Hi Tom,
Sorry, I was subconsciously thinking about Canada :wry:.
Marc
Historically, using warfare for economic gain was common practice, I agree. To clarify,for guys at my level, where the metal strikes the flesh, the idea of war as a business is repulsive because there are men and institutions that make money during conflicts, but the individual soldier pays the highest price.
From a grand strategy and strategic view, economics is most certainly a part of war. Business is part of economics the last time I looked.
Agree that Robb tends to look at things with USAF tinted glasses - his book, of which there are some excellent points, trends too heavily towards EBO and destroying critical nodes/targets at the tactical level.
He does bring up a very salient point - AQ and their ilk attack us at far less cost (monetarily) then we attack them. Can/will the nation spend $600-700B a year on the military? Probably not until the next attack, but the question still hasn't really been asked - are we really getting the military to defeat the islamic radicals for that $600-700B a year?
I understand why John Robb has irritated some ppl here, including our much admired SWJED, with one of his previous posts on Col. Kilcullen; they were correct to be upset; in my view his comments there were obnoxious.
In fairness, however, I'd like to make two brief points:
1) Mr. Robb's previous military career was in the special forces community, not dropping bombs from B-52s.
and, more significantly
2) Network Theory has too much scientific validity demonstrated by peer-reviewed research in too many domains to be lightly ignored by a community whose professional raison d'etre is suppressing very specific kinds of adaptive social networks. It's a subject worth looking at with an open mind - it ain't just electrical grids, bacterial colonies and internet hubs.
From what I've read, Robb is much bigger on pointing out problems than offering solutions, but I think this is the basic thrust of his thinking on solutions to terrorism and the decline of the state's ability to protect us:
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/...-security.html
I'm by no means convinced by Robb's theories, and he loses me with some of the programmer talk occasionally, but I think they're very interesting. It seems people here are quick to dismiss him because he's former Air Force, and because he believes small wars have fundamentally changed and the old solutions no longer apply.
He believes small group of terrorists, "global guerrillas," have the ability to cause state failure by attacking critical nodes in infrastructure (power, water, etc.) and denying the state the ability to provide for the basic needs of the populace. Reversion to primary loyalties (ethnicity, religion, tribe, etc.) will be the result in places where the state is already weak (much of the Middle East and Africa). Along the same lines, he emphasizes the power of black globalization, i.e. drug traffickers, oil smugglers, and the economic interests at play in state failure. Far from being an Air Force guy trying to put firepower on targets, he's arguing that open source insurgencies, where there is no central direction, just a unifying theme, are extremely tough to combat.
GS - yes, that's a good description of the book. I didn't want to seem overly anti-USAF...sometimes it's hard to overcome.
Using John Mackinlays model for insurgents:
In some places it has become war as an extension of economics, where lumpen insurgents just want to continue looting the remains of the state and flogging their goods on the black market, most notably in West Africa. For clan insurgents like in Somalia and Afghanistan, govt collapse is great because it lets the clans get along with making money on the blackmarket selling drugs or whatever because the return of the rule on law means they go out of business. Most of the above don't care about taking on the West and just want a continuation of the status quo.
While global insurgents could, (and have done with Al-Qaeda) jump from one collapsed state / warzone to another its very hard for anyone to unify such disparate types of insurgents, and the best you can hope for is mobilising individuals with a grand narrative through the internet and media.
In Afghanistan you've got people who don't want the government to succeed because that would mean no more poppy money, and they don't want the Taliban back - which is one reason why the Taliban have moved on into Pakistan tribal areas, and people have stayed under their warlords. One of the biggest mistakes was taking the War on Drugs to the middle of a counter insurgency war.
The one thing I did like was 'open source warfare' while it does point out the obvious 'whatever works will be copied' it is important to remember because it does come up and surprise you, now and then, such as when the Somalians copied the Sudanese tactics of using RPGs as anti aircraft (who copied it off the Afghans.)
History footnote here: RPGs were first used against helicopters in Vietnam. It's an old tactic...which makes me wonder why it surprised us so much in Somalia.
Let's be clear on Mr. Robb's previous military career. He was in an Air Force Special Operations outfit as a pilot, probably for an AC-130 or HC-130. This doesn't necessarily translate to good perspective in terms of boots on ground. His aviation missions supported the Special Operations community, which no one can take away from him. But it's a lot like saying that a fueler knows about reconnaissance operations because he puts gas in my tank.
Steve, we were 'surprised' by the RPG attacks against helos in Somalia the same way we were 'surprised' by RPG attacks against M1A1/2 tanks in Iraq. We had been told/taught/exposed to the perception that Vietnamese Regulars and VC troops were 'bad*sses' while African and Arab troops and insurgents were rabble, unprofessional, and down right silly. I believe we have learned much since then, respect your enemy.
On the question of evaluating capabilities and fighting methods of tribal societies, http://www.amazon.com/Insurgents-Ter...7780744&sr=8-1:
I hope Robb is wrong. His statement "Further, the relative modernity of Iraq features vectors of cross-connection that undermine any and all attempts at clearing/holding territory (the core of the Petraeus plan)." doesn't make a lot of sense to me. How does that physically prevent clearing territory? Perhaps someone else can translate what he is saying for me.
Things just look different a few hundred feet above the fray. :D
Always been fascinated by the techno approach to 'organizing' ground combat and have noted that the bulk of proponents of such have little or no experience (or,really, concept...) of actually getting from point X to point Y or clearing point Z when someone who hasn't read the right books doesn't want you to do those things on 'his' turf.
What makes the forum here unique is not that we often disagree, its how disagree. The best of what comes out of the SWC is the various perspectives so that we work through problem sets.
ZenPundit has a good point - don't discard the message jsut because the messenger sounds like he has a mouth full of marbles. Robb has made some good points, its his search for an application of them that often bothers me. He does often frame his questions in the context of the aviator (and its often worth hearing from our purple - winged brethen :) ), but that does not mean we can't evaluate some of the stuff he says and place in better context from our perspective.
I have my share of problems with both EBO and Net Centric Warfare - but I also have my own bias:eek: Sometimes you need a guy like Robb to force you to question your assumptions.
Now, I have to disagree with the over-arching statement. I think the approach that is ongoing in theater (the Petreaus/Kilcullen one in question) is evolving to meet the needs of the environment. I'll write more as to why I think it is later, but it has to to with the tactical price of operational success and translating that to meet strategic objectives that fulfill policy - (or in this case establishing the conditions where those political solutions can grow).
Good to be back - spent the last 3 days on a great staff ride considering Grant's Overland (AKA Wilderness) Campaign
Best regards, Rob
I'm not much swayed, but I think this does offer a good question. Much of the COIN theory we're taking as practice these days is intensely rooted in historical experiences. Which is all well and good - NOT using historical experience has gotten us fouled up in the first place - but one of Hammes' biggest points in "The Sling and the Stone" is that war, and insurgencies in particular, are constantly evolving. While I'm not gonna say Petraeus and Kilcullen are wrong, it is important to keep in mind that Iraq presents a wholly different COIN challenge than Algeria, Vietnam, or any of the other historical cases that seem to guide our thinking and practice. It is fair to ask whether the current strategy is too rooted in historical COIN examples rather than completely and effectively adapted to the unique Iraq situation.
Not that I'm the one to answer that, of course.
Robb's critique seems off-base to me, but continually questioning everything about COIN, even the dearly held principles we appear to take as gospel truth, is the only way to continue to evolve. And as many have said, adapt or die.
Ever find that open flank on Lee's line? I think they've been looking for 143 years now. . .
Matt
Few can expect a more thorough critic then Ralph Peter's - here is what he has to say about Gen Petreaus's "generalship"
From "Killing For Congress" in today's NY post
I've been thinking about that first statement - especially in light of the staff ride & reading Grant's memoirs.Quote:
He's that rarer-than-a-unicorn beast, a full general capable of learning. Petraeus hasn't "defended his dissertation" in the face of contrary facts. The politically correct counterinsurgency manual he produced before taking up this assignment delighted the left-of-center think-tank crowd - but they must be very disappointed today. Once in command in Iraq, Petraeus kept the doctrinal bits that worked, but dumped the baloney.
Nope - didn't find that flank, but ultimately it did not matter - While Lee arguably won some significant tactical engagements, he lost the operational initiative to Grant. While winning tactically is good, it does not guarantee operational or strategic success.
I'll probably get to it (writting more) this weekend, but I think the same lessons can be applied today. We often get caught up in tactical outcomes, without considering how tactical outcomes contribute/detract from operational and strategic success. LTC kilcullen wrote in one of his blogs about "securing the people". I think you can look at this as the "ways" portion of the "ends/ways/means" three legged stool - with means being the "surge" and the "ends" being a stable and politically/economically viable Iraq.
Securing the populace I think is an "operational" endevour. Much like Grant turning Lee out of his breast works as they proceeded South toward Richmond and denying Lee the initiative, we are also denying the AIF freedom of maneuver and influence by seperating them from the populace. We have taken the operational initiative.
There is a tactical cost though (though not the one that Grant and the Army of the Potomac paid). The AIF has decided to go after targets like the Yizidi, and what ever it can find to grab a headline and influence our public and political will. I believe though the operational momentum has turned and is on our side.
The next question I think is what it will take to translate operational success into the strategic kind - that stable, political and economically viable Iraq we want. Here too I think there is something to be learned from our own Civil War. What was required to politically and economically re-integrate the country? What was sacrificed to do so? How long did it take? What should be the public (both ours and the Iraqi's) expectations? I think we will require some additional means to do so, but I don't think it is beyond our physical capability. I also believe MNFI has recognized this and has a plan - but will require political leadership to allocate the means.