Farewell to our warrior nation
A scathing article by Max Hastings on the UK's defence policy; a taster:
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David Cameron’s Government is cutting the regular Army to its lowest manpower strength for centuries: 82,000. When the downsizing is complete, more than 20 per cent of our soldiers will have gone. I must confess that I am profoundly sceptical whether it will prove possible to recruit the 30,000 reservists the Defence Secretary promised this week.
Soon, we shall be capable of deploying only a single battlegroup of 7,000–8,000 men for sustained operations overseas. Compare this tiny force to the 35,000 troops deployed in Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles in the 1970s, or the 30,000 military personnel sent to the First Gulf War in 1991.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...or-nation.html
Significant implications for US strategy?
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Originally Posted by
Bill Moore
Thanks for sharing David, and while I can emphasize with UK's concerns about whether this is enough capacity based on the current and projected security environment, in my opinion this has significant implications on US strategy also. We have been endeavoring more to pursue "shared" security responsibility with our allies and partners, but the reality is most of our allies and partners have very little capacity to share, and the trend in most cases is downsizing, while potential adversaries such as China and Russia are significantly increasing the size of their militaries, not to mention the continued instability throughout much of the world that we will feel compelled to stick our noses into.
For too long both the UK & USA have leaned on each other; with one major exception when each has used large-scale military force, respectively Suez and Vietnam. Often the UK has made strategic choices to act and since the end of 'The Cold War' intervene simply as the 'Special Relationship' was seen to be at risk if we didn't.
The USA, especially with the historically close military to military relationship, has looked for support from the UK - from the low profile to the high profile, mass support seen in Afghanistan and Iraq. In Westminster-Whitehall-Cheltenham circles the 'special relationship' is seen as (pause) embedded for ever.
As an aside the differences between the DoD and State Dept in the Falklands War are a good illustration of how this can alter the situation.
In a curious way the UK's downsizing of military capability could enhance 'smart power' and doing more with less for the USA. This I suspect explains why UK SOF and intelligence escaping downsizing (and a few other capabilities).
Politics though come first.
It is easy to see US officials and politicians asking if the UK and others will not share the burden, do we need to engage with them? Engagement of course takes many forms, two examples: intelligence sharing and sales of equipment.
This has happened before: with New Zealand after its stance on nuclear weapons (which has just ended), Canada when its military capability and will evaporated in the 1970's and there's France - with whom the USA has well, a different relationship.
The significant implication for US strategy? Shared and shallow relationships with new partners for the USA, rather than the in-depth embedded 'special relationship' with the UK.
In the interests of contrary views try this:http://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.c...l-warrior.html
How the British Army will Fight
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kedBlURaRaE
These interviews impressed me as being balanced. Those interviewed realize that Afghanistan isn't a template for future conflict, and logically state the requirement for having a full range of military capabilities.
Comments from an armchair
Bill,
I have now watched and listened to the film clip twice. It raises a number of issues succinctly, although some of the footage was odd - the Russians in Kosovo and the IDF. Being an official product, when the MoD prefers to be in hibernation from public comment, it is a shame alternative voices do not feature. The speakers, with one exception, being MoD employees or contractors.
After a recent, speculative press report 'British Army's fleet of Apache helicopters 'could be scrapped' it was almost amusing to hear the remarks on "heavy" assets versus Apaches:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...-scrapped.html
What was more valuable was the very careful skirting round the issue of, from various voices:
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an ability to go with them (USA)...making a strategic difference to the USA....an ability to do a task alone..
There are dissenting voices that think the shrunken UK military have - now and will clearly do so soon - fallen below the US minimum level for a contribution.
Reductions in public spending are driving this process, not a change in strategic direction nor a change in public opinion - which gives defence a low priority. I suspect that politically no-one wants to ask, let alone hear either the British professionals or US politicians answer the question is the UK a meaningful ally when it comes to a fight? A fight not for national survival, hard to conceive of today, more likely an intervention with the USA somewhere.
Hypothetically had the UK not pushed others in NATO in 2005 over "making a difference" in Afghanistan; the decision for ISAF to go south, would the USA have done so alone? You can argue that the minimal campaigning by the USA in Afghanistan better suited your national purpose.
East of Suez: did we leave, now we're smarter?
I can recall the British decision to end its defence role 'East of Suez' in 1968, mainly due to economic factors and to cut defence spending - much to the dismay of a few partners and before Gulf War One only a smaller presence was left in Oman, the Gulf and (with the USA) on Diego Garcia.
Two Gulf Wars later, the interventions in Iraq and - still - Afghanistan the UK is there in force in the midst of an economic recession, with substantial cuts in defence spending. You might think now was not the time to expand the British role in the Persian Gulf, wrong!
RUSI, a Whitehall "think tank", has published a paper; in summary:
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The UK is approaching a decision point where a significant strategic reorientation of its defence and security towards the Gulf is both plausible and logical; and, for the first time since the UK unceremoniously left the Gulf in 1971, a coherent strategy for a ‘return to east of Suez’ is emerging.
There is a useful short podcast and a paper on:http://www.rusi.org/publications/oth...517AA8D59D1B3/
A BBC report notes:
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We are already committed to the Gulf. But we are just not doing it very well. There are 160,000 British citizens living there so if there is a crisis we will be involved, so we need to be better positioned to mitigate the threat.
Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-22333555
Responsibility in the Med?
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Originally Posted by
jmm99
... and the UK-EU would assume responsibility in the Med as well - a return to origins so to speak (in Corbettese).
JMM,
I see little reason why the UK should return to a military role in the Mediterranean, let alone try to assume some responsibility in other spheres. After all there are three albeit rather lame - in economic conditions - nations, France, Italy and Spain.
After the lessons seen over the Libyan intervention, the EU has yet to emerge as a truly capable, independent military partner.
The UK: now we're smarter?
Yes the UK has a number of strategic, national interests across the world, but IMHO a return to the Gulf, Med, Africa and other places ignores our much reduced military capabilities - not exclusively due to economics - and far more significant issues at home.
What is proposed is not smarter.
This one's for you, Bill Moore
Female Special Forces; and at 2:21:
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Soldiers from 1st SF call them "Killer Barbie Dolls".
:)
Regards
Mike
The first-order duty of people to speak truth unto power.
The title is taken from testimony by Lord Hennessey, a journalist-cum-historian, who with two others gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence on:
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a strategic inquiry, Towards the Next Defence and Security Review.
Not an exciting matter for the great British public and I expect many others. Within the testimony are many gems on how the UK does and doesn't do defence policy:http://www.publications.parliament.u...i/uc109001.htm
Here is one passage, Quinlan's law (named after a MoD civil servant of note):
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A theorem: In matters of military contingency, the expected, precisely because it is expected, is not to be expected. Rationale: What we expect, we plan and provide for; what we plan and provide for, we thereby deter; what we deter does not happen. What does happen is what we did not deter, because we did not plan and provide for it, because we did not expect it.
Another witness, an academic strategist, Professor Julian Lindley-French, who is British and currently based in The Netherlands, has some enlightening remarks, especially on alliance matters. His blog is:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/
In one post the Professor is straight-talking:
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The Royal Navy’s motto is; if you want peace, prepare for war. Thankfully, Britain today does not have to prepare for war. However, in a world full of friction if Britain is to help prevent conflict injurious to its national interests it must think and act strategically. Therefore, SDSR 2015 must finally look beyond Afghanistan and not simply re-fight it better. Indeed, the switch from so-called campaigning to contingency operations will make the 2015 review as close to a grand strategic year zero as Britain has known for a century. It is an opportunity to be seized not squandered.
Link:http://lindleyfrench.blogspot.co.uk/...-of-spear.html
No wonder Whitehall-Westminster prefer to make grand statements, but as our American allies know capability is needed with will. Just whether the UK has a strategy today is a moot point, plenty of policy or is it called retrenchment?
Hat tip to 'Red Rat' for the pointer to the testimony.
Wars of the future will be short, sharp and bloody
The UK's top soldier, General Peter Wall, has been interviewed:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...rmy-chief.html
Of note are his remarks on recruiting for military cyber warriors:
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The education and personal qualities of our cyber warriors are likely to be a challenge to more linear military behaviour and we therefore need to consider how we recruit.
British Generals in Blair's Wars
The highly respected British military historian, Hew Strachan, has edited this small volume, thinner as officialdom prevented six serving officers contributions appearing and makes some pithy comments:
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Like many armies in the past, the British army struggles to foster effective debate within a hierarchical command chain.....for fear of reputational damage and political controversy....The MoD has got to get real … Differences and debates need to be properly gone over. Otherwise we are none the wiser
If this is what retired officers are writing, as this review puts it I am not surprised controversy results:
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An underlying theme in the essays by former generals and senior British staff officers is the almost complete lack of preparedness and failure to provide enough resources, in terms of both money and men, in Iraq. The failures, the authors write, were not learned and were repeated in Afghanistan.
Link to review:http://m.guardian.co.uk/uk-news/2013...als?CMP=twt_gu
Link to publisher's website, where John Nagl comments:http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9781409437369
Found elsewhere a review by Sir Michael Howard, a historian who in his senior years remains sensible:
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This collection must be almost unique in military history. Seldom if ever have senior military commanders discussed so frankly the difficulties they have faced in translating the strategic demands made by their political masters into operational realities. The problems posed by their enemies were minor compared with those presented by corrupt local auxiliaries, remote bureaucratic masters, and civilian colleagues pursuing their own agendas. Our political leaders should study it very carefully before they ever make such demands on our armed forces again.
From:http://ccw.history.ox.ac.uk/2013/05/...n-blairs-wars/
Amazon.com, with no reviews:http://www.amazon.com/British-Genera...Blair%27s+Wars
Amazon.co.uk: not available yet (ho-hum).
British Political-Military Relations, 2001–10
A very short Chatham House briefing paper (less than 30 pgs) and IMHO sits here: Depending on the Right People: British Political-Military Relations, 2001–10. The summary starts with:
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There is a widespread view that Britain’s politicians should bear the main blame for the country’s military difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. In particular, they are accused of failing to heed professional military advice and of launching over-ambitious missions with insufficient resources. Recent evidence, including from the Iraq Inquiry, shows that this view is too simplistic.
Instead, Britain seems to have suffered a wider failure of the government system, with politicians, senior military officers and civil servants all playing their part.
Link:http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/de...deWaal1113.pdf
For reasons lost on me the author, a UK diplomat on study leave, remarks:
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Britain must learn from US experience and from its own mistakes.
Another article to read one day.
Gates: British Military Cuts Limit Scope for US Partnership
Gates: British Military Cuts Limit Scope for US Partnership
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British National Strategy: Who Does It?
Catching up with my reading backlog I have finally read Hew Strachan's Parameters article. It is an easy read, ten pages long:http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute...an_Article.pdf
Apologies if posted before, not sure where and when I found it!:wry:
A 'war weary' public needs short conflicts
Philip Hammond, the UK Defence Secretary, has warned short conflicts are the only way to win over 'war weary' public, at the Munich Security Conference.
Within his reported speech are some very odd phrases and words which hardly endear him to the listening public, probably some fellow MPs too. In particular that:
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..in Syria that we are creating a new hotbed of international terrorism....public opinion in Western countries is not yet persuaded that military intervention will be justified or in their own self interest.
No, Mr Hammond, 'we' are not creating this hotbed, nor have you persuaded me that military intervention - which was over CW use by the regime - not international terrorism was justified and practical.
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There is a climate of skepticism about engagement in failed or failing countries, a fear of getting entrapped in longer term, deeper forms of engagement....Increasingly we need to present intervention as time limited and with strictly defined ambitions. We are at a point in the public opinion cycle in the UK where there is a war weariness after ten years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is definitely a fear, quite irrational in some cases, that any engagement anywhere will somehow lead to an uncontrollable commitment to large numbers of troops, a large amount of resources and a long term intervention.
We are finding not always as persuasive as we would like it to be...It is very clear to those of us looking in horror at this emerging situation in Syria that we are creating a new hotbed of international terrorism, a new base from which international terrorism will operate that will probably rival any of those we have seen in the last decade or so.
We are allowing this to happen and yet public opinion in Western countries is not yet persuaded that military intervention will be justified or in their own self interest.
It will be a long time before anyone forgets the mistakes of Iraq. Dismantling a security infrastructure when there is nothing to put in its place is clearly a mistake and short term compromises are inevitable if we are going to maintain something of a secure environment.
Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ukne...Secretary.html
The strategy of external Western intervention appears alive and well in the UK Ministry of Defence.