disagree, Gray still argues for a holistic strategy.
Slap,
I disagree with your interpretation of Gray's paper, which by the way is focused on air power (which he mentioned as a caveat to the readers). He repeatedly states that he doesn't understand the continued debate within the U.S. military over land and air power, since both are essential. His central argument in this paper and others is that the U.S. lacks a strategy to unify all its warfighting tools.
I will argue the debate almost solely arises from a few narrow minded officers in the Air Force like COL (R) Warden, who speak more as a company man, than as a warrior who understands warfighting. Senior U.S. officers in theory are supposed to be joint, not parachocial. They are supposed to demonstrate professional maturity and have the higher interest of their country in mind versus the interests of their service. There may be examples, but I'm aware of any senior Army Officer making arguments against air power? We love fighting under the protection of world's finest air force, but we also realize (as do most Air Force officers) that air power isn't always decisive. Once we commit to go to war it generally requires a full effort of sea, land and air power (plus political, economic, information, etc.). In situations short of war air power has proven very successful, such as
Israel's interdiction of Saddam's nuclear production capability.
U.S. air power strike on Libya in response to their state sponsored terrorism.
Putting pressure on Serbia in regards to withdrawing their forces from Kosovo.
However, I see a parallel with air power and nuclear weapons. We had nuclear weapons primarily for strategic deterrence, but over time our foes learn how to tie our hands and make the nukes politically infeasible (asymmetrical threats). A perfect example was Al Qaeda's attack on 9/11, what could we have nuked to any effect? The same is true with kinetic air power, what could we have bombed that would have any lasting deterrence effect? Air power enabled us to be successful in the first phase of the Afghan war, but without land power (U.S. and Northern Alliance) it wouldn't have achieved much.
I included several excerpts from Gray's paper that gives Air Power its due, but also puts it in context.
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Near exclusive focus upon the contributions airpower can make to warfare is a mistake.
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The study advises frank recognition of airpower’s situational limitations. Those limitations are less than they used to be, but some remain simply as a consequence of the physical realities of flight with reference to a conflict that must relate, ultimately, to decisions and behavior on land.
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technological innovation lies at the heart of the argument for the privileging of airpower in a new American way in warfare. There is nothing wrong with that, as far as it goes. Unfortunately for the integrity of the argument, technology is only one of warfare’s seven contexts.
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Plainly, a holistic theory of warfare is lacking today. As a direct consequence, argument about the strategic implications of airpower’s recent transformation or the allegedly enduring necessity for the presence of “the man [our man, naturally; CSG] on the scene with the gun” is conducted
out of context and even, one can assert, out of paradigm
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Future warfare must, and will, be joint and perhaps even integrated in well “internetted” character.
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The potential value of airpower in future warfare is a spectrum of possibilities, depending upon the contexts or situation.
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American airpower is a very great asymmetrical advantage. At least, it is very great if it is properly equipped, trained, provided with suitable concepts of operation—doctrine—and properly employed within a coherent strategy in the service of a prudent overall strategy and national policy.
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For reasons that are both pragmatically sensible as well as deeply cultural, one can expect airpower to remain the most favored military agency in the American way of warfare.
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It is important for those sincerely convinced of the great advantages conferred by superior airpower not to understate its systemic and situational limitations.
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First, because airpower, broadly defined, is and will long remain a prime source of US asymmetrical advantage, it should be exploited to the fullest for all the leverage it can deliver.
I don't understand the airpower versus
9/11 point. What does one have to do with the other?
Also, I see you posted his 3d conclusion -- what is wrong with it?
what side of the argument are you on?
What was he wrong about? I'm not sure what your argument is here, but I'll take a swag at it.
9/11 was the culmination of a lot of factors, but in the end it was a successful attack due to the failure of airport security at Logan Airport. In this situation security forces were asleep at the wheel, and this weakness was exploited.
I wonder if we would have launched a war against "terrorism" if 9/11 didn't happen, but we still continued to suffer a major terrorist attack against one of our embassies or military compounds every 3-5 years? This is the political context that Gray makes reference to.
This goes back to one of our previous debates, are we really at war with terrorism, drugs, and poverty? Can we achieve victory against any of these by waging war? If not, then what are we doing? We were forced (we opted, but we didn't have many options) to fight, but I'm not so sure (in hindsight) that declaring war was the right answer. Since terrorism will "always" be with us, just like illegal drugs, have we entered another war with no end and really no meaning? What is the strategic context of the war against terror?
Generally, terrorism is best dealt with via good security measures, law enforcement in depth (city, county, state, federal, and international) and by the intelligence services (the critical war in the shadows that some in our Congress continue to undermine). In this context air power is a small player, but so is war making land power.
What changed? Obviously the American people demanded a visible answer (a reaction) to 9/11, so we invaded Afghanistan after the Taliban refused to turn over Al Qaeda. That changed the character of the fight from law enforcement and intelligence work to a conventional military operation. That in itself, IMO, was prudent, but instead of just launching a major punitive raid, which was quickly realized wouldn't defeat terrorism, we once again changed the mission, this time to nation building in hopes of pacifying entire populations with democracy and free markets, thus denying that area a future safe haven to terrorism.
Air power was essential for the first part, and as Gray stated Air Power is not restricted to kinetic power. Only our Air Force could have moved our Army to and sustained our Army in a remote land locked country. Only the Air Force had the reach to hammer Taliban and Al Qaeda positions with kinetic power. Air also provided critical intelligence support. So based on our conventional strategy for the first phase of the "war", air power was an essential part of the equation. Special Forces and the Northern Alliance we're not going to defeat the Taliban without air power in a few short weeks. The bombing not only broke the Taliban's and AQ's will, but it stiffened the will of the Northern Alliance which empowered them physically and psychologically to take and hold the ground surrendered by the Taliban.
After the Taliban and AQ broke ranks and ran into Pakistan for safehaven, the character of the war changed into a more unconventional fight, where air power is much less influencial (still critical based on the way we decided to fight the war). Now air power, at least the kinetic application of it may be doing more harm than good, but the intelligence and sustainment aspects of air power are still critical.
Air power will probably never prevent a future terrorist attack, but it may provide a deterrence (especially if it is a state sponsored attack) and a viable counterattack mechanism in some situations. My underlying argument is we can't effectively wage war against terrorism. A lot of folks laughed when the President said we're going to change GWOT to overseas contingency operations, but IMO that makes more sense. Furthermore, we can't define every future threat based on Al Qaeda. If we go to war with North Korea in the future, Al Qaeda will become back page news, and the same is true if Russia attempts to forceably reintegrate certain countries back into its imaginary empire.