of eliminating its CBRN and particularly nuclear capabilities. Secondary objectives would be minimizing casualties in general, protecting the region from North Korean retaliation and deterring or if necessary winning a full-scale Second Korean War. Neither regime change nor unification will be part of the objectives, in order to allay Sino-South Korean concerns, however, all parties will be required to contribute to the humanitarian aid required in the aftermath of the operation.
2. In order to prevent North Korean observance of attack preparations, the U.S. and South Korea will rely upon forces already in-theater or which are non-observable. The strike will solely be conducted with standoff (TLAM, JASSM-ER) and stealth (B-2) weapons. The assets will include US attack and cruise missile submarines already operating in the Pacific as well as strategic bombers already allocated to the Pacific as part of the "Pivot" (60%). These assets can reasonably be expected to bring 1,400 to 1,900 land-attack cruise missiles (or their equivalent in Mk 84 bombs via B-2s) into the theater. The U.S. Navy alone has 3,500 TLAMs stockpiled.
3. Follow-on forces, including the Carrier Strike Group in Japan, can be moved into position if necessary.
4. At zero hour, U.S. and ROK artillery along the DMZ open up on the 200-500 HARTS in North Korea to suppress any (counter)battery fire against allied forces or countervalue targets in and around Seoul. At the same time, cruise missiles begin striking the 350-430 SAM sites in North Korea, with an emphasis on C4ISR. B-2s can be applied where necessary, and possibly also against airbases hosting MiG-29 fighters. In addition, there are some 165-210 ballistic missiles on TELs that will need to be struck, as well as 35 to 60 CBRN facilities where WMDs could be mated to delivery systems. All in all, the target set for the strike would range from 750 to 1,200 discrete targets, of which U.S./ROK artillery in situ could tackle 200-500 of. Once the IADS is destroyed, the ROKAF/USAF can begin overflying North Korean airspace, and the forward-deployed USN CAW can also come into the picture.
5. Following this major strike and assuming that the operation is successful, it will be essential to prevent a North Korean conventional retaliatory invasion. The Allies will have to communicate their limited intentions to Pyongyang, but also to the DPRK forces along the DMZ, and airdrops of leaflets, medical supplies and food will go a long way. At this point, China could also intervene to stabilize North Korea by promising protection from a ground invasion and providing humanitarian aid.
6. If this sounds difficult: it is. But so too was Operation Desert Storm, and this is just as doable.
Sources include:
- My matrix: Attachment 5354
- Roger Cavazos, "Mind the Gap Between Rhetoric and Reality", NAPSNet Special Reports, June 26, 2012,
Desert Storm is definitely the model, I would add that affecting the power grid in such a way as to deny use to NoK military until end of war and then return as close to full power as possible would be a critical requirement. Otherwise the follow on humanitarian disaster would begin to nullify the victory political benefits.
The Korea Crisis: When Human Politics Apes That of Chimps
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http://abcnews.go.com/International/...ality-50624437Quote:
The notion of Chinese power over the North — that the countries are as "close as lips and teeth," according to a cliche recorded in the 3rd century — is so tantalizing that Donald Trump has spent a good part of his young presidency playing it up.
The reality, however, is that the complicated, often exasperating, relationship is less about friendship or political bonds than a deep and mutually uneasy dependency. Nominally allies, the neighbors operate in a near constant state of tension, a mix of ancient distrust and dislike and the grating knowledge that they are inextricably tangled up with each other, however much they might chafe against it.
This matters because if China is not the solution to the nuclear crisis, then outsiders long sold on the idea must recalibrate their efforts as North Korea approaches a viable arsenal of nuclear-tipped missiles capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, something the CIA chief this week estimated as only a matter of months away.
*Indicator*
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/...age/785344001/Quote:
WASHINGTON#— President Trump signed an executive order Friday allowing the Air Force to recall as many as 1,000 retired pilots to active duty to address a shortage in combat fliers, the White House and Pentagon announced.
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/10/22...cial-says.htmlQuote:
The U.S. Air Force is preparing to place its fleet of nuclear-armed B-52 bombers on 24-hour alert for the first time since 1991 amid escalating tensions with North Korea, the military branch's chief of staff said in a report Sunday.
Defense officials denied to Fox News that bombers were ordered to go on 24-hour alert, but#Gen. David Goldfein told Defense One#it could happen.
This country is like a real-life Horror movie. I expect to post articles about satellite images of giant glowing NorK turtles next.
'Quote:
Japanese media reports 200 North Koreans died in a tunnel collapse at their nuclear test site.
In September, North Korea tested a powerful nuclear weapon that experts say rocked the mountain and made it unstable.
If the test site is totally compromised, the hazardous radioactive material could spread across the region.
After North Korea's most powerful ever nuclear test underground at Punggye-ri in the country's northeast, Japan's TV Asahi reports that up to 200 have been killed in a tunnel collapse.
https://www.msn.com/en-au/news/world...ple/ar-AAugbMh
Recently, the Congressional Research Service produced a report, providing 7 military options for Congress to consider (https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R44994.pdf):
1. Maintain Military Status Quo
- This was the joint US-ROK policy from 2009 through 2016, often referred to as “strategic patience”. Since 2017, the priority level of the DPRK threat has been raised and US officials have openly discussed the possibility of preventive strikes against the DPRK
2. Enhanced Containment and Deterrence
- Forward-deploying more forces to the region and prepositioning equipment
- Enhanced missile defenses e.g. THAAD, Aegis BMD
3. Deny DPRK Acquisition of Delivery Systems Capable of Threatening CONUS
- Reduce emphasis on de-nuclearization and focus on delivery systems, especially nuclear-tipped ICBMs
- The US BMD could attempt to shoot down future S/M/IRBM launches to disrupt DPRK testing
- DPRK missile tests are specifically prohibited by various UNSC resolutions
4. Destroy ICBM Facilities and Launch Pads
- Similar to Option 3 in focus
- Involves airstrikes and cruise missile attacks, and possibly US and ROK SOFs
5. Destroy DPRK Nuclear Facilities
A more expansive variant of Option 4
6. DPRK Regime Change
7. Withdraw US Forces from ROK
In an earlier post on this thread, I had argued for a variant of Option 5, which would also involve the destruction of conventional DPRK artillery/missiles targeting Seoul for a mass casualty retaliation.
Unfortunately, the CRS relies upon DPRK conventional military data from 2015, and it also ignores various risks of not attacking, namely:
1. At what point will the DPRK halt its nuclear weapon production? At 50 fusion warheads? 100? 200? 300? If the DPRK arsenal becomes too formidable, it will force China to increase its "minimum credible deterrent", which will have follow-on effects on the US-Russia-China strategic balance in East Asia, as well as New START.
2. Any enhancements to ballistic missile defense will be met with suspicion by China and Russia, and provoke strategic competition (as noted above).
3. The DPRK state is inherently unstable due to the personal rule of KJU. What if it fractures or fails of its own accord? Will KJU be able to control his growing nuclear arsenal? What if you have ex-officers and officials as nuclear-armed warlords?
4. Any toleration of the DPRK as a nuclear power means that it becomes "too nuclear to fail", and therefore any attempt to undermine it - from sanctions to diplomatic isolation - will be seen as risky.
5. Any toleration also sends a signal to Iran, Sudan and others that nuclear faits accompli can work against the US.
Parallel reading / Indicator #2
http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...4&postcount=34
Reading music gratis
To wit
https://www.yahoo.com/news/report-ap...220347441.htmlQuote:
Disturbing reports have emerged from North Korea#stating that the country's nuclear program has had a crippling effect on nationals who live near a major testing site.
The Research Association of Vision of North Korea spoke with 21 defectors from#Kilju, a town near the Punngye-ri nuclear test site where six tests have been conducted, according to South Korean#newspaper#Chosun Ilbo.
The group painted an extremely bleak picture of the current state of the region, claiming that about 80 percent of trees planted in the city die and that all of their underground wells have run dry due to nuclear activity.
"I heard from a relative in Kilju that deformed babies were born in hospitals there," one defector told the paper.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world...ine/ar-BBF4gnnQuote:
According to the website 38 North—a program from the U.S Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies—satellite imagery of the Sinpo South Shipyard on the country’s east coast, taken on November 5, shows the movement of parts and components, including sections of a submarine’s pressure hull in the yards adjacent to construction halls, which suggests that the SINPO-C ballistic missile submarine might be under construction.