If it can prevent this (Carnage in Mosul), I'm all for it.
Luckily for me, my chow hall was guarded by some fine soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division ("Balls of the Eagle," "No Slack;" see I speak Army :D).
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If it can prevent this (Carnage in Mosul), I'm all for it.
Luckily for me, my chow hall was guarded by some fine soldiers from the 101st Airborne Division ("Balls of the Eagle," "No Slack;" see I speak Army :D).
Did you mean what useful purpose did it serve or what useful purpose did I serve? I will assume you mean the former.
I will try to address your concerns the best I can. First, maybe childish and just for fun were bad choice phrases to use. There was necessity in doing this. First of all, we had a job to do and tasks to accomplish. Has one of my fellow Marines forgotten thier ID card and then when they returned to the FOB, only then did they realize that they did not have it. Sure...that thing could have possibly happened over the course of a deployment. So, now, we are posed with a delima. Do I try to explain for 15 minutes to a security guard that this Marine left his ID on the FOB, but verify to him...who has no authority over me or is not in my chain of command...that this is individual is in fact a United States Marine, even though this security guard can barely understand English. Or, do I make another choice. We're tired, hungry, and the sun is down. We may have returned to our FOB, but it will still be another serveral hours before we finally rack out. Do I really have time for this? By the mere fact that I could have pulled this off, shows the whole internal security situation to be a farce.
Second. There was no PMO. The first, MP unit to roll into our FOB arrived as we were preparing to leave. But, as you probably know, just being an MP unit doesn't make you PMO.
Third. I literally had about a hundred tasks to accomplish in a single day. What number do you think talking to the site manager was on my list?
After we were able to get through the first time this peaked my interest. So, we "tested" it a few more times. This was by no means a normal or everyday occurance. 99% of the time we went through the regular routine, all presenting our own valid cards, and proceeded about normally.
Maybe it would have been better to say it was an experiment born out of a situation that arose during a specific time period. I recall something similar to this happening in the news when agents smuggled bomb making materials through TSA checkpoints. Fortunately we had only ourselves and our equipment to bring through the gate.
Now that I'm back in the States I can address this issue. I assumed that taking it to a fourm for discussion would be a good starting point. Criticize the issue, but do not go into a personal attack.
What useful purpose did your little Red Team exercise serve? What deficiency did you identify to anyone who could correct the deficiency?
Ass U Me. Not out of me, Devil Dog.Quote:
I will assume you mean the former.
Particularly bad if you consider any agreement with your own characterization a personal attack.Quote:
First, maybe childish and just for fun were bad choice phrases to use.
Your fellow Marine was in the wrong.Quote:
There was necessity in doing this. First of all, we had a job to do and tasks to accomplish. Has one of my fellow Marines forgotten thier ID card and then when they returned to the FOB, only then did they realize that they did not have it.
Does a security contractor manning an entry control point not have the same authority to challenge you or your CAC cardless buddy when you try to get into his DFAC as you have over him when he tries to get into your ASP?Quote:
Sure...that thing could have possibly happened over the course of a deployment. So, now, we are posed with a delima. Do I try to explain for 15 minutes to a security guard that this Marine left his ID on the FOB, but verify to him...who has no authority over me
Is this another assumption on your part, or did you attempt to explain? Most of the Ugandans speak some English. He wasn't in radio contact with his Supervisor?Quote:
even though this security guard can barely understand English.
Your buddy is running around without his CAC card, you are aiding and abetting unauthorized entry into the facility, and the whole internal security situation is a farce because both of you aren't face down in the gravel?Quote:
Or, do I make another choice. We're tired, hungry, and the sun is down. We may have returned to our FOB, but it will still be another serveral hours before we finally rack out. Do I really have time for this? By the mere fact that I could have pulled this off, shows the whole internal security situation to be a farce.
[QUOTE] Second. There was no PMO. The first, MP unit to roll into our FOB arrived as we were preparing to leave. But, as you probably know, just being an MP unit doesn't make you PMO.[/UNQUOTE]
No Facility NCOIC? No Force Protection Officer? No Guard Force Supervisor?
Quite low, obviously. What has caused this incident to rise to the top of your priority list so many months later?Quote:
Third. I literally had about a hundred tasks to accomplish in a single day. What number do you think talking to the site manager was on my list?
Who did you report the results of your "test" to? What use was made of the information you obtained? What deficiencies were corrected through your diligence as a self-appointed Assistant Contracting Officer's Representative?Quote:
After we were able to get through the first time this peaked my interest. So, we "tested" it a few more times. This was by no means a normal or everyday occurance. 99% of the time we went through the regular routine, all presenting our own valid cards, and proceeded about normally.
What gate would this be?Quote:
Maybe it would have been better to say it was an experiment born out of a situation that arose during a specific time period. I recall something similar to this happening in the news when agents smuggled bomb making materials through TSA checkpoints. Fortunately we had only ourselves and our equipment to bring through the gate.
Negative. The time to address the issue in a positive manner was when you discovered the deficiency. The people who should have been made aware of it at the time have been deprived of your input from then until now. And many of those people may well be gone by now.Quote:
Now that I'm back in the States I can address this issue.
See paragraph 4 above.Quote:
I assumed that taking it to a fourm for discussion would be a good starting point.
If you consider criticism a personal attack, perhaps you can understand how people who work for SOC-SMG or who have worked with them could consider your statements slanderous.Quote:
Criticize the issue, but do not go into a personal attack.
1-866-369-9100 is the toll free number to SOC-SMG.
ce_pao_watch_officer@mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil <ce_pao_watch_officer@mnf-wiraq.usmc.mil> can probably hook you up with AT/FP at the FOB in question.
Well maybe they should. They do that at the residence hall dining facilities on my university. Any student who wants to eat has to have his or her ID with them and have it swiped before they can enter. No card, no food. And the gate folks are supposed to compare the picture with the bearer (and most do...not worth your job just to let some idiot eat on someone else's meal plan). They're even going over to a palmprint system within the next year or so. And that's just for dorm food.
And on a side note, I'd appreciate it if folks could keep this discussion civil. That includes basic things like refraining from posting responses in either ALL CAPS or all bold. Thanks.
All PMCs are not privately held. DynCorp, which is fighting a private war for the USG/State Dept in Colombia, is traded on the NYSE. Stock has done well, even with the current downturn.
http://www.dyn-intl.com/
The LA Times did an interesting story yesterday (28 Jan) on TCNs from Latin America who are making good money as security contractors in Iraq. http://http://ebird.afis.mil/ebfiles/e20080128576144.html[/URL]
--Bill Latham
DISCLAIMER - I AM NOT DEFENDING SOC NOR THE USE OF TCNS
I have been following this thread as I have first hand experience working with the TCNs in question as well as the PMC in question. I can say that they are doing what they can. Several years ago, money was of no real object to the government. Now however, there has been a dramatic decrease across the board in money that is available. Anyone that has been to Iraq can testify to this...wages for expats are significantly less than they were 3 years ago.
We can comment and critique on the TCNs ability to accomplish the mission, but at the end of the day I have to look at the USG for allowing it to happen...not the PMC. In the following example, please realize I m breaking it down into very simplistic terms for brevities sake. The USG looks at the proposals frm the various PMCs to provide internal security for say Camp Victory. PMC A bids 3million for a one year base period, PMC B 2.5 Million, and PMC 3 2 million. Who gets the contract...C. Why, because they bid the least...now C has to figure out how to man, equip and provide for that contract for less than 2million...the cheaper they do it, the greater the profit. We can say that profit should not be their concern, but at the end of the day, they are a company based on capitalism and need to make money to work. So where do they make money...well instead of hiring Westerner's at 500/day...let's hire TCNs at 800/month....instead of M4s lets use a cheap knockoff... you see the point...who is at fault? The PMC that is out to make money...or the Government to allow them get away with those standards.
My specialty is medicine...so let me give a real world example. Under the current TWISS contracts, the government is asking the PMCs to provide a medical officer to handle the primary healthcare needs for the guard force. The USG will only provide support in cases of life, limb or eyesight. The USG defined a medical officer as a PA, RN or an EMT with 2 years of experience, and that is THE ONLY MENTION OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE RFPs. I can say that on the vast majority of sites that SOC is manning there is a former Special Forces Medic or PA. They are trying to maintain the intent...PMC taking care of itself...however, their competition is bidding contracts using EMT-B's with 2 years of experience. There is a significant difference. An EMT-B is designed to provide a level of care above that of a first responder, but are very limited in their scope of practice. In addition, the USG makes no mention of Medical Oversight (everyone works for a medical director, unless you are a MD or DO) and no mention of medical supplies or medical liability insurance. So in the case of SOC, they attempt to do the right thing in this case, but are underbid by one of their competitors, say Sabre. Sabre, bids the contract based off of the minimums that are put out in RFP...SOC bids on a little more than minimum. Sabre wins...so what does SOC do next time....they bid the minimum, which in this case means a greater drain on the military healthcare system for having to treat patients for coughs and colds.. Again...who is at fault...the PMC or the USG? If the problem is to be resolved...the USG needs to clearly define what the standard is. Not in vague terms.
Just my opinion...now back to my hole.
Lessons Not Learned: Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising by Peter W. Singer at The Brookings Institution, 12 May 2008.
Singer is with Brooking's 21st Century Defense Initiative which is charterd to produce cutting-edge research, analysis, and outreach that address some of the most critical issues facing leaders shaping defense policy in the coming century. The initiative focuses on the following three core issues: The Future of War, The Future of U.S. Defense Needs and Priorities, and The Implications for the U.S. Defense System.
From Contracting Out Iraqi Army Advising:
Much more at Brookings. Hat tip to Phil Carter at Intel Dump for the e-mail pointer to this piece.Quote:
One of the key questions surrounding the government’s escalating uses of military contractors is actually not whether they save the government client money or not (this, however, is getting harder to argue with the more than $10 billion that the Defense Contract Audit Agency believes was either wasted or misspent on contracting in Iraq. Rather the crucial question that should asked at the onset of any potential outsourcing is simple: Should the task be done by a private company in the first place?
...the Pentagon is seeking to hire private contractors to help fill out the teams that will train and advise Iraq army units, including in their operations in the field. In more blunt terms, arguably the most important aspect of the operation in Iraq, the crux to defeating the insurgency/getting our troops out of there (whichever you care more about), is starting to be outsourced.
This one is a doozy of lessons not learned. First off, outsourcing training of the Iraqi military has been tried before and is actually one of the many, many factors into why we have had such a hard time...
Second, to turn over the task of advising the Iraqis now, at such a critical stage in the war effort as we try to translate the limited tactical success of the surge into something more permanent, is not just horrible timing. In the words of one U.S. Army officer, it is “definitely not a job that rational USG policy-makers should want in the hands of U.S./western contractors anytime soon.”...
Thirdly, the resultant messaging and long-term effects have to be a cause for concern. General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker testified a few weeks to Congress that building up Iraqi capabilities was the priority in the year ahead. Contrast this with the message that this contract sends to Congress, the American public, and most importantly, our Iraqi counterparts...
But, fourth, advising a partner military is not just about building up their military skillset. It is also about passing on values and building long-term relationships. When you contract out military advisors, the values of civil-military relations and professionalism are supplanted by the evident commoditization of military skills, not always the best message in a developing democracy. In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...
Plain and simple right there. It would be dumb. Might as well place a few phone calls to the Comoro Islands while theire at it, to see if they can dig up any consultants lingering around.Quote:
In turn, the relations are not built between officers advancing up the ranks between the two forces, but with a company and its ever-changing staff of employees...
1) Hard to blame CENTCOM/MNF-I for what is essentially their approach to filling a capacity gap. The number of units and individual augmentees going into theater to do advisory work has not fallen off; it is actually on the increase as more and more units going into theater are finding some aspect of SFA and advising in their mission set. We can continue along with lots of identified but unfilled holes, or we can do what I believe is trying to be done, contracting out those gaps. Its my understanding that these are primarily meant to be support teams, which will play a key role as LOG architecture in Iraq is modified over the coming years - this may prove to be the more sustainable option. It may also allow more uniform types to go where they are critically needed vs. in the supporting structure. I'd also mention that at least one segment - those of senior level/ministerial advisor teams may actually be better filled from the pool of retirees who have worked at those levels vs. plugging a NBQ O5 into that position who has not developed the specific skill sets required for that job - he might be a hell of an Infantryman, but might not know anything about FMS or developing bureaucracy.
2) Even if we said we were going to reorganize and create something new for Iraq, it would take some real time to get there. We can outline new stuff on paper, but until we actually recruit, train, equip and grow our own force structure - the holes would continue to go unfilled - a concern for MNF-I/CENTCOM who must contend with current and future conditions which not only reflect those in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also those here on the domestic political front. In my opinion, they are taking action as opposed to leaving it up to hope.
3) We have not determined if Iraq and Afghanistan are representative of the real demand signal for SFA in a given state. While we know the requirements in both of those places, and we know that we are not meeting them like we'd like to (e.g. development across their security services has been uneven not because we like it that way, but because we've had to make choices due to our own resource constraints). It may be that Iraq and Afghanistan are not representative of future SFA requirements with regard to any one state. Regime change, and the complete dismantlement or destruction of a security sector have created requirements that may not reflect the typical future requirement for SFA - its hard to say for sure, but I think unless we have a situation where regime change is a requirement and the complete destruction or dismantlement of that regime's security sector is a requirement, we'd be well advised to consider alternative ways of generating, organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding and advising FSFs - its just that big of an investment, and the political objective needs to be of commensurate importance - as I contend they are in Iraq. Future SFA may look different in its scope.
4) You could make the issue that all ground forces should be converted to TTs to meet the CENTCOM demand signal, however - as I mentioned in points one and two - most units going over now already are touching SFA in some way - and there is still some requirements there to do the things that BCTs do best as well. If you converted them all to work as advisors exclusively you'd create risk in other areas - some of it would be of the unacceptable type. There is also the issue of our global commitments - as important as Iraq and Afghanistan are - we still have other GCCs to support - the number of violent places seems to be on the uptick.
Singer had some decent points, and in a perfect world where we had the luxury to concentrate on 1 or even 2 things for awhile, where we had all the resources we could ask for, where we wrote something on paper and received authorization and funding for it, and it was filled the same day - we might come up with more palletable, please everyone solutions. These are not the times we live in. - the low hanging fruit disappeared from the tree some time ago. Can we do better - probably some - particularly in the individual leadership piece - but that is almost always the case. Hopefully they have done the legwork to determine what advisory efforts within the broader whole require a set of ACUs/Cammies over a pair of slacks and knit polo. It may be the best we can do based on the rules of supply and demand.
Anyway, just a few thoughts, things never seem to be quite as easy or straight forward as think tanks paint them.
Best, Rob
On the uniform side, is it possible we just aren't matching skill sets properly? My view on MITT assignments is that they're filled by the "shotgun blast" method of old-fashioned quotas per branch/OCF. Perhaps we (Army) might want to look at who is needed as opposed to the what (re: OH SH*T FILL THOSE SLOTS, ASSIGNMENTS GUY) as a method. The unit-driven MITT concept, while an improvement in C4I and internal log, is still flawed so long as we're driven to frothy-mouthed desperation in staffing those units.
to contracting for things that should be inherently governmental!:eek:
In general, contracting training of other people's militaries (and police) is something that should be done by the USG (and its allied governments). That said, if Rob is correct, then some of the current contracting is, indeed, legitimate. On one issue, however, I would argue that there is little reason to use contractors and that is in the Ministry Support Teams. Here, the expertise lies in the USAR Civil Affairs Commands and is an outgrowth of their function beginning in WWII. The MSTs were pioneered in Panama, Kuwait, and Haiti and draw on the functional teams inherent in a CA Command and the civilian expertise that members bring.
Is there a place for contractor's in the MSTs? Some of us older guys who have retired could be brought in under contract to fill holes in the MSTs but, I think it would be better, cheaper, and easier to simply recall some of us to active duty out of the retired reserve.
Cheers
JohnT
Edison once said that he never failed in his experiments, but in the process of developing something like the incandescent light bulb, he discovered 10,000 ways that didn't work.
Well, we have discovered a host of ways that don't work in the security force assistance business.
The is documented evidence from multiple previous advisory efforts demonstrates that advisors need certain psychological skills and that they need to be developed in order to be successful. Yet, as sandbag points out, HRC uses the shotgun method of assigning advisors. There are combat advisors in Iraq or on their way who have NO combat experience and stale tactical experience. Luckily, they had a wealth of "dwell time", so they would obviously make great advisors.
You can also look at the experience HRC (I love Sean Byrne like a brother) sent to John Nagl to train advisors out at Riley -- Very few former advisors. Even now that the assignment process has improved, the ratio of advisors to the rest of the faculty ain't great.
Ministry-level advisors. Gotta disagree w/John T. At the ministry level, contractors (the right ones, guys like John T. and others who have served on national-level staffs) make great advisors, as long as they have other skills. Or maybe the Service chiefs just need greater recall authority. MRD moves a lot of talent out of the Army (and other Services). Haul these guys back in and put them in uniform. I'd take the tax breaks, awards, financial accouterments and add'l 2-1/2 percent retirement increase any day of the week.
Essentially government services. Although this belongs on the contractor thread, let me just say that the definition of what government essential services subsume has been debated long and hard, and to date no one has come up with a meaningful solution. The sound bites offered by talking heads conveniently dodge major war-stopping issues, but sound good. I can tell you that the mindset of government employee good, contractor bad is not useful.
Have a great Memorial Day!
took me a while to figure out what we disagree about.;) I think I've got it though. I would not reject pulling in as contractors for MSTs old geezers like us although, as we both said, recall from the Retired Reserve would be a better option.
I do think that in the 350th, 351st, and 352nd CA Commands there are probably enough relatively senior folk - with the needed civilain skills (unless we've lost those guys in the last decade) - to man the required MSTs (perhaps with some augmentation by contractors or recalled retirees as above). Or, do we disagree on this? :D
Have a super Memorial Day, all.
Cheers
JohnT
Well, they certainly have a lot of sr folk. Don't think I've ever seen so many COLs in an MTOE.
I think that we actually agree that contractors can have a place in MSTs. They should not be the sole source of personnel, and arguably not even the major one.
I think that one of the challenges in the current contingencies is the fact that CA have been over-subscribed in the plans. It's not a question of capability, but rather one of capacity. Even when I was "over there" years ago, the CA guys we worked with had endured multiple deployments -- and that was in the early days of the wars. Can't imagine what it's like now. During the small wars of the 90s, many of the same folk were being sent off on all expense paid forays to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, then Afghanistan and Iraq.
In looking at the solution to overuse of contractors, whatever it is has to be very broad. Maybe now is time to fix the military force structure and the civilian one. Maybe every employment contract above GS-10 ought to have a deployment clause. There is also a need to grow overstructure in the O-3 to O-5 and E-6 and above paygrades. Maybe "dwell time" for non-TPU reservists needs to be cut, also. Or maybe we just need to continue to rely on exceptionally talented and good-looking contractors, but possibly with better management.
In short, before fixating on the bitch about contractors, let's examine some of the easy solutions to replace them. Not willing to do that? Then there's no bitch!
Agree!!!I submit we already have overstructure -- too many CPT to LTC folks are just not in the right places and in my observation most staffs are too large. I also suspect that in about four years we're gonna have a glut of Majors. Company Commanders, perhaps???Quote:
There is also a need to grow overstructure in the O-3 to O-5 and E-6 and above paygrades.
Also need to figure out what we're going to do with the overstrength in SSGs that's looming.
For Officer and enlisted ranks, is up or out really that good an idea...A lot of those folks used to get a lot of AD time built up working for the CA Brigades and Commands overseas back in the days of peace. While the war may make some less anxious for AD, I suspect there's still a pretty good flow. Might be worth looking at...Quote:
...Maybe "dwell time" for non-TPU reservists needs to be cut, also...
In any event, HRC needs to get rid of their 'fill the hole' mentality and the force structure guys need to undo some of the 'balance' they've applied to the force to facilitate said hole filling. Whatever is done, you're totally correct in saying that:Totally true and it seems to me the onus is on the pachyderms and HRC...Quote:
In short, before fixating on the bitch about contractors, let's examine some of the easy solutions to replace them. Not willing to do that? Then there's no bitch!
U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, Dec 08:
Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations
Quote:
In October 2007, the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq (The Panel), composed of outside experts, was assembled to review the Department’s security practices in Iraq following the Nisoor Square incident and to provide recommendations to strengthen the coordination, oversight, and accountability of Embassy Baghdad’s security practices. This report examines the status of The Panel’s recommendations and whether changes in operations enhanced the protection of U.S. mission personnel and furthered U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In making this assessment, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) visited Embassy Baghdad and sites throughout Iraq where private security contractors provide movement and personal protection for U.S. mission personnel, including Erbil, Kirkuk, Hillah, Tallil, and Basra. In addition, OIG examined Department reporting on the status of the recommendations and consulted with senior and operational-level officials in Management and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), Embassy Baghdad, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and the three security companies under contract with the Department to provide protective services in Iraq—Blackwater USA, DynCorp International, and Triple Canopy. The evaluation was conducted according to Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
I guess the one thing that I do not understand is how it is cheaper to contract to companies then to contract individuals.
Reed
individuals, you have to cover the Admin costs of payroll, insurance, etc. etc. -- plus, if equipment is involved, you have to provide it or specify with some precision what the individual is to provide. Cheaper to just get a Company to do all that minutia.
Plus, Congress like it that way because the contracting companies can contribute to Congressional campaigns whereas the Armed Forces or OGA cannot... :D
Your still paying for all that "minutia" with companies too. It's not like they don't add those charges , along with the need for hefty profit into the contract proposals. Besides support positions already exist w/i the DOS and trainers can be dual purpose (train FT and "Contract" agents along w/ other nation security teams if need arises). Sorry, but I have heard that line a lot, I have never seen it pan out in practice. What I have seen is the disparity in income increase as we pay the "doers" less and shift the money to some CEO type. I'm sure that's not 100% the case, but it is in my limited experiance (private corrections, and State level service contracting).
Reed
to do it so your number of spaces can be decreased even as your overall costs increase. That lets you do other things with people and still stay within your Congressionally imposed personnel ceiling.Why be sorry? Yeah, me too, you're right on that.Quote:
Sorry, but I have heard that line a lot, I have never seen it pan out in practice. What I have seen is the disparity in income increase as we pay the "doers" less and shift the money to some CEO type. I'm sure that's not 100% the case, but it is in my limited experiance (private corrections, and State level service contracting).
Did you know the Army and the USAF, USN, USMC, NG and Reserves used to provide free Helicopter Ambulance service nation wide? Did you know that USN and US Army Stevedore companies cannot unload ships in the US? Did you know that military postal units cannot peform most postal services (for training) in the US?
Know why?
Might I suggest you go back and read the second paragraph of my response above; that really is the answer to everyones complaints of all types about government's contracting out, mismanagement and such as well as all the dumb things I asked about above. Oh, and add the civilian operators of Air Ambulance Services and Unions to those who can contribute to Congressional campaigns...
Thanks. I guess I just get touchy on the topic becouse so many who should know better have swallowed the "privitization" kool aid. Now go a write a book.
Reed
There is also the issue of pure numbers. As of a couple of years ago the total number of contractors employed for PSD just in the Baghdad area was around 4,000. That's just Baghdad. Now, is it better to pay a few organizations to recruit, train and equip all of those contractors or is it better to have 4,000 individual contracts and then create or contract a whole other organization to do all of that? You are going to have to pay someone to do it. The existing systems would be overwhelmed with those types of numbers. Why not just pay one organization to take care of its own?
SFC W
The biggest issue, though, is the "government service as a great big welfare program" mentality that pervades full time gov't employees.
The Contractors, you can fire. Unfortunately the great majority of gov't employees are there because you are overpaid, underworked and cannot be fired for incompetence.
The real problem isn't contractors or contract companies, it is that the supervision of contracts is accomplished by the same lazy, incompetent gov't full-time employees you are trying to avoid in the first place.
Until gov't service becomes "at will" and performance based, you will see more of the same. Except you can fire a contractor.
well, a former, now retired one but I agree with you.
I would suggest one consider the WG employees of DoD working in Afghanistan and Iraq on tech support and equipment rebuild...
As for most other Government employees, I don't take umbrage at your remarks because because there's a lot of truth in them. After 18 years as a DAC, the first seven as a TRADOC School Instructional Branch Chief, the last 11 at increasingly senior levels, I agree that ""government service as a great big welfare program" mentality that pervades full time gov't employees."exists. In my observation, it affects about one third or slightly less of the employees nationwide with pools of large percentages here and smaller ones there. The cities generally have larger pools, the boonies have smaller ones. In any event, that 30% in my observation is, thanks to Congress, only slightly above the 20% or so level that I have noticed for incompetents and drones in every single category of human endeavor to which I've been exposed -- and that includes soldiers of all ranks, academic, doctors and hamburger flippers.
Another 50% of Guvmint employees are not really that way but can give that impression to the really unobservant because they are severely constrained by an overwhelming bureaucracy and an environment that literally punishes those who take ANY risks. That is more true in DoD than in most of government due to the DoD 'zero defects' and dress right and cover down mentality.
Most of those employees in all Federal agencies really want to do a good job but they are in a system that precludes them from doing so in far too many cases. Fortunately, most of them most of the time can do at least a fair and sometimes even a really good job. Incompetent Supervisors and over nervous, untrusting bosses, officers and commanders contribute to all that but thank your Congress for most of that problem.
The remaining 20% or so of government employees do most of the work that gets done, routinely circumvent their bosses (and Commanders...), make hard decisions, try to eliminate the unproductive and do things that are literally illegal to get things done. It's amazing the system works as well as it does. That 20% again tracks with my observation over many years of all fields of human effort; 80% of the work is done by 20% of the people regardless of rank, status and work type. I think that old Commie, Bertrand Russell also noted that... :wry:
Your comment about firing incompetents is correct. We had one employee that required over 18 months of effort and several hearings to fire after said employee had accrued a record of about 30% of work time as unexcused absences in the course of a year. There were others almost as bad, it generally takes three letters, at least one hearing and about a year to fire someone -- thus, the marginal employee gets to slide. If the employee is a female or a minority group member, that process is more difficult. Again, thank your Congress for, among other things, their respect for the AFGE and allied unions for that problem.
I will take issue with these two statements:Mixed bag -- there are some sorry companies out there and a fair number of the contract supervisors you disparage are Commissioned officers of the US armed services and their reserve components. The Companies are provided with possibly too many protective clause and safeguards...Quote:
"The real problem isn't contractors or contract companies, it is that the supervision of contracts is accomplished by the same lazy, incompetent gov't full-time employees you are trying to avoid in the first place."
The fact that sorry companies are allowed to bid and are not required to adequately police their employees is due to -- guess who -- your Congress who insists that anyone be allowed to bid, the lowest bid be taken and who also ties the hands of contract supervisors because those companies can --and DO -- contribute to Congressional campaigns.I agree on the government service being at will and performance based. Strongly. I will point out that the NSPS in 2005 was an attempt to get just that and it was gutted by Congress 'to protect the employees' (voters plus unions...).Quote:
Until gov't service becomes "at will" and performance based, you will see more of the same. Except you can fire a contractor.
I disagree on the firing of a contractor -- it is not at all easy to fire a contractor (the Contractor can fire his employees; some are better than others but most don't want the hassle and are reluctant to fire -- overseas employment is different), there are a lot of steps required to do that; all favor the contractor -- and all are at the behest of Congress.
Wouldn't it be great if the margins on both sides (contractor & govt) decided to work together for the win instead of just the majorities. :rolleyes:
From wikipedia Stuart Bowen
And from Merriam-Webster:Quote:
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., is an American lawyer who serves as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), a position he has held since October 2004. He previously served as the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG), a position to which he was appointed in January 2004. Bowen's mission includes ensuring effective oversight of the $50 billion appropriated for Iraq's relief and reconstruction.[1]
Diplomacy: 2 : skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility : tact
A useful skill for when one works with others on a team (such as a mixed govt'/contractor situation)...
Our Silent Partners: Private Security Contractors in Iraq
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Our Silent Partners: Private Security Contractors in Iraq
Entry Excerpt:
--------
Read the full post and make any comments at the SWJ Blog.
This forum is a feed only and is closed to user comments.