What happens when no one wants to volunteer for the all volunteer force
Hi all,
Good to be back. Trying to get my house in order, go on vacation and then start the PCS and enroute schools - sums up my last couple of three weeks.
I was thinking about this morning when I read it on the earlybird. Aside from possibly inserting a layer of command that would further delay needed decisions and possibly installing a personality whose situational perspective is far away from ground truth (time and space), yet whose inter-perspective is one of being validated by both his military experience and obligation to try and get it right; how about the idea of opening yourself (those asked to take the job) to becoming a magnet (or shield) for criticism from both sides- what was the term one perspective candidate used "ulcer?
I think this is important in the context of some of the other things coming to light. Anybody read what retired General Scales wrote recently about ground truth? One of the things he mentioned in addition to the status of equipment & time needed to refit and train was in ref. to the data quoted by DoD ref. retention of experienced, innovative, creative talent that the private sector is competing for. A buddy of mine just called to say he got word his TT tour was going to be 15 months. He is close to 20, I predict he will leave when he gets back. There seems to be a couple break points for most - those under the point with good opportunities are apt to leave prior to a delayed captain's course, those at 20 are not really considering 30 (although I know some 06s who are looking at high 3, etc.) These are good people. Those of us in the middle are playing the wait and see, but it doesn't look good - why, because we see the mill continuing to turn with less compensation ( ex. we lose money when we PCS because we try and make it easy on the family )while we try and balance obligations to family with obligations to our service and nation.
Here is the part that I think military service members are really starting to look hard at, and I think the response to the "War Czar" is indicative of.
1) Those who serve or served ( I think its reasonable to include LE and FDP types) understand that they are a minority, most American citizens don't understand the word sacrifice in the sense that we do.
2) They also don't understand what they inherit by virtue of birth, they have not really faced adversity, get their news in sound bytes, prescribe to the T.V and Internet for morals and values and in general don't understand us a minority - many I've run into are glad we do what we do, but many of those are only glad that someone else does a job that they would never want to.
3) So why should less then 1% take up the burden for so many for so little in return? Sure when there is no war, its a pretty good life, but most of are aware that the world is fundamentally changed, and war will be with us for a long time to come.
So why when Congress and the administration play politics with the money we need for training, equipping, etc; when although there are bonuses for retention of some and recruitment of others, but no real fundamental shift in investing in people (a significant raise that competes with Industry/Private Sector), performance bonuses, etc that place people above cash cows should that 1% obligate themselves to the point of exhaustion (anybody seen the new #s on how many 04s and 05s the Army is short - anybody want to guess how we'll fix that?) Retired General Scales is 100% correct on the value he places on people - good equipment is good and part of investing in people, but to do both we'll need a larger % of the GDP.
I think those who serve love serving, but you have to compensate them better if you are going to ask more of them. I'll bet the Czar candidates thought of Sherman's words when asked - can you blame them? I love the all volunteer military, but I think unless we start looking hard at compensation (not one shot bonuses, but the kind of compensation that people see they are in an organization that invests in them for the long term - yes people are expensive - good ones more so - but you have to have them), I think we'll be forced to consider selective obligatory service. This war is not over in 2008. I think we'll be at war in this populated and competing world and committed to fighting those who would come here and kill us for decades, if we are going to ask a small percentage to shoulder the burden, then we better ante up.
We have a long term strategic human resource problem that we are addressing with tactical foresight - its a cultural problem.
Be Careful What You Ask For . . .
Rather than just note the failure of inter-agency cooperation with regard to the efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq, perhaps we ought to try to understand why this failure has occurred. If one looks at the basic structure of American government, I believe that understanding should be fairly easy to attain.
(Sorry for the Pol. Sci. 101 rehash, but we often seem to forget the basics.) The fundamental principle that underlies our government is a separation of powers to provide a system of checks and balances for the whole structure. The separation is not just limited to the three main branches of government. It also exists within each branch. As an example, consider the Federal budget process. Three different Congressional groups are involved in deciding how to spend the taxpayers' dollars--the budget committees, the authorization committees, and the appropriations committees (and they need the approval of the two houses of Congress to boot). The history of the United States is a history of the struggle of the nation to work through these checks and balances to achieve results. The process is the reason that governmental reform efforts achieved results very slowly and in very small increments.
Before we look for a solution to the current lack of interagency cooperation, we might do well to ask what we would give up were we able to resolve the problem. In Democracy in America, De Tocqueville prognosticated that the United States would not survive for long because of the many small interests competing in the country. As it turns out, America has probably survived for as long as it has because of those many conflicting special interests. They have prevented the nation's being overwhelmed by a tyranny of the majority. Contrast our country’s relatively peaceful internal disagreements with the struggle in Iraq between Shia (empowered majority) and Sunni (largely disempowered minority). Attribution of the conflict to religious differences is, I believe, largely a misapprehension of the social dynamic--conflict is almost always about power.
When American special interest groups have disputes, talk show hosts are suspended. When Iraqi special interest groups have disputes, Parliament’s cafeteria is bombed.
Fixing the interagency process may well be possible. However, to do so may run contrary to the very spirit of the American political process as expressed in the Federalist papers and other places, like the Constitution.